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Hicks,  Lewis  Ezra,  1839 

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A  critique  of  design- 

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A   CRITIQUE 


DESIGN-AKGUMENTS 


HISTORICAL    REVIEW  AND   FREE    EXAMINATION 

OF   THE   METHODS   OF  REASONING  IN 

NATURAL   THEOLOGY 


BY 


L.  E.  HICKS 

PROFESSOR  OF  GEOLOGY  IN  DENISON  UNIVERSITY, 
GRANVILLE,   OHIO 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1883 


Copyright,  1883,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS. 


jFranftltn  ^resss: 

BAND,  AVERY,  AND   COMPANY, 
BOSTON. 


PKEFACE. 


Notwithstanding  the  great  bulk  of  the  literature  already 
produced  upon  the  subject  of  Natural  Theology,  I  have  no 
apology  to  offer  for  this  addition  to  it.  This  is  not  simply 
another  book  on  a  hackneyed  theme  in  the  same  line  with 
its  predecessors.  Instead  of  constructing  a  new  design- 
argument,  or  revamping  an  old  one,  I  have  assumed  the  task 
of  the  reviewer  and  critic.  Instead  of  heaping  new  mate- 
rial upon  the  mass,  I  have  undertaken  to  sort  out  and  label 
the  elements  of  the  heap  which  has  already  accumulated. 

History  and  criticism  are,  therefore,  the  two  dominant 
characteristics  of  this  work.  I  take  the  liberty  to  offer  a 
few  words  upon  each  of  these  points. 

In  the  first  place,  respecting  my  historical  sketch  of  Natu- 
ral Theology,  I  do  not  wish  it  to  be  supposed  that  I  regard 
it  as  a  complete  history,  but  only  as  a  sketch,  outline,  or 
summary  view  of  the  work  done  and  the  progress  made  in 
this  line  of  thought.  It  is  not  exhaustive,  even  as  regards 
English  writers,  and  is  far  from  being  so  as  regards  Conti- 
nental writers.  The  attempt  to  follow  minutely  the  later 
developments  of  European  thought  upon  this  topic,  would 
have  been  so  large  an  undertaking  that  the  publication  must 
have  been  delayed  for  years.  Besides,  the  task  seemed  to 
me  not  only  formidable,  but  rather  the  reverse  of  inviting. 

iii 


IV  PREFACE. 

That  part  of  it,  especially,  which  relates  to  German  meta- 
physics looked  like  a  fathomless  and  misty  sea.  German 
natural  theology  is  inextricably  mingled  and  blended  with 
German  philosophy.  He  who  would  master  either  must 
patiently  untangle  both.  If  my  present  venture  should 
prove  fortunate,  it  is  possible  that  I  may  trim  my  sails  for  a 
voyage  upon  that  misty  sea  of  German  speculation. 

But  such  as  it  is,  —  a  mere  sketch, — I  conceive  that  the 
historical  part  of  my  work  may  be  useful.  It  presents  the 
salient  points  in  the  development  of  a  certain  phase  of  intel- 
lectual effort.  By  reason  of  this  it  may  possess  a  degree  of 
interest  and  profit  for  general  readers,  —  all  the  more,  per- 
haps, because  it  is  a  sketch,  rather  than  a  formal  and  elabo- 
rate history.  Aside  from  this  general  utility,  it  may  be  of 
some  special  value  to  theologians.  I  cannot  flatter  myself 
that  they  will  unanimously,  or  even  generally,  accept  my  con- 
clusions ;  still,  they  may  be  thankful  for  my  facts.  My  work 
does  not  constitute  an  exhaustive  bibliography  of  Natural 
Theology,  but  it  supplies  considerable  material  for  one.  If 
any  of  my  readers  contemplate  writing  a  ' '  Natural  TJieol- 
ogy,"  I  may  be  of  service  to  them.  This  history  reveals 
the  fact,  that  a  great  many  who  formerly  cherished  such  an 
ambition  knew  almost  nothing  of  the  work  of  their  prede- 
cessors. If  my  book  does  not  give  information  complete 
enough  to  guide  future  writers,  and  to  preserve  them  from 
the  reproach  and  wasted  energy  of  doing  over  again  what 
has  been  already  done,  I  hope,  at  least,  that  it  will  provoke 
them  to  seek  that  complete  information  from  other  sources. 

In  the  second  place,  as  regards  the  critical  portion  of  my 
work,  my  claim  to  originality  will  rest  chiefly  upon  these 
four  points :  — 


PREFACE.  V 

1.  The  fuller  appreciation  of  the  distinctness  of  the  two 
sorts  of  reasoning  in  physico-theology.  I  have  not  only 
recognized  the  existence  of  two  separate  arguments,  but  I 
have  endeavored  to  mark  out  their  precise  boundaries,  and 
to  fix  and  perpetuate  the  distinctions  and  differences  which 
separate  them,  by  giving  to  the  argument  from  order  a  dis- 
tinct name.  It  was  necessary  to  coin  a  word  for  this  pur- 
pose. My  choice  among  the  several  Greek  compounds 
which  might  have  been  considered  as  possible  candidates  for 
the  honor,  may  not  have  been  the  happiest  one  ;  but  I  am 
sure  it  is  not  the  worst.  At  all  events,  I  present  eutaxiology 
as  a  companion-word  to  teleology.  The  former  designates 
the  argument  from  order ;  the  latter  designates  the  argument 
from  ends. 

2.  My  criticism  of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  and  of  the 
scholastic  phrase  upon  which  it  is  based.  I  am  not  the  first 
to  express  dislike  for  the  term  "final  cause,"  just  as  I  am 
not  the  first  to  recognize  an  argument  from  order ;  but  I 
have  given  careful  and  detailed  reasons  for  my  repugnance 
to  this  phrase,  and  shown  the  possibility  of  dispensing  with 
it  entirely. 

3.  My  reasons  for  denying  that  the  arguments  of  physico- 
theology  are  mere  corollaries  of  the  causal  argument.  The 
law  of  causation  —  every  event  must  have  a  cause  —  can  only 
conduct  us  to  some  cause.  When  we  wish  to  reach  a  specific 
agent,  such  as  intelligence  or  volition,  we  are  obliged  to 
leave  the  causal  argument  far  behind  us,  instead  of  leaning; 
upon  it  throughout.  Thus,  reasoning  in  eutaxiology,  we 
may  infer  from  the  law  of  causality  that  order  has  some 
cause ;  but,  in  order  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  this  cause 
is  intelligence,  we  must  rely  upon  the  invariable  conjunction 


VI  PREFACE. 

of  order  and  intelligence  as  ascertained  by  induction,  with- 
out any  regard  to  causality.  Reasoning  in  teleology,  we 
may  infer  upon  the  basis  of  causation  that  there  is  some 
reason  for  the  precise  arrangement  of  causes  in  converging 
lines  to  produce  a  rational  result ;  but,  in  order  to  reach  the 
specific  conclusion  that  this  result  is  an  end  foreseen  and 
chosen  by  an  intelligent  being,  we  must  invoke  some  other 
law  than  that  of  cause  and  effect.  Eutaxiology  and  tele- 
ology are,  therefore,  not  only  independent  of  the  causal 
argument,  but  they  are  in  advance  of  it  and  superior  to  it, 
in  that  they  conduct  us  to  higher  and  more  specific  conclu- 
sions. 

4.  My  criticism  of  teleology.  If  my  views  are  sustained, 
they  will  cause  a  radical  change  in  the  handling  of  this  argu- 
ment. I  maintain  that  it  has  been  hitherto  uniformly  taken 
in  an  inverted  order.  The  attempt  has  been  to  conclude  in- 
telligence from  ends,  whereas  the  true  and  only  valid  form 
of  the  argument  is  to  conclude,  from  intelligence  as  a  prem- 
ise, that  ends  exist  in  nature.  I  have  shown  that  the  old 
form  of  the  argument  involves  its  advocates  in  this  dilemma : 
either  their  major  premise  is  an  identical  proposition,  or  it  is 
not  true.  The  explanation  of  this  dilemma  is,  that  ends 
must  be  rational.  Intelligence  is  the  only  mark  which  dis- 
tinguishes them  from  simple  effects.  Hence,  if  you  put  ends 
in  your  subject,  you  have  included  intelligence  in  it,  and  thus 
made  it  identical  with  your  predicate.  For  example, 
"Adaptation  of  means  to  ends  implies  intelligence"  begs 
the  question,  because  ends  can  only  be  distinguished  from 
effects  in  so  far  as  they  are  rational.  The  end  must  include 
intelligence  by  definition.  Attempting  to  avoid  this  horn  of 
the  teleological  dilemma,  you  may  say,  "  The  convergence  of 


PREFACE.  Vli 

many  forces  to  produce  a  definite  result  implies  intelligence." 
But  this  is  not  true.  Forces  converge  to  all  sorts  of  definite 
results  which  are  not  ends  because  they  are  not  rational ; 
i.e.,  not  such  as  a  rational  being  would  choose.  A  railway 
collision,  a  boiler  explosion,  a  Chicago  fire,  a  pestilence,  a 
Lisbon  destroyed  by  an  earthquake,  are  definite  results  for 
the  production  of  which  many  forces  have  coincided.  Are 
they  therefore  ends,  or  simply  effects  ? 

The  topics  discussed  in  this  volume  have  claimed  a  share 
of  my  thoughts  for  many  years.  Hence,  during  a  few 
months'  residence  in  London,  I  eagerly  availed  myself  of 
the  advantages  afforded  by  the  excellent  library  of  the  Brit- 
ish Museum,  where  I  found  material  for  the  historical  review 
of  Natural  Theology.  My  thanks  are  due,  and  are  hereby 
tendered,  to  the  trustees  of  that  institution  for  the  facilities 
there  enjoyed  while  composing  this  work. 

L.   E.   HICKS. 
Edinborough,  Sept.  6, 1882. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

I.  Classification  of  Design-Abguments 

II.  Analysis  of  Teleology 

III.  Analysis  of  Eutaxiology     . 

IV.  Use  and  Abuse  of  the  Woed  "  Design 
Y.  The  Doctbine  of  Final  Causes  . 


PAGE 

1 

9 
16 
26 


CHAPTER  L 

The  Natubal  Theology  of  the  Gbeeks  and  Romans: 

soceates,  clceeo,  and  galen 46 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Natural  Theology  of  the  Middle  Ages:  Thomas 

Aquinas,  Sebonde 74 

CHAPTER  III. 

Natural  Theology  in  the  Seventeenth  Centuby: 

MOBE    AND    CUDWOBTH 90 

CHAPTER  IT. 
Spinoza's  Cbiticism  of  Final  Causes 125 

CHAPTER  V. 

Natubal    Theology    in    the    Seventeenth    Centuby 

(Continued):  Boyle  and  Ray 133 


X  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Newton,  Grew,  and  Deeham 162 


CHAPTER  VII. 

NlEUWENTYT,   WOLL ASTON,   AND   MAUPERTUIS  .  .  .        1S7 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Reimarus,  Kant,  Hume,  and  Reid 20S 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Paley,  Stewart,  and  Crombie      ......      229 

CHAPTER  X. 
The  Bridgewater  Treatises 243 

CHAPTER  XL 

Brougham,  Irons,  and  the  Burnett  Prize  Essays         .      270 

CHAPTER  XH. 
McCosh,  Powell,  and  Cooke 283 

CHAPTER  XILT. 
Results  of  the  Historical  Review 297 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Darwinism  and  Design 308 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Evolution  and  Physico-Theology 331 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
The  Critique  of  Eutaxiology 347 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
The  Critique  of  Teleology 3(>9 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 


Janet  on  Final  Causes 


390 


INTRODUCTION. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Most  of  the  reasoning  in  natural  theology  falls 
under  the  head  of  what  has  been  called  design.  If  we 
inquire  into  the  meaning  of  this  word  "design,"  we  shall 
find  that  our  ordinary  conception  of  it  grows  out  of  its 
constant  association  with  teleology.  We  think  of  de- 
sign-arguments as  teleological  arguments.  Not  only  do 
we  so  think  of  them  in  those  moments  when  we  aje  not 
making  any  studied  effort  to  analyze  them,  or  to  think 
profoundly  about  them,  but  all  writers  on  systematic 
theology  have  so  classified  them  in  those  careful  and 
elaborate  treatises  in  which  they  have  given  us  their 
best  and  deepest  thoughts.  They  make  all  design- 
arguments  teleological.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  show  that 
there  are  good  grounds  for  a  radical  change  in  this 
classification.  A  teleological  argument  always  has  ref- 
erence to  the  accomplishment  of  an  end  or  purpose 
(t£\os).  There  are  numerous  appearances  in  nature, 
which,  upon  any  ordinary  principle  of  judging  from  ap- 
pearances, are  strongly  indicative  of  an  intention  upon 
the  part  of  the  Creator  to  accomplish  this  or  that  result. 
Mankind  have  in  all  ages  accepted  these  marks  of  de- 


Z  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

sign  in  good  faith,  and  drawn  certain  conclusions  from 
them.  But  the  extent  to  which  these  indications  of  a 
purpose  in  nature  have  been  suffered  to  guide  the  mind 
to  an  inference  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of  a 
Supreme  Ruler,  has  varied  extremely  in  different  peri- 
ods of  human  history ;  as  has  also  the  extent  of  that 
field,  or  sphere  of  action,  in  nature  wherein  the  play 
of  special  purposes  and  divine  interpositions  was  sup- 
posed to  be  customary  and  legitimate. 

In  the  youth  of  the  world  men  looked  upon  all  phe- 
nomena as  direct  products  of  a  divine  activity,  spe- 
cially directed  to  serve  and  bless,  or  to  punish  and 
destroy,  mankind.  Every  natural  event  was  an  end 
foreseen,  chosen,  and  brought  to  pass  by  suitable  means. 
But  with  the  birth  of  science  many  such  teleological 
notions  perished;  and,  as  science  has  advanced,  the 
phenomena  of  nature  have  been  brought  more  and  more 
under  the  reign  of  law,  while  the  field  of  special  inter- 
ventions of  a  divinity  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  this 
or  that  result  as  an  end  has  been  constantly  narrowed. 
At  length  the  province  of  biology,  the  last  stronghold 
of  the  old  teleology,  has  been  invaded  by  the  theory 
of  evolution,  and,  if  not  absolutely  conquered,  at  least 
so  far  occupied,  that  teleology  must  either  ally  itself 
with  evolution,  or  retire  from  the  field.  But,  just  as 
fast  and  as  far  as  the  field  of  teleology  has  been  re- 
stricted by  the  advances  of  science,  the  range  of  another 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God  has  been  corre- 
spondingly enlarged.  The  reign  of  law  is  but  another 
name  for  the  order  of  nature.  Physical  law  is  merely 
a  formula  for  the  orderly  movement  of  physical  force. 
But  order,  and  method,  and  the  harmonious  action  and 
interaction  of  physical  forces,  are  marks  of  intelligence, 
and  prove  the  divine  authorship  of  the  cosmos  just  as 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS.  6 

conclusively  as  the  use  of  means  to  accomplish  an  end 
proves  it.  As  the  reign  of  law  has  been  extended  over 
one  after  another  of  those  provinces  which  were  thought 
to  be  the  special  preserve  of  teleology,  the  argument 
from  the  order  of  nature  has  been  progressively  drawn 
into  greater  and  greater  prominence.  This  is  also  a 
design-argument,  as  well  as  the  teleological  argument. 
So  that  while  teleology  has  been,  as  La  Place  remarked, 
pushed  back  more  and  more  as  science  advanced,  the 
order-argument  having  been  at  the  same  time  brought 
to  the  front,  the  province  of  design-arguments  has  not 
suffered  any  restriction.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been 
constantly  enlarged,  because  the  advances  of  science 
have  created  new  fields  for  it,  without  infringing  at  all 
upon  the  sphere  it  formerly  occupied. 

It  is  not  indeed  historically  true,  that  the  order-argu- 
ment has  advanced  pari  passu  with  the  retreat  of  tele- 
ology. All  that  can  be  said  is,  that  it  ought  to  have 
done  so,  and  would  have  done  so  if  natural  theologians 
had  been  awake  to  their  mission,  and  made  good  use  of 
their  opportunities.  But  it  is  only  quite  recently  that 
reasoning  from  the  order  of  nature,  without  regard  to 
ends,  has  been  recognized  as  an  argument  distinct  from 
teleology,  and  quite  as  valid  as  that.  In  fact,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  yet  to  be  so  recognized,  only  a  few 
writers  having  employed  it  in  such  manner  as  to  show 
that  they  clearly  apprehended  it  as  a  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent line  of  reasoning.  If  the  present  treatise  shall 
serve  to  set  out  the  order-argument  more  clearly  and 
prominently,  an  important  object  will  be  accomplished. 

Dr.  McCosh  regards  the  order-argument  in  the  light 
of  a  revival  rather  than  a  new  invention.  He  says  that 
natural  theology  has  been  chiefly  occupied  in  this 
country  for  a  century  or  two  in  displaying  the  external 


4  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

facts  of  nature  instead  of  its  internal  principles  of 
order,  which  the  ancients  attended  to  as  well  as  the 
facts.  Now  "this  branch  of  proof  must  come  once 
more  into  prominence."  *  Professor  Baden  Powell  also 
maintains,  that  design-arguments  need  a  radical  re-ad- 
justment, such  as  to  bring  order  to  the  front  instead 
of  utility,  or  useful  ends  accomplished.2 

A  clear  proof  that  this  is  a  very  new  argument,  or 
else  a  very  old  one  newly  revived,  is  that  it  has  not  yet 
been  named.  As  a  distinct  argument  it  deserves  a 
name.     Dr.  McCosh  has,  indeed,  suggested  one  :  — 

"Two  great  principles  run  through  every  part  of  the 
works  of  God.  The  one  is  the  principle  of  order,  or  general 
plan,  to  which  every  given  object  is  conformed  with  amaz- 
ing skill.  The  other  is  the  principle  of  special  adaptation,  by 
which  each  object,  while  formed  after  an  ideal  pattern,  is  at 
the  same  time,  and  by  an  equally  wonderful  skill,  accommo- 
dated to  the  situation  which  it  occupies,  and  the  purpose 
which  it  has  to  serve.  .  .  .  The  science  which  treats  of  the 
one  might  be  called  —  were  it  not  that  the  word  has  been  so 
abused  —  cosmology ;  the  science  which  treats  of  the  other 
has  an  admirable  phrase  allotted  to  it  in  teleology. ' ' 8 

This  suggestion  is  very  cautiously  advanced  here, 
but  repeated  with  greater  confidence  in  his  "  Typical 
Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation,"  published  six 
years  later  (1856).  The  doctor  has  not,  however,  fol- 
lowed his  own  suggestion.     In  his  frequent  references 

1  Method  of  the  Div.  Gov.,  p.  519.  The  first  edition  was  published  in 
1850.    Great  Britain  is  meant  by  "  this  country." 

2  Unity  of  Worlds,  p.  135;  Order  of  Nature,  p.  236.  His  second 
title  is  significant.  "  Unity  of  Worlds  "  was  published  in  1855;  "  Order 
of  Nature,"  1859. 

8  Meth.  of  Div.  Gov.,  p.  158.  The  passage  does  not  occur  in  the 
earlier  editions:  hence  the  more  confident  proposal  of  the  name  cos- 
mology is  probably  earlier  than  the  more  cautious  one,  though  it  appears 
in  a  work  published  six  years  later. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS.  5 

to  the  principle  of  order  in  subsequent  portions  of  these 
books,  and  in  later  publications,  he  describes  it  in  other 
terms,  avoiding  the  word  "  cosmology."  Wolff,  the 
famous  German  mathematician  and  philosopher,  divided 
metaphysics  into  ontology,  psychology,  cosmology,  and 
theology.  Lewes  adopts  his  division,  except  that  he 
drops  ontology.  "  There  are  three  grand  divisions  of 
metaphysics ;  namely,  psychology,  cosmology,  and  the- 
ology." 1  This  is  a  natural  and  convenient  division. 
The  terms  might  be  briefly  interpreted  thus :  psychol- 
ogy, the  doctrine  of  the  soul;  theology,  the  doctrine  of 
God ;  and  cosmology,  the  doctrine  of  the  cosmos,  or  the 
general  metaphysical  considerations  respecting  the  uni- 
verse. The  meaning  of  the  term  seems  to  be  too  well 
fixed  in  this  sense  to  admit  of  its  being  applied  in  the 
sense  suggested  by  Dr.  McCosh. 

It  is  true  it  has  been  used  in  several  other  senses; 
and  in  order  to  judge  fairly,  and  with  all  the  evidence 
before  us,  whether  it  can  be  brought  into  physico-the- 
ology  as  a  companion  word  to  teleology,  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  notice  some  other  examples  of  its  use. 

A  quarter  of  a  century  before  the  publication  of 
Wolff's  "  Transcendental  Cosmology,"  which  appeared 
in  1731,  Nehemiah  Grew,  M.D.,  published  in  London 
his  "  Cosmologia  Sacra."  The  greater  part  of  this  is  in 
the  ordinary  style  of  apologetics,  or  a  treatise  upon  the 
evidences  of  Christianity;  and,  so  far  as  this  part  is 
concerned,  the  title,  Sacred  Cosmology,  has  no  perti- 
nence. But  it  also  contains  design-arguments,  and  a 
singular  theory  of  a  "  vital  principle  "  in  matter  gen- 
erally, aside  from  vegetative  and  animal  life,  —  a  sort  of 
hylozoism,  or  world-soul  theory.  So  far  it  is  cosmo- 
logical,  or  treats  of  the  cosmos. 

i  Hist,  of  Phi.,  I.  lviii. 


6  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Twenty  years  after  Wolff's  book  appeared  in  Ger- 
many, —  that  is,  in  1751,  —  another  cosmology  was 
published  in  France1  by  Moreau  de  Maupertuis.  His 
"  Essai  de  Cosmologie "  is  an  attempt  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God  by  a  novel  method.  Starting  with  a 
definition  of  the  Supreme  Being,  he  deduces  from  this, 
by  rigid  mathematical  processes  and  formulas,  the  laws 
of  the  universe.  Then  comparing  the  laws  so  deduced 
with  those  actually  found  in  nature,  and  finding  them 
to  be  identical,  he  infers  that  the  being  from  whom 
they  were  deduced  must  truly  exist,  and  must  be  the 
author  of  the  actual  cosmos. 

Still  another  cosmology  appeared  in  1861  in  New 
York.  This  was  the  "  Rational  Cosmology "  of  Lau- 
rens P.  Hickok,  D.D.  He  attempts  to  reduce  all  phe- 
nomena under  two  forces,  "antagonist  and  diremptive." 
"  The  principle  of  the  generation  of  the  material  uni- 
verse involved  the  agency  of  these  two  forces,  and 
needed  none  other." 2  He  seems  to  be  trying  to  get  at 
the  modus  operandi  of  creation  ex  niJiilo,  —  a  truly  haz- 
ardous attempt. 

Thus  we  have  the  transcendental  cosmology  of  Wolff, 
the  metaphysical  cosmology  of  Lewes,  the  sacred  cos- 
mology of  Grew,  the  mathematical  cosmology  of  Mau- 
pertuis, and  the  rational  cosmology  of  Hickok.  Ger- 
many, France,  England,  and  America  have  all  had  their 
tilt  at  the  word.  With  good  reason  the  canny  Scotch- 
man felt  shy  of  attempting  to  appropriate  it  in  a  new 
and  special  sense  after  it  had  been  thus  bandied  about. 
Besides,  if  life  were  not  too  short  to  be  wasted  in  such 
an  investigation,  we  might  probably  find  still  other 
varieties  of  cosmology.  It  is  one  of  those  handy  Greek 
compounds,  general  in  signification  and  convenient  in 

1  It  first  appeared  in  Berlin  in  1748.  2  p#  334. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS.  7 

form,  so  that  it  is  sure  to  be  taken  up  and  used  in  dif- 
ferent senses  by  authors  in  different  lines  of  research. 
Another  objection  to  its  use  in  theology  is,  that  the 
adjective  form  of  it,  cosmological,  is  already  appropriated 
for  the  argument  for  a  First  Cause. 

The  order-argument  is  therefore  still  unnamed.  I 
propose  to  call  it  eutaxiological,  from  eutaxy  (cvTa&a), 
established  order.  Eutaxiology  will  then  be  the  sum 
of  the  reasonings  from  the  order  of  nature  respecting 
the  existence  of  Gocl. 

In  the  following  treatise  I  propose  to  deal  with  these 
two  design-arguments,  the  eutaxiological  and  the  teleo- 
logical.  But  their  relations  to  other  arguments  for  the 
existence  of  God  are  so  numerous  and  intricate,  that  it 
will  be  impossible  to  treat  these  fully  without  giving 
some  attention  to  the  others.  And,  in  order  that  I  may 
be  clearly  understood,  it  is  desirable  here  in  the  begin- 
ning to  set  forth  all  these  arguments  in  their  mutual 
relations,  and  with  their  mutual  limitations  and  bound- 
aries, as  I  understand  them. 

First,  there  is  the  argument  from  intuitive  concep- 
tions of  the  necessary  existence  of  a  perfect  Being,  — 
the  Ontological  Argument. 

Secondly,  the  argument  which  proceeds  upon  the 
principle  of  cause  and  effect,  and  seeks  for  an  adequate 
First  Cause,  —  the  Causal  Argument. 

Thirdly,  the  argument  from  the  mental  and  moral 
attributes  of  man,  as  implying  the  existence  of  God  as  a 
necessary  complement  to  human  faculties,  —  the  Anthro- 
pological Argument. 

The  fourth  and  fifth  are  the  two  Design-Arguments. 

The  Ontological  and  Causal  Arguments  together 
constitute  Rational,  or,  as  Kant  calls  it,  Transcenden- 
tal Theology.     The  two  Design-Arguments  constitute 


8  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

Ph}rsico-Theology ;  and  the  same,  with  the  addition  of 
the  Anthropological  Argument,  constitute  Natural  The- 
ology. 

What  I  have  called  the  causal  argument  is  often 
called  the  cosmological  argument,  in  accordance  with 
Kant's  scheme,  I  suppose.  But  Kant  is  not  consistent 
with  himself.  In  one  place  he  applies  the  term  "  cosmo- 
logical "  to  the  causal  argument  alone ;  but  in  another 
place  he  includes  under  it  the  design-arguments  of  ph}'s- 
ico-theology,  as  well  as  the  causal  argument.  A  mo- 
ment's consideration  will  suffice  to  enable  us  to  see 
that  the  latter  usage  of  the  term  is  the  more  correct. 
The  design-arguments  are  unquestionably  cosmological. 
They  draw  their  data  from  the  cosmos  just  as  much,  or 
even  more,  than  the  causal  argument ;  since  the  last 
may  be  based  upon  the  existence  of  any  single  being, 
while  design-arguments  involve  a  wide  surve}r  of  the 
universe.  Indeed,  they  all  draw  their  facts  from  na- 
ture ;  but  each  views  its  facts  from  its  own  peculiar 
standpoint.  Teleology  views  them  always  in  the  rela- 
tion of  means  and  ends ;  eutaxiology,  with  reference  to 
the  principle  of  order ;  while  the  argument  for  a  First 
Cause  views  them  always  in  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  They  are  all  cosmological ;  but  as  one  is  named 
teleological  from  its  special  ground-notion  of  an  end, 
another  eutaxiological  from  its  special  ground-notion  of 
order,  so  ought  the  third  to  be  named  causal  from  its 
special  ground-notion  of  cause  and  effect. 

This  would  remove  one  objection  to  the  use  of  the 
term  "  cosmology"  as  proposed  by  Dr.  McCosh ;  namely, 
that  the  adjective  "  cosmological  "  was  already  appropri- 
ated to  the  argument  for  a  First  Cause.  But  it  brings 
another  objection  into  view  at  the  same  time  that  it 
removes  the  one.     It  would  be  as  inappropriate  to  re- 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.         9 

strict?  the  term  to  one  of  the  design-arguments  as  to 
restrict  it  to  the  causal  argument.  Besides,  the  other 
objections  to  the  doctor's  suggestion  are  numerous 
enough  without  that. 

The  extent  which  I  have  given  to  the  term  "  natural 
theology,"  making  it  include  the  argument  drawn  from 
the  human  intellect  and  conscience,  has  not  been 
uniformly  observed  by  writers  upon  this  subject.  The 
greater  number,  perhaps,  have  written  about  natural 
theology  just  as  if  it  had  to  do  only  with  design-argu- 
ments ;  and,  as  these  were  all  included  under  teleology, 
the  latter  term  was  practically  a  synonyme  of  natural 
theology.  The  truth  is,  most  of  them  did  not  stop 
either  to  analyze  or  define  their  terms  and  arguments ; 
but,  of  those  who  did  systematize  their  thoughts,  the 
greater  number  include  the  anthropological  argument 
under  natural  theology.  Lord  Brougham  notably  does 
so,  and  he  further  distinguishes  between  natural  the- 
ology and  natural  religion.  The  first  appeals  to  rea- 
son, endeavoring  to  convince  men  that  there  is  a  God ; 
the  second  appeals  to  the  moral  sentiments,  to  the 
hopes  and  fears  and  reverence  natural  to  man,  as  he 
contemplates  his  relation  to  the  Deity  so  far  as  it  is 
manifested  to  him  by  the  light  of  nature. 


II. 

ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 

There  is  a  degree  of  simplicity  about  teleological 
reasoning  which  in  part  accounts  for  its  great  strength 
as  a  popular  argument.  It  has  the  advantage,  that  it 
can  be  gathered  up  into  a  single  proposition,  and  hurled 


10  crit:que  of  design- arguments. 

like  a  solid  shot  at  an  adversary.  Don't  you  believe 
that  feet  were  made  for  the  purpose  of  walking?  It  is 
difficult  to  make  a  blank  denial,  but  the  anti-teleolo- 
gist  must  deny  it.  If  he  admits  a  purpose  in  this  case, 
he  must  do  the  same  in  a  multitude  of  similar  cases ; 
and,  if  he  admits  the  existence  of  a  purpose,  he  admits 
the  existence  and  dominance  of  mind  in  nature.  There 
is  no  such  thing  as  a  blind  purpose.  Purposes  belong 
to  the  realm  of  mind.  Every  conceivable  sort  of 
purpose  is  an  act  of  intelligence,  though  it  may  not 
display  wisdom.  The  most  foolish  aims  of  men  pre- 
suppose an  intellect  to  conceive  and  a  will  to  execute 
them.  There  are  no  foolish  aims  in  nature ;  but,  since 
even  a  foolish  purpose  can  only  be  entertained  by  a 
being  endowed  with  mind,  how  much  more  evident  is 
it  that  nature's  purposes,  provident  and  admirable  as 
they  are,  could  not  have  been  conceived  and  executed 
by  any  other  than  an  intelligent  being ! 

This,  I  say,  must  be  the  conclusion  if  purpose  is 
admitted  at  all.  The  anti-teleologist  must  bolt  on  a 
steel-plate  armor  of  hard  scepticism  thick  enough  to 
turn  that  first  solid  shot,  or  else  make  up  his  mind  to 
lower  his  flag  sooner  or  later.  He  must  speak  out  fair 
and  plain,  without  any  mouthing  or  mincing,  and  say 
that  feet  Were  somehow  formed  without  any  intention 
that  they  should  be  used  for  walking. 

In  view  of  this  fact,  the  reason  of  the  popular  strength 
of  teleology  is  not  far  to  seek.  Imagine  two  men  de- 
bating in  public,  one  affirming  and  the  other  denying 
that  e}^es  were  intended  to  see  with !  In  the  average, 
intelligent,  lecture-going  audience,  the  man  who  would 
plant  himself  squarely  in  the  negative  of  that  question 
would  be  set  down  for  a  fool  by  half  of  his  hearers  the 
moment  he  did  so.     Much  more  would  he  be  set  down 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.       11 

for  a  fool  by  the  common  crowd.  This  popular 
strength  may  be  delusive,  but  it  is  a  fact.  Whatever 
fate  this  argument  may  meet  at  the  hands  of  metaphy- 
sicians, the  common  sense  of  mankind  will  always 
gravitate  mightily  towards  the  belief  that  bodily  organs 
were  intended  to  perform  the  functions  which  they  do 
perform. 

It  is  implied  in  what  has  been  said  of  the  popular 
strength  of  teleology,  that  this  strength  is  due  to  the 
simplicity  of  the  reasoning.  It  is  apparently  very  sim- 
ple ;  and,  as  compared  with  what  Herbert  Spencer  calls 
"compound  quantitative  reasoning,"  it  is  really  very 
simple.  Still  the  analysis  of  it  discloses  a  greater  num- 
ber of  elements,  and  a  greater  complexity  of  relations, 
than  would  be  suspected  without  analysis.  Take  a 
familiar  example :  The  ear  being  well  fitted  for  hear- 
ing, we  infer  that  it  was  created,  or  evolved,  for  the 
purpose  of  hearing.  In  this  the  elements  are,  (1)  the 
ear,  a  material  object;  (2)  hearing,  a  physiological 
function,  but  just  as  real  a  thing  as  the  material  object ; 
(3)  a  relation  of  fitness  between  the  organ  and  its  func- 
tion ;  (4)  a  mental  conception  of  hearing  as  an  end  to 
be  attained  by  means  of  the  ear,  —  that  is,  a  conception 
which  includes  all  the  first  three  elements,  and  forms  a 
sort  of  duplicate  of  them  ;  (5)  a  volition  or  determina- 
tion of  the  will  to  bring  about  hearing  by  means  of  the 
ear.  The  consideration  that  the  end  attained  is  a  use- 
ful one  is  usually  involved  in  the  reasoning,  and  consti- 
tutes an  additional  element,  making  six  in  all.  And 
these  are  simply  the  conceptions  involved  in  teleological 
reasoning,  without  any  reference  to  the  logical  pro- 
cesses involved  in  it.  These  will  be  carefully  investi- 
gated in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

Thus  the  argument  which  looked  so  simple  in  its 


12  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

concentrated  form,  looks  much  less  simple  when  spread 
out  by  analysis  into  its  elements.  These  are  numerous 
enough;  and  their  relations  of  dependence  and  like- 
ness and  unlikeness  are  intricate  enough  to  furnish 
ground  for  two  notable  consequences.  In  the  first 
place,  there  is  a  splendid  chance  for  the  advocates  of 
teleology  to  get  themselves  tangled  up,  and  involved  in 
dangerous  if  not  hopeless  confusion,  through  the  fail- 
ure to  keep  each  of  these  elements  in  its  places  clear  of 
entanglements  with  its  neighbors  or  relatives  to  whom 
it  bears  a  striking  family  resemblance.  The  sequel  will 
show  that  they  have  made  the  most  of  this  opportu- 
nity. Especially  has  there  been  a  general  failure  to 
recognize  the  duplication  of  the  elements  of  this  argu- 
ment. Hearing,  for  example,  is  one  thing  when  re- 
garded as  the  function  of  the  ear,  but  quite  another 
thing  when  it  is  regarded  as  an  end.  The  one  is  a 
fact,  the  other  a  supposed  mental  conception  of  the 
Creator.  The  most  cursory  examination  of  plrysico- 
theological  writings  will  reveal  instances  of  the  fallacy 
of  an  ambiguous  middle  term,  arising  from  the  fact 
that  the  author  glided  unconsciously  from  the  function 
to  the  mental  conception  of  it  as  an  end. 

In  the  second  place,  there  is  a  splendid  chance  here 
for  the  enemies  of  teleology  to  throw  these  numerous 
elements  into  false  relations  and  utter  confusion ;  and 
they  have  not  been  slow  to  do  it.  They  had  this  ad- 
vantage, too,  that  they  often  gained  their  purpose 
through  ignorance  as  well  as  through  knowledge. 
They  did  not  need  to  attain  and  hold  fast  to  clear  dis- 
tinctions. All  they  wanted  was  to  spoil  the  argument ; 
and  for  that  a  small  outfit  of  dialectic  ingenuity  was 
just  as  effective  as,  if  not  more  so  than,  a  thoroughly 
philosophical  comprehension.     And,  in  addition  to  their 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.       13 

original  capital  of  dialectic  skill,  their  stock  was  always 
re-enforced  by  the  blunders  of  the  other  side  to  an  ex- 
tent which  enabled  them  to  do  a  very  respectable  busi- 
ness in  the  argumentative  line.  The  debaters  on  the 
affirmative  side  must  comprehend  their  propositions 
through  and  through;  but  for  those  on  the  negative 
side  a  superficial  treatment  has  certain  advantages, 
especially  if  the  affirmative  position  is  inherently  sound 
and  strong. 

But  what  if  the  affirmative  is  weak?  Or,  suppose  it 
is  apparently  stronger  than  it  is  really,  is  it  then  the 
policy  of  its  advocates  to  blink  distinctions,  and  con- 
fuse relations,  so  as  to  conceal  their  weakness  ?  That 
depends,  of  course,  upon  the  question  whether  you 
love  truth  and  righteousness.  Now,  in  respect  to  the 
popular  strength  of  teleology,  I  am  constrained  to  make 
a  remark  which  may  be  painful  to  my  readers,  because 
it  is  disparaging  to  that  argument.  But,  besides  being 
tolerably  fond  of  truth  and  righteousness,  I  think  I  am 
doing  a  real  service  to  any  cause  by  ridding  it  of  facti- 
tious and  unreal  elements  of  strength. 

Now,  the  thing  I  am  getting  at  is  not  so  dreadful, 
after  all,  as  you  might  suppose  from  such  a  solemn  and 
formal  introduction  of  it.  It  is  simply  this :  the  pop- 
ular strength  of  teleology  is  parti}'  due  to  a  blinking  of 
distinctions.  Ask  almost  any  ordinary  person  whether 
the  eye  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  with  it.  He 
will  say,  "  Yes,  of  course  it  was.  Why  should  you  ask 
such  a  foolish  question?"  But  nine  out  of  ten  —  nay, 
more  likely,  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred  —  of  such  persons 
make  that  answer,  and  regard  the  question  as  a  silly 
one,  simply  because  they  don't  know,  or,  if  they  know, 
don't  think  of,  the  difference  between  function  and  pur- 
pose, —  between  seeing  as  a  fact,  and  the  mental,  crea- 


14  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

tive  conception  of  vision  as  an  end.  The  function  of 
the  biceps  muscle  is  to  bend  the  arm  at  the  elbow,  is 
one  proposition ;  the  purpose  of  the  biceps  muscle  is 
to  bend  the  arm  at  the  elbow,  is  a  very  different  propo- 
sition. The  first  is  a  plain  truth  of  physiology,  to 
which  all  who  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms  will  yield 
a  prompt  and  willing  assent.  The  second  is  a  teleo- 
logical  statement,  to  which  no  one  who  knows  the  full 
import  of  the  terms  will  subscribe,  unless  he  is  ready  to 
go  the  whole  length  of  the  teleological  road,  and  accept 
its  uttermost  conclusion.  If  the  biceps  muscle  was 
created,  or  evolved,  for  the  purpose  of  bending  the  arm, 
that  was  an  act  of  intelligence,  and  the  presence  and 
supremacy  of  mind  in  nature  is  established. 

To  the  man  who  does  not  know  or  think  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  use  and  end,  between  function  and 
purpose,  between  vision  as  a  fact  and  the  primitive 
conception  of  it  in  creative  thought,  not  only  does  the 
affirmative  answer  seem  a  matter  of  course,  but  so  much 
a  matter  of  course,  that  he  adds  to  his  "yes  "  the  mental 
if  not  audible  comment,  "  What  a  silly  question  !  "  To 
deny  that  ears  were  made  for  the  purpose  of  hearing  is, 
to  him,  precisely  equivalent  to  saying  that  they  are  not 
used  for  hearing,  and  consequently  are  of  no  use  at  all. 
That  is  why  the  anti-teleological  debater  would  be  set 
down  for  a  fool  by  the  crowd,  if  he  made  a  point-blank 
denial  that  organs  were  intended  for  the  functions  ap- 
propriate to  them. 

The  popular  strength  of  teleology  is  delusive  to  this 
extent  at  least,  that  it  depends  in  part  upon  this  oblivi- 
ousness to  an  actual  distinction,  — a  distinction,  too,  so 
fundamental  that  no  teleological  argument  can  be  valid 
which  does  not  take  it  into  account.  The  service  ren- 
dered to  the  cause  by  pointing  out  this  fallacy  of  con- 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.      15 

fusion  is  therefore  a  real  one,  since  it  lays  the  founda- 
tion for  correct  reasoning,  and  at  the  same  time  explains, 
or  does  something  towards  explaining,  the  fact  that 
teleology  has  been  so  much  stronger  with  the  thought- 
less masses  than  with  the  thoughtful  few.  If  it  stands 
on  such  props  alone,  away  with  them,  and  let  it  fall ! 
but  if,  as  I  believe,  it  has  other  and  better  supports, 
still  away  with  these  !  Popular  strength  may  be  a 
source  of  real  weakness.  It  enables  the  other  side  to 
say  with  a  sneer,  and  a  wag  of  the  head,  "  Your  argu- 
ment will  do  for  the  multitude."  Or  it  may  lead  the 
defenders  of  a  cause  to  repose  in  a  false  security  while 
enemies  sap  its  foundations.  But,  worst  of  all,  it  fosters 
the  feeling,  that  an  argument  which  is  naturally  so 
strong  can  be  easily  and  effectively  handled  by  almost 
any  one  whose  fancy  it  is  to  make  the  trial.  Teleology 
has  suffered  untold  mischief  from  this  source.  Not 
only  have  incompetent  bunglers  taken  it  up  because  it 
seemed  so  eas}7,  but  very  able  men  writing  upon  it  have 
confided  too  much  in  its  popular  strength,  and  failed  to 
subject  teleolog}^  in  general,  and  their  own  presentation 
of  it  in  particular,  to  that  severe  analysis  and  criticism 
which  would  have  stripped  off  some  of  its  fallacies. 

Another  remark  of  the  same  kind  as  the  last,  I  have 
to  make,  —  like  it,  disparaging  to  teleology,  bnt  having 
the  same  sort  of  defence.  False  pretensions  are  as 
damaging  to  a  cause  as  apparent  but  unreal  elements  of 
strength.  Now,  it  is  a  fact  that  a  certain  claim  ad- 
vanced by  teleologists  is  a  false  one ;  and  it  has  been 
entered  in  behalf  of  their  doctrine,  and  persistently 
insisted  upon,  because  of  this  very  same  blinking  of  dis- 
tinctions mentioned  in  the  previous  remark.  That  is 
to  say,  it  has  been  asserted  that  teleology  is  a  useful, 
and  even  an  indispensable,  guide  in  physical,  or  still 


16  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

more  in  biological,  research.  The  case  of  Harvey's  dis- 
covery of  the  circulation  of  the  blood  is  cited ;  and,  so 
far  as  he  is  individually  concerned,  there  is  some  justice 
in  the  claim.  He  said  to  himself,  "These  valves  all 
opening  in  the  same  direction  are  not  here  without  a 
wise  purpose ;  "  and,  thus  reasoning  teleologically,  he 
was  led  on  to  his  great  discovery.  But  just  make  the 
reasoning  non-teleological  by  substituting  function  for 
"  wise  purpose,"  and  it  works  out  the  conclusion  quite 
as  well.  Any  rejecter  of  teleology,  any  Huxley  or 
Haeckel  with  mere  function  as  a  guide,  might  have 
made  the  discovery  just  as  well  as  Harvey  did  with 
"  wise  purpose  "  as  a  guide. 

But  not  any  better  !  The  teleologist  is  not  disquali- 
fied for  scientific  investigation  by  his  belief,  —  only  he 
has  no  private  latch-key  to  the  riddles  of  nature.  He 
treads  no  royal  road  to  discovery.  Still,  as  he  trudges 
along  the  common  highway  of  science  side  by  side 
with  his  unbelieving  brother,  is  there  not  possibly  some 
difference?  As  scientists  they  are  on  precisely  the 
same  level ;  but  as  men,  as  beings  endowed  with  im- 
mortality, having  a  few  other  problems  to  solve  besides 
those  which  can  be  attacked  with  scalpel,  crucible,  and 
balance,  there  may  be  just  the  difference  that  exists  be- 
tween a  friendless  orphan  and  a  beloved  child  in  his 
father's  house. 


III. 

ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 

At  first  view  the  teleological  argument  seems  simple  ; 
but  we  find  that  it  possesses  a  considerable  degree  of 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.    17 

complexity.  At  first  view  the  eutaxiological  argument 
looks  rather  complex,  but  it  is  really  very  simple.  The 
order  of  nature  seems  like  a  broad  theme.  To  treat  it 
exhaustively  one  would  be  obliged  to  survey  the  whole 
field  of  the  physical  sciences,  and  draw  from  each  one 
of  them  its  fundamental  principles  as  illustrations  of 
eutaxiology.  Physical  science  is  a  classified  knowledge 
of  external  nature  ;  but  the  possibility  of  classification, 
and  therefore  of  science,  lies  in  the  fact  that  there  is 
first  a  natural,  external  order,  whence  arises  the  logical, 
internal  order  in  the  arrangement  of  facts  and  princi- 
ples, which  constitutes  true  science.  The  external 
order  existed  before  the  science  which  is  based  upon  it. 
There  was  celestial  harmony  before  the  science  of 
astronomy  was  constructed  by  formulating  the  laws 
and  principles  gathered  from  observation  of  the  heavens. 
What,  then,  is  this  impressive  fact  of  celestial  harmony, 
—  this  majestic  and  orderly  movement  of  vast  bodies 
through  boundless  space,  —  what  is  it  but  a  divine 
thought  impressed  upon  the  cosmos?  Chemical  combina- 
tions obey  the  law  of  definite  and  multiple  proportions : 
can  nature  count  then  ?  Crystals  present,  some  simple 
and  complete,  others  modified  and  complex,  geometrical 
forms:  is  nature  a  geometrician?  Plants  and  inferior 
animals  are  built  upon  the  radiate  plan,  the  higher  ani- 
mals having,  on  the  contrary,  distinct  right  and  left 
sides,  dorsal  and  ventral  aspects :  is  there  any  thought 
of  symmetry  in  this?  or  any  thought  of  symmetry 
and  number  both  in  the  parts  of  flowers,  and  the  frac- 
tional series  in  phyllotaxy  ?  Then  there  are  the  "types 
of  structure  "  in  zoology,  —  a  definite  pattern  or  fashion 
running  through  whole  classes  and  sub-kingdoms;  a 
plan  it  would  seem,  and  so  the  comparative  anatomists 
call  it. 


18  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

Thus  we  might  go  on  through  all  the  sciences,  and 
see,  ever  and  anon,  some  new  principle  of  order  stand- 
ing out  like  a  creative  thought.  This  eutaxiological 
argument,  then,  seems  to  have  no  end  to  it ;  for  order  is 
universal  in  nature.  True,  it  is  universal ;  and  there  is 
no  end  to  the  examples  of  it,  but  they  are  all  essen- 
tially alike.  Order  in  the  heavens  is  the  same  principle 
as  order  in  the  setting  of  leaves  on  a  tiny  plant,  or  of 
the  sparkling  facets  of  a  minute  crystal.  The  illustra- 
tions of  the  principle  of  order  are  countless,  but  the 
argument  based  upon  them  is  one. 

The  fundamental  proposition  of  eutaxiology  is,  that 
order  and  harmony  are  marks  of  intelligence.  They 
imply  that  there  has  been  a  preconceived  plan,  to  which 
the  phenomena  in  question  have  been  made  to  conform. 
Let  us  take  an  illustration  from  the  animal  king-dom. 
Here  eutaxiology  takes  the  special  form  of  morphology, 
or  the  doctrine  of  typical  forms ;  that  is,  morphology 
is  one  of  its  phases,  though  not  the  only  one.  The 
orderly  series  of  animals  grouped  into  classes,  orders, 
and  genera,  is  another  phase  of  eutaxiology;  but  we 
will  draw  upon  morphology  at  present  for  an  illustra- 
tion. 

In  the  sub-kingdom  vertebrata  the  morphological 
type  of  a  limb  is,  that  there  shall  be  first  a  single  bone 
(humerus  or  femur},  then  two  bones  side  by  side  (radi- 
us and  ulna  or  tibia  &nd  fibula),  then  a  number  of  small 
bones  (wrist  or  ankle),  then  five  bones  side  by  side 
(metacarpus  or  metatarsus),  and  finally  five  digits  (fin- 
gers or  toes).  This  type,  though  not  universal  among 
vertebrated  animals,  prevails  so  widely,  and  is  so  often 
realized  in  different  animals  which  are  otherwise  ex- 
tremely unlike,  that  naturalists  have  no  hesitation  in 
accepting  it  as  a  type,  and  describing  its  elements  with 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.    19 

all  the  minuteness  and  confidence  which  belong  to  the 
description  of  real  things.  Is  it  not  then  a  real  thing? 
Not  in  the  sense  of  being  material :  it  is  simply  an  idea, 
nothing  more  and  nothing  less.  But  an  idea  which  has 
moulded  the  form  of  the  hand  with  which  you  hold  this 
book,  and  the  wing  of  a  bat,  and  the  paw  of  a  lion,  and 
a  thousand  other  animal  forms,  all  on  the  same  pentam- 
erous  pattern,  is  considerable  of  an  idea.  It  is  quite  a 
real  fact  if  it  is  not  a  material  object.  Call  it  a  crea- 
tion-idea or  an  evolution-idea,  whichever  you  like  best. 
An  idea  it  is  at  all  events, — a  veritable  plan  which  only 
an  intelligent  being  could  have  conceived  and  executed. 

The  key-note  of  eutaxiology  is  plan,  as  that  of  tele- 
ology is  purpose.  "  Plans  and  Purposes  in  Nature " 
would  be  a  comprehensive  title  for  a  treatise  on 
physico-theology. 

The  elements  of  the  eutaxiological  proof,  or  the  fun- 
damental conceptions  involved  in  it,  are,  (1)  the  fact  of 
order  in  nature  ;  (2)  the  plan,  or  the  mental  conception 
of  that  disposition  of  objects  and  that  movement  of 
forces  which  constitute  order  and  harmony. 

This  analysis  shows  that  the  eutaxiological  is  much 
simpler  than  the  teleological  argument.  There  is  no 
such  reduplication  of  the  elements,  and  they  are  clearly 
distinct  and  different;  so  that  there  is  not  the  same 
danger  of  confounding  similar  elements  as  in  teleology. 
Eutaxiology  is  certainly  simpler,  but  is  it  as  forcible? 
I  shall  not  at  present  attempt  to  answer  this  question 
in  full.  The  critical  estimation  of  both  these  argu- 
ments will  be  undertaken  after  I  have  given  a  historical 
review  of  natural  theology,  and  after  that  estimate  will 
be  the  time  to  institute  the  comparison. 

But,  without  such  careful  examination,  judging  simply 
by  what  lies  upon  the  surface,  it  would  seem  that  this 


20  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

argument  is  at  least  equal  to  the  other  in  effectiveness. 
Moreover,  it  is  probable  that  a  considerable  part  of  the 
energy  supposed  to  belong  to  teleology  has  really  come 
from  eutaxiology,  seeing  that  they  have  always  been 
lumped  together  under  the  head  of  design.  When 
Napoleon,  in  reply  to  the  fine-spun  theories  of  the 
French  atheists,  pointed  to  the  heavens  and  said,  "  But 
who  made  all  these  things  ?  "  his  argument  was  eutaxi- 
ological,  and  there  is  no  question  but  that  it  was  forci- 
ble. It  was  a  shot  quite  as  solid  as  any  which  teleology 
can  forge.  The  order,  harmony,  and  beauty  of  the 
heavens  speak  a  clear  and  universal  language.  "  Their 
line  is  gone  out  through  all  the  earth,  and  their  words 
to  the  end  of  the  world."  The  burden  of  their  nightly 
song  is  the  existence  of  a  creative  Intelligence.  There 
is  no  thought  of  their  utility,  of  an  end  for  which  they 
exist,  —  no  complex  relations  of  means  and  ends  to  be 
reasoned  out  before  we  can  receive  their  sublime  mes- 
sage. The  lesson  they  teach  is  as  simple  as  it  is  grand ; 
and  the  argument  based  upon  it  is  so  plain,  that  neither 
bungling  advocates  nor  captious  critics  can  easily  throw 
it  into  confusion. 

If  it  should  turn  out  that  eutaxiolosrv  is  as  strono- 
as  teleology,  the  addition  of  an  independent  and  valid 
proof  of  God's  existence  to  those  already  in  use  would 
be  a  reason  for  separating  this  argument  from  teleology. 
But  it  may  be  that  the  latter  is  weakened  by  the  separa- 
tion. There  ought  to  be  solid  reasons  for  it,  aside  from 
the  mere  increase  in  the  number  of  arguments.  There 
is  a  natural  conservatism  in  human  thought  which  will 
resent  the  change.  Men  who  have  become  accustomed 
to  associate  the  word  "  design  "  with  teleology  alone,  will 
possibly  feel  reluctant  to  entertain  the  proposed  divis- 
ion of  design-arguments  into  two  distinct  species.     Is 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.   21 

tliere  not  a  purpose  in  the  order  of  nature  ?  Why  not 
leave  that  argument  where  it  was  before,  under  teleol- 
ogy ?  Are  not  all  arguments  from  the  order  of  nature 
really  teleological,  no  matter  how  they  are  named  ? 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  deny  that  there  is  a  purpose  in 
the  admirable  harmony  of  the  universe.  But  the  whole 
force  of  teleological  reasoning  consists  in  the  fact,  that 
not  merely  some  purpose  may  be  plausibly  supposed  to 
exist,  but  that  the  purpose  is  unmistakable,  if  it  is  a 
purpose  at  all.  The  purpose  of  the  eye  is  vision,  and 
no  possibility  of  mistake  about  it,  if  it  has  any  purpose 
whatever.  Now,  while  the  fact  of  order  is  plain  enough, 
and  the  supposition  of  an  underlying  purpose  is  plausi- 
ble enough,  it  is  not  so  easy  to  say  just  what  the  pur- 
pose is.  And  teleology  is  certainly  in  a  bad  way,  if, 
having  set  out  to  prove  God's  existence  from  the  fact 
that  special  ends  appear  to  have  been  chosen  and 
wrought  out  in  nature,  its  advocate  is  unable  to  specify 
what  the  end  is,  from  the  selection  and  accomplishment 
of  which,  as  a  premise,  he  hopes  to  reach  his  desired 
conclusion  by  legitimate  reasoning. 

But  suppose  we  say  that  order  is  an  end  in  itself? 
Very  well :  how,  then,  was  it  brought  to  pass  ?  What 
are  the  means?  Can  you  specify  them  minutely?  Is 
not  order  too  broad,  and,  so  to  speak,  diffuse  a  thing  to 
be  of  any  teleological  value  ?  That  argument  is  forcible 
only  when  structures  and  forces  are,  as  it  were,  focused 
upon  a  definite  result.  But  order  is  produced  in  a 
thousand  different  wa}^s  and  places.  Turn  it  about  as 
you  will,  call  it  a  means  or  call  it  an  end,  the  notion  of 
order  sturdily  refuses  to  shape  itself  as  a  valid  teleo- 
logical argument.  But  why  grieve  over  that  ?  Order  is 
in  itself  a  mark  of  intelligence  just  as  clearly  as  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  an  end.     If  by  main  force  you 


22  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

thrust  it  under  the  relation  of  means  and  ends,  it  will 
give  you  but  a  halting  and  unwilling  service.  Why 
not  leave  it  where  it  belongs  ?  why  so  eager  to  spoil  a 
good  eutaxiological  argument  to  make  a  bad  teleologi- 
cal  one  ? 

But  suppose  that  the  advocate  of  the  old  teleology 
returns  to  the  charge  once  more  with  the  suggestion 
that  law  is  the  means  by  which  order  is  maintained. 
That  notion  might  be  sound  enough  in  political  science, 
but  not  in  physics  or  in  physico-theology.  Human 
laws  are  a  means  of  preserving  order,  but  nature's  laws 
are  a  different  affair  altogether.  Natural  law,  instead 
of  being  the  cause  of  order,  is  merely  one  form  of  order : 
it  is  order  itself  under  another  name.  Law  is  merely 
an  expression  of  constancy  in  the  operation  of  forces. 
It  signifies  that  forces  move  in  a  regular,  that  is,  an 
orderly,  manner.  Now,  not  only  is  it  a  difficult  matter 
to  point  out  the  means  by  which  other  forms  of  order 
are  brought  about,  and  particularly  so  in  the  case  of 
the  orderly  movement  of  forces,  —  who  can  tell  why 
or  by  what  means  gravitation  acts  according  to  the  law 
of  inverse  squares? — but  when  order  appears  under 
the  form  of  law  it  is  positively  repugnant  and  hostile  to 
the  radical  notion  of  teleology.  Law  is  unbending  and 
universal;  teleology  asserts  that  there  has  been  a  bend- 
ing, a  modification  of  structures  directed  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  a  special  result.  Fixedness  and  universality 
are  quite  the  opposites  of  adaptation  and  specialty. 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  constant  encroach- 
ment of  the  province  of  eutaxiology  upon  that  of  tele- 
ology >  —  a  diminution  of  the  latter  which  has  progressed 
just  in  proportion  as  men  learned  the  lesson  that  Gocl 
rules  by  fixed  laws  rather  than  by  special  interventions. 
The  question  whether  there  is  any  thing  left  of  tele- 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.    23 

ology,  or,  granting  that  it  has  some  standing-room 
now,  whether  there  will  be  any  thing  left  of  it  after 
science  has  done  its  best  or  worst  to  reduce  every 
thing  under  fixed  laws,  —  that  question  is  held  in  abey- 
ance for  the  present.  But,  assuming  that  it  may  possi- 
bly receive  an  affirmative  answer,  that  there  is  flexibility 
as  well  as  fixedness  in  nature,  that  there  are  such  nu- 
merous convergences  of  things  and  forces  to  a  particular 
issue  that  any  philosophical  view  of  the  whole  system 
must  take  these  into  the  account  as  well  as  the  inflexible1 
order  of  the  cosmos,  —  then  it  is  obvious,  that,  if  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  teleology,  it  is  not  only  a  thing  quite 
distinct  from  eutaxiology,  but  the  very  opposite  of  it. 
Flexibility  and  specialty  characterize  the  one,  but  fixed- 
ness and  universality  are  the  marks  of  the  other.  These 
opposite  characteristics  furnish  ample  ground  for  refus- 
ing to  leave  both  together  under  the  same  name  and  in 
the  same  province  of  argument,  —  ample  ground  for  the 
erection  of  eutaxiology  into  a  distinct  argument  with  a 
distinct  name. 

But,  in  thus  emphasizing  the  sharp  contrast  between 
these  two  arguments  for  the  purpose  of  justifying  my 
classification  and  nomenclature,  it  may  seem  that  I  have 
so  far  overdone  my  task  as  to  make  them  appear,  not 
only  distinct,  but  repugnant,  hostile,  irreconcilable,  and 
mutually  destructive  the  one  to  the  other.  It  is  there- 
fore now  in  order  to  set  forth  their  relations  of  harmony 
and  likeness  if  they  have  any.  Such  relations  do  exist, 
and  require  but  a  moment's  reflection  to  discover  them. 
Radically  different  and  even  opposite  in  character  as 
they  are,  still  they  are  not  opposed  and  hostile,  but  har- 
monious. Eutaxiology  furnishes  the  general  ground 
upon  which  teleology  builds  up  definite  results.  If  the 
scene  which  nature  unfolds  always  presents  certain  hard 


24  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  inflexible  lines  of  order,  and  at  the  same  time  cer- 
tain flexible  lines  which  shape  themselves  into  definite 
and  graceful  forms,  the  whole  picture  is  none  the  less 
harmonious  for  that.  There  is  unity  of  composition, 
notwithstanding  the  several  elements  are  in  sharp  con- 
trast. 

Not  only  are  these  elements  harmonious  whenever 
they  are  found  together,  they  are  almost  always  to- 
gether, almost  inseparable  in  nature.  Wherever  the 
one  is  present,  the  other  is  more  or  less  involved.  In  the 
analysis  of  teleology  the  divine  element  appears  as  a  pur- 
pose ;  in  eutaxiolog}^  it  appears  as  a  plan.  The  concep- 
tion of  a  plan,  t}^pe,  or  pattern  realized  in  material 
forms  is,  indeed,  quite  distinct  from  the  conception  of 
an  end  accomplished  by  suitable  means;  but,  though 
clearly  distinct,  it  is  entirely  harmonious,  and  thus  capa- 
ble of  co-existence  in  the  same  object,  or  in  the  same 
series  of  operations.  General  plans  and  special  pur- 
poses are  alike  products  of  mind :  they  both  alike  and 
equally  involve  the  notion  of  a  foreseeing  intelligence 
and  a  determining  will.  This  brings  them  into  a  very 
close  likeness,  and  the  more  when  we  observe  that  the 
presence  of  the  one  frequently  involves  the  other  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree.  For  instance,  the  conception 
of  a  given  function  as  an  end  involves  the  conception  of 
the  plan  of  an  organ  as  a  means.  Respiration  involves 
the  conception  of  lungs  constructed  upon  some  general 
pattern.  Every  clear  case  of  teleology  involves  eutaxio- 
logical  elements. 

Is  the  converse  equally  true  ?  Is  there  a  purpose  in 
every  example  of  order  ?  We  have  already  seen  that  if 
there  is,  —  and  no  one  who  admits  any  purposes  at  all  in 
nature  would  feel  competent  to  deny  that  there  may  be, 
—  still  it  cannot,  in  many  cases,  be  so  specified  as  to  base 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EUTAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.     25 

a  teleological  argument  upon  it.  The  typical  vertebrate 
limb  terminating  in  five  digits  is  a  plan  realized  in  thou- 
sands of  material  forms  ;  and  it  is  probable  there  is  a 
purpose  in  all  this  persistent  exhibition  of  a  morpho- 
logical type,  though  it  is  not  obvious  what  the  purpose 
is,  —  at  least  not  so  obvious  as  in  the  case  of  organs  in 
relation  to  their  functions.  Hence  it  appears  that  the 
converse  is  not  true  in  the  same  sense  and  to  the  same 
extent. 

In  another  sense,  however,  the  teleological  element  is 
clearly  present  in  all  these  cases.  All  the  limbs  built 
upon  this  general  plan  have  some  function,  either  walk- 
ing or  grasping  or  swimming  or  flying.  But,  the  mo- 
ment you  turn  your  thought  into  this  channel,  it  is  the 
contrast  and  opposition  of  teleology  and  eutaxiology  — 
or  morphology,  the  biological  phase  of  eutaxiology  — 
that  forces  itself  upon  your  notice.  Teleology  seizes 
the  general  pentamerous  type  which  morphology  pre- 
sents, and  plays  all  sorts  of  tricks  with  it ;  spreads  it  out 
into  a  paddle  for  swimming,  or  a  wing  for  flying ;  swings 
round  one  or  two  of  the  digits  to  oppose  the  others  for 
grasping ;  lops  off  one  here,  another  there,  or  all  but 
one  of  them  for  the  sake  of  concentration  and  solidar- 
ity, as  in  the  foot  of  the  horse ;  in  short,  takes  the 
greatest  liberties  with  the  general  type,  treating  it  as  a 
sort  of  convenient  platform,  or  stage,  upon  which  to 
produce  her  ever-changing  play  of  special  ends. 


26  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

IV. 

THE  USE  AND  ABUSE  OF  THE  WORD  "DESIGN." 

What  is  meant  by  design  in  natural  theology? 
From  the  fact  that  it  has  been  constantly  associated 
with  teleology,  we  might  infer  that  it  means  contrivance 
for  a  purpose,  or  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end.1  That 
has  undoubtedly  been  the  thought  of  authors  ^n  the 
majority  of  places  where  they  have  written  the  word. 
But  it  is  an  ambiguous  word :  it  has  a  number  of  other 
meanings.  It  may  mean  preliminary  sketch,  outline, 
plan,  or  delineation,  as  in  drawing  and  architecture ; 
or  it  may  mean  scheme,  plot,  device,  aim,  intent,  or 
purpose.  Any  one  who  will  examine  the  writings  of 
design-advocates  will  easily  find  examples  of  gliding 
insensibly  from  the  meaning  usual  with  them,  contri- 
vance for  a  purpose,  to  some  other  of  these  numerous 
meanings.  It  is  a  pity  that  this  ambiguous  term  should 
have  so  long  held  a  foremost  place  in  physico-theology ; 
and,  if  this  branch  of  theology  is  ever  to  have  any  pre- 
tensions to  exactness  and  scientific  method,  the  word 
"design"  must  either  be  wholly  banished  from  its  vo- 
cabulary, or  at  least  remanded  to  a  subordinate  place, 
and  used  with  extreme  caution,  in  order  not  to  mislead 
and  confuse  both  author  and  reader. 

1  Whewell's  definition  of  design.  "  We  direct  our  thoughts  to  an 
action  we  are  about  to  perform:  we  intend  to  do  it;  we  make  it  our  aim ; 
we  place  it  before  us,  and  act  with  purpose  (propositum) ;  we  design  it,  or 
mark  it  beforehand  (designo)."  Elements  of  Morality,  I.,  i.  7.  This 
would  be  a  better  definition  of  designate  than  design.  He  has  been  too 
much  influenced  by  the  force  of  the  Latin  original.  Besides,  the  range 
of  meaning  of  the  noun  is  considerably  different  from  that  of  the  verb, 
and  it  is  the  noun  with  which  we  have  to  deal  in  teleology. 


THE  USE  AND  ABUSE  OF  THE  WORD  "DESIGN."     27 

Although  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  do  so,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  present  an  extended  list  of  examples  to 
show  what  abuses  have  arisen  in  the  use  of  this  word. 
The  bare  fact  that  teleology  and  eutaxiology  have  been 
lumped  together  as  a  single  design-argument  is  enough 
to  condemn  it.  How  so?  Are  they  not  both  concerned 
with  the  question  of  design  in  nature  ?  Certainly  they 
are;  and  that  is  just  what  I  complain  of,  —  that  is  to 
say,  that  design  is  so  versatile  in  meaning  that  it  can  be 
applied  to  both  of  these  arguments  in  spite  of  their 
radical  distinctness  and  sharp  contrasts.  It  has  even 
caused  a  persistent  ignoring  of  the  fact  that  they  were 
distinct.  Were  they  not  both  design-arguments,  and 
therefore  one  and  the  same  argument? 
^^JJwo  considerable  infelicities  are  involved  in  the  use 
of  the  word  "design."  The  first  is  rhetorical.  Shall  I 
-fcay  argument  from  design,  argument  for  design,  argu- 
ment of  design,  argument  respecting  design?  or  shall  I 
"dodge  the  delicate  question  of  preference  among  pretty 
little  prepositions,  and  (as  some  men  have  died  bachelors 
rather  than  grieve  the  other  fair  charmers  by  choosing 
one)  bluntly  say  design-argument  ?  What  is  the  trouble 
about  those  prepositions?  None  whatever:  the  mis- 
chief lies  in  the  word  "  design."  There  is  some  real  diffi- 
culty or  ambiguity  about  that,  which  has  been  at  the 
bottom  of  all  these  variations  in  the  phrase-form  used  as 
a  synonyme  of  teleology.  All  the  variations  given  above 
have  been  actually  employed  by  different  authors. 

The  reason  of  it  is  this :  if  your  argument  is  teleologi- 
cal,  then  "  design  "  means  "  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
end,"  and  it  is  an  argument  from  design ;  that  is,  from 
the  fact  of  adaptation,  as  a  premise,  to  an  intelligent 
author  of  that  adaptation  as  a  conclusion.  But,  if  your 
argument  is  eutaxiological,  then  " design  "  means  "plan," 


28  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  it  is  an  argument  for  design ;  that  is,  the  fact  of 
order  in  nature  is  3- our  premise,  from  which  you  infer  a 
preconceived  plan,  or  design,  as  a  conclusion.  So  that 
it  is  indeed  true  that  both  kinds  of  reasoning  have  to  do 
with  design,  but  in  very  different  senses  of  that  word. 

It  turns  out  that  none  of  those  phrase-forms  are  cor- 
rect. If  we  say  argument  from  design,  that  might  an- 
swer as  a  synonyme  for  teleology,  were  it  not  for  a  couple 
of  serious  objections.  One  of  these  will  appear  pres- 
ently; the  other  is,  that,  since  eutaxiology  has  to  do 
with  design  as  well  as  teleology,  it  is  inexpedient  to 
incorporate  the  word  "design  "  in  the  name  of  the  latter. 
The  same  objection  lies  against  the  phrase,  "  argument 
for  design,"  as  a  synonyme  of  eutaxiology.  And  if  we 
should  attempt  to  deal  out  an  even-handed  justice  to 
both  arguments  by  calling  one  the  argument  from  de- 
sign, and  the  other  the  argument  for  design,  that  would 
involve  the  awkwardness  of  using  design  in  opposite 
senses  in  two  closely  related  phrases  in  the  same 
science. 

It  is  also  inadmissible  to  speak  of  the  design-argu- 
ment, or  the  argument  of  design,  or  the  argument  re- 
specting design ;  for  in  each  case  it  is  implied  that  there 
is  but  one  design-argument.  These  phrase-forms  all 
involve  and  imply  a  failure  to  perceive  the  distinction 
between  eutaxiology  and  teleology,  and  are  indeed 
largely  responsible  for  that  failure.  It  is,  however,  con- 
venient sometimes,  and  always  quite  admissible,  to  use 
these  phrase-forms  in  the  plural,  —  to  speak  of  eutaxiol- 
ogy and  teleology  collectively  as  design-arguments.  Or 
we  may  speak  of  either  one  of  them  as  a  design-argu- 
ment, but  not  properly  as  the  design-argument.  De- 
sign, with  all  its  shortcomings,  is  too  good  a  word,  and 
too  firmly  fixed  by  usage,  to  be  wholly  banished  from 


THE  USE  AND  ABUSE  OF  THE  WORD   "DESIGN."     29 

natural  theology.  And,  if  used  at  all,  it  may  be  con- 
veniently employed  in  the  general  way  indicated  by 
the  phrase  design-arguments,  or  arguments  respecting 
design;  these  phrases  being  understood  as  equivalent 
expressions  for  the  sum  of  eutaxiological  and  teleologi- 
cal  arguments.  In  this  way,  whatever  convenience  and 
utility  there  is  in  the  word  will  be  preserved,  and  at  the 
same  time  its  power  to  work  mischief  through  ambiguity 
will  be  neutralized. 

The  second  unhappy  consequence  involved  in  the  old 
loose  and  indiscriminate  employment  of  the  word  "  de- 
sign "  was  a  logical  one,  and  so  disastrous  that  it  would 
be  an  abuse  of  terms  to  call  it  a  mere  infelicity.  Design  is 
a  cloak  for  numerous  fallacies.  Some  of  these  have  been 
pointed  out  by  various  writers ;  but  it  does  not  seem  to 
be  sufficient  merely  to  designate  " design"  as  a  dangerous 
word,  and  to  show  that  this  or  that  fallacy  has  resulted 
from  its  use.  The  most  effectual  remedy  would  seem 
to  be  that  of  drawing  hard  and  fast  lines  between 
eutaxiology  and  teleology,  and  showing  in  what  sense 
design  is  used  in  each  of  these  arguments.  This  I  have 
done  already ;  and  a  further  safeguard  against  the 
ambiguities  of  design  will  be  furnished  by  keeping  each 
argument  in  its  proper  place,  and  applying  it  to  its 
proper  use,  as  I  shall  show  in  the  sequel. 
•  One  of  these  fallacies  which  has  been  frequently 
criticised  is  that  involved  in  the  proposition,  "  Design 
implies  a  designer."  Irons,  McCosh,  Powell,  and  sev- 
eral others  have  noticed  this  fallacy,  some  of  these  criti- 
cisms being  nearly  half  a  century  old ;  and  yet  we  find 
that  Dr.  Hodge  opens  his  discussion  of  teleology  with 
this  syllogism :  "  Design  supposes  a  designer.  The 
world  everywhere  exhibits  marks  of  design.  There- 
fore the  world  owes  its  existence  to  an  intelligent  au- 


30  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

thor." 2  He  goes  on  to  explain  design  as  including, 
"  (1)  The  selection  of  an  end  to  be  attained.  (2)  The 
choice  of  suitable  means  for  its  attainment.  (3)  The 
actual  application  of  those  means  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  proposed  end.  Such  being  the  nature  of 
design,  it  is  a  self-evident  truth,  or  even  an  identical 
proposition,  that  design  is  indicative  of  intelligence, 
will,  and  power." 

Exactly  so :  the  major  premise  is,  as  he  says,  an 
identical  proposition.  But,  that  being  the  case,  the 
syllogism  reduces  to  this  form :  A  is  A ;  B  is  A ;  therefore 
B  is  A.  No  valid  syllogism  can  be  constructed  with 
only  two  terms.  The  truism  contained  in  the  major 
premise  contributes  nothing  to  legitimate  reasoning,  but 
serves  only  to  cloak  a  fallacy. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES. 

Another  phrase  which  has  been  used  as  a  synonyme 
of  teleology  is  the  "doctrine  of  final  causes."  To 
show  that  this  is  still  more  objectionable  than  any  of 
the  names  containing  the  word  "design,"  is  the  object 
of  the  following  discussion. 

Aristotle  stands  sponsor  for  final  causes  ;  also  for  the 
dictum  that  nature  does  nothing  in  vain,  —  two  things 
which  have  done  infinite  mischief  in  physico-theology. 
Respecting  any  object  in  nature,  the  question  may  be 
asked,  What  is  it  good  for?  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion designates  the  Aristotelian  so-called  final  cause  of 

i  Systematic  Theology,  i.  215. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  31 

that  object.  What  is  a  house  good  for  ?  To  dwell  in : 
habitableness  is  therefore  the  final  cause  of  a  house. 

Aristotle's  statement  of  his  fourth  principle  is,1  That 
on  account  of  ivhich  a  thing  was  to  be  and  the  good  of 
it,  for  this  is  the  END  of  all  becoming  and  change.  It 
might  easily  be  shown  that  modern  teleologists  have 
understood  final  cause  somewhat  differently  from  Aris- 
totle's own  interpretation  of  it.  But  that  would  be  a 
waste  of  words,  because  the  doctrine  is  vicious  in  any 
form,  whether  it  be  the  primitive  Aristotelian,  or  the 
perverted  scholastic  phase  of  it. 

Ueberweg  says,  — 

"Of  the  four  principles,  matter  (f)  vA^),  form  (rb  cTSog), 
moving  cause  (to  86ev  fj  /cu/770-19),  and  end,  or  final  cause  (t6  ov 
€j/€Ka) ,  the  three  latter  are  often  one  and  the  same  in  fact ; 
for  essence  (form)  and  end  are  in  themselves  identical,  since 
the  proximate  end  of  every  object  consists  in  the  full  devel- 
opment of  its  proper  form  (i.e.,  the  immanent  end  of  every 
object,  by  the  recognition  of  which  the  Aristotelian  doctrine 
of  finality  is  radically  distinguished  from  the  superficial  utili- 
tarian teleology  of  later  philosophers),  and  the  cause  of  mo- 
tion is  at  least  identical  in  kind  with  the  essence  and  the 
end."2 

From  which  it  would  seem  that  Aristotle's  fourth 
principle  was  not  the  ultimate  but  the  proximate  end. 
But  with  teleologists  the  notion  of  final  cause  seems  to 
be  ultimate  and  exclusive  cause,  or  end. 

The  schoolmen  in  the  Middle  Ages  took  up  the 
phrase,  and  manipulated  it  in  their  peculiar  fashion. 
From  their  commentatorial  mills  it  sifted  down  into 
modern    philosophy   and    theology.      What  sort  of   a 

*  to  o5  eVe/ca  (^i>  elvai)  /cat  Taya96vt  Te'Aos  yap  yeviaews  /cat  /aircrew?  nacnjs 
Tovt    eariy) 

2  Hist,  of  Phi.,  i.  162. 


32  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

grist  it  has  become  may  be  gathered  from  Whewell's 
statement  of  it :  — 

"  Thus  we  Decessarily  include  in  our  idea  of  organization 
the  notion  of  an  End,  a  Purpose,  a  Design  ;  or,  to  use  an- 
other phrase  which  has  been  peculiarly  appropriated  in  this 
case,  a  Final  Cause.  This  idea  of  a  Final  Cause  is  an  essen- 
tial condition  in  order  to  the  pursuing  our  researches  re- 
specting organized  bodies.  This  idea  of  Final  Cause  is  not 
deduced  from  the  phenomena  by  reasoning,  but  is  assumed 
as  the  only  condition  under  which  we  can  reason  on  such 
subjects  at  all."  l 

He  refers  to  his  "  History  of  Physiology,"  where, 
says  he, — 

' '  I  have  shown  that  those  who  studied  the  structure  of 
animals  were  irresistibly  led  to  the  conviction  that  the  parts 
of  this  structure  have  each  its  end  or  purpose  ;  that  each 
member  and  organ  not  merely  produces  a  certain  effect  or 
answers  a  certain  use,  but  is  so  framed  as  to  impress  us 
with  the  persuasion  that  it  was  constructed  for  that  use  ;  that 
it  was  intended  to  produce  the  effect.  It  was  there  seen  that 
this  persuasion  was  repeatedly  expressed  in  the  most  em- 
phatic manner  by  Galen  ;  that  it  directed  the  researches  and 
led  to  the  discoveries  of  Harvey ;  that  it  has  always  been 
dwelt  upon  as  a  favorite  contemplation,  and  followed  as  a 
certain  guide,  by  the  best  anatomists ;  and  that  it  is  incul- 
cated by  the  physiologists  of  the  profoundest  views  and  most 
extensive  knowledge  of  our  own  times.  All  these  persons 
have  deemed  it  a  most  certain  and  important  principle  of 
physiology,  that  in  every  organized  structure,  plant,  or  ani- 
mal, each  intelligible  part  has  its  allotted  office ;  each  organ 
is  designed  for  its  appropriate  function ;  that  nature,  in 
these  cases,  produces  nothing  in  vain ;  that,  in  short,  each 
portion  of  the  whole  arangement  has  its  final  cause,  — an  end 

1  Phi.  of  Ind.  Sciences.  B.  ix.  c.  6. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  33 

to  which  it  is  adapted,  and  in  this  end  the  reason  that  it  is 
where  and  what  it  is. 

"  The  use  of  every  organ  has  been  discovered  by  starting 
from  the  assumption  that  it  must  have  some  use.  The  doc- 
trine of  the  circulation  of  the  blood  was,  as  we  have  seen, 
clearly  and  professedly  due  to  the  persuasion  of  a  purpose 
in  the  circulatory  apparatus."  x 

These  statements  involve  all  the  principal  vices  of  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes,  —  the  exaggerated  pretension 
that,  in  "  pursuing  our  researches  respecting  organized 
bodies,"  the  idea  of  final  cause  "  is  assumed  as  the  only 
condition  under  which  we  can  reason  on  such  subjects 
at  all;"  the  ignoring  of  the  distinction  between  use 
and  purpose,  which  plainly  appears  in  the  unconscious- 
ness with  which  he  glides  from  the  one  to  the  other  in 
the  last  quotation,  and  upon  which  fallacy  of  confusion 
his  whole  claim  rests ;  the  maxim  that  nature  does  noth- 
ing in  vain ;  the  notion  of  final  cause  as  ultimate  and 
exclusive,  —  "  the  reason  why  it  (any  organ)  is  where 
and  what  it  is ; "  and  the  confounding  of  the  two  dis- 
tinct notions  of  cause  and  effect,  and  means  and  ends. 
Let  us  examine  some  of  these  weak  points  in  this  doc- 
trine, beginning  with  the  last. 

The  trouble  with  final  causes  is,  that  while  they  are 
not  causes-  at  all,  but  ends  or  purposes,  they  take  on 
the  semblance  of  causes  by  reason  of  this  name  which 
is  applied  to  them.  Thus  we  have  an  inexcusable  jum- 
bling-up  of  two  entirely  distinct  notions.  Entirely 
distinct,  I  say,  and  so  they  are  in  close  analysis  ;  and 
yet  they  are  sufficiently  alike  (here  is  where  the  trouble 
comes  in)  to  lend  themselves  with  great  facility  as 
instruments  of  confusion  and  mischief  and  mistaken 
identity,  —  in  short,  a  whole  "  Comedy  of  Errors  "  when 
1  Hist,  of  Ind.  Sciences,  iii.  511. 


34  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

they  are  set  jigging  and  masquerading  in  each  other's 
clothes  as  they  are  in  the  doctrine  of  final  causes. 

Dr.  Whewell  distinctly  admits  this  objection,  but 
does  not  regard  it  as  fatal :  — 

"The  idea  of  final  cause,  of  end,  purpose,  design,  inten- 
tion, is  altogether  different  from  the  idea  of  cause  as  effi- 
cient cause.  .  .  .  But,  if  the  idea  be  clearly  entertained  and 
steadily  applied,  the  word  is  a  question  of  subordinate  im- 
portance. The  term  final  cause  has  been  long  familiarly 
used,  and  appears  not  likely  to  lead  to  confusion."  * 

In  order  to  judge  for  ourselves  of  the  extent  of  the 
danger,  which  he  admits  does  exist,  that  this  term  may 
lead  to  confusion,  let  us  look  into  it  a  little  more 
closely.  The  doctrine  of  final  causes  is  clearly  a  tele- 
ological  affair:  hence  we  must  recall  the  analysis  of 
teleology  already  given,  in  order  to  see  whether  any  of 
the  elements  of  that  argument  can  properly  be  called 
a  cause.  We  have  in  the  example  previously  given, 
that  of  hearing,  (1)  the  ear,  (2)  hearing  as  a  function, 
(3)  the  relation  of  the  first  to  the  second,  (4)  the  re- 
duplication of  all  these  three  elements  in  creative 
thought,  (5)  the  determination  of  creative  will. 

If  "any  one  of  these  is  a  cause,  it  is  certainly  the  last. 
But  in  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  the  formula  would 
be,  Hearing  is  the  final  cause  of  the  ear.  That  is  what 
it  is  good  for,  in  Aristotelian  phraseology;  that  is  "the 
end  to  which  it  is  adapted,"  "the  reason  that  it  is 
where  and  what  it  is,"  in  the  phraseology  of  Whewell. 
Let  us  see  what  consequences  are  likely  to  follow  from 
the  proposition  that  hearing  is  the  cause  of  the  ear. 
No  one  but  a  veteran  teleologist  ever  thinks  of  cause 
in  any  other  sense  than  as  efficient  cause ;  and  even  for 

i  Phi.  of  Ind.  Sciences,  p.  628. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  35 

the  teleologist  it  requires  a  special  effort  to  think  of  it 
simply  as  an  end  or  purpose.  It  looks  very  much  as 
if  Whewell  himself  mixed  a  little  efficient  cause  into 
his  notion  of  final  cause  when  he  spoke  of  it  as  the 
reason  for  any  organ  being  such  as  it  is  and  placed 
where  it  is.  Whether  he  did  or  not,  the  ordinary 
reader  would  be  sure  to  do  it ;  and  we  will  endeavor 
to  see  where  it  will  lead  him. 

Hearing  is  the  final  cause  of  the  ear ;  but  is  it  hear- 
ing as  a  function,  or  hearing  as  an  end?  The  latter  of 
course,  because  end  and  final  cause  are  synonymous.  I 
say  the  latter  of  course ;  because,  in  the  light  of  a  clear 
analysis  of  teleology,  there  can  be  no  possible  doubt 
about  it.  But  would  it  be  a  matter  of  course  in  the 
absence  of  that  analysis?  The  old  teleologists  failed 
entirely  to  distinguish  between  function  and  purpose. 
This  is  notoriously  true  of  Whewell :  he  glides  from 
use  to  purpose,  and  skips  back  again  to  function,  with 
a  serene  and  guileless  unconsciousness  of  any  differ- 
ence between  them.  If  he  had  seen  the  distinction,  it 
must  instantly  have  opened  his  eyes  to  the  monstrous 
fallacy  of  his  pretension,  that  an  apprehension  of  the 
idea  of  final  cause  was  the  only  condition  under  which 
we  can  reason  at  all  about  organized  beings.  Turn 
back  to  the  last  quotation  but  one,  and  observe,  that,  if 
he  had  stuck  to  the  word  use  all  the  way  through,  it 
would  have  given  no  support  to  his  claim  of  the  value 
of  final  causes ;  but  in  the  very  crisis  of  the  statement 
he  slips  in  the  word  purpose  instead  of  use,  just  as  if  it 
were  synonymous  with  it.  If  he  used  these  words  and 
the  notions  they  represent  so  indiscriminately,  it  would 
be  surprising  if  his  readers  were  not  still  more  confused 
about  them.  So  that,  when  it  is  said  that  hearing  is  the 
cause  of  the  ear,  it  is  just  as  likely  to  be  understood 


36  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  the  function  as  of  the  purpose.  Suppose  it  is  the 
latter,  however  :  what  follows  ?  The  statement  will  be, 
that  the  conception  in  creative  thought  of  hearing  as  a 
desirable  end  was  the  cause  of  the  ear.  How  would 
such  a  statement  be  commonly  understood?  If  it  con- 
veyed any  meaning  at  all,  which  is  somewhat  doubtful, 
it  must  be  either,  that,  if  God  had  not  happily  thought 
of  hearing,  the  ear  would  never  have  existed ;  or  that 
the  conception  acting  as  a  motive  was  the  cause  of  that 
volition  which  set  in  motion  the  whole  train  of  agencies 
resulting  in  the  production  of  the  ear.  The  first  alterna- 
tive makes  it  a  condition  rather  than  a  cause ;  and  the 
second  is  almost  blasphemous,  because  it  implies  a 
denial  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  of  the  Almighty 
himself. 

Suppose,  then,  it  is  hearing  as  a  function  that  is  the 
cause  of  the  ear.  Will  the  veteran  teleologist  sub- 
scribe to  that  opinion?  If  so,  he  surrenders  his  whole 
case.  That  is  precisely  what  those  evolutionists  who 
deny  all  teleology  assert.  The  utility  of  hearing,  they 
say,  even  in  the  rudest  beginnings  of  the  ear,  was  so 
great,  that,  in  the  struggle  for  life,  natural  selection 
and  inheritance  carried  the  organ  right  up  to  perfec- 
tion, without  any  purpose  about  it.  The  assertion 
that  the  physiological  function  of  the  ear  was  the  cause 
of  its  present  perfection  at  least,  if  not  of  its  origin, 
would  be  received  with  applause ;  but  the  plaudits 
would  come  from  the  wrong  quarter. 

See  where  the  devout  teleologist  is  liable  to  be 
landed  if  he  starts  with  the  assertion  that  hearing  is 
the  cause  of  the  ear.  He  is  brought  to  face  a  dilemma 
of  which  one  horn  pushes  him  to  the  verge  of  blas- 
phemy, and  the  other  into  the  enemy's  camp.  That  is 
what  may  come  of  playing  fast  and  loose  with  words, 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  37 

and  mixing  up  two  distinct  notions  in  one  phrase.  The 
safe  course  will  be  not  to  say  that  hearing  is  the  cause 
of  the  ear  at  all :  it  is  sure  to  be  misunderstood,  and 
there  is  no  need  of  it.  When  we  have  good  plain 
words  to  express  the  only  legitimate  meaning,  —  viz., 
that  hearing  is  the  purpose  of  the  ear,  —  why  should 
we  resort  to  an  obsolete  scholastic  phrase,  and  say  that 
hearing  is  the  final  cause  of  the  ear  ? 

When  you  say  cause  you  are  supposed  to  mean  it. 
There  is  but  one  kind  of  cause  known  to  mankind  in 
general,  and  that  is  efficient  cause,  —  a  cause  that  causes 
something.  But  the  schoolmen  were  so  much  better 
off  than  mankind  in  general,  that  they  had  four  kinds 
of  causes,  —  the  formal,  the  material,  the  efficient,  and 
the  final  cause.  They  supposed  that  they  got  all  these 
from  Aristotle ;  but  he  probably  regarded  the  first  two, 
matter  and  form  (y  vXrj  and  to  eTSos),  as  principles,  or 
categories  of  existence  rather  than  causes;  and,  whether 
he  would  agree  to  it  or  not,  it  is  the  real  fact,  that  the 
fourth  is  not  a  cause  any  more  than  the  first  two.  At 
all  events,  the  notion  of  cause  as  efficient  holds  the 
common  mind  so  firmly  and  exclusively,  that  confusion 
is  sure  to  be  the  result  of  attempting  to  use  the  word 
"  cause  "  in  any  other  sense.  There  is  no  conceivable 
advantage  in  it  which  cannot  be  gained  as  well  or 
better  in  some  other  way ;  and  the  dangers,  difficulties, 
and  objections  involved  in  it  are  real,  radical,  and 
fatal. 

It  would  be  an  interesting  piece  of  knowledge,  if  it 
were  attainable,  to  find  out  exactly  what  was  the  ordi- 
nary state  of  mind  of  a  believer  in  final  causes  in 
respect  to  them  and  their  relation  to  efficient  cause; 
and  whether  they  always  succeeded  in  keeping  them 
distinct,  or  sometimes  themselves  shared  in  the  confu- 


38  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

sion  which  their  use  of  terms  was  liable  to  produce  in 
the  minds  of  their  readers.  Just  what  was  the  "  idea  " 
of  which  Whewell  speaks  when  he  says,  that,  if  it  "  be 
clearly  entertained  and  steadily  applied,  the  word  in 
question  is  of  subordinate  importance "  ?  Of  course 
the  answer  to  that  is  quite  attainable :  it  was  end,  or 
purpose,  though  he  called  it  cause.  But  his  language 
implies  some  difficulty  in  holding  on  to  this  notion  in 
its  strictness,  and  yet  calling  it  a  cause.  It  is  difficult. 
It  requires  a  special  and  constant  effort.  The  teleolo 
gist  can  manage  it  so  long  as  his  mental  machinery  is, 
so  to  speak,  screwed  up  to  it.  But,  as  we  often  get  a 
very  different  notion  of  a  man  by  seeing  him  in  church 
on  Sunday  from  that  obtained  by  a  business  transaction 
with  him  on  Monday,  the  interesting  point  would  be  to 
get  at  the  every-day  conceptions  of  these  men  who 
believed  in  final  causes. 

In  the  first  place,  what  did  they  ordinarily  mean  when 
they  used  the  word  cause  ?  That,  too,  is  a  question 
easily  answered.  They  meant  efficient  cause,  just  as 
mankind  in  general  do,  who  know  nothing  about  any 
other  kind  of  cause  but  that.  In  his  discussion  of 
"The  Idea  of  Cause,"  Dr.  Whewell  thus  defines  it: 
"  By  cause  we  mean  some  quality,  power,  or  efficacy,  by 
which  a  state  of  things  produces  a  succeeding  state."  1 
He  gives  this  simply  as  a  general  definition  of  cause, 
without  specifying  it  as  efficient  cause.  But  he  plainly 
meant  that,  though  he  left  off  the  adjunct  "efficient;" 
and  he  goes  on  through  three  chapters  talking  about 
cause  just  as  if  there  were  only  one  kind  of  cause  in  the 
world.  He  does  not  call  it  efficient  cause  in  all  those 
chapters,  but  simply  cause.  Subsequently,  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  final  cause,  he  brings  in  the  term  "  efficient." 

1  Phi.  of  Ind.  Sciences,  i.  166. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  39 

It  was  a  matter  of  course  with  himself  as  well  as  his 
readers,  that,  when  he  said  cause,  he  meant  efficient 
cause. 

The  same  is  true  of  Dr.  McCosh.  In  a  long  discus- 
sion of  "  cause  and  effect,"  he  seems  utterly  oblivious 
of  any  other  than  efficient  causes.  Nevertheless,  he  uses 
elsewhere  the  term  "  final  cause."  It  might  be  shown, 
that  the  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  gener- 
ally thought  of  cause  as  efficient.  So  far  our  attempt 
to  get  at  their  every-day  thoughts  of  this  matter  have 
been  reasonably  successful.  But  in  the  further  attempt 
to  round  out  and  complete  this  interesting  piece  of 
knowledge  by  inquiring  whether  they  ever  tripped, 
nodded,  or  got  confused  in  respect  to  the  two  kinds 
of  causes,  and  what  was  their  notion  of  the  relation  of 
final  to  efficient  cause,  the  path  of  this  investigation  is 
not  so  plain  and  easy. 

It  is  not  certain  that  Whewell  always  kept  up  a  clear 
distinction  in  his  own  mind  between  final  and  efficient 
causes.  As  already  hinted,  his  language  about  the 
reason  of  a  thing  being  "where  and  what  it  is,"  smacks 
somewhat  of  efficient  cause.  If  his  thought  was  at  all 
tinged  with  that  notion,  then  he  himself  was  weltering 
in  the  "  confusion  "  to  which  he  hoped  the  term  "  final 
cause  "  "  was  not  likely  to  lead."  However  that  may  be, 
it  is  certain  that  another  advocate  of  final  causes  was 
thoroughly  confused.  I  mean  Dr.  Cudworth.  His 
general  notion  seems  to  be,  that  all  mental  causes  are 
final  causes ;  and  yet  he  speaks  of  the  "  wisdom  and 
contrivance  of  the  divine  Architect"  as  "the  true 
efficient  cause."  * 

Upon  the  last  point  —  that  is,  the  relation  of  final  to 
efficient  cause  —  Kant's  definition  of  end  may  give  us 

1  See  pp.  115-117  of  this  volume. 


40  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

some  light :  "  An  end  is  the  object  of  a  conception, 
provided  that  this  (the  conception)  is  considered  as  the 
cause  of  that  (the  object),  the  real  ground  of  its 
possibility."  l 

Here  is  a  definition  within  a  definition,  and  the  inci- 
dental one  is  better  than  the  principal  one.  An  end 
need  not  be  a  material  object,  as  seems  to  be  implied 
here  :  but  the  incidental  definition  of  cause  is  "  the 
real  ground  of  its  (the  object's)  possibility."  All  the 
associations  of  this  definition,  as  well  as  the  definition 
itself,  which  would  not'  well  apply  to  efficient  cause, 
show  that  Kant  was  speaking  of  final  cause.  The 
ground  of  possibility  of  a  thing  is  of  the  nature  of  a 
condition  :  hence  it  appears  that  final  cause  was  a  con- 
ditional notion  in  the  mind  of  the  German  philosopher. 
But  each  condition  is  a  part  of  the  efficient  cause :  it  is 
one  of  the  circumstances,  all  of  which  must  be  taken 
into  the  account  in  an  exhaustive  statement  of  the 
efficient  cause  :  so  that  here  again  we  have  a  blending 
and  mingling  of  the  two  notions,  instead  of  a  clean 
separation. 

Not  that  Kant  was  to  blame,  however,  for  not  making 
a  clean  separation  of  the  two  notions.  It  cannot  be 
done,  at  least  not  without  doing  violence  to  nature  and 
truth.  He  undoubtedly  hit  upon  the  correct  statement 
of  the  relation  when  he  made  it  conditional.  We  have 
previously  encountered  the  same  notion  in  this  discus- 
sion. In  speaking  of  the  interpretations  which  might 
be  placed  upon  the  scholastic  formula.  —  Hearing  is  the 
cause  of  the  ear.  —  one  alternative  (and  the  only  admis- 
sible one)  was.  that  the  conception  of  hearing  as  an  end 
was  a  condition  of  the  existence  oi  the  ear.     Kant  was 

1  Enquiry  into  the  Grounds  of  Proof  for  the  Existence  of  God, 
p.  70,  note. 


THE  DOCTRINE   OF  FINAL   CAUSES.  41 

right  in  making  the  final  cause  a  condition,  because,  in 
a  true  teleology  emancipated  from  scholastic  "finality," 
the  conception  of  an  end  is  of  the  nature  of  a  condition. 

But  the  vital  consideration  here  again  emerges,  that 
the  notion  of  an  end  is,  though  distinct,  very  closely 
related  to  the  notion  of  efficient  cause ;  that  it  is,  in 
fact,  a  part  of  the  cause.  Hence  the  "  Comedy  of 
Errors."  The  twin  brothers  in  the  same  dress  —  that  is, 
both  ideas  clothed  in  the  same  word  "cause  "  —  make  it 
a  tough  problem  even  for  the  veteran  teleologist  to  dis- 
tinguish them,  and  entirely  too  much  for  the  "lay 
brethren  "  to  manage. 

Upon  the  whole,  it  appears  that  the  advocates  of  final 
causes  ordinarily  thought  of  cause  just  as  other  people 
do.  When  they  said  cause  they  meant  efficient  cause. 
And  so  deep  and  strong  was  this  current  of  their 
thought,  that  it  was  hard  rowing  for  them  to  bring  their 
minds  up  to  the  conception  of  final  cause  as  simply  pur- 
pose,—  so  hard  that  we  find  some  of  them  in  precarious 
shallows,  and  others  actually  aground  upon  the  mud- 
banks  of  error  and  confusion.  Hence  it  seems  highly 
inexpedient,  as  it  is  wholly  unnecessary,  to  use  the  word 
"cause"  in  any  other  than  the  commonly  accepted  sense 
of  efficient  cause. 

But  we  have  as  yet  dealt  with  only  one-half  of  the 
phrase  "final  cause."  The  word  "final"  is  no  less  ob- 
jectionable than  "cause."  Its  proper  function  in  the 
phrase  is  to  direct  the  mind  to  an  end  (finis)  ;  and,  if  it 
stopped  there,  all  would  be  well,  —  at  least,  not  so  bad 
as  it  is.  It  would,  indeed,  be  a  self-stultifying  phrase 
even  then ;  for  one  end  of  it  is  a  plain  "  end,"  and  the 
other  a  fine,  wire-drawn,  metaphysical  "cause."  The 
two  opposite  notions  might,  however,  neutralize  each 
other,  and  less  harm  be  done.     But  "final"  does  not 


42  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

stop  short  and  conclude  its  meaning  when  it  has  desig- 
nated an  end  —  or  cause  (?)  (I  am  really  in  doubt  which 
word  would  give  the  orthodox  finish  to  that  sentence. 
In  this  "  Comedy  of  Errors,"  where  "  causes "  and 
"  ends  "  —  Dromios  and  Antipholuses  —  are  cantering 
indistinguishable  about  the  stage,  one  is  very  liable  to 
salute  the  wrong  person  as  his  dear  friend  who  owes 
him  money.)  It  goes  on  to  describe  it  as  the  ultimate 
and  exclusive  end,  or  cause.  When  }^ou  have  given  the 
final  cause  of  a  thing,  there  is  no  more  to  be  said. 
That's  the  end  of  it.  You  have  given  the  reason  for  its 
being  "  where  and  what  it  is." 

Now  nothing  could  be  more  aside  from  the  true*  aim 
and  intent  of  teleology  than  such  a  notion  as  that.  The 
purpose  of  any  organ  is  always  proximate  and  subordi- 
nate, not  ultimate,  not  final.  Lungs  exist  for  the  pur- 
pose of  respiration :  but  that  is  subordinate  to  the 
existence  and  well-being  of  the  animal;  that  possibly 
is  subordinate  to  the  utility  of  the  animal  to  man,  to 
plough  his  fields  for  example ;  that  to  the  raising  of 
grain;  and  so  on  through  a  long  series  of  proximate 
ends,  all  subordinate  to  some  ultimate  divine  purpose. 
This  word  final  throws  a  tremendous  load  upon  the 
teleologist,  and  a  wholly  needless  one.  It  places  him 
in  the  attitude  of  attempting  to  demonstrate,  not  merely 
a  purpose,  but  the  purpose,  the  only,  the  ultimate,  the 
exclusive,  the  final  intention  of  the  Creator  in  respect 
to  each  structure.  It  has  been  objected  to  teleological 
reasoning,  that  it  is  presumptuous  in  man  to  ascribe  any 
intention  whatever  to  the  Deity.1  How  much  more  pre- 
sumptuous to  assume  that  we  have  entered  so  far  into 

1  "  I  take  care  not  to  ascribe  to  God  any  intention."  —  Geoffroy  St. 
Hi  11  aire:  Phil.  Zool.,  10.  Des  Cartes  expressed  himself  substantially  to 
the  same  effect  long  before. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  43 

the  divine  counsels  as  to  discern  the  one  purpose  which 
is  exhaustive  of  his  whole  thought ! 

It  may  be  said,  that  the  advocates  of  this  doctrine 
never  meant  any  such  thing  by  "  final,"  whatever  force 
that  adjective  may  have  acquired  in  popular  use.  With 
them  it  meant  only  what  the  etymology  indicates.  It 
is  derived  from  finis,  end ;  and  its  whole  force  and  func- 
tion is  to  describe  cause  as  that  peculiar  sort  of  cause 
which  is  not  a  cause,  but  an  end  (finis). 

I  am  quite  desirous  to  put  the  case  as  favorably  as 
possible  for  this  "  consecrated  "  2  doctrine  of  final  causes. 
But  really  it  is  hard  for  me  to  defend  it  in  any  of  its 
phases  without  seeming  to  make  fun  of  it,  as  witness 
that  last  sentence  of  the  preceding  paragraph.  Let  it 
be  granted  that  the  trained  advocates  of  this  doctrine 
never  tripped  on  the  precise  teleological  force  of 
"  final :  "  it  would  not  follow  that  the  rank  and  file  of 
their  readers  did  not.  The  English  force  of  the  word 
would  be  very  likely  to  get  the  better  of  the  Latin 
force  of  it  in  the  common  mind ;  and  that  would  be  a 
valid  objection  to  it,  no  matter  how  rigidly  teleologists 
might  keep  to  the  technical  meaning. 

A  third  element  of  difficulty  in  the  doctrine  of  final 
causes  is  the  Aristotelian  maxim,  that  nature  does  noth- 
ing in  vain.  On  this  point  I  might  content  myself  with 
saying,  that,  in  the  first  place,  the  maxim  is  not  true ; 
and,  in  the  second  place,  that,  while  it  has  stubbornly 
held  its  place  as  an  inseparable  element  of  the  doctrine 
of  final  causes,  it  is  no  part  of  a  true  teleology.  But 
such  brevity  might  be  misunderstood.  To  be  more  ex- 
plicit, then,  the  maxim  is  true  in  one  sense,  though  false 
in  the  sense  intended  by  Whewell  and  the  teleologists 

1  Dugald  Stewart  speaks  of  the  term  final  cause  as  being  "  conse- 
crated in  the  writings  of  Newton." 


44  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  the  last  century.  It  is  not  true,  that  "  in  every  or- 
ganized structure,  plant,  or  animal,  each  intelligible  part 
has  its  allotted  office."  There  are  abortive  and  rudi- 
mentary organs.  These  are  "  in  vain  "  as  regards  their 
utility  to  the  plant  or  animal  to  which  they  belong, 
though  not  in  vain  as  tokens  of  morphological  symme- 
try. The  general  plan,  or  type,  of  structure  is  often 
adhered  to,  even  at  the  cost  of  making  the  creature  car- 
ry about  rudiments  of  organs  which  are  of  no  manner 
of  use  to  it.  Such  facts  thrust  themselves  very  disa- 
greeably in  the  face  of  an  advocate  of  the  doctrine  of 
final  causes,  but  give  no  concern  whatever  to  the  true 
teleologist.  He  can  assert,  that  the  stomach  was  in- 
tended to  digest  food  without  'being  at  all  shaken  in 
this  conclusion  by  the  consideration  that  farther  down 
the  alimentary  tract  there  is  a  worm-like  appendage 
to  the  csecurn  which  has  no  function  at  all.  Instead 
of  these  rudiments  disturbing  him  in  the  least,  he  seizes 
upon  them  as  materials  for  eutaxiology,  —  an  argument 
wholly  distinct  from  teleology,  but  none  the  less  valid 
for  that.  Those  ideas  of  a  plan  in  nature  so  forcibly 
brought  home  to  the  mind  by  the  occurrence  of  abortive 
organs  are  very  conclusive  tokens  of  intelligence,  al- 
though they  have  no  relation  whatever  to  the  adapting 
of  means  to  an  end. 

There  are  ample  reasons  why  the  term  final  cause 
ought  to  be  summarily  thrust  out,  and  forever  excluded, 
not  only  from  physics,  in  which  province  Bacon  regard- 
ed it  as  an  intruder,1  but  also  from  metaphysics  and 
theology. 

1  Causarum  finalhim  inquisitio  sterilis  est,  et  tanquam  virgo  Deo  conse- 
crata,  nihil  parit.  In  view  of  the  numerous  progeny  of  fallacies  and 
errors  trailing  in  the  wake  of  these  "  virgines  consecratce,"  a  different 
sort  of  charge  than  that  of  sterility  is  liable  to  be  brought  against 
them. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  45 

Notwithstanding  these  ample  reasons,  the  term  "  final 
cause  "  will  cut  an  important  figure  in  the  following 
pages ;  but  that  is  only  because  teleology  has  generally 
assumed  the  form  of  a  doctrine  of  final  causes,  and  in 
the  historical  review  this  term  cannot  be  avoided.  In 
the  subsequent  chapters  it  will  not  appear,  unless  it 
steals  in  as  the  ghost  of  a  defunct  fallacy. 


CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS: 
SOCRATES,  CICERO,  AND  GALEN. 

"  For  by  the  primitive  and  very  ancient  men,"  it  has  been  handed 
down  in  the  form  of  myths,  that  the  Divine  it  is  which  holds  together  all 
nature."  — Aristotle:  Metaphys.,  xi.  8,  19. 

It  is  impossible  to  fix  a  time  when  men  had  not 
already  begun  to  draw  inferences  respecting  the  gods 
from  the  natural  events  and  appearances  which  sur- 
rounded them.  As  young  rustics  in  a  great  city,  with 
wide-open  eyes  and  eager  ears,  drink  in  all  sights  and 
sounds  with  ever-increasing  amazement  and  mystery, 
so  mankind  in  early  ages,  unable  to  rise  to  any  con- 
ception of  nature  as  a  settled  and  orderly  system, 
looked  upon  every  striking  phenomenon  as  the  manifes- 
tation of  a  being  or  of  beings  of  whom  they  could 
just  dimly  comprehend  that  they  were  mighty,  mysteri- 
ous, and  awe-inspiring. 

Such  sentiments  existed  and  crystallized  into  a  firm 
conviction  of  the  existence  of  superior  beings  long 
before  men  began  to  philosophize  about  them.  The 
period  of  reflection,  deliberation,  argument,  was  long 
subsequent  to  that  of  childish  emotion  and  open-eyed 
wonder. 

47 


48  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Kant  says,  — 

"  In  our  humble  opinion  this  cosmological  proof  is  as  old 
as  the  reason  of  man.  It  is  so  natural,  so  engaging,  and  en- 
larges our  reflection  so  much  with  the  progress  of  our  insights, 
that  it  must  last  as  long  as  there  exists  anywhere  a  rational 
creature  who  wishes  to  partake  of  the  noble  contemplation 
of  knowing  God  by  his  works.1  " 

We  have  already  seen,  that  Kant  uses  the  term  "  cos- 
mological "  as  a  generic  one  for  all  proofs  of  God's  ex- 
istence drawn  from  nature,  or,  as  indicated  by  the  last 
words  of  this  quotation,  all  discussions  based  upon  that 
knowledge  of  God  which  may  be  obtained  from  his 
works.  When  he  says  that  this  argument  "  is  as  old  as 
the  reason  of  man,"  this  statement,  if  admitted  to  be 
true,  must  be  taken  in  a  very  general  sense,  so  as  to  in- 
clude those  crude  inferences,  mingled  with  sentiments 
of  wonder  and  awe,  which  characterized  the  youth  of 
the  world,  as  well  as  the  more  regular  and  philosophical 
reasonings  of  a  later  period  which  alone  deserve  the 
name  of  argument. 

Among  the  ancient  philosophers,  Anaxagoras,  born 
about  five  hundred  years  before  the  Christian  era,  dis- 
tinctly recognized  mind  in  nature.  Dr.  Hodge  says, 
"  Anaxagoras  argued  that  vovs,  mind,  must  be  admitted 
as  controlling  every  thing  in  the  world,  because  every 
thing  indicates  design."  2 

But  it  seems  rather,  that,  instead  of  arguing  from  the 
marks  of  contrivance  to  mind  as  their  source,  he  fixed 
his  attention  upon  the  harmony  and  beauty  of  the  cos- 
mos, and  assumed  the  existence  of  mind  as  a  necessary 
hypothesis  to  account  for  the  steady  course  and  orderly 
sequences  of  nature.     His  notion  of  the  vovs  was  that 

1  Enquiry  into  the  Grounds  of  Proof  for  the  Existence  of  God,  p.  24. 

2  Sys.  Theol.,  i.  226. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    49 

of  a  world-ordering  force  producing  the  broad  and  deep 
harmonies  of  the  cosmos,  rather  than  that  of  a  being 
directing  events  to  special  ends.  That  is,  his  argument 
was  eutaxiological  instead  of  teleological,  and  it  stopped 
short  of  the  inference  of  a  personal  God. 

About  the  same  time  Zeno  undertook  to  prove  that 
the  world  is  animated  with  intelligence.  He  framed  a 
number  of  syllogisms  for  this  purpose,  of  which  the 
following  is  a  sample :  That  which  reasons  is  preferable 
to  that  which  does  not.  Nothing  i$  preferable  to  the 
world.     Therefore  the  world  reasons. 

It  is  possible  that  this  syllogism  may  once  have  con- 
vinced somebody,  —  at  least,  puzzled  him ;  which,  though 
less  desirable  than  conviction,  yet  serves  the  same  pur- 
pose in  one  respect,  namely,  to  silence  one's  antagonist. 
But  I  fear  it  would  not  make  much  impression  upon  a 
modern  materialist.  This  is  the  same  Zeno  who  proved 
that  Achilles  can  never  catch  the  tortoise,  because,  as 
often  as  he  reaches  the  place  occupied  by  the  tortoise 
at  the  previous  moment,  the  latter  has  already  left 
it. 

Half  a  century  later  Socrates,  for  the  first  time,  so 
far  as  we  can  learn  from  authentic  sources,  drew  out 
the  teleological  argument  in  a  clear  and  rational  man- 
ner :  — 

"For  observing  that  he  (Aristodemus)  neither  prayed  nor 
sacrificed  to  the  gods,  nor  yet  consulted  any  oracle,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  ridiculed  and  laughed  at  those  who  did,  he  said 
to  him,  — 

"Tell  me,  Aristodemus,  is  there  any  man  whom  you  ad- 
mire on  account  of  his  merit? 

"Aristodemus.     Many. 

"  Socrates.     Name  some  of  them,  I  pray  you. 

"  Aristodemus.      I  admire  Homer  for  his  epic    poetry, 


50  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

Melanippides  for  dithyrambies.  Sophocles  for  tragedy,  Poly- 
cletes  for  statuary,  and  Xeuxis  for  painting. 

"  Socrates.  But  which  seems  to  you  most  worthy  of  ad- 
miration, Aristodemus?  the  artist  who  forms  images  devoid 
of  motion  and  intelligence,  or  one  who  hath  skill  to  produce 
animals  that  are  endued,  not  only  with  activity,  but  under- 
standing ? 

"Aristodemus.  The  latter,  there  can  be  no  doubt;  pro- 
vided the  production  was  not  the  effect  of  chance,  but  of 
wisdom  and  contrivance. 

"  Socrates.  But  since  there  are  many  things,  some  of 
which  we  can  easily  see  the  use  of,  while  we  cannot  say 
of  others  to  what  purpose  they  were  produced,  —  which  of 
these,  Aristodemus,  do  you  suppose  the  work  of  wisdom  ? 

"  Aristodemus.  It  would  seem  most  reasonable  to  affirm 
it  of  those  whose  fitness  and  utility  are  so  evidently  apparent. 

"  Socrates.  But  it  is  evidently  apparent  that  he  who  at 
the  beginning  made  man  endued  him  with  senses  because 
they  were  good  for  him,  eyes  wherewith  to  behold  whatever 
was  visible,  and  ears  to  hear  whatever  was  to  be  heard.  For 
say,  Aristodemus,  to  what  purpose  should  odors  be  prepared 
if  the  sense  of  smelling  had  been  denied?  or  why  the  dis- 
tinctions of  bitter  and  sweet,  of  savory  and  unsavory,  unless 
a  palate  had  been  likewise  given,  conveniently  placed  to  arbi- 
trate between  them,  and  declare  the  difference?  Is  not  that 
providence,  Aristodemus,  in  a  most  eminent  manner  con- 
spicuous, which,  because  the  eye  of  man  is  so  delicate  in  its 
contexture,  hath  therefore  prepared  eyelids  like  doors,  where- 
by to  screen  it,  which  extend  themselves  whenever  it  is 
needful,  and  again  close  when  sleep  approaches  ?  Are  not 
these  eyelids  provided,  as  it  were,  with  a  fence  on  the  edge 
of  them,  to  keep  off  the  wind,  and  guard  the  eye?  Even  the 
eyebrow  itself  is  not  without  its  office,  but,  as  a  pent-house, 
is  prepared  to  turn  off  the  sweat,  which,  falling  from  the 
forehead,  might  enter  and  annoy  that  no  less  tender  than 
astonishing  part  of  us.     Is  it  not  to  be   admired  that  the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.     51 

ears  should  take  in  sounds  of  every  sort,  and  yet  are  not  too 
much  filled  with  them?  that  the  fore-teeth  of  the  animal 
should  be  formed  in  such  a  manner  as  is  evidently  best  fitted 
for  the  cutting  of  its  food,  as  those  on  the  side  for  grinding 
it  in  pieces?  that  the  mouth  through  which  the  food  is 
conveyed  should  be  placed  so  near  the  nose  and  eyes  as  to 
prevent  the  passage  unnoticed  of  whatever  is  unfit  for 
nourishment?  while  nature,  on  the  contrary,  hath  set  at  a 
distance,  and  concealed  from  the  senses,  all  that  might  dis- 
gust or  in  any  way  offend  them  ?  And  canst  thou  still  doubt, 
Aristodemus,  whether  a  disposition  of  parts  like  this  should 
be  the  work  of  chance,  or  of  wisdom  and  contrivance?  "  2 

The  severe  simplicity  of  this  argument  deserves  high 
praise.  As  compared  with  the  work  of  later  writers, 
whose  beau  ideal  of  teleology  seemed  to  be  a  huge,  un- 
digested mass  of  examples  and  illustrations,  it  is  as  a 
statue  to  a  brick-kiln. 

The  reasoning  is  purely  teleological ;  and  in  most  of 
his  examples  the  purpose,  and  the  means  of  accomplish^ 
ing  it,  are  both  obvious  in  their  nature,  and  clearly 
specified  by  him.  The  peculiar  Socratic  method  appears 
in  the  skill  with  which  he  drew  from  Aristodemus  him- 
self those  admissions  which  he  desired  as  a  foundation 
for  his  argument ;  namely,  that  the  works  of  nature  are 
more  admirable  than  those  of  art,  and  that  fitness  and 
utility  are  marks  of  wisdom  and  contrivance. 

Yet  his  argument  deserves  some  criticism  as  well  as 
praise.  If  he  did  not  fall  bodily  into  that  snare  which 
caught  the  feet  of  so  many  modern  teleologists,  that 
of  enlarging  and  expatiating  and  multiplying  examples 
without  discriminating  the  dubious  from  the  good,  per- 
haps even  that  negative  excellence  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  he  did  not  take  the  time  to  enlarge.     He  convinced 

i  Xenophon's  Mem.  of  Socrates;  Con.  with  Aristodemus. 


52  CEITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Aristodemus,  and  that  was  enough  for  his  immediate 
purpose.  But  even  in  this  brief  argument  he  brings  in 
examples  of  doubtful  validity. 

For  instance,  that  case  of  the  ear  taking  in  sounds 
without  being  filled  with  them :  the  end  contemplated 
is  a  negative  one,  that  the  ear  should  not  be  filled.  The 
means  are  not  specified :  they  could  not  be  in  his  day ; 
and,  if  modern  physiologists  can  tell  how  the  vibrations 
which  produce  the  sensation  of  sound  in  the  ear  are 
stopped  after  they  have  done  their  work  upon  the  audi- 
tory nerve,  it  is  still  true  that  the  explanation  is  dif- 
ficult, recondite,  and  conjectural  to  a  degree  which  is 
damaging  to  any  argument  based  upon  it.  He  is  to  be 
commended,  however,  for  leaving  this  result  without 
explanation  rather  than  to  give  a  false  one.  Many 
teleologists  have  damaged  their  cause  by  inferring  in- 
finite wisdom  from  some  explanation  of  phenomena 
which  was  totally  at  variance  with  the  truth.  And  the 
remarkable  thing  about  it  is,  that  the  true  explanation 
being  given,  and  being  precisely  opposite  to  that  which 
was  formerly  supposed  to  be  correct,  the  evidence  of 
wisdom  has  been  held  to  be  equally  good  on  either  sup- 
position. This  is  an  interesting  sort  of  paradox,  to 
which  I  shall  give  some  attention  in  a  subsequent 
chapter. 

But  the  most  serious  objection  to  this  as  an  example 
of  teleological  reasoning  remains  to  be  stated.  The 
reverberations  of  sound  in  the  ear  constitute  a  difficulty 
incident  to  the  function  of  hearing.  When  men  encoun- 
ter difficulties,  the  contrivances  which  they  employ  to 
overcome  them  are  good  evidence  of  skill,  because  the 
difficulties  overcome  are  inherent  in  matter,  and  thus 
beyond  the  power  of  man  to  remove,  though  he  may 
surmount  them  or  circumvent  them  by  his  ingenuity. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    53 

But  the  argument  does  not  apply  to  the  works  of  God. 
Having  complete  control  of  matter,  he  could  remove 
the  difficulty  bodily,  instead  of  getting  around  it  in 
human  fashion  by  contrivance.  It  is  an  unworthy  con- 
ception of  him  to  regard  any  thing  in  the  light  of  a  dif- 
ficulty in  his  thought. 

But  if  you  insist  upon  doing  so,  and  upon  the  infer- 
ence of  skill  displayed  in  overcoming  the  difficulty, 
how  can  you  avoid  the  counter-inference  that  the  dif- 
ficulty itself  is  a  blemish  in  his  work?  An  architect 
whose  buildings  invariably  displayed  bad  acoustic  prop- 
erties would  not  escape  the  blame  and  loss  of  reputation 
incident  to  that  fact  by  inventing  an  ingenious  appara- 
tus of  curtains  and  wires  to  prevent  the  mischief.  It 
is  no  evidence  of  wisdom,  that  the  ear  is  not  a  bad  struc- 
ture acoustically.  Its  positive  excellence,  not  its  possi- 
ble defects,  is  the  rational  ground  for  the  teleological 
argument. 

There  is,  nevertheless,  a  sort  of  fascination  about  just 
such  vague  and  negative  examples  as  this  of  the  stop- 
page of  reverberations  in  the  ear.  They  awaken  won- 
der and  admiration  in  the  common  mind,  all  the  more 
because  they  are  vague,  and  the  explanation  difficult 
or  wholly  unattainable.  For  the  purpose  of  arousing  a 
sense  of  dumb  wonderment  akin  to  that  with  which 
men  viewed  all  natural  processes  at  first,  they  may  have 
their  uses.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  object  of 
Socrates  was  not  to  prove  God's  existence,  but  his 
wisdom  and  power ;  and  in  that  view  the  production 
of  a  sense  of  wonder  in  the  face  of  unexplainable  re- 
sults was  a  point  gained. 

If  it  were  not  manifestly  unfair  to  criticise  an  argu- 
ment upon  the  ground  of  principles  and  discoveries 
wholly  unknown  to  its  author,  many  other  weak  points 


54  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

might  be  specified  in  the  reasoning  of  Socrates.  But 
all  objections  drawn  from  the  development  of  modern 
science  mnst  be  ruled  out  as  inapplicable  to  him  indi- 
vidually. The  effect  of  these  upon  teleology  in  general 
will  be  carefully  examined  in  the  sequel ;  but  in  the 
criticism  of  individuals  the  only  questions  raised  will 
be  whether  their  arguments  are  internally  self-consist- 
ent, and  externally  conformable  to  that  degree  of  knowl- 
edge of  nature  which  belonged  to  the  age  in  which  those 
arguments  were  promulgated. 

The  point  alluded  to  above  —  namely,  that  Socrates 
aimed  rather  to  show  the  Creator's  wisdom  and  power 
than  to  demonstrate  his  existence  —  is  worthy  of  more 
careful  attention .  Observe  the  steps  of  his  argument. 
First,  the  works  of  nature  are  more  admirable  than 
those  of  art,  unless,  as  suggested  by  Aristodemus,  the 
former  are  the  products  of  chance.  Now,  the  mark  of 
utility  distinguishes  the  products  of  wisdom  and  con- 
trivance from  those  of  chance.  "  But  it  is  obviously 
apparent,  that  he  who  at  the  beginning  made  man 
endued  him  with  senses  because  they  were  good  for 
him."  Socrates  is  laboring  to  cut  off  the  hypothesis  of 
chance  having  produced  the  human  form,  by  establish- 
ing the  utility  of  its  organs  and  their  functions.  There 
is  a  suspicion  of  reasoning  in  a  circle  when  he  adduces 
the  utility  of  the  senses  on  the  one  hand  because  they 
enable  us  to  perceive  certain  qualities  of  objects,  and 
then  claims  utility  in  those  qualities  on  the  other  hand 
because  the  senses  are  provided  so  as  to  distinguish 
between  them.  But,  granting  that  he  makes  out  a  good 
case  for  utility,  what  are  the  resulting  inferences? 
Chance  is  ruled  out  in  accordance  with  the  axiom  laid 
down  in  the  words  of  Aristodemus,  that  "  it  would  seem 
most  reasonable  to  affirm  it  (/wisdom)  of  those  (things) 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    55 

whose  fitness  and  utility  are  so  evidently  apparent." 
The  alternatives  of  chance  are,  that  there  is  a  personal 
being  whose  wisdom  has  been  displayed  in  nature,  or 
that  there  is  an  intelligent  principle  in  nature  itself. 
As  Aristodemus  did  not  suggest  the  latter  alternative, 
both  he  and  Socrates  seem  to  have  settled  upon  the 
former ;  and  the  conclusion  of  the  argument  is,  that  there 
is  a  wise  and  mighty  Being  to  whose  contrivance  all 
these  marvellous  results  are  due. 

Is  it  not  therefore,  after  all,  an  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God  ?  So  it  seems  from  its  course  and  conclu- 
sion ;  and  yet  at  the  beginning  Socrates  distinctly 
assumed  that  point  (at  least  he  assumed  the  existence 
of  a  personal  agent)  by  saying,  "  It  is  evidently  appar- 
ent, that  he  who  in  the  beginning  made  man  endued 
him,"  etc.  That  is  to  say,  if,  as  indicated  by  its  course 
and  conclusion,  the  aim  of  the  argument  was  to  estab- 
lish God's  existence,  then  Socrates  begged  the  question 
at  the  start.  And  if,  to  save  him  from  that  reproach, 
we  say  that  this  was  not  his  aim,  but  that  he  was  simply 
illustrating  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God,  then  he 
ought  to  have  adhered  more  strictly  to  that  line  of 
thought.  The  fact  seems  to  be,  that  he  had  a  kind 
of  confused  double  aim,  partly  to  show  the  wisdom  of  a 
creator  whose  existence  was  assumed,  and  partly  to 
meet  the  denial  of  any  creator  at  all. 

This  sort  of  confusion  is  not  peculiar  to  Socrates,  but 
appears  in  almost  all  teleological  discussions.  The  con- 
viction that  there  is  a  God,  however  it  may  have  arisen, 
is  a  fact  so  fundamental  in  the  human  understanding, 
that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  dismiss  it  long  enough 
to  get  down  plump  and  square  upon  an  argumentative 
basis  so  constructed  that  this  conviction  forms  no  part 
of  it.     Besides  this  difficulty  which  confronts  the  initial 


56  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

steps  of  the  advocate  of  teleology,  his  whole  subsequent 
course  is  beset  with  temptations  to  wander  from  the 
severe  and  abstract  logic  of  a  demonstration  of  God's 
existence  into  the  far  easier  and  pleasanter  paths  of 
expatiating  and  indulging  in  pious  reflections  upon  his 
wisdom,  power,  and  goodness.  These  reflections  are  in 
no  wise  to  be  condemned  or  disparaged,  but  they  ought 
to  be  sharply  separated  from  pure  argumentation. 
Each  is  good  in  its  place ;  but  the  blending  of  the  two 
makes  the  logic  suspicious,  at  the  same  time  that  it  de- 
tracts from  that  height  of  emotion  and  adoration  to 
which  a  discourse  entirely  free  from  abstract  reasoning 
might  raise  the  mind  of  the  reader. 

Alarcus  Tullius  Cicero,  who  was  born  in  the  year  one 
hundred  and  five  before  Christ,  devotes  the  greater  part 
of  his  treatise,  " De  Natura  Deorum"  to  the  arguments 
for  the  existence  of  God,  or  rather  of  the  gods.  The 
book  is  a  record  of  conversations  between  Velleius, 
Balbus,  Cotta,  and  Cicero.  The  last  two  were  Acade- 
micians, (disciples  of  Plato),  Balbus  was  a  Stoic,  and 
Velleius  an  Epicurean.  Balbus  the  Stoic  delivers  the 
teleological  and  eutaxiological  arguments,  with  the 
manifest  approval  and  support  of  Cicero  and  Cotta; 
while  Velleius  alone  maintains  that  the  world  was  pro- 
duced by  a  "  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms." 

It  would  be  a  great  mistake,  however,  to  infer  that 
Velleius  was  an  atheist.  He  was  just  as  firm  a  believer 
in  the  gods  as  Cotta  or  Balbus;  only  he  insists  that 
they  did  not  create  the  world,  and  do  not  concern  them- 
selves at  all  in  respect  to  man,  or  any  thing  else  upon 
the  earth :  — 

"  For  they  do  naught  at  all,  are  not  entangled  in  any  affairs, 
nor  hammer  out  any  designs,  but  are  wholly  taken  up  in  the 
delight  and  contemplation  of  their  own  wisdom  and  virtue." 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.  57 

He  thinks  that  such  an  opinion  of  the  gods  has  mani- 
fest advantages  over  any  other,  especially  in  delivering 
men  from  superstitious  dread  :  — 

"If  we  only  sought  piously  to  worship  the  gods,  and  be 
delivered  from  vain  apprehensions,  here  were  enough  said  for 
that  end  ;  for  our  devotions  are  due  to  the  godhead  upon  the 
single  score  of  its  blessedness  and  immortality,  because  that 
which  is  excellent  exacts  regard  and  veneration  as  its  due. 
But  all  superstitious  dread  of  the  power  and  anger  of  the 
Deity  is  removed ;  for  hatred  and  love  are  alike  held  to  be 
separate  from  the  blessed  and  immortal  nature,  and,  they  be- 
ing once  taken  away,  there  can  no  longer  be  any  cause  to 
stand  in  fear  of  those  that  are  above  us." 

Velleius,  who  is  here  simply  expounding  the  tenets 
of  his  master  Epicurus,  thinks  that  the  knowledge, 
both  of  the  existence  and  of  the  attributes  of  the  gods, 
is  intuitive :  — 

"  We  cannot  but  be  satisfied  of  the  existence  of  a  deity, 
because  all,  as  well  fools  as  philosophers,  are  possessed  with 
ingrafted,  or  rather  innate  and  connatural,  apprehensions  of 
one.  .  .  .  And  the  same  nature  that  furnished  the  notion 
of  their  very  existence  engraved  also  in  our  minds  an  assur- 
ance of  their  happiness  and  immortality." 

Velleius  was,  of  course,  estopped  from  any  inference 
of  the  existence  or  attributes  of  the  gods  from  nature, 
because  of  the  fundamental  tenet  of  his  sect,  that  the 
world  was  neither  created  by  them,  nor  do  they  now 
give  themselves  the  slightest  concern  about  it.  He 
argues  stoutly  against  the  possibility  of  creation,  and 
especially  against  the  Platonic  view  of  it :  — 

' '  For  with  what  eyes  of  the  mind  was  your  Plato  able  to 
see  that  workhouse  of  such  stupendous  toil,  in  which  he 
makes  the  world  to  be  modelled  and  built  by  God  ?     What 


58  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

materials,  what  tools,  what  bars,  what  machines,  what  assist- 
ants, were  employed  in  so  vast  a  work?  How  could  the  air, 
fire,  water,  and  earth  pay  obedience  and  submit  to  the  will 
of  the  architect?  .  .  .  What  was  it  that  incited  the  Deity 
to  act  the  part  of  an  aedile  to  illuminate  and  decorate  the 
world  ?  If  it  was  because  God  might  be  the  better  accom- 
modated in  his  habitation,  why  did  he  dwell  such  an  infi- 
nite length  of  time  before  in  darkness  as  in  a  dungeon?1 
Do  we  imagine  that  he  could  afterwards  be  delighted  with 
that  variety  with  which  we  see  the  heaven  and  the  earth 
adorned  ?  What  entertainment  could  that  be  to  the  Deity  ? 
If  it  was  any,  he  would  not  have  been  without  it  so  long  ;  or 
were  these  things  made,  as  you  almost  say,  by  God  for  the 
sake  of  men  ?  ' ' 

Plato  had  maintained  that  the  earth  itself  is  ani- 
mated with  intelligence.  His  doctrine  on  this  subject 
is  stated  by  Balbus  in  the  following  argument :  — 

1 '  That  which  is  moved  spontaneously  is  more  divine  than 
that  which  is  moved  by  another  power.  This  self-motion 
Plato  places  only  in  mind,  and  from  thence  concludes  the 
first  principle  of  motion  is  derived  :  therefore,  since  all  mo- 
tion arises  from  the  heat  of  the  world,  and  that  heat  not 
the  effect  of  any  external  impulse,  but  of  its  own  virtue,  it 
must  necessarily  be  a  spirit  or  mind ;  from  whence  it  follows 
that  the  world  is  animated." 

To  this  notion  of  the  world  itself  being  a  sort  of 
"round  and  voluble  deity,"  Velleius  raises  a  novel  ob- 
jection :  — 

"  We  see  vast  tracts  of  land  uninhabitable  and  barren,  — 
some  because  they  are  scorched  by  the  too  near  approach  of 
the  sun  ;  others  because  they  are  bound  up  with  frost  and 

1  In  reply  to  the  question,  What  was  God  doing  hefore  he  made 
the  world?  Luther  said,  "  In  the  "birch-grove  cutting  rods  to  punish  im- 
pertinent questioners."  —  Hase  :  Gnosis,  ii.  s.  183. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    59 

snow  through  the  great  distance  of  it  (the  sun) .  Therefore, 
if  the  world  is  a  deity,  as  these  are  parts  of  the  world,  some 
of  the  deity's  limbs  may  be  said  to  be  scorched,  and  some 
frozen." 

Cotta  undertakes  the  task  of  answering  Velleius. 
He  resorts  to  ridicule  in  answer  to  the  argument  for 
the  atomic  theory :  — 

"You  attribute  the  most  absolute  power  and  efficacy  to 
atoms.  Out  of  them  you  pretend  every  thing  is  made.  But 
there  are  no  atoms  ;  for  there  is  nothing  without  body,  nor 
is  there  any  place  which  is  not  occupied  by  body :  therefore 
there  can  be  no  vacuum,  no  individual.  I  advance  these 
principles  of  the  naturalists  without  knowing  whether  they 
are  true  or  false ;  yet  they  are  more  like  truth  than  those 
absurdities  you  imbibed  from  Democritus,  or  before  him 
from  Leucippus,  that  there  are  certain  light  corpuscles,  some 
smooth,  some  rough,  some  round,  some  square,  some  crooked 
and  bent  as  bows  ;  which,  by  a  fortuitous  concourse,  made 
heaven  and  earth  without  the  influence  of  any  natural 
power." 

He  is  still  more  unsparing  in  his  ridicule  of  the  Epi- 
curean conception  of  the  gods.  He  claims  that  the 
ideal  of  happiness  in  the  system  of  Epicurus  was  un- 
checked indulgence  in  sensual  pleasures;  but,  since 
the  gods  were  deprived  of  these,  they  could  not,  from 
the  Epicurean  point  of  view,  be  happy :  — 

"But  they  are  free  from  pain.  Is  that  sufficient  for 
beings  who  are  supposed  to  enjoy  all  good  things,  and  the 
most  supreme  felicity?  The  Deity,  they  say,  is  constantly 
meditating  on  his  own  happiness,  having  no  other  idea  in  his 
mind.  Consider  a  little  ;  reflect  what  a  figure  the  Deity 
would  make,  idly  thinking  of  nothing  through  all  eternity 
but,  '  It  is  very  well  with  me,  and  I  am  happy.'  Nor  do  I 
see  why  this  happy  Deity  should  not  fear  being  destroyed, 


60  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

since  without  any  intermission  he  is  driven  and  agitated  by 
an  everlasting  incursion  of  atoms,  and  from  him  images  are 
constantly  flowing.  Your  Deity,  therefore,  is  neither  happy 
nor  eternal." 

Balbus,  too,  has  his  shot  at  the  fortuitous  concourse 
of  atoms  theory  :  — 

"  Can  I  but  wonder  here  that  any  one  can  persuade  him- 
self that  certain  solid  and  individual  bodies  should  move  by 
their  natural  force  and  gravitation  in  such  manner  that  a 
world  so  beautifully  adorned  should  be  made  by  their  fortui- 
tous concourse?  He. who  believes  this  possible  may  as  well 
believe,  that  if  a  great  quantity  of  the  one  and  twenty  letters, 
composed  either  of  gold  or  any  other  matter,  were  thrown 
upon  the  ground,  they  would  fall  into  such  order  as  legibly 
to  form  the  'Annals  of  Ennius.'  I  doubt  whether  fortune 
could  make  a  single  verse  of  them." 

This  form  of  argument  against  the  doctrine  of  chance 
was  a  favorite  one  with  the  ancients ;  and  we  shall  find 
that  it  has  been  revived  and  much  relied  upon  in  modern 
times  as  a  method  of  attack  upon  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion. 

Cotta  and  Balbus  having  thus  cleared  the  ground  by 
their  destructive  criticism  of  the  systems  of  Democritus 
and  Epicurus,  the  Stoic  proceeds  to  his  constructive 
task  of  framing  arguments  for  the  existence  of  the 
gods : — 

"  Our  sect,"  says  he,  "  divide  the  whole  question  concern- 
ing the  immortal  gods  into  four  parts,  —  first,  that  there  are 
gods  ;  secondly,  what  they  are  ;  thirdly,  that  the  universe  is 
governed  by  them  ;  and,  lastly,  that  they  regard  mankind  in 
particular." 

But,  although  he  starts  with  these  clear  distinctions, 
he    does   not   adhere  to  them  closely,  but   blends  the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    61 

several  arguments  together.  Like  Socrates,  he  seems 
unable  to  place  himself  fairly  upon  a  platform  of  argu- 
ment in  which  the  existence  of  the  gods  is  not  assumed. 
He  says  that  no  one  denies  their  existence ;  that  it 
needs  no  proof,  or,  if  it  did,  a  glance  at  the  heavens 
would  be  enough :  "  for,  when  we  contemplate  the 
celestial  bodies,  what  can  be  so  plain  and  evident  as 
the  existence  of  some  supreme,  divine  intelligence  by 
which  they  are  governed  ?  "  Still,  he  goes  on  to  recite 
many  of  the  arguments  of  his  sect  to  prove  their  exist- 
ence. 

In  the  first  place,  he  claims  that  the  gods  exist  be- 
cause of  the  significance  of  "  signs,  portents,  and  prodi- 
gies : "  — 

"  How  great  is  the  reputation  of  the  augurs  !  Is  not  the 
art  of  the  aruspices  divine  ?  Innumerable  are  the  facts  of 
this  kind:  who,  then,  can  doubt  the  existence  of  the  gods? 
They  who  have  interpreters  must  certainly  exist  themselves. 
Now,  there  are  interpreters  of  the  gods :  therefore  we  must 
allow  there  are  gods. 

u  Cleanthes,  one  of  our  sect,  imputes  the  idea  of  the 
gods,  implanted  in  the  minds  of  men,  to  four  causes.  The 
first  is  what  I  just  now  mentioned,  a  pre-knowledge  of  future 
things.  The  second  is  the  great  advantages  we  enjoy  from 
the  temperature  of  the  air,  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  and  the 
abundance  of  various  kinds  of  benefits.  The  third,  from 
the  terror  with  which  the  mind  is  affected  by  thunder,  tem- 
pests, storms,  snow,  hail,  devastation,  pestilence,  earth- 
quakes often  attended  with  hideous  noises,  showers  of  stones, 
and  rain  like  drops  of  blood  ;  by  rockings  and  sudden  open- 
ings of  the  earth ;  by  monstrous  births  of  men  and  beasts ; 
by  meteors  in  the  air,  and  blazing  stars,  the  appearance  of 
which  in  the  late  Octavian  war  was  ominous  of  great  calami- 
ties ;  by  two  suns,  which,  as  I  have  heard  my  father  say, 
happened  in  the  consulship  of  Tuditanus  and  Aquillius,  in 


62  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

which  year  also  another  sun  (P.  Africanus)  was  extinguished. 
These  things  have  terrified  mankind,  and  produced  the  notion 
of  the  existence  of  some  celestial  and  divine  power.  His 
fourth  cause,  and  that  the  strongest,  is  drawn  from  the 
regularity  of  the  motion  and  revolution  of  the  sun,  the  dis- 
tinction, variety,  beauty,  and  order  of  the  heavens,  the  mere 
appearance  of  which  is  sufficient  to  convince  us  they  are  not 
the  effects  of  chance  ;  as  when  we  enter  into  a  house,  a 
school,  or  court,  and  observe  the  exact  order,  discipline,  and 
method  therein,  we  cannot  suppose  they  are  so  regulated 
without  a  cause,  but  must  conclude  there  is  some  one  who 
commands,  and  to  whom  obedience  is  paid :  so  we  have 
much  greater  reason  to  think  that  such  wonderful  motions, 
revolutions,  and  order  of  those  many  and  great  bodies,  no 
part  of  which  is  impaired  by  the  lapse  of  countless  ages, 
must  be  governed  by  some  intelligent  being. 

"Let  us  proceed  from  celestial  to  terrestrial  things. 
What  is  there  in  them  which  does  not  prove  an  intelligent 
nature  ?  First,  as  to  vegetables  :  they  have  roots  to  sustain 
their  stems,  and  to  draw  from  the  earth  a  nourishing  mois- 
ture. They  are  clothed  with  a  rind  or  bark  to  secure  them 
from  heat  and  cold.  The  vines  we  see  take  hold  on  props 
with  their  tendrils  as  if  with  hands,  and  raise  themselves 
as  if  they  were  animated.  It  is  even  said  that  they  shun 
cabbages  and  coleworts  as  noxious  and  pestilential  to  them, 
and,  if  planted  by  them,  will  not  touch  any  part. 

' ;  But  what  a  vast  variety  is  there  of  animals  !  and  how 
wonderfully  is  every  kind  endowed  with  what  is  necessary 
for  its  preservation !  Some  are  covered  with  hides,  some 
clothed  with  fleeces,  and  some  guarded  with  bristles  ;  some 
are  sheltered  with  feathers,  and  some  with  scales ;  some  are 
armed  with  horns,  and  some  are  assisted  with  wings. 

"Mankind  likewise  receives  great  advantages  from  dif- 
ferent soils.  The  Nile  waters  Egypt ;  and,  after  having  over- 
flowed and  covered  it  the  whole  summer,  it  retires,  and  leaves 
the  fields  softened  and  manured  for  the  reception  of  seed. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.     63 

The  Euphrates  fertilizes  Mesopotamia,  into  which,  as  we 
may  say,  it  carries  yearly  new  fields.  The  Indus,  which  is 
the  largest  of  all  rivers,  not  only  improves  and  cultivates 
the  ground,  but  sows  it  also;  for  it  is  said  to  carry  with  it  a 
great  quantity  of  grain. 

"But  how  bountiful  is  Nature,  that  has  provided  for  us 
such  various  and  delicious  food,  and  this  in  different  sea- 
sons, that  we  may  be  constantly  pleased  with  change  and 
with  plenty  !  How  seasonable  and  useful  to  man,  to  beasts, 
and  even  to  plants,  are  the  eastern  winds  she  has  bestowed, 
which  moderate  intemperate  heat,  and  render  navigation  more 
sure  and  speedy  ! ' ' 

Then  Balbus  plunges  into  the  subject  of  human 
anatomy,  where  we  could  not  follow  him  in  such  man- 
ner as  to  do  him  justice  without  transcribing  whole 
pages.  He  infers  a  divine  purpose  from  the  position 
and  character  of  the  cutting  and  grinding  teeth,  in 
which  he  was  borrowing  from  Socrates ;  from  the  "  sort 
of  coverlid  "  (epiglottis)  which  guards  the  entrance  to 
the  "rough  artery"  (trachea),  so  that  food  may  not 
fall  into  it  and  stop  the  respiration ;  from  the  functions 
of  the  stomach,  lungs,  and  heart ;  from  the  bones  and 
their  joints ;  from  the  upright  form,  enabling  us  to  con- 
template the  heavens,  and  attain  a  knowledge  of  the 
gods ;  from  the  commanding  position  of  the  senses  in 
the  highest  part  of  the  body;  from  the  eyelids,  eye- 
brows, and  the  bony  walls  of  the  sockets  in  which  the 
eyes  are  lodged ;  from  the  fact  that  the  ears  and  nos- 
trils are  always  open,  while  the  mouth  and  eyes  may 
be  closed  ;  from  the  modulating  power  of  the  tongue 
and  lips  in  articulate  speech ;  and  from  the  human 
hand,  so  nicely  adapted  for  a  multiplicity  of  uses. 

"Thus,  if  we  everyway  examine  the  universe,  it  is  ap- 
parent from  the  greatest  reason  that  the  whole  is  admirably 


64  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

governed  by  a  divine  providence  for  the  safety  and  preserva- 
tion of  all  beings." 

In  the  examination  of  these  arguments  which  Cicero 
puts  into  the  mouth  of  Balbus,  two  things  strike  us 
with  astonishment,  —  first,  the  extent  of  his  knowledge 
of  human  anatomy ;  and,  secondly,  the  exhaustiveness 
with  which  he  traversed  the  field  of  reasoning  covered 
by  the  writings  of  modern  teleologists.  Scarcely  any 
thing,  either  in  the  style  of  argument,  or  in  the  range  of 
illustration  used  by  them,  but  was  anticipated  by  Cicero, 
and,  before  him,  by  I  know  not  how  many  Greeks. 

Like  most  of  the  modern  teleologists,  he  constructed 
his  argument  by  the  method  of  analogy :  — 

"When  you  view  an  image  or  a  picture,  you  imagine  it 
is  wrought  by  art ;  when  you  behold  afar  off  a  ship  under 
sail,  you  judge  it  is  steered  by  reason  and  art ;  when  you 
see  a  dial  or  water-clock,  you  believe  the  hours  are  showed 
by  art,  and  not  by  chance :  can  you  then  imagine  that  the 
universe,  which  coutains  all  arts  and  the  artificers,  can  be 
void  of  reason,  void  of  understanding? 

"If  that  sphere  lately  made  by  our  friend  Posiclonius, 
which  shows  the  course  of  the  sun,  moon,  and  five  wander- 
ing stars  (planets),  as  it  is  every  day  and  night  performed, 
were  carried  into  Scythia  or  Britain,  who  in  those  barbarous 
countries  would  doubt  that  reason  presided  in  that  work? 
Yet  these  people  (the  Epicureans)  doubt  whether  the  uni- 
verse, from  whence  all  things  arise  and  are  made,  is  not  the 
effect  of  chance  or  some  necessity,  rather  than  the  work  of 
reason  and  a  divine  mind.  According  to  them  Archimedes 
shows  more  knowledge  in  representing  the  motions  of  the 
celestial  globe,  than  nature  does  in  causing  them,  though 
the  copy  is  so  infinitely  beneath  the  original." 

Another  of  Cicero's  books,  the  "  De  Divinatione" 
contains  additional  design-arguments :  — 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    65 

"Can  any  thing  done  by  chance  have  all  the  marks  of 
design?  Four  dice  may  by  chance  turn  up  four  aces;  but 
do  you  think  that  four  hundred  dice,  thrown  by  chance,  will 
turn  up  four  hundred  aces?  Colors  thrown  upon  canvas 
without  design  may  have  some  similitude  to  a  human  face  ; 
but  do  you  think  they  might  make  as  beautiful  a  picture  as 
that  of  the  Coan  Venus?  A  hog  turning  up  the  ground 
with  his  nose  may  make  something  of  the  form  of  the  letter 
A  ;  but  do  you  think  that  a  hog  might  describe  on  the  ground 
the  Andromache  of  Ennius?  Carneades  imagined,  that,  in 
the  stone-quarries  at  Chios,  he  found,  in  a  stone  that  was 
split,  a  representation  of  the  head  of  a  little  Pan,  or  sylvan 
deity.1  I  believe  he  might  find  a  figure  not  unlike,  but 
surely  not  such  a  one  as  you  would  say  had  been  formed  by 
an  excellent  sculptor  like  Scopas  ;  for  so,  verily,  the  case 
is,  that  chance  never  perfectly  imitates  design." 

In  comparing  these  arguments  of  Cicero  with  those 
of  Socrates,  we  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that,  while 
the  latter  confined  himself  to  teleology,  the  former 
gives  equal  prominence  to  eutaxiology.  At  least  half 
of  his  reasoning  is  based  upon  the  order  of  nature, 
especially  the  celestial  harmonies.  This  justifies  the 
remark  of  Dr.  McCosh,  that  the  ancients  attended  to 
the  internal  principles  of  order  in  the  cosmos,  as  well 
as  to  the  external  facts  of  adaptation.  So  far  as  the 
proof  of  God's  existence  is  concerned,  Cicero  seems  to 
rely  wholly  upon  eutaxiology.  His  teleological  reason- 
ing has  for  its  sole  aim  the  establishment  of  the  propo- 
sition that  the  gocls  "regard  mankind  in  particular." 
It  is  an  argument  for  the  providence  of  God,  rather 
than  for  the  existence  of  God. 

1  Some  fossils  are  decidedly  better  looking  than  some  of  the  old  syl- 
van deities.  This  does  not  invalidate  the  argument,  however;  since  the 
fossils  are  not  the  work  of  chance,  as  Cicero  implies  that  the  one  in 
the  quarry  at  Chios  was. 


66  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

In  the  second  place,  Cicero  is  at  once  more  copious 
and  more  faulty  than  Socrates.  The  wide  range  of 
illustration  in  which  he  indulges  has  been  a  snare  to 
him.  Even  in  the  quotations  I  have  made,  though  I 
have  selected  the  best  specimens  of  his  style,  there  are 
trivial  examples  and  inconsequent  reasonings.  The 
antipathy  of  vines  to  cabbages  is  not  a  very  solid 
corner-stone  for  an  argument.  An  east  wind  may  be  a 
good  thing  in  Italy,  but  quite  the  reverse  elsewhere. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  said  of  atmospheric  phenomena  in 
general,  that  they  are  not  good  teleological  material. 
Though  one  should  believe  ever  so  firmly  that  each 
wind  and  cloud  were  divinely  guided,  it  would  not  be 
wise  to  select  these  as  the  means  of  convincing  another 
who  was  sceptical  about  it,  that  there  are  special  and 
kindly  purposes  underlying  natural  phenomena.  Gen- 
tle winds  and  soft  showers  are  beneficent  enough,  but 
hurricanes  and  water-spouts  must  be  considered  also. 

In  the  third  place,  Socrates  had  much  more  positive 
convictions  and  worthier  conceptions  of  the  gods  than 
Cicero.  The  latter  seems  to  be  floundering  in  a  misty 
sea  of  heathen  speculation,  unable  to  settle  upon  any 
positive  opinion  as  to  the  number  or  nature  of  the 
gods.  Balbus  maintains  that  each  star  is  a  deity  as 
well  as  the  earth.  His  expressions  respecting  the  "  in- 
telligent nature  "  of  plants  show  that  he  regarded  mind 
in  nature  somewhat  as  Anaxagoras  did ;  namely,  as  a 
principle  embodied  in  matter,  and  ruling  it,  rather  than 
as  an  attribute  of  a  personal  being.  But  this  is  ex- 
plicitly asserted  in  the  following  quotation  :  — 

"That  universal  nature  which  embraces  all  things  is  said 
by  Zeno  to  be  not  only  artificial,  but  the  absolute  artificer, 
ever  thinking  and  providing  all  things  proper  ;  and  as  every 
particular  nature  owes  its  rise  and  increase  to  its  own  proper 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.  67 

seed,  so  universal  nature  has  all  her  motions  voluntary,  has 
affections  and  desires  productive  of  actions  agreeable  to 
them,  like  us  who  have  sense  and  understanding  to  direct 
us." 

His  exaggerated  polytheism  is  displayed  in  the  fol- 
lowing :  — 

"  I  have  hitherto  spoken  of  the  universal  world,  and  also 
of  the  stars :  from  whence  it  is  apparent,  that  there  is  an 
almost  infinite  number  of  gods,  always  in  action,  but  without 
labor  or  fatigue ;  for  they  are  not  composed  of  nerves, 
veins,  and  bones.  Their  food  and  drink  are  not  such  as 
cause  humors,  too  gross  or  too  subtile.  Their  bodies  are  not 
subject  to  the  fear  of  falls  or  blows,  or  in  danger  of  diseases 
from  a  weariness  of  limbs.  Epicurus,  to  secure  his  gods 
from  such  accidents,  has  made  them  only  sketches  of  deities, 
thin,  pellucid,  and  void  of  action ;  but  our  gods  of  the  most 
beautiful  form  (that  of  a  sphere) ,  and  situated  in  the  purest 
region  of  the  heavens,  dispose  and  rule  their  course  in  such 
a  manner,  that  they  seem  to  contribute  to  the  support  and 
preservation  of  all  beings.  Besides  these  (i.e.,  besides  the 
stars,  already  '  almost  infinite '  in  number) ,  there  are  many 
other  natures  which  have  with  reason  been  deified  by  the 
wisest  Grecians,  and  by  our  ancestors,  in  consideration  of 
the  benefits  derived  from  them  :  for  they  were  persuaded  that 
whatever  was  of  great  utility  to  human  kind  must  proceed 
from  divine  goodness  ;  and  the  name  of  the  deity  was  applied 
to  that  which  the  deity  produced,  as  when  we  call  corn  Ceres, 
and  wine  Bacchus." 

Balbus  then  goes  on  through  the  whole  calendar  of 
heathen  deities,  taking  it  nearly  all  in  good  faith.  It 
would  be  unjust  to  Cicero  to  take  the  opinions  which  he 
puts  into  the  mouth  of  Balbus  as  his  opinions  in  the 
same  sense  and  to  the  same  extent  as  if  he  had  uttered 
them  in  his  own  name,  though  it  is  true  that  in  gen- 


68  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

eral  he  and  Cotta  agreed  with  Balbus.  But  the  latter, 
being  a  Stoic,  was  more  positive  than  they  in  his  con- 
victions. And  this  leads  at  once  to  the  consideration 
how  far  the  contrast  between  Socrates  and  Cicero,  and 
the  indecis^n  of  the  eloquent  Roman  orator  respecting 
the  gods,  w«s  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  an  Acade- 
mician. The  enemies  of  that  sect  charged,  that  their 
fundamental  tenet  was  "  to  be  certain  of  nothing,"  —  an 
accusation  which  is  repeated  by  Velleius  in  this  very 
conversation  of  which  the  Be  Natura  Deorum  is  a  record. 
Addressing  Cicero  and  Cotta,  Velleius  says,  "  For  you 
have  both  learned  from  the  same  Philo  to  be  certain  of 
nothing."  The  Academics,  of  course,  repudiated  this 
form  of  statement  of  their  doctrine.  What  they  claimed 
was,  that  the  sources  of  doubt  and  error  are  so  many, 
and  so  inextricably  blended  with  the  truth,  that  a  judi- 
cial suspense  of  judgment  is  more  rational  than  ill- 
grounded  positive  convictions.     Cicero  remarks,  — 

"The  Academics  are  prudent  in  refusing  their  assent  to 
things  uncertain  ;  for  what  is  more  unbecoming  in  a  wise  man 
than  to  judge  rashly?  or  what  rashness  so  unworthy  the 
gravity  and  stability  of  a  philosopher  as  to  conceive  wrongly, 
or  to  defend  absolutely,  what  he  has  not  thoroughly  exam- 
ined, and  does  not  clearly  comprehend?  .  .  .  We  do  not 
assert  that  nothing  has  the  appearance  of  truth ;  but  we  say 
that  some  falsehoods  are  so  blended  with  all  truths,  and  have 
so  great  a  resemblance  to  them,  that  there  is  no  certain  rule 
of  judging  and  assenting." 

That  last  sentence  goes  near  to  justify  the  charge 
of  their  enemies,  that  they  had  learned  to  be  certain  of 
nothing.  For  if  there  are  elements  of  falsehood  in  all 
truth,  and  "  no  certain  rule  of  judging  "  by  which  we 
may  separate  the  false  from  the  true,  then  nothing  re- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.  69 

mains  for  us  but  doubt  and  indecision  on  every  possible 
question. 

This  sort  of  excessive  philosophical  caution  was  very 
different  from  that  of  Socrates.  With  him  it  took  the 
form  of  intellectual  humility.  He  said  the  justification 
of  the  oracle  in  pronouncing  him  the  wisest  of  men 
was,  that,  while  others  thought  they  knew  something, 
he  had  found  out  that  he  knew  nothing.  But  his  dialec- 
tic method  did  not  stop  with  stripping  off  the  masks 
of  error,  and  dissecting  away  the  semblances  of  knowl- 
edge :  it  went  on  to  positive  results.  Intellectual  humil- 
ity is  a  very  different  thing  from  univeral  scepticism. 

Claudius  Galen,  born  at  Pergamos  in  Asia  Minor  in 
the  year  130  A.D.,  was  remarkable  for  his  learning, 
and  for  his  skill  in  medical  practice.  He  was  a  walk- 
ing encyclopedia  of  the  knowledge  of  his  own  age, 
and  the  medical  science  of  previous  ages;  and  for 
twelve  centuries  after  his  death  his  authority  in  medi- 
cine was  supreme,  and  "the  veneration  in  which  he 
was  held  was  such  that  he  was  by  many  regarded  as 
a  god."  Dr.  Coxe  stoutly  maintains  that  he  was  well 
acquainted  with  the  circulation  of  the  blood ;  and  con- 
sequently that  Harvey's  claim  to  the  exclusive  honor  of 
that  discovery  is  groundless.  His  knowledge  of  anat- 
omy and  physiology  was  certainly  of  surprising  extent 
and  accuracy. 

In  his  book  "  Concerning  the  Use  of  the  various  Parts 
of  the  Body,"  he  develops  his  teleological  views :  — 

"  Those  weapons  with  which  the  lion  is  furnished  are  as 
appropriate  to  his  nature  as  they  would  be  useless  to  the 
timid  hare,  whose  safety,  depending  entirely  on  flight,  re- 
quires that  swiftness  of  foot  for  which  she  is  so  remarkable. 
But  to  man,  the  only  animal  that  partakes  of  divine  intelli- 
gence, the  Creator  has  given,  in  lieu  of  every  other  weapon 


70  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

or  organ  of  defence,  that  instrument  the  hand,  —  an  instru- 
ment applicable  to  every  art  and  occasion,  as  well  of  peace 
as  of  war.  Man  therefore  wants  not  a  hoof  or  a  horn  or 
any  other  natural  weapon,  inasmuch  as  he  is  able  with  his 
hand  to  grasp  a  much  more  effective  weapon,  the  sword  or 
spear." 

With  this  he  weaves  the  garment  that  protects  him 
from  summer's  heat  or  winter's  cold,  forms  nets  and 
snares,  the  lyre  and  lute,  altars  and  shrines,  and  with 
the  pen  "  bequeathes  to  posterity  in  writing  the  intel- 
lectual treasures  of  his  own  divine  imagination." 

"  Let  us,  then,  scrutinize  this  member  of  our  body,  and  in- 
quire, not  simply  whether  it  be  in  itself  useful  for  all  the 
purposes  of  life,  and  adapted  to  an  animal  endued  with  the 
highest  intelligence,  but  whether  its  entire  structure  be  not 
such  that  it  could  not  be  improved  by  any  conceivable  altera- 
tion." 

He  goes  on  to  show  its  fitness  for  grasping  by  virtue 
of,  (1)  its  division  into  digits ;  (2)  co-operation  of  the 
two  hands ;  (3)  opposition  of  the  thumb  to  the  fingers ; 
(4)  softness,  yet  not  too  great  softness,  of  the  inner 
tips ;   (5)  hardness  of  the  outer  tips,  or  nails. 

' '  How  can  a  man  of  any  intelligence  refer  all  this  to 
chance  as  its  cause  ?  or,  if  he  deny  this  to  be  the  effect  of 
foresight  and  skill,  I  would  ask,  What  is  there  that  foresight 
and  skill  do  effect?  For  surely,  where  chance  and  fortune 
act,  we  see  not  this  correspondence  and  regularity  of  parts. 

"What!  was  it  chance  that  made  the  skin  give  way  so 
as  to  produce  a  mouth?  Or,  if  this  happened  by  chance, 
did  chance  also  place  teeth  and  a  tongue  within  that  mouth  ? 
For,  if  so,  why  should  there  not  be  teeth  and  a  tongue  in 
the  nostrils  or  in  the  ear?  .  .  .  Did  chance  dispose  the 
teeth  themselves  in  their  present  order?  Which,  if  it  were 
any  other  than  it  is,  what  would  be  the  consequence?    If, 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.    71 

for  instance,  the  incisors  and  canine  teeth  had  occupied  the 
back  part  of  the  mouth,  and  the  molar  or  grinding  teeth  had 
occupied  the  front,  what  use  could  we  have  made  of  either  ? 
Shall  we,  then,  admire  the  skill  of  him  who  disposes  a  chorus 
of  thirty- two  men  in  just  order?  and  can  we  deny  the  skill 
of  the  Creator  in  disposing  the  same  number  of  teeth  in  an 
order  so  convenient,  so  necessary  even,  for  our  existence?  " 

The  argument  of  Galen  is  wholly  teleological.  This 
is  the  natural  result  of  his  studies.  Physiology  pre- 
sents the  best  examples  in  nature  of  specific  results  so ' 
wrought  out  that  they  seem  to  indicate  an  intelligent 
purpose.  These  examples  made  a  profound  impression 
upon  the  mind  of  Galen ;  and  his  reasonings  upon  them 
cover  the  whole  ground,  and  exhaust  the  evidences  in 
this  line,  so  far  as  the  method  is  concerned.  Whatever 
has  been  said  since  about  the  perfection  of  the  human 
body  as  a  machine,  is  only  of  the  nature  of  additional 
examples  and  illustrations.  No  new  argument  in  that 
line  was  possible. 

What  was  Galen's  method  ?  It  was  the  same  which 
holds  the  foremost  place  in  later  teleology,  and  may 
justly  be  characterized  as  the  mechanical  method.  Here 
are  certain  machines  produced  by  human  art,  —  a  ship, 
a  dial,  or  a  watch ;  but  there  are  animal  machines  too. 
The  human  body  is  a  most  wonderful  and  elaborate 
piece  of  mechanism.  It  required  a  skilful  workman  to 
construct  the  former:  how  much  greater  must  have 
been  the  wisdom  of  that  being  who  produced  the  latter  ! 
Such  is  the  style  of  this  mechanical  argument.  It  is 
foreshadowed  in  Cicero ;  but  in  the  hands  of  Galen, 
a  very  competent  anatomist  and  practical  physician,  to 
whom  the  details  of  the  human  form,  as  well  as  those 
of  many  animals,  were  as  familiar  as  the  alphabet,  this 
method  at  once   bloomed  out  to  its   full   dimensions. 


72  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Something  more  might  be  said  after  Galen  on  account 
of  the  advance  in  anatomical  science ;  but  the  method 
was  the  same.  And  what  use  of  piling  up  new  exam- 
ples and  illustrations  of  it  when  there  was  already  more 
than  was  needed?  It  was  only  an  embarrassment  of 
riches. 

Dr.  Coxe  thinks  that  not  only  have  later  writers 
failed  to  strike  out  any  new  paths  of  argument,  but 
that  their  handling  of  the  old  argument  respecting 
the  mechanical  perfection  of  the  body  is  inferior  to 
Galen's :  — 

"The  treatise  on  the  hand  by  Sir  Charles  Bell,  much  as 
it  has  been  admired,  is,  in  my  opinion,  infinitely  inferior  to 
these  books  of  Galen  on  the  same  subject.  Indeed,  his  best 
parts  may  be  regarded  as  abstracted  from  Galen,  and  clothed 
in  the  language  of  the  present  age."  * 

That  is  pretty  hard  on  Sir  Charles.  "  Infinitely  infe- 
rior "  to  Galen,  even  after  he  had  stolen  so  much  from 
him!  But  what  could  the  man  do?  Having  the  task 
of  writing  a  whole  book  on  the  human  hand,  he  was 
bound  to  cross  Galen's  track  somewhere.  Did  not 
Galen  himself  repeat  the  arguments  of  Socrates  and 
Cicero  without  acknowledgment.  The  position  and 
character  of  the  various  kinds  of  teeth  was  an  argu- 
ment employed  by  the  Greeks  several  centuries  before 
the  Christian  era ;  and  yet  Galen,  in  the  second  century 
after  Christ,  employs  it  as  if  for  the  first  time.  It 
seems  probable  that  this  and  similar  examples  were 
repeatedly  cited  by  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  handed 
down  from  generation  to  generation,  until  they  came 
to  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  common  teleological  armory, 

1  The  Writings  of  Hippocrates  and  Galen.  Epitomized  by  John 
Redman  Coxe,  M.D.;  note,  p.  523. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  GREEKS  AND  ROMANS.     73 

from  which  any  individual  might  draw  the  weapon 
which  pleased  him,  without  any  consciousness  of  pla- 
giarism. Still,  these  ill-natured  charges  of  borrowing 
and  stealing,  such  as  the  one  brought  against  Sir  Charles 
Bell  by  Dr.  Coxe,  are  very  common  in  teleology,  as  we 
shall  see  hereafter. 

Here  are  three  great  minds  of  antiquity  whose 
thoughts  upon  this  stupendous  problem,  How  far  can 
God  be  known  from  his  works  ?  we  have  briefly  exam- 
ined. Here  is  the  greatest  of  the  Greek  philosophers, 
the  most  eloquent  of  the  old  Romans,  and  the  most 
renowned  physician  of  Greece  and  Rome ;  for  Galen 
belonged  to  both,  or  strictly  speaking  to  neither,  but 
was  cosmopolitan,  a  citizen  of  the  world.  What  can 
these  men  tell  us  about  God?  Galen  was  the  only  one 
of  the  three  who  had  any  knowledge  of  the  Christian 
Scriptures.  He  quotes  from  the  writings  of  Moses,  but 
without  giving  them  any  greater  credence  than  to  any 
other  ancient  documents.  Still  his  conceptions  of  God 
were  manifestly  influenced  by  them :  he  is  the  only 
pronounced  monotheist  of  the  three.  But  in  the  utter- 
ances of  Socrates  and  Cicero  we  have  an  exact  measure 
both  of  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  natural  the- 
ology. They  had  no  aid  from  revelation,  and  yet  they 
knew  a  great  deal  about  the  divine  nature.  Still,  with 
all  their  splendid  gifts  of  intellect,  they  groped  among 
the  shadows,  and  failed  to  grasp  true  conceptions  of  the 
one  God. 


74  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   NATURAL    THEOLOGY   OF   THE    MIDDLE   AGES: 
THOMAS  AQUINAS,    SEBONDE. 

It  would  betoken  a  levity  ill  suited  to  the  dignity 
of  my  theme  if,  following  a  famous  precedent,  I  should 
begin  a  chapter  with  the  above  heading,  and  end  it  by 
saying,  There  was  no  natural  theology  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  That  would  be  about  as  near  truth  as  wit,  but 
not  a  shining  example  of  either.  Natural  theology 
was  not  wholly  ignored ;  though,  as  compared  with  the 
copious  supply  of  it  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  it  was  a  scarce  article. 

During  the  early  centuries  the  church  Fathers  built 
up  their  systems  of  theology  almost  wholly  upon  a 
scriptural  basis.  Each  doubtful  point  must  be  settled 
by  a  text  from  the  Bible,  instead  of  an  appeal  to  human 
reason,  or  to  nature's  storehouse  of  facts  and  laws: 
hence  we  may  look  in  vain  for  design-arguments  in 
their  writings.  Subsequently  a  school  of  theology 
sprang  up  which  added  to  the  scriptural  method  of 
verification,  that  of  appeal  to  the  Fathers  themselves. 
If  no  sacred  text  was  ready  to  hand,  a  quotation  from 
Origen,  Ambrose,  or  Augustine,  would  serve  quite  as 
well.  It  was  not  until  the  later  medieval  ages,  in  the 
times  of  the  schoolmen,  that  we  find  much  attention 
given  to  the  rational  proofs  of  theological  doctrines ; 
and  even  then  those  proofs  which  may  be  drawn  from 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         75 

external  nature  are  quite  subordinate  to  those  which 
rest  upon  first  principles.  The  a  priori  proofs  are  pre- 
ferred to  the  a  posteriori :  it  is  rational,  rather  than 
natural,  theology  to  which  they  resort  to  confirm  scrip- 
tural theology. 

Such  as  it  was,  however,  the  new  departure  was 
most  weighty  in  its  consequences.  The  revolt  against 
authority  once  begun,  there  was  no  telling  where  it 
would  end.  The  notion  that  an  appeal  to  the  Scrip- 
tures and  the  Fathers  was  not  sufficient  to  stop  all 
controversy  being  once  broached,  there  was  logically 
no  stopping-place  until  human  reason  was  completely 
emancipated  from  that  bondage  to  authority  which 
almost  justifies  the  term  sometimes  applied  to  the 
mediseval  period,  the  Dark  Ages.  Much  contempt  has 
been  heaped  upon  the  schoolmen,  and  a  great  deal  of 
it  is  well  deserved;  but  to  them  belongs  the  honor 
of  leading  men  once  more  to  thiuk  for  themselves. 
As  early  as  the  middle  of  the  ninth  century  Scotus 
Erigena  taught  that  an  appeal  to  the  Fathers  should  be 
kept  as  a  last  resort,  and  then  only  used  to  convince 
those  "  men,  who,  unpractised  in  reasoning,  yield  rather 
to  authority  than  to  logic."  Even  this  mild  form  of 
rationalism  drew  upon  him  the  thunders  of  orthodox 
denunciation.1 

In  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries  we  find  theo- 
logians drawing  out  the  rational  proofs  of  the  existence 
of  God  without  any  scruple,  or  any  suspicion  of  heter- 
odoxy. The  revival  of  learning  had  then  made  some 
progress,  and  reason  was  getting  on  its  feet.  The 
emancipation  of  reason,  however,  is  one  thing,  and  the 
use  it  shall  make  of  itself  when  free  is  quite  another 
thing.     It  had  not  yet  even  become  free  in  any  large 

1  Lewes:  Hist,  of  Phi.,  ii.  11. 


76  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

sense,  and  it  made  a  poor  use  of  the  little  liberty  it  had 
achieved.  The  schoolmen  exhausted  their  strength  in 
subtile  disputations,  logomachies  pure  and  simple  ;  that 
is,  contests  in  which  words  rather  than  substantial 
verities  were  the  things  in  dispute.  They  were  little 
inclined  to  observation  or  the  contemplation  of  nature, 
and  not  much  in  the  direction  of  natural  theology  is  to 
be  expected  of  them. 

Still,  teleology  was  not  wholly  neglected.  A  fair 
example  of  the  extent  to  which  it  was  employed,  and 
of  its  subordination  to  the  causal  and  ontological  argu- 
ments,  is  furnished  by  the  method  of  Thomas  Aquinas 1 
for  proving  the  existence  of  God :  "  The  existence  of 
God  may  be  proved  in  five  ways."  I  give  a  condensed 
summary  of  the  first  four,  and  the  fifth  in  full:  (1) 
From  the  principles  of  motion :  there  must  be  a  primum 
movens,  —  something  which  originated  all  movement. 
(2)  From  the  law  of  efficient  cause:  there  must  be  a 
prima  causa,  or  First  Cause.  (3)  From  the  principle 
of  possibility  and  necessity :  certain  things  exist  whose 
non-existence  is  possible ;  but  something  must  exist 
whose  non-existence  is  impossible,  and  this  necessarily 
existing  being  is  God.  (4)  From  the  grades  of  exist- 
ence :  as  there  are  degrees  of  various  qualities,  hot,  hot- 
ter, hottest,  —  noble,  more  noble,  most  noble,  —  "there 
must  be  some  being  which  is  the  source  of  excellence, 
or  of  any  sort  of  perfection  whatever  in  all  beings." 
(5)  "  From  the  government  of  things.  For  we  see 
that  certain  things  without  intelligence,  as  natural 
bodies  for  instance,  work  according  to  a  purpose,  which 
appears  from  this,  because  they  always,  or  very  often, 
work  in  the  same  way  as  if  they  followed  that  which 
was  best.     Whence  it  is  plain,  that  they  reach  the  re- 

i  Born  1227,  died  1274. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         77 

suit,  not  by  chance,  but  by  intention.  But  things  with- 
out thought  would  not  work  to  a  purpose  unless  they 
were  directed  by  some  conscious  and  intelligent  being, 
as  an  arrow  by  a  bowman.  Therefore  there  is  some 
intelligent  being  by  whom  all  things  in  nature  are 
directed  to  an  end ;  and  this  being,  we  say,  is  God."  1 

The  first  two  arguments  are  one  and  the  same ;  for, 
if  there  is  a  prima  causa,  it  is  also  a  primum  movens. 
The  First  Cause  accounts  for  the  existence  of  motion 
just  as  well  as  any  other  form  of  existence.  These 
both  fall,  therefore,  into  the  category  of  causal,  or  cos- 
mological,  arguments.  The  third  and  fourth,  in  like 
manner,  fall  together  under  the  head  of  ontological,  or 
d  priori,  arguments ;  for  the  conception  of  some  being 
whose  non-existence  is  impossible,  and  the  conception 
of  a  perfect  being,  the  crowning  excellence  of  the 
several  grades  of  existence,  are  both  of  them  of  the 
nature  of  first,  or  d  priori,  principles.  The  fifth  mode 
of  proving  the  existence  of  God  is  clearly  teleological. 
The  statement  of  it  is  general,  and  it  is  not  fortified  by 
any  examples.  It  stands,  therefore,  as  a  mere  asser- 
tion, that  "  natural  bodies  without  intelligence  work  to 
a  purpose,  as  if  they  followed  that  which  is  best." 
Perhaps  the  "  angelic  doctor  "  was  wiser  to  leave  it  so 
than  some  later  teleologists,  who  affect  to  fortify  their 
general  assertions  by  examples  either  ill  fitted  or  posi- 
tively inimical  to  their  purpose. 

Design-arguments  were,  generally  speaking,  at  a  dis- 
count with  the  schoolmen.  A  subtle  dialectic  method 
was  more  agreeable  to  their  taste.  No  author  during 
^the  Middle  Ages  (regarding,  with  Hallam,  the  end  of 
the  fifteenth  century  as  the  mediae val  limit)  has  made 
much   of  teleology.     Even   Sebonde,  whose   work  we 

1  Quaes,  ii.  Art.  iii. 


78  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

shall  notice  next,  and  who  has  been  called  the  "  father 
of  natural  theology,"  does  not  employ  the  teleological 
method  at  all;  though  his  argument,  being  to  some 
extent  eutaxiological,  is  to  the  same  extent  a  design- 
argument. 

Raymond  Sebonde,  or  Sabieude,1  was  professor  of 
medicine,  philosophy,  and  theology  at  Toulouse  early 
in  the  fifteenth  century.  Dugald  Stewart  places  his 
residence  there  "towards  the  end  of  the  fourteenth 
century ; "  2  but  in  this  he  was  undoubtedly  mistaken, 
as  he  was  also  respecting  the  object  of  Sebonde's  work, 
and  the  language  in  which  it  was  written.  Very  little 
is  known  about  Sebonde,  not  even  the  date  of  his  birth ; 
and  authorities  do  not  agree  as  to  the  year  of  his  death. 
The  Abbot  Trithemius  says  that  he  died  in  1432.  But, 
from  one  of  the  manuscripts  examined  by  Dr.  Kleiber 
in  the  Imperial  Library  of  Paris,  it  appears  that  Se- 
bonde's "Natural  Theology"3  was  finished  in  the  Uni- 
vershy  of  Toulouse  "  in  1436,  in  the  month  of  February, 
the  sixth  day,  which  was  the  sabbath  day."  Kleiber 
says,  — 

"  It  is  certain  that  the  '  Natural  Theology '  was  written  by 
Raimunclus  at  Toulouse  from  the  year  1434  to  the  year  1436, 
and  that  he  was  born  in  Spain.     The  rest  of  his  life  is  un- 

1  For  some  curious  particulars  about  his  name,  see  Dr.  C.  C.  L. 
Kleiber's  "  De  Raimundi  quern  vocant  de  Sabunde  vita  et  scriptis,"  Ber- 
lin, 1856.  Kleiber  found  some  manuscript  copies  of  the  "  Theologia 
Naturalis  "  in  the  Imperial  Library  of  Paris,  by  means  of  which  he 
was  able  to  correct  several  errors  which  had  been  current  respecting 
Sebonde;  for  I  shall  still  call  him  by  that  name,  since  it  is  pretty  well 
fixed  by  usage.  Kleiber  thinks  the  correct  spelling  is  Sabieude.  He 
gives  a  dozen  other  variations  of  the  spelling. 

2  Essays,  p.  103. 

3  The  full  title  is  "  Theologia  Naturalis,  sive  Liber  Creaturarum," 
—  Natural  Theology,  or,  the  Book  of  Creatures.  Sebonde  teas  the  first  to 
use  the  term  "  natural  theology." 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES  79 

certain.  Raimimdus  wrote  nothing  but  the  '  Natural  The- 
ology.' All  the  other  writings  which  have  borne  his  name 
are  only  abstracts  from  the  '  Natural  Theology.'  The 
4  Natural  Theology  '  was  written,  not  in  the  Spanish,  but  in 
the  Latin  language." 

Seboncle's  book  has  never  been  translated  into  Eng- 
lish. Montaigne  translated  it  into  the  French  language 
in  obedience  to  a  request  made  by  his  father  a  short 
time  before  his  death.  The  book  had  been  presented  to 
the  elder  Montaigne  by  Peter  Bunel,  a  learned  man, 
who  commended  it  highly  as  an  antidote  to  the  doc- 
trines of  Luther,  which  were  just  then  beginning  to 
make  serious  inroads  upon  the  ancient  faith. 

Montaigne  also  wrote  a  long  essay  entitled,  "  Apology 
for  Raymond  Sebonde."  But  the  witty  Frenchman 
gave  a  loose  reign  to  his  fancy,  and  wandered  widely  in 
the  realms  of  thought,  touching  up  the  manners  and 
morals  of  ancient  and  modern  nations ;  comparing  man 
to  other  animals,  quite  to  the  advantage  of  the  latter ; 
inquiring  whether  the  elephant  has  any  sentiments  of 
religion ;  ridiculing  science  and  philosophy ;  and,  by  a 
skilful  play  of  words,  slyly  poking  fun  at  religion  also 
at  the  very  moment  when  he  seemed  to  be  uttering  the 
most  pious  sentiments :  so  that,  all  in  all,  you  shall  find 
a  hundred  words  on  other  subjects  to  one  for  Sebonde. 

His  translation  of  the  "  Natural  Theology  "  was  pub- 
lished in  1569. 1  The  rendering  is  free,  but  substantially 
correct.  Indeed,  the  wonder  is  that  Montaigne  should 
have  had  the  patience  to  execute  so  laborious  a  task  as 
well  as  he  did.     The  original  is  in  such  bad  Latin,  and 

1  "  The  original  Latin  work  was  first  printed  at  Deventer  in  1487,  and 
was  often  reprinted  in  France  during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries."  —  Montaigne's  Essays,  p.  200,  note.  The  copy  in  the  British 
Museum  is  marked  Beventrie. 


80  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

so  full  of  abbreviations,1  that  I  almost  repented  having 
undertaken  to  translate  one  chapter  of  the  three  hun- 
dred and  thirty. 

Sebonde  had  a  strong  conviction  of  the  value  of 
those  inferences  respecting  the  being  and  attributes 
of  God  which  we  may  draw  from  nature.  This  abun- 
dantly appears  in  the  following  extract  from  the  pref- 
ace to  his  "  Natural  Theology  :  "  — 

"  Two  books  have  been  given  to  man  by  God ;  namely, 
the  book  of  the  whole  universe  of  created  tilings,  or  the 
book  of  nature ;  and  the  other  is  the  book  of  the  Sacred 
Scriptures.  This  first  book  was  given  to  man  from  the  be- 
ginning, when  the  world  was  made,  because  any  creature 
you  please  is  nothing  else  than  a  certain  letter  written  by  the 
finger  of  God  ;  and  from  many  creatures,  as  "from  many  let- 
ters, a  book  is  composed.2  Thus  is  composed  the  book  of 
creatures,  in  which  book  man  also  is  included,  and  is  the 
chief  letter  of  it  all.  And  these  letters  and  the  words  made 
from  them  are  significant,  and  contain  knowledge  and  a 
diversity  of  meanings  and  wondrous  thoughts.  .  .  .  More- 
over, the  first  book,  that  is  the  book  of  nature,  cannot  be 
falsified  nor  destroyed  nor  wrongly  interpreted ;  for  this 
reason  even  heretics  cannot  misunderstand  it,  nor  can  any 
one  become  a  heretic  by  reason  of  it.3  But  the  second  can 
be  falsified,  and  wrongly  interpreted,  and  misunderstood. 
Nevertheless,  each  book  is  from  the  same  person  :  the  same 
God  both  formed  all  created  things,  and  revealed  the  Sacred 
Scriptures.  Hence  they  mutually  agree,  and  do  not  contra- 
dict the  one  the  other ;  yet  the  first  is  to  us  connatural,  the 

1  Querams  e'go  qure  res  pmi  yds  no  hnt  pis  qm  ee ;  for,  Qiieramas  ergo 
quare  res  primi  gracilis  nonhabent  plus  quam  esse  is  a  moderate  example 
of  Sebonde's  parsimony  in  the  use  of  letters. 

2  Hence  the  sub-title  Liber  Creatiirarum,  the  Book  of  Creatures. 
This  is  the  running-title  in  Montaigne's  translation. 

3  This  notion  may  have  suggested  to  Peter  Bunel  that  Sebonde's 
book  would  serve  as  an  antidote  against  the  Lutheran  heresy. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         81 

second  supernatural.  Furthermore,  since  man  is  by  nature 
rational  and  capable  of  instruction  ;  and  since  he  had  in  fact 
from  his  creation  no  knowledge,  but  was  apt  to  acquire  it ; 
and  since  knowledge  cannot  be  had  without  a  book  in  which 
it  is  written, — it  was  very  appropriate,  lest  man  might  in 
vain  be  capable  of  learning,  that  divine  wisdom  should  have 
created  a  book  for  him,  in  which,  without  a  master,  he  might 
for  himself  learn  what  was  necessary  for  salvation." 

Sebonde's  classification  of  natural  objects,  or  "  crea- 
tures," is  not  only  something  of  a  curiosity  to  a  modern 
naturalist,  but  it  is  so  important  as  a  basis  for  his  dem- 
onstration of  the  existence  of  God,  that  it  must  not  by 
any  means  be  omitted.  In  his  first  chapter  he  enumer- 
ates the  following  classes  of  creatures,  or  grades  of 
existence :  — 

First,  every  thing  having  mere  existence,  but  which 
neither  lives  (yivit),  nor  feels  (sentit),  nor  knows  (in- 
telligit),  nor  has  free  will  (yult  liber e). 

Secondly,  every  thing  having  existence  and  life,  with- 
out sensation  or  knowledge. 

Thirdly,  every  thing  which  exists,  lives,  and  feels ; 
"and  this  sensation  includes  seeing,  hearing,  tasting, 
smelling,  and  touch."  .In  this  class  he  gives  three  sub- 
divisions :  (a)  Animals  having  the  sense  of  touch  with- 
out memory  or  hearing;  as  shell-fish.  (6)  Animals 
having  the  sense  of  touch  and  memory,  but  not  hear- 
ing ;  as  ants,  (c)  Animals  having  memory,  and  hear- 
ing, and  all  that  belongs  to  "  animalia  perfecta;"  as 
dogs  and  cats. 

Fourthly,  every  creature  which  exists,  lives,  feels, 
knows,  discerns,  and  has  free  will. 

In  brief,  his  four  classes  are  minerals,  plants,  animals, 
and  man.  In  the  second  chapter  he  enters  into  an 
elaborate    comparison    of    man   with   the    three    other 


82  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

grades  of  existence.  His  third  chapter  contains  his 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  is  worthy  of 
being  reproduced  entire.  Montaigne's  headings  to  the 
chapters  are  usually  condensed  from  the  original,  and 
that  is  the  case  with  the  heading  to  this  chapter.  In 
the  French  translation  it  is,  "  That  there  is  one  invisi- 
ble master  who  built  the  world."  Sebonde's  heading  is, 
"  Here  is  shown  the  result  of  that  comparison  [i.e.,  the 
comparison  of  man  to  the  inferior  grades  of  existence 
given  in  Chap.  II.]  :  It  is  plainly  demonstrated  and 
concluded,  that  there  is  some  invisible  lord  above  man 
who  has  constructed  and  arranged  all  these  grades  of 
being." 

Following  is  a  free  rendering  of  his  third  chapter:  — 

"Now,  it  behooves  us  to  consider  what  conclusions  we 
ought  to  draw  from  this  comparison.  We  ought  thence  to 
infer,  that,  since  man  has  collectively  all  those  things  which 
other  creatures  have  severally,  it  is  the  very  same  one,  and 
none  other,  who  has  imparted  to  each  of  them  his  portion, 
and  has  combined  all  in  man  himself ;  that  is  to  say,  exist- 
ence, life,  sensation,  intelligence,  and  free  will.  Therefore 
he  who  gave  to  inferior  creatures  what  they  have,  is  the 
same  who  gave  to  man  what  he  has.  But,  as  man  did  not 
give  to  other  creatures  what  they  possess,  so  he  did  not  im- 
part to  himself  what  he  has.  As  he  did  not  give  them  being, 
life,  and  sensation,  so  he  did  not  give  himself  being,  life, 
sensation,  and  intelligence.  Therefore  the  same  hand  made 
all  things  :  the  same  lord  and  artificer  has  proportioned  and 
limited  and  arranged  all  things. 

' '  Let  us  inquire  why  the  creatures  of  the  first  degree  have 
nothing  but  existence  ;  why  the  elements  have  neither  life  nor 
sensation.  Who  prescribed  to  them  that  they  should  not  have 
more?  [  Who  cut  their  allowance  so  short?  —  Montaigne.] 
Who  prescribed  to  plants  that  they  should  have  nothing 
higher  than  life,  and  to  animals  that  they  should  have  nothing 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         83 

.more  than  sensation?  Who  has  caused  animals  to  rise  one 
grade  above  plants,  and  caused  plants  to  be  of  one  rank 
rather  than  another?  Who  has  measured  out  their  portion 
thus,  and  not  otherwise?  Why  has  man  intelligence  and 
free  will,  the  power  to  choose  or  refuse,  in  addition  to  the 
first  three  qualities?  Who  was  it  that  joined  those  three 
qualities  with  free  will,  so  that  there  is  no  creature  higher 
than  man,  but  he  is  the  end  and  consummation  of  things, 
and  nothing  is  wanting  to  him  ?  Who  exalted  man  above 
trees  and  brute  beasts  ? 

"  Let  us  inquire  whether  man  has  himself  united  these 
things  in  himself  in  order  that  he  might  want  nothing,  and 
whether  he  has  exalted  himself  above  all  other  creatures, 
or  whether  some  other  being  has  done  this.  Let  us  inquire 
whether  those  other  creatures  have  ordained  and  measured 
out  their  portion  to  themselves,  that  each  should  have  so 
much  and  no  more,  or  whether  some  other  being  has  done 
this  ;  whether  all  creatures  have  bestowed  upon  themselves 
their  faculties,  so  much  and  no  more,  or  whether  some  other 
being  has  done  this.  Now,  it  is  impossible  that  all  these 
creatures  should  have  imparted  to  themselves  what  they  pos- 
sess ;  and  yet  it  has  been  imparted  and  measured  out. 
Therefore  some  being  superior  to  them  all  has  arranged, 
apportioned,  and  limited  all  those  things,  and  given  its  por- 
tion to  each  creature.  The  same  master,  the  same  artificer, 
the  same  hand,  has  arranged  all  things  in  order,  and  given 
to  each  its  appropriate  place  ;  and  it  is  the  same  being  who 
caused  trees  to  rise  above  the  elements  in  rank,  and  animals 
above  trees,  and  men  above  animals.  He  who  ordained  that 
trees  should  live  by  taking  nutriment  immediately  from  the 
earth  by  means  of  their  roots  descending  into  the  soil,  is  the 
same  who  ordained  that  animals  should  live  by  taking  nutri- 
ment through  the  mouth  instead  of  roots,  and  that  man 
should  live  more  nobly  than  either  plants  or  animals.  Now, 
who  ordained  and  contrived  these  three  modes  of  living? 
Was  it  not  the  same  lord  and  artificer  ?     Moreover,  who  is  it 


84  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

that  preserves  all  these  in  such  manner  that  each  remains  in 
its  own  rank,  station,  and  order?  Who  made  these  distinct 
grades  of  existence  permanent,  so  that  they  remain  without 
confusion  ?  Who  holds  the  land  and  the  sea  in  their  places  ? 
Is  it  not  the  same  who  made  them  at  first? 

"Conclusion:  Thou,  O  man,  hast  received  thy  faculties 
from  the  same  being  from  whom  other  creatures  have  re- 
ceived theirs !  Therefore  thou  also  pertainest  to  the  same 
system  as  other  creatures,  and  makest  one  series  and  hierar- 
chy with  them.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  thou  belongest  to 
him  who  owns  all  the  rest :  thou  art  preserved  and  ruled  by 
him  who  rules  all  the  rest.  As  other  creatures  are  not  their 
own,  but  his  who  made  them,  so  thou  art  not  thine  own,  but 
his  who  owns  all  the  others.  Thou  belongest  to  him  who 
owns  the  earth,  the  ocean,  and  the  elements  where  thou 
dwellest. 

"Conclude  further:  Thou,  0  man,  hast  neither  given  to 
thyself  what  thou  hast,  nor  have  inferior  beings  given  it  to 
thee,  or  made  thee  such  as  thou  art !  Therefore  some  One 
greater  than  thou,  who  is  above  thee,  has  given  thee  what 
thou  hast,  because  thou  hast  it  not  from  another  creature, 
nor  from  thyself,  nor  from  eternity." 

In  the  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  chapters  he  undertakes 
to  prove  the  unity  of  God,  and  that  his  nature  is  truly 
infinite.  Some  confused  notion  of  proving  the  unity 
of  God  at  the  same  time  that  he  proved  his  existence 
seems  to  have  been  running  in  his  head  all  through  the 
third  chapter  also.  It  got  the  better  of  the  primary 
notion  of  proving  God's  existence  in  several  places,  for 
instance,  where  he  speaks  of  one  and  the  same  hand 
having  arranged  all  things,  and  repeats  similar  expres- 
sions over  and  over.  Then,  again,  the  first  half  of  the 
conclusion  is  partly  of  the  nature  of  a  religious  exhor- 
tation, but  more  emphatically  a  statement  of  the  origin 
of  all   things   from   one  sole  fountain  of  being.     It  is 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         85 

only  in  the  second  part  of  it  that  he  gets  back  to  his 
primary  notion  of  existence  pure  and  simple.  The 
notion  of  unity  is  so  prominent  in  the  chapter,  that  it 
has  crept  into  Montaigne's  heading,  although  it  is  not 
in  Sebonde's. 

Chapter  VII.  is  headed,  "  How  by  the  comparison  of 
the  four  grades  of  existence  it  is  proved  that  God  has 
being,  life,  sensation,  intelligence,  and  free  will ; "  and 
its  conclusion  is,  "  It  follows  that  he  exists,  lives,  feels, 
understands,  and  exercises  free  will."  In  subsequent 
chapters  Seboncle  shows  that  existence  is  the  founda- 
tion and  the  means  of  proving  all  the  other  divine 
attributes.  From  all  this  it  is  plain  that  the  third 
chapter,  containing  his  demonstration  of  the  existence 
of  God,  is  the  basis  of  all  his  subsequent  arguments. 

The  first  forty-five  chapters  contain  all  of  the  natural 
theology  proper ;  and  his  summary  of  the  work  up  to 
this  point  is,  "  We  have  infallibly  demonstrated  that  a 
Maker  of  the  world  exists,  lives,  feels,  knows,  and  has 
power." 

Then  he  wanders  off  into  "  the  mystery  of  the 
Trinity,"  transubstantiation,  penances,  purgatory,  and 
other  abstruse  matters  and  insalubrious  places,  where 
we  need  not  follow  him. 

It  is  obvious  at  a  glance,  that  Sebonde's  argument  is 
unique.  He  does  not  follow  the  well-beaten  paths  of 
teleology/  He  draws  his  inferences  from  the  open  page 
of  nature,  the  book  of  creatures,  as  he  calls  it ;  but  he 
reads  this  book  in  a  way  of  his  own.  Fixing  his  atten- 
tion upon  the  complex  hierarchy  of  lifeless  and  living 
things,  organized  in  ascending  series  from  senseless  ele- 
ments to  rational  humanity,  he  inquires  in  the  first 
place  for  the  source  of  those  qualities  which  constitute 
the  ground  of  distinction  between  these  grades  of  being. 


86  CKITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Especially  does  he  press  the  query  with  respect  to  man, 
who  is  "  the  consummation  of  things,  to  whom  nothing 
is  lacking."  His  fundamental  and  very  pertinent  ques- 
tion is,  "  Whence  did  man  derive  his  faculties  ?  "  He 
has  not  existed  from  eternity:  therefore,  thought  Se- 
bonde,  his  faculties  have  had  a  beginning  at  some 
point  of  time.  He  had  not  heard  of  the  modern  theory, 
that  life,  sensation,  and  intelligence  were  latent  in  the 
primitive  cosmic  gas.  His  notion  was,  that  human 
faculties  had  their  starting-point  in  time  simultaneous 
with  the  introduction  of  man  upon  the  earth.  They 
were  not  derived  from  inferior  creatures,  nor  did  man 
confer  them  upon  himself :  hence  they  must  have  been 
imparted  by  a  being  competent  to  bestow  such  gifts,  — 
that  is,  by  a  conscious,  intelligent,  and  free  agent. 

So  far  his  argument  is  causal.  He  is  seeking  for  an 
adequate  cause  of  those  forms  of  existence  which  he 
beholds  in  the  universe. 

But  there  is  not  only  the  existence  of  certain  facul- 
ties to  be  accounted  for;  there  is  also  the  fact,  that 
these  have  been  so  measured  out  as  to  constitute  defi- 
nite grades  of  existence  in  an  ascending  scale.  This 
eutaxy,  this  orderly  arrangement,  is  a  mark  of  intelli- 
gence. As  a  ground  of  inference,  it  is  just  as  reliable 
as,  and  leads  to  its  conclusion  more  directly  than,  the 
search  for  a  First  Cause  adequate  to  the  impartation  of 
the  faculties  and  properties  which  mark  off  the  several 
ranks,  and  distinguish  them  each  from  the  others. 

Although  Seboncle  does  not  make  the  mental  analy- 
sis of  his  argument  in  this  way,  it  clearly  contains  the 
elements  of  these  two  distinct  lines  of  reasoning ; 
namely,  the  causal  and  the  eutaxiological.  He  says 
that  "some  being  superior  to  them  all  has  given  its 
portion   to  each  creature;"  and  that  "the  same   lord 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  OF  THE   MIDDLE  AGES.         87 

and  artificer  preserves  all  these  in  such  manner  that 
each  remains  in  its  own  rank,  station,  and  order." 

His  argument  is  somewhat  awkwardly  stated;  and 
this  is  clue  in  part  to  his  confused  double  aim  of  prov- 
ing the  unity  and  existence  of  God  at  the  same  time. 
Then  it  may  be  remarked  further,  that,  in  subsequent 
chapters,  he  presses  the  argument  to  unwarrantable 
conclusions,  endeavoring  to  establish  the  whole  body 
of  systematic  theology  upon  a  natural  basis.  This 
makes  his  reasoning  appear  weaker  than  it  really  is. 
His  first  point  is  well  taken. 

This  real  strength  in  one  part  of  his  book,  while  other 
parts  are  lame  in  their  logic,  and  mingle  pious  reflec- 
tions, crude  metaphysics,  and  downright  absurdities 
confusedly  together,  may  account  for  the  various  and 
conflicting  opinions  respecting  the  merit  of  the  work. 
Hadrian  Turnebus,  a  learned  friend  of  Montaigne,  said 
it  was  so  admirable  that  it  must  have  been  stolen  from 
Thomas  Aquinas.1  The  Jesuit,  Theophilus  Raynaud, 
speaks  of  it  with  contempt.2  Comenius  commends  it 
highly,  as  does  Montaigne  himself  also ;  that  is,  if  we 
could  ever  be  absolutely  sure  what  a  man  means  who  is 
so  skilful  a  master  of  that  art  commended  to  diplo- 
matists by  another  famous  Frenchman,3  —  the  art  of 
using  words  so  as  to  conceal  your  meaning.  There  is 
a  possible  double  entendre  in  Montaigne's  eulogy  of 
Seboncle :  "  I  think  nobody  can  go  farther  than  he 
upon  that  subject,  and  that  none  did  ever  equal  him." 

Dugald  Stewart  is  taken  sharply  to  task  by  Henry 
Hallam  for  saying  that  "  the  principal  aim  of  Sebonde's 
book,  according  to  Montaigne,  is  to  show  that  Chris- 
tians are  in  the  wrong  to  make  human  reason  the  basis 

1  Montaigne's  Essays,  p.  200. 

2  Prolegomena  Theologia  Naturalis,  86.  3  Talleyrand. 


88  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS.      . 

of  their  belief,  since  the  object  of  it  is  only  conceived 
by  faith,  and  by  a  special  inspiration  of  the  divine 
grace."  "  Far  from  such  being  the  aim  of  Sebonde," 
says  Hallam,  "his  book  is  wholly  devoted  to  the  ra- 
tional proofs  of  religion." 1  Hallam's  own  statement, 
subsequently  made,  is  as  follows :  "  The  object  of  Se- 
bonde's  book  is  to  develop  those  truths  as  to  God  and 
man  which  are  latent  in  nature,  and  through  which 
man  may  learn  e\ery  thing  necessary.  .  .  .  He  under- 
takes to  prove  the  Trinity  from  the  analogy  of  nature." 

I  rather  sympathize  with  Stewart  than  blame  him. 
Any  man  who  should  undertake  to  find  out  from  Mon- 
taigne's essay  what  Sebonde  was  driving  at,  deserves 
commiseration.  It  is  more  than  most  men  can  manage 
to  follow  the  meteoric  flights  of  Montaigne  himself,  and 
know  what  he  would  be  at. 

That  Stewart  realty  obtained  his  mistaken  notion  of 
Sebonde  from  Montaigne's  "  Apology "  appears  from 
the  fact,  that  his  language  is  an  almost  exact  copy  of 
a  sentence  in  that  essay.  Montaigne  is  stating  the 
objections  that  have  been  made  against  Sebonde  by 
certain  over-zealous  Christians :  "  The  first  thing  they 
reprehend  in  his  work  is,  '  That  Christians  are  to  blame 
to  repose  their  belief  upon  human  reason,  which  is  only 
conceived  by  faith  and  the  particular  inspiration  of 
divine  grace.' " 

If  the  reader  will  glance  back  at  Stewart's  statement, 
he  will  see  that  it  is  copied  from  this  ambiguous  ex- 
pression of  an  objection,  —  ambiguous  because  it  is  so 
worded  that  it  may  easily  be  taken  for  the  thing  ob- 
jected to  instead  of  the  objection.  Stewart  says,  "  It 
is  proper  to  add,  that  I  am  acquainted  with  Sebonde 
only  through  the  medium  of  Montaigne's  version,"  leav- 

1  Lit.  of  En.,  i.  140. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY   OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.         89 

ing  us  to  infer  that  he  gathered  his  opinion  of  the  work 
from  Sebonde  himself  in  his  French  dress.  Ungracious 
as  it  may  seem  to  doubt  this,  it  is  more  charitable  than 
to  accept  it ;  for,  if  we  must  take  him  at  his  word  in 
this  matter,  our  sympathy  for  him  in  his  perplexity, 
seeking  amid  the  mazy  whirl  of  Montaigne's  rhetoric  to 
find  out  what  Sebonde  meant,  turns  at  once  to  censure. 
His  reading  must  have  been  very  superficial  indeed  not 
to  discover  that  the  object  of  his  author  was  precisely 
the  opposite  of  what  he  understood  Montaigne  to  say  it 
was.  He  seems  to  have  thought  the  original  was  in  the 
Spanish  language.1 

Another  modern  author  has  tripped  in  respect  to  this 
very  rare  book.  Professor  Baden  Powell  of  Oxford 
says  that  Sebonde  assumed  the  existence  of  God.  "  The 
argument  was  solely  as  to  the  perfection  of  the  Crea- 
tor." 2  On  the  contrary,  the  demonstration  of  God's 
existence  is  the  best  part  of  the  work,  and  the  founda- 
tion of  all  the  rest.  It  is  probable  that  Powell,  like 
Stewart,  took  his  opinions  of  this  book  at  second  hand. 

i  Essays,  p.  103.  2  Order  of  Nature,  p.  36. 


90  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY: 
MORE  AND  CUDWORTH. 

The  sixteenth  century  was  one  of  the  most  stirring 
and  revolutionary  periods  of  human  history.  It  was 
the  seed-plot  of  whatever  is  most  characteristic  in 
modern  civilization.  It  witnessed  the  birth  of  Protes- 
tantism, and  of  modern  science.  It  was  the  age  of 
Luther,  Copernicus,  and  Galileo.  The  thunders  of  the 
Reformation  resounded  through  Europe  during  its 
earlier  years :  its  later  decades  were  illumined  by  the 
ghastly  light  of  martyr-flames  kindled  in  the  vain  hope 
of  extinguishing  the  new  faith.  The  massacre  of  St. 
Bartholomew  stained  it  with  innocent  blood;  and  its 
expiring  notes  were  mingled  with  the  dying  groans  of 
Giordano  Bruno,  who  was  burned  at  Rome  for  the 
double  offence  of  repudiating  the  authority  of  the  Pope 
in  religion,  and  of  Aristotle  in  science. 

Such  commotions  and  agitations  were  not  favorable 
to  the  study  of  natural  theology.  The  great  religious 
movement  of  the  age,  the  Reformation,  resulted  in  the 
restoration  of  scriptural  theology  to  the  place  it  held  in 
the  earliest  centuries.  The  Bible  had  been  hidden  from 
the  world.  Luther  brought  it  forth  from  its  conceal- 
ment, and  made  its  interpretation  his  main  business  as 
a  theologian.  All  the  Protestant  divines  followed  his 
example  ;  and,  as  for  the  Catholic  theologians,  they  were 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.   91 

too  busy  with  the  refutation  of  heresies,  and  the  inven- 
tion and  management  of  the  Inquisition,  to  give  any 
attention  to  natural  theology. 

At  the  opening  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  move- 
ment of  human  thought  assumed  two  marked  phases : 
it  began  to  flow  in  two  currents,  distinct,  and  in  some 
sort  opposed  to  each  other.  The  struggles  of  the  six- 
teenth century  had  compelled  men  to  think,  and  they 
now  began  to  assume  that  boldness  of  utterance,  that 
daring  and  unrestrained  expression  of  the  results  of 
thought,  which  struck  the  death-knell  of  authority. 
Human  reason  was  at  last  fairly  on  its  feet ;  and  the 
next  question  was  whither  it  should  walk,  and  by  what 
rule  or  method  its  steps  should  be  guided. 

It  has  often  been  remarked,  that,  in  each  great  emer- 
gency in  human  affairs,  some  leader  has  arisen  whose 
genius  was  the  beacon-light  revealing  a  way  of  escape 
or  a  path  of  progress.  In  this  emergency  of  human 
thought  newly  emancipated  and  seeking  for  a  method, 
Francis  Bacon  was  the  first  to  propose  one.1  To  him 
is  justly  accorded  the  honor  of  pointing  out  one  legiti- 
mate path  of  progress  for  the  human  mind  seeking  truth 
independently  of  authority ;  viz.,  the  inductive  method. 
By  observation  and  experiment  men  can  accumulate  a 
store  of  facts ;  and,  by  reasoning  upon  these,  they  can 
formulate  general  laws  and  construct  the  various  sci- 
ences. Upon  this  path  of  progress  men  entered  with 
eagerness,  pursued  it  with  great  success,  and  are  still 
engaged  in  the  good  work,  with  the  prospect  of  even 
grander  results  yet  to  be  attained. 

But  there  are  certain  truths  or  principles  not  to  be 

i  Bacon's  work  on  the  Advancement  of  Learning  was  first  published 
in  the  English  language  in  1605.  It  was  subsequently  much  enlarged, 
and  published  in  Latin  in  1623. 


92  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

reached  by  observation  and  experiment,  because  they 
lie  in  the  mind  itself,  and  can  only  be  drawn  out  by 
reflection.  From  these  first  principles  others  may  be 
obtained  by  deduction,  and  thus  a  body  of  philosophy 
may  be  built  up.  Here  is  a  distinct  method,  metaphysi- 
cal and  deductive,  instead  of  experimental  and  induc- 
tive. Rene  Descartes  is  the  author  of  this  subjective 
and  deductive  method.1  The  justice  of  according  to 
Bacon  and  Descartes  the  honor  of  inventing  these 
two  methods  may  be  called  in  question ;  because  both 
had  undoubtedly  been  used  before  these  men  were 
born,  but  never  with  that  full  comprehension  of  them 
as  distinct  methods,  and  never  with  that  complete  and 
fearless  abandonment  to  their  guidance  which  these 
two  men  exhibited. 

Thus  early  in  the  seventeenth  century,  under  the 
leadership  of  two  great  minds,  human  thought  began 
to  flow  in  these  two  distinct  channels.  Properly  con- 
sidered, the  Baconian  inductive  method  and  the  Carte- 
sian subjective  method  are  complementary,  and  not 
antagonistic  to  each  other.  Moreover,  they  had  at  their 
origin  this  in  common,  and  as  a  bond  of  sympathy,  that 
both  were  directly  and  irrepressibly  hostile  to  the  bane- 
ful influence  of  authority.  But  a  common  point  of 
antagonism  operates  as  a  bond  of  sympathy  and  union, 
only  so  long  as  the  enemy  is  in  the  field.  A  marked 
antagonism  was  soon  developed  between  the  adherents 
of  these  two  schools  of  thought. 

This  antagonism  in  turn  split,  and  separated  into 
cross-currents.  There  was  a  purely  metaphysical  phase 
of  it,  dividing  philosophy  into  what  might,  broadly 
speaking,  be  called  the  English  school  and  the  Conti- 
nental school  of  metaphysicians;  and  there  was  the 
1  Descartes'  Discourse  on  Method  was  published  in  1637. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.   93 

theological  phase  of  it,  which  is  the  only  one  that  con- 
cerns us  at  present.  This  latter  antagonism  did  not 
arise  from  the  fundamental  positions  of  Bacon  and  Des- 
cartes, as  the  metaphysical  antagonism  did,  but  from 
certain  principles  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  which 
were  not  at  all  necessarily  or  essentially  involved  in 
his  method.  Inasmuch  as  this  antagonism  is  directly 
and  intimately  related  to  the  development  of  natural 
theology  in  the  seventeenth  century,  it  is  no  digression, 
but  lies  precisely  in  the  line  of  my  work,  to  point  out 
its  existence,  and  trace  it  to  its  causes. 

In  the  first  place,  there  was  the  Cartesian  theory  of 
"vortices."  This  was  an  attempt  to  explain  the  origin 
and  movements  of  the  earth  and  of  celestial  bodies 
upon  mechanical  principles,  —  a  sort  of  crude  evolution 
hypothesis,  less  tenable  than  the  nebular  hypothesis 
of  La  Place,  —  the  cosmic-gas  theory,  as  the  Germans 
call  it,  —  but,  like  that,  welcomed  by  atheists  and  depre- 
cated by  theists.  The  following  account  of  it  is  quoted 
from  Whewell : x  — 

"  He  asserts  it  to  be  also  manifest,  that  a  vacuum  in  any 
part  of  the  universe  is  impossible  : 2  the  whole  must  be  filled 
with  matter ;  and  the  matter  must  be  divided  into  equal 
angular  parts,  this  being  the  most  simple,  and  therefore  the 
most  natural,  supposition.  This  matter  being  in  motion,  the 
parts  are  necessarily  ground  into  a  spherical  form ;  and 
the  corners  thus  rubbed  off  (like  filings  or  sawdust)  form  a 
second  and  more  subtile  matter.  There  is,  besides,  a  third 
kind  of  matter,  of  parts  more  coarse  and  less  fitted  for 
motion.  The  first  matter  makes  luminous  bodies,  as  the  sun 
and  the  fixed  stars  ;  the  second  is  the  transparent  substance 

i  Hist,  of  Ind.  Sci.,  ii.  142. 

2  It  is  said  that  Descartes  first  framed  his  theory  of  the  cosmos  upon 
the  basis  of  a  vacuum  ;  but,  hearing  that  a  vacuum  was  not  then  popular 
at  Paris,  he  changed  his  basis  to  &  plenum  I 


94  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  the  skies  ;  the  third  is  the  material  of  opaque  bodies,  as 
the  earth,  planets,  and  comets.  We  may  suppose  also,  that 
the  motions  of  these  parts  take  the  form  of  revolving  circular 
currents,  or  vortices.  B37  this  means  the  first  matter  will  be 
collected  to  the  centre  of  each  vortex,  while  the  second,  or 
subtile  matter,  surrounds  it,  and,  by  its  centrifugal  effort, 
constitutes  light.  The  planets  are  carried  round  the  sun  by 
the  motion  of  his  vortex,  each  planet  being  at  such  a  dis- 
tance from  the  sun  as  to  be  in  a  part  of  the  vortex  suitable 
to  its  solidity  and  mobility." 

In  the  second  place,  there  was  the  total  rejection  of 
teleology  by  Descartes  :  — 

4 'We  wholly  reject  from  our  philosophy  the  search  for 
final  causes  ;  for  we  ought  not  to  take  so  much  upon  our- 
selves as  to  believe  that  God  wished  us  to  take  part  in  his 
counsels." 

We  are  not  thence  to  infer,  however,  that  he  was  at 
all  inclined  towards  atheism  or  irreligion.  It  is  well 
known,  that  he  made  more  of  the  ontological  argument 
for  the  existence  of  God  than  had  been  done  by  any 
previous  writer.  One  author  uncharitably  suggests 
that  he  had  an  interest  in  making  away  with  teleology 
in  order  to  have  a  clear  field  for  his  favorite  ontology. 

I  have  said  that  these  two  things  —  his  vortex  theory 
and  his  rejection  of  teleology  —  were  not  necessary  con- 
sequences of  his  method ;  and  this  I  am  free  to  maintain. 
At  the  same  time  they  were,  in  a  sense,  natural  con- 
sequences, though  not  necessary  consequences,  of  his 
subjective  method.  His  fondness  for  the  ontological 
proof  was  a  direct  consequence  of  his  method,  and 
needs  no  other  explanation ;  and  the  very  fact  that  his 
mind  was  so  filled  with  the  importance  of  that  proof 
would  be  an  obstacle  to  his  appreciation  of  teleology. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.   95 

But  there   is  another  reason  why  he  was  inclined  to 
disparage  the  teleological  argument,  and  this  is  more  - 
directly  related  to  his  method.     Teleology  thrives  upon 
the  observation  of  nature ;  and  Descartes'  method,  in- 
stead of  leading  to  such  observation,  was  based  upon 
reflection,  meditation,  and  introspection.     For  the  same 
reason    his   vortex   theory    was    harmonious  with   his 
method,  though  that  particular  theory  was  not  neces- , 
sary  to  it.     It  was  a  construction  of  the  universe  out  | 
of   the    depths  of'  his  own   consciousness,  just    as  his 
method  required  all  philosophy  to  be  constructed. 

It  might  seem  at  first  glance,  that  the  rejection  of 
teleology  was  a  point  of  agreement  between  Bacon  and 
Descartes,  since  the  former  stigmatized  final  causes  as 
"sterile  virgins."  But,  accurately  speaking,  it  was  not 
final  causes  that  he  criticised,  but  the  misplacement  of 
them ;  and  it  was  the  search  for  them  in  the  province 
of  physics  that  he  said  was  barren.  Moreover,  the 
Baconian  philosophy  of  induction  was  the  immediate 
occasion  of  a  group  of  writers  on  natural  theology 
springing  up  in  the  last  half  of  the  seventeenth  centu- 
ry. The  cultivation  of  the  sciences,  stimulated  and 
guided  by  that  philosophy,  revealed  so  many  new  illus- 
trations of  God's  wisdom  in  the  creation,  that  a  crop  of 
teleology  followed  just  as  naturally  as  harvest  follows 
seeding. 

Of  the  English  group  of  teleologists  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  consisting  of  More,  Cudworth,  Boyle,  Ray,  and 
Newton,  the  last  three  were  ardent  disciples  of  the  Ba- 
conian method.  More  and  Cudworth  were  more  nearly 
allied  to  the  Cartesian  than  to  the  English  school  of 
metaphysics ;  but,  in  respect  to  the  theological  antago- 
nism to  Descartes  on  account  of  his  vortex  theory  and 
his  rejection  of  teleology,  they  were  as  violently  anti- 


96  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Cartesian  as  the  other  three.  Thus  we  see  how  the 
cross-currents  and  counter-currents  of  opinion  brought 
the  same  men  into  sympathy  on  some  points  and  into 
antagonism  on  other  points.  More  and  Cudworth  ac- 
cepted Descartes'  ontology  with  thanks,  but  antago- 
nized him  on  other  points.  They  were  not  strictly 
Cartesians  on  any  point,  but  Platonists ;  and  this  fact 
of  their  attempting  to  resuscitate  Platonic  philosophy, 
while  it  allied  them  with  Descartes  rather  than  with 
the  English  school  of  metaphysics  as  represented  by 
Locke,  and  was  thus  in  one  sense  a  bond  of  sympathy, 
still  in  another  sense  it  was  a  symbol  of  antagonism. 
Plato's  opinion  that  the  world  was  animated,  which  was 
the  fountain  of  Cudworth's  "plastic-nature"  theory, 
was  pointedly  opposed  to  the  Cartesian  mechanical 
theory  of  the  universe. 

This  whole  group  of  English  teleologists  might  justly 
be  called  the  anti-Cartesian  group,  but  this  expression 
must  be  strictly  construed  as  referring  to  a  theological 
antagonism  of  opinion.  They  all  attack  Descartes  on 
account  of  his  vortex  theory  and  his  rejection  of  tele- 
ology :  but  they  were  friendly  enough  to  his  other  opin- 
ions ;  and  More  was  on  such  friendly  terms  as  to  carry 
on  a  personal  correspondence  with  the  French  philoso- 
pher, the  object  of  which  was  to  relieve  the  latter  of 
any  suspicion  of  atheism  in  the  minds  of  the  English 
public  on  account  of  the  two  obnoxious  elements  of  his 
philosophy. 

With  this  preliminary  view  of  the  tendencies  of  specu- 
lative thought  during  the  seventeenth  century,  we  are 
prepared  to  enter  more  intelligently  upon  the  detailed 
study  of  the  writings  of  the  anti-Cartesian  group. 

Henry  More,  D.D.,  the  first  of  this  group,  was  a  man 
of  considerable  learning,  and  a  prominent  figure  among 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.   97 

the  English  divines  of  his  day,  as  might  be  inferred 
from  the  fact  of  his  correspondence  with  Descartes. 
Besides  his  "  Antidote  to  Atheism,"  which  contains  his 
natural  theology,  he  was  the  author  of  several  other 
theological  treatises.  The  "  Antidote  "  was  published  in 
1662.  In  his  preface  the  author  claims,  that,  if  it  be 
granted  as  a  postulate,  "  That  our  faculties  are  true" 
then  he  has  "  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  God." 

In  some  cases,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  sequel,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  ascertain  whether  a  given  writer  makes  it  his 
aim  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  by  means  of  tele- 
olog}r,  or  only  to  illustrate  the  divine  attributes  of  wis- 
dom, power,  and  goodness.  But  in  this  case  we  are 
not  left  in  doubt  as  regards  More's  intentions  at  the 
outset,  nor  as  regards  his  own  opinion  of  his  success  in 
his  undertaking.  He  distinctly  assumed  the  task  of 
demonstrating  God's  existence,  and  supposed  that  he 
had  succeeded  in  the  attempt. 

His  work  is  divided  into  three  books.  Book  I.  is 
devoted  to  the  ontological  and  moral  or  anthropologi- 
cal arguments.  Book  II.  is  devoted  to  physico-theolo- 
gy,  and  mainly  to  teleology;  but,  without  conscious 
analysis  of  it  as  a  distinct  argument,  he  introduces  in 
several  places  clear  examples  of  eutaxiological  reason- 
ing. Still  more  frequently  does  he,  through  the  failure 
to  make  that  analysis  and  to  draw  that  distinction, 
affect  to  extract  a  teleological  conclusion  from  the  facts 
of  order  in  the  cosmos ;  thus  making  a  lame  attempt 
where  he  might  have  made  a  strong  argument.  As  a 
clear  case  of  eutaxiology,  take  the  following :  — 

"  That  the  rising  and  setting  of  the  lights  of  heaven,  the 
vicissitude  of  day  and  night,  winter  and  summer,  being  so 
ordered  and  guided  as  if  they  had  been  settled  by  exquisite 
consultation  and  by  clearest  knowledge  :  therefore  that  which 


98  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

did  thus  ordain  them  is  a  knowing  principle,  able  to  move, 
alter,  and  guide  the  matter  according  to  his  own  will  and 
pleasure ;  that  is  to  say,  that  there  is  a  God.  .  .  .  And 
it  is  observable,  that,  if  nature  shape  any  thing  near  this 
geometrical  accuracy,  we  take  notice  of  it  with  much  con- 
tent and  pleasure.  For  symmetry,  equality,  and  correspond- 
ence of  parts  is  the  discernment  of  reason,  and  not  the  object 
of  sense,  as  I  have  heretofore  proved." 

Cosinical  harmonies  in  the  heavens,  and  geometrical 
accuracy  in  the  formation  of  crystals,  are  widely  differ- 
ent topics ;  but  they  both  illustrate  the  principle  of 
eutaxy,  good  order,  and  both  serve  well  as  a  basis  for 
the  eutaxiological  argument. 

For  an  example  of  spoiling  a  good  case  of  eutaxiolo- 
gj  in  order  to  make  a  poor  piece  of  teleology,  this  will 
serve :  — 

"  But  I  will  rather  insist  upon  such  things  as  are  easy 
and  intelligible  even  to  idiots,  who  if  they  can  but  tell  the 
joints  of  their  hands,  or  know  the  use  of  their  teeth,  they 
may  easily  discover  it  was  counsel,  not  chance,  that  created 
them.  For  why  have  we  three  joints  in  our  legs  and  arms, 
as  also  in  our  fingers,  but  that  it  was  much  better  than  hav- 
ing two  or  four?  " 

The  doctor  is  convinced  that  three  joints  are  better 
than  two  or  four ;  but,  if  there  had  been  but  two,  as 
is  actually  the  case  in  the  thumb,  he  would  probably 
have  thought  that  was  best.  There  is  a  notable  dispo- 
sition manifest,  not  only  in  his  writings,  but  in  those  of 
the  old  teleologists  generally,  to  see  divine  wisdom  in 
every  petty  detail ;  though,  if  the  arrangement  so  inter- 
preted were  something  other  than  it  actually  is,  they 
would  find  it  an  equally  conclusive  proof  of  wisdom.  In 
this  case,  it  is  true,  he  touched  a  very  interesting  topic, 
but  unfortunately  he  did  not  know  how  to  handle  it. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.   99 

His  radical  error  consists  in  misplacing  the  argument. 
By  claiming  that  this  number  of  joints  is  better  than 
any  other,  he  makes  it  teleological.  The  utility  of  the 
arrangement  —  its  reference  to  an  end — is  the  uppermost 
thought  in  his  mind.  His  attempt  to  turn  it  to  a  tele- 
ological account  shows  how  fully  he  was  possessed  and 
dominated  by  the  Aristotelian  maxim,  that  nature  does 
nothing  in  vain,  which  he  quotes  in  several  places. 
But,  curiously  enough,  this  very  fact  of  a  definite  num- 
ber of  joints  in  limbs  and  digits  is  one  of  the  greatest 
obstacles  to  the  acceptance  of  that  maxim.  The  three- 
jointed  limb  terminating  in  five  three-jointed  digits  is 
not  limited  to  man  alone.  It  is  not  an  isolated  fact,  but 
takes  hold  of  wide  homologies,  and  has  a  deep  signifi- 
cance in  the  animal  kingdom.  It  is  a  morphological 
type  of  very  wide  range,  especially  as  regards  the  first 
element  of  it ;  namely,  the  three-jointed  limb.  The 
mode  of  its  termination  in  five  three-jointed  digits,  or, 
at  all  events,  in  five  digits  with  a  variable  number  of 
joints,  is  also  a  pronounced  typical  form,  but  not  so 
widely  prevalent  as  the  three-jointed  limb. 

But  now  this  fact  of  the  existence  of  typical  forms 
results  in  the  existence  of  useless  rudiments.  A  joint 
is  lopped  off  here,  another  there,  a  whole  digit  gone 
with  all  its  joints,  even  several  of  them  missing  if  any 
special  end  of  utility  is  to  be  served  by  it.  In  this 
wholesale  and  seemingly  reckless  process  of  clipping 
and  pruning,  there  are  certain  fragments  of  the  digits 
left  behind.  These  remnants  are  not  destitute  of  sig- 
nificance, but  their  meaning  is  very  wide  of  the  teleolo- 
gical mark.  It  is  not  the  constancy  of  the  type,  but 
the  departures  from  it,  which  constitute  good  material 
for  teleological  argument.  So  far  from  utility  causing 
or  maintaining  the  typical  form,  it  is  constantly  violat- 


100  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ing  it ;    and,  in   the   course  of   these  modifications  for 
special  ends,  useless   rudiments   are   left,  such   as  the 
splint-bones  representing  the  second  and  fourth  digits 
in  the  leg  of  a  horse,— tag-ends,  so  to  speak,  of  the  typi- 
cal form.    These  give  the  lie  to  the  Aristotelian  dictum, 
unless  you  take  it  in  a  new  sense,  not  as  regards  utility 
to  the  animal,  or  utility  in  any  form  whatever;  for,  if 
utility  is  the  standard,  nature  does  do  some  things  in 
vain.    But  there  are  other  standards  than  that  of  utility. 
Nature  does  nothing  in  vain  in  the  sense  that  all  she 
does  has  a  rational  meaning.     The  meaning  of  useless 
rudiments  is  that  there  is  a  typical  form.     But  all  such 
forms  are  examples  of  the  orderly  methods  of  nature. 
Morphology,  the  doctrine  of  typical  forms,  is  a  branch 
of  eutaxiology.     The  relative  constancy  of  the  type,  in 
spite  of   the  numerous  inroads  made    upon    it    by  the 
pressure  of  special  utilities,  is  so  remarkable,  that  we 
are  justified  in  the  inference  that  this  type  is  an  arche- 
type, that  it  existed  as  a  divine  thought  before  it  was 
embodied  in  living  forms.     Thus  the  three-jointed  pat- 
tern of  the  limbs  of  vertebrate  animals  furnishes  the 
basis   of  a   good    design-argument  when    rightly  used. 
But  it  must  be  considered  simply  as  a  fact  of  eutaxy, 
of  orderly  arrangement,  without  raising  the  question  of 
the  end,  or  purpose,  or  whether  it  is  better  or  worse 
than  some  other  arrangement.     The  moment  you  make 
it  teleological  you  spoil  it  altogether. 

This  may  seem  a  harsh  and  sweeping  judgment,  but 
a  little  consideration  will  amply  justify  it.  In  the  first 
place,  this  is  a  weak  piece  of  teleology,  because  it 
would  put  Dr.  More,  or  any  other  man,  to  his  wits' 
end  to  tell  why  three  joints  are  better  than  any  other 
number.  Insects  seem  to  be  quite  happy  with  more 
than  three  joints  in  their  legs,  and  mollusks  are  entirely 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  101 

contented  with  none  at  all.  But,  in  the  second  place, 
if  he  should  succeed  in  that  desperate  undertaking,  he 
would  only  be  steering  the  argument  into  deeper  water 
than  ever.  If  the  three-jointed  type  is  the  best  possible 
type,  then  the  utility  of  it  may  have  operated  to  pro- 
duce it  by  natural  selection.  It  is  an  extremely  inter- 
esting question  whether  it  has  not  done  so,  —  a  question, 
too,  of  such  difficulty  that  it  is  not  to  be  disposed  of 
out  of  hand  by  any  ex  cathedra  judgment.  But  there 
is  one  weighty  consideration  opposed  to  it;  viz.,  that 
this  type  was  first  developed  in  fishes,  where  the  limb  is 
so  buried  in  the  body  that  the  three  joints  are  of  little 
use.  It  is  true  that  the  homology  of  the  bones  sup- 
porting the  pectoral  fins  of  fishes  to  the  humerus,  radius, 
and  ulna  in  higher  animals,  is  not  very  clear,  and  that 
the  typical  number  of  five  digits  with  three  joints  is 
ignored  in  that  class  of  vertebrates.  But  the  case  is 
little  better  for  natural  selection  if  we  shift  our  ground, 
bringing  the  origin  of  the  type  in  question  to  a  later 
period,  and  into  a  higher  class  ;  for,  in  the  case  of  many 
amphibians  and  reptiles  having  three  distinct  segments 
to  their  limbs,  some  of  the  joints  are  still  buried  in  the 
flesh. 

' '  Hitherto  we  have  only  considered  the  more  rude  and 
careless  strokes  and  delineaments  of  divine  providence  in  the 
world,  set  out  in  those  larger  phenomena  of  day  and  night, 
winter  and  summer,  land  and  sea,  rivers,  mountains,  metals, 
and  the  like.  We  now  come  to  a  closer  view  of  God  and 
nature  in  vegetables,  animals,  and  man." 

This  is  the  opening  sentence  of  Chapter  V.,  Book  II. 
It  is  evident  that  More  considered  his  teleology  the 
strongest  part  of  his  work.  The  most  charitable  sup- 
position for  us  to  make  is,  that  he  was  mistaken  in  this 


102  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

view  of  the  relative  excellence  of  the  several  parts  ;  for, 
if  the  rest  is  not  so  good  as  the  teleology,  silence  re- 
specting it  would  be  the  greatest  kindness. 

"And  first  of  vegetables,  where  I  shall  touch  only  these 
four  heads,  their  form  and  beauty,  their  seed,  their  signatures, 
and  their  great  use,  as  well  for  medicine  as  sustenance." 

Having  argued  that  the  seeds  of  plants  indicate  a 
providence,  he  proceeds :  — 

"  Nor  is  it  material  to  object  that  stinking  weeds  and 
poisonous  plants  bear  seed  too,  as  well  as  the  most  pleasant 
and  useful ;  for  even  those  have  their  use.  For,  first,  the 
industry  of  man  is  exercised  by  them  to  weed  them  out  where 
they  are  hurtful." 

Great  danger  that  men  might  become  lazy  if  it  were 
not  for  the  weeds !  The  very  lack  of  usefulness  be- 
comes a  use.  In  the  second  place,  the  doctor  thinks 
they  suck  up  the  poisonous  matter  of  the  soil,  and  make 
it  purer,  as  "  toads,  and  other  poisonous  serpents,  lick 
the  venom  from  off  the  earth."  And,  lastly,  they  may 
have  medicinal  virtues  of  which  we  are  ignorant. 

It  is  plain  that  in  all  this  discussion  the  doctor's  notion 
of  utility  has  reference  to  human  uses.  The  usefulness 
of  seeds  to  plants  themselves  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence did  not  occur  to  him,  but  not  so  when  he  comes 
to  animals.  Here  he  shows  that  he  is  quite  capable  of 
entertaining  the  idea  of  usefulness  without  any  refer- 
ence to  man ;  for  it  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  in  what 
he  says  about  cock's  spurs  he  had  an  eye  to  the  brutal 
sports  of  his  day  :  — 

"I  demand,  therefore,  concerning  the  cock,  why  he  has 
spurs  at  all ;  or,  having  them,  how  they  came  to  be  so  fittingly 
placed.     For  he  might  have  had  none,  or  so  misplaced  that 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  103 

they  had  been  utterly  useless,  and  so  his  courage  and  pleas- 
ure in  fighting  had  been  to  no  purpose." 

He  makes  a  novel  suggestion  as  to  the  use  of  the  tur- 
key's wattles :  — 

"  Nor  are  we  to  cavil  at  the  red-puggered  attire  of  the 
turkey,  and  the  long  excrescency  that  hangs  down  over  his 
bill,  when  he  swells  with  pride  and  anger ;  for  it  may  be  a 
receptacle  for  his  heated  blood,  that  has  such  free  recourse 
to  his  head." 

Might  save  him  from  a  fit  of  apoplexy,  I  suppose. 

"  We  come  now  to  the  signatures  of  plants.  .  .  .  The 
decoction  of  quinces,  which  are  a  downy  and  hairy  fruit,  is 
accounted  good  for  the  fetching  again  hair  that  has  fallen 
off. 

"  Scorpion-grass  is  like  the  crooked  tail  of  a  scorpion, 
and  adder's- tongue  has  a  very  plain  and  perfect  resemblance 
of  the  tongue  of  a  serpent,  as  also  ophioscorodon  of  the  entire 
head  and  upper  parts  of  the  body ;  and  these  are  all  held 
very  good  against  poison,  and  the  biting  of  serpents.  And 
generally  all  such  plants  as  are  speckled  with  spots  like  the 
skins  of  vipers  or  other  venomous  creatures  are  known  to 
be  good  against  the  stings  or  bitings  of  them,  and  are  power- 
ful antidotes  against  poison.  Thus  did  Divine  Providence, 
by  natural  hieroglyphics,  read  short  physic-lectures  to  the 
rude  wit  of  man." 

That  is  very  flimsy  teleology;  and  of  course  there 
are  much  better  specimens  in  the  book.  He  cites  the 
usefulness  of  domestic  animals ;  he  describes  the  eye  at 
great  length,  and  as  well  as  the  anatomical  science  of 
his  age  permitted ;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  his  ar- 
guments from  the  structure  of  the  lungs,  heart,  and 
teeth.     In  his  preface  he  says,  — 


104  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

"  Only  I  may  say  thus  much,  that  I  did  on  purpose  abstain 
from  reading  any  treatises  concerning  this  subject,  that  I 
might  the  more  undisturbedly  write  the  easy  emanations  of 
my  own  mind." 

Thus  he  forestalls  any  charges  of  plagiarism,  though, 
of  course,  he  repeats  arguments  which  had  been  used 
by  previous  writers. 

Next  to  his  teleology,  Dr.  More  thought  his  ghost- 
argument  was  the  best.  What !  did  he  not  only  believe 
in  ghosts  and  witchcraft,  but  thought  to  make  capital 
of  them  against  atheism  ?  Certainly,  that  is  all  true  ; 
and  he  was  not  at  all  peculiar  in  that.  Clergymen  of 
that  day,  and  indeed  for  a  long  time  afterwards,  made 
constant  use  of  the  belief  in  apparitions  to  convince 
men  that  there  were  spirits.  The  utility  of  ghosts  in 
tHs  respect  was  a  prime  cause  of  the  tardiness  with 
wliich  they  yielded  to  the  force  of  rational  views  respect- 
ing their  unreality.  Some  good  people  have  imagined 
that  the  phenomena  of  modern  spiritualism  might  be 
utilized  in  the  same  way.  Very  likely  it  might  be  done 
in  the  same  way  in  one  respect ;  that  is,  the  attempt 
would  be  just  as  silly  and  contemptible  in  one  case  as 
the  other.  But  in  another  respect  the  result  would  be 
very  different.  Men  are  not  so  easily  caught  by  shams 
and  delusions  as  they  were  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
But  let  us  see  how  it  wTas  done  iu  that  age :  — 

' '  Thus  we  have  gone  through  the  manifold  effects  repre- 
sented to  our  senses  on  this  wide  theatre  of  the  world ;  the 
faintest  and  obscurest  whereof  are  arguments  full  enough  to 
prove  the  existence  of  a  Deity.  .  .  .  And  such  are  especially 
these  last  two  I  insisted  upon,  — the  curious  frame  of  man's 
body  and  apparitions, 

"  Bodinus  relates  how  himself  and  several  others  at  Paris 
saw  a  young  man  with  a  charm  in  French  move  a  sieve  up 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  105 

and  down.  And  that  ordinary  way  of  divination  which  they 
call  coskinomancy ,  or  finding  who  stole  or  spoiled  this  or 
that  thing  by  the  sieve  and  shears,  Pictorins  Vigillanus  pro- 
fesseth  he  made  use  of  thrice,  and  it  was  with  success." 

In  regard  to  the  ceremonies  which  witches  perform  in 
order  to  raise  tempests,  he  says,  — 

' '  But  whether  there  be  any  causal  connection  between 
those  ceremonies  and  the  ensuing  tempests,  I  will  not  curi- 
ously decide.  [He  is  thinking  of  physical  causation  evi- 
dently, and  he  will  not  deny  that  there  may  be  some  hidden 
bond  of  that  sort ;  and  yet  he  goes  on  to  show  that  it  cannot 
be  any  ordinary  action  of  natural  law.]  But  that  the  con- 
nection of  them  is  supernatural,  is  plain  at  first  sight.  For 
what  is  the  casting  of  flint-stones  behind  their  backs  toward 
the  west,  or  flinging  a  little  sand  in  the  air,  or  striking  a 
river  with  a  broom,  and  so  flinging  the  wet  of  it  towards 
heaven,  or  the  stirring  of  urine  or  water  with  their  finger  in 
a  hole  in  the  ground,  or  the  boiling  of  hog's  bristles  in  a 
pot?  what  are  these  fooleries  available  of  themselves  to 
gather  clouds,  and  cover  the  air  with  darkness,  and  then  to 
make  the  ground  smoke  with  peals  of  hail  and  rain,  and 
to  make  the  air  terrible  with  frequent  lightnings  and  thunder  ? 
Certainly  nothing  at  all.  Therefore  the  ensuing  of  these 
tempests  after  such  like  ceremonies  must  be  either  from  the 
prevision  of  the  Devil  (as  Wierus  would  have  it)  who  set 
the  witches  on  work,  or  else  from  the  power  of  the  Devil 
which  he  hath  in  his  kingdom  of  the  air." 

As  regards  the  power  of  witches  to  fill  the  bodies  of 
their  victims  with  a  whole  arsenal  of  heterogeneous 
missiles,  he  says,  — 

"  I  will  begin  with  that  memorable  story  that  Langius  tells 
of  one  Ulricus  Neusesser,  who,  being  grievously  tormented 
with  a  pain  in  his  side,  suddenly  felt  under  his  skin,  which 
was  yet  whole,  an  iron  nail  as  he  thought ;  and  so  it  proved 


106  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

when  the  chirurgeon  had  cut  it  out.  But,  nevertheless,  his 
great  torments  continued,  which  enraged  him  so  that  he  cut 
his  own  throat.  The  third  day,  when  he  was  carried  out  to 
be  buried,  Eucharius  Rosenbader  and  Johannes  ab  Ettenstet, 
a  great  company  of  people  standing  about  them,  dissected 
the  corpse,  and,  ripping  up  the  ventricle,  found  a  round  piece 
of  wood  of  a  good  length,  four  knives,  some  even  and  sharp, 
others  indented  like  a  saw,  with  other  two  rough  pieces  of 
iron  a  span  long.  There  was  also  a  ball  of  hair.  This  hap- 
pened at  Fugenstall,  1539. 

"  Wierus  tells  also  of  one  that  was  possessed,  of  which 
himself  was  an  eye-witness,  that  vomited  up  pieces  of  cloth 
with  pins  stuck  in  them,  nails,  needles,  and  such  like  stuff. 
.  .  .  Cardan  relates  the  like  of  a  good  simple  country-fellow, 
and  a  friend  of  his,  that  had  been  a  long  time  troubled  with 
vomiting  up  glass,  iron,  nails,  and  hair,  and  that,  at  the  time 
he  told  Cardan  of  it,  he  was  not  so  perfectly  restored,  but 
that  something  yet  crashed  in  his  belly  as  if  there  were  a 
bag  of  glass  in  it." 

He  tells  of  a  witch  raising  a  tempest,  and  being  her- 
self "  discharged  by  that  last  thunder-clap  upon  the  top 
of  the  oak,  and  there  hung  amongst  the  boughs ; "  and 
several  other  stories  of  the  same  sort :  — 

"We  might  abound  in  instances  of  this  kind  (I  mean 
supernatural  effects  unattended  with  miraculous  apparitions) 
if  I  would  bring  in  all  that  that  I  have  myself  been  informed 
of  [it  does  not  appear  that  Dr.  More  ever  saw  any  thing  of 
this  nature  himself]  by  either  e}Te-witnesses  themselves  or 
by  such  as  have  had  the  narrations  immediately  from  them 
[he  takes  his  information  at  first  or  second  hand,  but  there 
he  draws  the  line],  —  as,  for  example,  bricks  being  carried 
round  about  a  room  without  any  visible  hand  ;  multitudes  of 
stones  flung  down  at  a  certain  time  of  the  day  from  the  roof  of 
a  house  for  many  months  together,  to  the  amazement  of  the 
whole  country ;  pots  carried  off   from  the  fire,   and  set  on 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  107 

again,  no  hand  touching  them  ;  the  violent  flapping  of  a 
chest-cover,  nobody  meddling  with  it ;  the  carrying-np  linens 
that  have  been  a-bleaching  so  high  that  table-cloths  and 
sheets  looked  like  napkins,  and  this  when  there  was  no  wind, 
but  all  calm  and  clear ;  .  .  .  boxes  carefully  locked  unlock- 
ing themselves,  and  flinging  the  flax  out  of  them ;  .  .  . 
women's  pattens  rising  up  from  the  floor,  and  whirling 
against  people  [he  should  have  mentioned  that  the  women's 
feet  were  not  in  them]  ;  the  breaking  of  a  comb  in  two  pieces 
of  itself  in  the  window,  the  pieces  also  flying  in  men's  faces 
[no  wonder  it  broke  if  they  propped  the  window  up  with  it]  ; 
the  rising-up  of  a  knife  also  from  the  same  place,  being  car- 
ried with  its  haft  forwards  [the  witches  or  spirits  were 
more  thoughtful  than  some  people,  who  will  hand  you  a  knife 
blade  foremost]  ;  with  several  other  things  which  would  be 
too  voluminous  to  repeat  with  their  due  circumstances. 

"But,  if  the  objector  will  yet  persist  in  his  opinion,  let 
him  read  the  circumstances  of  the  second  conjuration  of  this 
witch.  For  the  same  maid  being  sent  again  to  her  from  the 
same  party  to  inquire  in  what  part  of  the  house  the  poison 
was  that  should  be  given  to  her  mistress,  hereupon  she  took 
her  stick  as  before,  and,  making  therewith  a  circle,  the  wind 
rose  forthtmth.  Then,  taking  a  besom,  she  swept  out  the 
circle,  and  made  another ;  and,  looking  in  her  book  and  glass 
as  formerly,  and  using  some  words  softly  to  herself,  she  stood 
in  the  circle,  and  said,  Beelzebub,  Tormentor,  Lucifer,  and 
Satan,  appear  !  There  appeared  first  a  spirit  in  the  shape  of 
a  little  boy,  as  she  (the  maid)  conceived,  which  then  turned 
into  another  shape  something  like  a  snake,  and  then  into 
the  shape  of  a  shagged  dog  with  great  eyes,  which  went 
about  in  the  circle.  And  in  the  circle  she  set  an  earthen  [it 
must  not  be  iron  or  tin]  pan  of  coals,  wherein  she  threw 
something  which  burned  and  stank,  and  then  the  spirit  van- 
ished. After  which  the  witch  took  her  book  and  glass  [it 
must  be  a  green  glass]  again,  and  showed  the  maid  in  the 
glass  Sarah  Goddard's  chamber  [Sarah  and  Anna  Goddard 


108  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

were  step-daughters,  and  their  amiable  step-mother,  aided  by 
the  witch  and  the  maid,  was  trying  to  convict  them  of  an 
attempt  to  poison  her]  the  color  of  the  curtains  and  the  bed 
turned  up  the  wrong  way,  and  under  that  part  of  the  bed 
where  the  bolster  lay  she  shoiced  the  poison  in  a  ivhite  paper. 
"The  transformation  of  a  boy  into  a  snake,  and  of  that 
snake  into  a  shagged  dog  with  staring  eyes,  is  a  feat  far 
above  all  human  art  or  wit  whatsoever."      [Quite  so,  doctor.] 

To  finish  up  this  uncanny  business  while  we  are 
about  it,  let  us  note  that  the  next  writer  of  this  group, 
Ralph  Cudworth,  D.D.,  also  employs  the  ghost-argu- 
ment :  — 

' '  For,  if  there  be  once  any  invisible  ghosts  or  spirits  ac- 
knowledged as  things  permanent,  it  will  not  be  easy  for  any 
one  to  give  a  reason  why  there  might  not  be  one  supreme 
ghost  also  presiding  over  them  all  and  the  whole  world. 
...  To  these  phenomena  of  apparitions  may  be  added 
those  two  others  of  witches  and  demoniacs,  both  of  these 
proving  that  spirits  are  not  fancies,  nor  inhabitants  of  men's 
brains  only,  but  of  the  world  ;  as  also  that  there  are  some 
impure  spirits  (is)  a  confirmation  of  the  truth  of  Christian- 
ity. The  confident  exploders  of  witchcraft  (are)  suspicable 
of  atheism."  * 

Cudworth's  "Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe" 
was  published  in  1678.  It  was  declared  to  be  "the 
vastest  magazine  of  reasoning  and  learning  that  ever 
singly  appeared  against  atheism."  Its  author  was 
undoubtedly  quite  familiar  with  the  literature  of  Greece 
and  Rome.  He  illustrates  almost  every  point  by  copi- 
ous quotations  from  the  old  philosophers,  especially 
from  Plato  and  Aristotle  for  confirmation,  and  from 
Democritus,  Epicurus,  and  Lucretius  for  refutation. 
He  was  a  decided  Platonist,  and  his  peculiar  theory  of 

i  From  the  heading  to  Chapter  V.  of  the  Int.  Sys.  of  the  Universe. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  109 

"plastic  natures"  was  an  adumbration  of  the  Platonic > 
notion  of  a  world-soul.  With  all  his  learning  it  must 
be  confessed,  that,  upon  a  candid  examination  of  his 
"Intellectual  System,"  we  are  compelled  to  pronounce 
it  an  ill-digested  mass  of  erudition,  and  to  concur  in 
the  judgment  of  some  critics  of  his  own  time,  that  he 
raised  more  objections  than  he  was  able  to  answer. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  things  in  Cudworth  is 
that  alluded  to  above  ;  viz.,  his  plastic-nature  theory :  — 

"For,  unless  there  be  such  a  thing  admitted  as  a  plastic 
nature  that  acts,  eVexa  rov,  for  the  sake  of  something,  and 
in  order  to  ends,  regularly,  artificially,  and  methodically,  it 
seems  that  one  or  other  of  these  two  things  must  be  con- 
cluded ;  that,  either  in  the  efformation  and  organization  of 
the  bodies  of  animals,  as  well  as  the  other  phenomena,  every 
thing  comes  to  pass  fortuitously,  and  happens  to  be  as  it  is, 
without  the  guidance  and  direction  of  any  mind  or  under- 
standing ;  or  else  that  God  himself  cloth  all  immediately, 
and,  as  it  were,  with  his  own  hand,  form  every  gnat  and  fly, 
insect  and  mite."      (I.  218.) 

He  seems  to  be  of  the  opinion  that  there  is  a  species 
of  thought  in  nature  itself :  — 

"For,  if  clear  and  express  consciousness  be  supposed  to 
be  included  in  cogitation,  then  it  must  needs  be  granted 
that  cogitation  doth  not  belong  to  the  plastic  life  of  nature  ; 
but,  if  the  notion  of  that  word  (cogitation)  be  enlarged  so 
as  to  comprehend  all  action  distinct  from  local  motion,  and 
to  be  of  equal  extent  with  life,  then  the  energy  of  nature  is 
cogitation."      (I.  246.) 

Unconscious  cogitation  co-extensive  with  life  —  that 
is,  existing  in  plants  as  well  as  animals  —  would  be  a 
very  low  form  of  thought ;  but  to  that  extent,  in  so  far 
as  that  can  be  called  thinking,  Cudworth  believed  that 


110  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

nature  itself  thinks.     His  plastic-nature  theory  would 
knock  the  bottom  out  of  teleology. 

But  he  even  gives  a  sort  of  personality  to  the  plastic 
nature :  — 

' '  From  what  hath  been  hitherto  declared  concerning  the 
plastic  nature,  it  may  appear,  that  though  it  be  a  thing  that 
acts  for  ends  artificially,  and  which  may  also  be  called  the 
divine  art,  and  the  fate  of  the  corporeal  world  ;  yet,  for  all 
that,  it  is  neither  god  nor  goddess,  but  a  low  and  imperfect 
creature."      (I.  250.) 

Having  proved  that  the  plastic  nature  is  not  corpo- 
real, he  goes  on  :  — 

"Now,  if  the  plastic  nature  be  incorporeal,  then  it  must 
of  necessity  be  either  an  inferior  power  or  faculty  of  some 
soul  which  is  also  conscious,  sensitive,  or  rational ;  or  else 
a  lower  substantial  life  by  itself,  devoid  of  animal  conscious- 
ness."     (I.  255.) 

Of  these  alternatives  he  shows  that  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle took  the  latter ;  that  is,  they  held  that  the  world- 
soul  was  not  an  inferior  faculty  of  the  Deit}-,  but  a  life 
by  itself.  And  Cudworth  agrees  with  them  so  far,  but 
differs  only  in  that  he  makes  it  depend  "  immediately 
upon  the  Deity  itself,"  though  it  is  not  an  inferior 
power  or  faculty  of  the  Deity ;  while  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle made  it  a  distinct  and  independent  being. 

' '  Though  there  were  no  such  mundane  soul  as  both  Plato 
and  Aristotle  supposed,  distinct  from  a  supreme  Deity,  yet 
there  might,  notwithstanding,  be  a  plastic  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse depending  immediately  upon  the  Deity  itself."  (I. 
271.) 

"Besides  this  general  plastic  nature  of  the  universe,  and 
those  particular  plastic  powers  in  the  souls  of  animals,  it  is 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  Ill 

not  impossible  but  that  there  may  be  other  plastic  natures 
also,  as  certain  lower  lives  or  vegetative  souls. 

"And  now  we  have  finished  our  first  task,  which  was  to 
give  an  account  of  the  plastic  nature,  the  sum  whereof  brief- 
ly amounts  to  this  :  that  it  is  a  certain  lower  life  than  the 
animal,  which  acts  regularly  and  artificially,  according  to 
the  direction  of  mind  and  understanding,  reason  and  wisdom, 
for  ends,  or  in  order  to  good,  though  itself  do  not  know  the 
reason  of  what  it  does,  nor  is  master  of  that  wisdom  accord- 
ing to  which  it  acts  but  only  a  servant  to  it,  and  a  drudging 
executioner  of  the  same ;  it  operating  fatally  and  sympa- 
thetically, according  to  laws  and  commands  prescribed  to  it 
by  a  perfect  intellect,  and  impressed  upon  it ;  and  which  is 
either  a  lower  faculty  of  some  conscious  soul,  or  else  an  in- 
ferior kind  of  life  or  soul  by  itself,  but  essentially  depend- 
ing upon  a  higher  intellect. " 

The  several  parts  of  this  summary  are  not  entirely 
consistent.  A  thing  which  "  acts  fatally  according  to 
laws  prescribed  to  it  and  impressed  upon  it  by  a  perfect 
intellect,  "  would  be  simply  the  ordinary  conception  of 
matter.  And  in  that  aspect  of  it,  the  ends  in  nature 
being  wrought  out  by  natural  laws  impressed  upon 
matter  by  an  intelligent  being,  there  would  be  some 
chance  for  teleology,  as  there  is  also  upon  the  supposi- 
tion that  evolution  is  a  true  theory.  But  in  other  parts 
of  his  description  he  gives  a  sort  of  life,  and  even  a  low 
form  of  thought,  to  his  plastic  nature,  as  if  it  were  a 
person,  acting  under  God's  control  it  is  true,  but  yet 
"a  lower  substantial  life  by  itself."  Now,  the  moment 
you  admit  the  intervention  between  God  and  the  prod- 
ucts of  nature,  of  a  creature  having  any  degree  of 
intelligence,  even  the  lowest  sort  of  "  cogitation  "  con- 
ceivable, you  cut  off  completely  and  utterly  the  possi- 
bility of  any  inferences  respecting  God  from  those  prod- 


112  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ucts.  How  are  you  to  know  what  things  are  clue  to 
that  imperfect  intelligence  of  the  plastic  nature,  and 
what  to  the  perfect  intelligence  of  the  Deity?  It  is 
true,  that  Cuclworth  strove  to  guard  this  point  by  say- 
ing that  his  plastic  nature  was  wholly  dependent  upon 
God ;  but  that  was  inconsistent  with  the  radical  feature 
of  the  theory,  which  consists  in  making  the  plastic 
nature  capable  by  itself,  by  virtue  of  its  own  low 
degree  of  intelligence,  of  acting  "  for  the  sake  of  some- 
thing, and  in  order  to  ends,  regularly,  artificially,  and 
methodically."  Plato  and  Aristotle  were  more  consist- 
ent than  Cudworth.  They  made  the  world-soul  inde- 
pendent of  God.  Cudworth  took  the  theory  from  their 
hands,  and,  in  order  to  adapt  it  to  a  Christian  theism, 
made  the  world-soul  a  blind  instrument  "  acting  fatally 
according  to  laws  impressed  upon  it."  His  theistic 
annex  is  in  a  totally  different  style  of  architecture,  and 
does  not  harmonize  well  with  the  main  body  of  the  old 
pagan  theory :  — 

"We  proceed  to  our  second  undertaking,  which  was  to 
show  how  grossly  these  two  sorts  of  atheists  before  men- 
tioned,—  the  Stoical  or  Cosmo-plastic,  and  the  Stratonical  or 
Hylozoic,  —  both  of  them  acknowledging  this  plastic  life  of 
nature,  do  mistake  the  notion  of  it,  or  pervert  it,  and  abuse 
it,  to  make  a  certain  spurious  and  counterfeit  God- Almighty 
of  it.,, 

It  must  in  all  soberness  be  admitted,  that  his  plastic 
nature  was  very  likely  material  to  be  moulded  into  "  a 
certain  spurious  and  counterfeit  God-Almighty."  He 
accepted  it  from  Plato  and  Aristotle,  in  order  to  confute 
the  mechanical  theory  of  the  Epicurean  atomists,  and 
more  especially  that  of  Descartes,  whose  theory  of  vor- 
tices Cudworth  thought  was  more  improbable  than,  and 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  113 

quite  as  atheistic  as,  the  fortuitous-concourse-of-atoms 
theory  of  Democritus.  But,  instead  of  braining  his 
adversaries,  he  unwittingly  put  a  club  in  their  hands. 
The  atheists  had  been  especially  puzzled  to  account  for 
the  exquisite  perfection  displayed  in  organic  structures. 
They  immediately  seized  upon  Cudworth's  theory  of  a 
plastic  nature  to  supply  that  defect  in  their  system. 
With  the  mechanical  theory  for  the  heavens  and  the 
plastic-nature  theory  for  animals  and  plants,  they  were 
armed  and  equipped  at  all  points,  and  ready  to  account 
for  every  thing  without  any  divine  intervention. 

Cudworth's  theory  was  attacked  by  Pierre  Bayle,  and 
defended  by  Le  Clerc.  A  long  controversy  followed,  in 
which  the  champion  of  a  plastic  nature  was  worsted ; 
and  that  theory  has  long  been  buried  in  oblivion.  This 
controversy  occurred  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth 
century ;  but  in  Cudworth's  own  day  he  was  himself 
assailed  as  an  atheist  in  disguise,  partly  on  account  of 
his  pet  theory,  but  still  more  because  he  had  given  such 
fair  and  ample  statement  of  atheistic  objections  and 
arguments. 

Perhaps  the  plastic-nature  theory  might  as  well  have 
been  left  in  that  limbo  of  exploded  and  forgotten  things 
to  which  it  was  consigned  nearly  two  centuries  ago. 
But,  besides  the  fact  that  it  is  a  piece  of  obsolete  natu- 
ral theology  which  it  falls  in  my  way  to  investigate,  it 
has  curious  relations  with  evolution  by  natural  selec- 
tion, which  are  food  for  thought.  In  fact,  a  greater 
amount  of  thinking  might  be  generated  and  nourished 
upon  the  pabulum  of  these  relations  than  could  well  be 
set  down  in  this  place.  The  summing-up  and  conclu- 
sion of  such  thoughts  would,  however,  in  my  opinion, 
reveal  a  greater  number  of  relations  of  difference  than 
of  likeness  between  the  two  theories.     One  apparent 


114  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

similarity  is,  that  both  were  welcomed  by  atheists  as 
enabling  them  to  explain  organic  structures  without 
invoking  the  deus  ex  machina.  But  however  much  aid 
and  comfort  they  might  extract  from  the  plastic  nature, 
they  were  hasty  in  supposing  that  evolution  was  har- 
nessed to  their  cart.  It  has  simply  reduced  the  phe- 
nomena of  biology  under  the  reign  of  natural  law, 
where  vastly  the  greater  part  of  the  universe  was  al- 
ready ;  thus  making  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the 
cosmos  to  the  Creator  the  same  uniform  problem  for  all 
sorts  of  phenomena.  That  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  interposing  a  quasi-intelligent  being  between  God 
and  organic  phenomena. 

It  would  hardly  be  expected  that  Cuclworth  could 
make  much  of  teleology ;  yet  he  does  devote  consider- 
able space  to  it  in  the  second  volume.  And  this  he 
does,  notwithstanding  his  plastic-nature  theory,  which 
fills  up  so  much  of  the  first  volume,  had  sapped  the 
foundations  of  teleology.  A  great  many  of  these  old 
authors  seem  to  enjoy  a  happy  exemption  from  all  sense 
of  obligation  to  be  consistent  with  themselves  ;  or  per- 
haps it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say,  that  they  enjoy 
a  happy  obliviousness  to  the  fact  that  they  are  not  self- 
consistent.  His  teleology  appears  in  the  form  of  a 
doctrine  of  final  causes ;  but  he  takes  a  singular  view 
of  final  cause,  making  it  synonymous  with  mental  cause. 
This  is,  of  course,  correct  to  this  extent,  that  final  cause, 
or  purpose,  is  mental ;  but  incorrect  when  pushed  to  the 
extreme  of  exclusiveness,  that  is,  when  it  is  asserted 
that  all  mental  causality  is  final.  This  is  not  indeed 
asserted,  but  it  is  plainly  implied  ;  although  in  the  very 
same  passage  it  is  also  implied  that  efficient  cause  may 
also  be  mental,  thus  furnishing  a  new  illustration  of 
the  doctor's  happy  exemption  from  the  bonds  of  self- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  115 

consistency.  Still  more  forcibly  does  it  illustrate  the 
power  of  working  mischief  and  confusion,  which  is  la- 
tent in  the  doctrine  of  final  causes.  But,  although  the 
passage  in  question  is  a  long  one,  the  reader  shall  see  it 
for  himself,  and  then  judge  whether  Cud  worth  was  not 
all  at  sea  in  regard  to  final  and  efficient  cause  :  — 

"It  is  no  idol  of  the  cave  or  den  (to  use  that  affected 
language)1  —  that  is,  no  prejudice  or  fallacy  imposed  upon, 
ourselves,  from  the  attributing  our  own  animalish  properties 
to  the  things  about  us  —  to  think  that  the  frame  and  system  of 
this  whole  world  was  contrived  by  a  perfect  understanding 
Being  or  Mind  (now  also  presiding  over  the  same)  which 
hath  everywhere  printed  the  signatures  of  its  own  wisdom 
upon  the  matter.  .  .  .  For  it  is  altogether  inconceivable  how 
we  ourselves  should  have  mind  and  intention  in  us  were  there 
none  in  the  universe,  or  in  that  highest  principle  from  whence 
all  proceeds.  Moreover,  it  was  truly  affirmed  by  Aristotle, 
that  there  is  much  more  of  art  in  some  of  the  things  of  na- 
ture, than  there  is  in  any  thing  artificially  made  by  man  ;  and 
therefore  intention,  or  final  and  mental  causality,  can  no  more 
be  secluded  from  the  consideration  of  natural,  than  it  can 
from  that  of  artificial,  things.  Now,  it  is  plain  that  things 
artificial,  as  a  house  or  clock,  can  neither  be  understood,  nor 
any  true  cause  of  them  assigned,  without  design,  or  intention 
for  ends  and  good.  For  to  say  that  a  house  is  stones,  tim- 
ber, mortar,  iron,  glass,  lead,  etc.,  all  put  together,  is  not 
to  give  a  definition  thereof,  or  to  tell  what  indeed  it  is,  it 
being  such  an  apt  disposition  of  all  these  materials  as  will 
make  the  whole  fit  for  habitation,  and  the  uses  of  men. 
Wherefore  this  is  not  sufficiently  to  assign  the  cause  of  a 
house  neither,  to  declare  out  of  what  quarry  the  stones  were 
dug,  nor  in  what  woods  or  forests  the  timber  was  felled,  and 
the  like.  [Here  follows,  in  accordance  with  Cudworth's  cus- 
tom of  fortifying  each  point  by  a  classical  quotation,  a  pas- 

1  He  refers  to  Bacon's  classification  of  fallacies. 


116  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

sage  from  Aristotle,  which  I  omit.  It  is  Cudworth's  opinion, 
not  that  of  the  Stagirite,  that  I  am  after.]  Nor,  lastly,  if, 
as  the  same  Aristotle  elsewhere  also  suggesteth,  one  should 
further  pretend  that  a  house  was  therefore  made  such  merely 
because  the  hands  of  the  laborers,  and  the  axes  and  ham- 
mers and  trowels  and  other  instruments,  chanced  all  to  be 
moved  so  and  so,  we  say  that  none  of  all  these  would  be  to 
assign  the  true  cause  of  a  house,  without  declaring  that  the 
architect  first  framed  in  his  mind  a  model  or  platform  of 
such  a  thing  to  be  made  out  of  those  materials,  so  aptly  dis- 
posed into  a  foundation,  walk,  roof,  doors,  rooms,  stairs, 
chimneys,  windows,  etc.,  as  might  render  the  whole  fit  for 
habitation,  and  other  human  uses.  And  no  more  certainly 
can  the  things  of  nature  (in  whose  very  essence  final  causal- 
ity is  as  much  included)  be  either  rightly  understood,  or  the 
causes  of  them  assigned,  merely  from  matter  and  mechanism, 
or  the  necessary  and  unguided  motion  thereof,  without  design 
and  intention  for  ends  and  good.  Wherefore  to  say  that  the 
bodies  of  animals  became  such,  merely  because  the  fluid  seed, 
by  motion,  happened  to  make  such  traces,  and  beget  such 
stamina  and  lineaments,  as  out  of  which  that  compages  of 
the  whole  resulted,  is  not  to  assign  a  cause  of  them,  but  to 
dissemble,  smother,  and  conceal  their  true  efficient  cause, 
which  is  the  wisdom  and  contrivance  of  that  divine  Archi- 
tect and  Geometer,  making  them  every  way  fit  for  the  inhabi- 
tation and  uses  of  their  respective  souls.  Neither,  indeed, 
can  we  banish  all  final  —  that  is,  all  mental —  causality  from 
philosophy  or  the  consideration  of  nature,  without  banishing 
at  the  same  time  reason  and  understanding  from  ourselves, 
and  looking  upon  the  things  of  nature  with  no  other  eyes 
than  brutes  do."      (II.  608,  seq.) 

The  whole  passage  is  an  argument  against  the  exclu- 
sion of  final  causes  from  natural  philosophy,  in  which 
Lord  Bacon  regarded  them  as  intruders.  You  cannot 
account  for  a  house,  says  Cudworth,  without  consider- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  117 

ing  the  plan  of  the  architect,  —  that  mental  conception 
of  the  house  which  existed  before  the  house  itself. 
This  is  true  enough,  but  not  pertinent :  the  plan  of  the 
architect  is  neither  the  final  nor  the  efficient  cause, 
speaking  in  the  language  of  a  believer  in  final  causes. 
Then  he  goes  on  to  say,  that  the  things  of  nature  can- 
not be  understood,  or  the  causes  of  them  assigned, 
"  merely  from  matter  and  mechanism  ;  "  implying  that 
the  exclusion  of  final  causes  would  leave  only  matter 
and  mechanism ;  that  is,  that  all  mental  causality  is 
final.  But  in  the  next  sentence  he  calls  the  "  wisdom 
and  contrivance  of  the  divine  Architect "  an  efficient 
cause ;  and  again  in  the  last  sentence  goes  back  to  the 
notion  that  final  causality  includes  "  all  mental  causal- 
ity." In  short,  he  is  completely  tangled  up  and  con- 
fused in  regard  to  final  and  efficient  causes. 

The  greater  part  of  his  teleology  is  brought  in  by 
way  of  replies  to  the  objections  raised  by  Lucretius, 
Epicurus,  and  the  other  old  atomists.  Thus  he  quotes 
from  the  Roman  poet-philosopher :  — 

"  You  are  by  all  means  to  take  heed  of  entertaining  that 
so  dangerous  opinion  (to  atheism)  that  eyes  were  made  for 
the  sake  of  seeing,  and  ears  for  the  sake  of  hearing.  But 
to  think  [says  Cuclworth]  that  not  only  eyes  happened  to  be 
so  made,  and  the  use  of  seeing  unintended  followed,  but 
also  that  in  all  the  same  animals  ears  happened  to  be  so 
made  too,  and  the  use  of  hearing  followed  them;  and  a 
mouth  and  tongue  happened  to  be  so  made  likewise,  and 
the  use  of  eating  and  (in  men)  of  speaking  was  also  acci- 
dentally consequent  thereupon;  and  feet  were  in  the  same 
animals  made  by  chance  too,  and  the  use  of  walking  fol- 
lowed ;  and  hands  made  in  them  by  chance  also,  upon 
which  so  many  necessary  uses  depend ;  besides  innumerable 
other  parts  of  the  body,  both  singular  and  orgauical,  none  of 


118  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

which  could  have  been  wanting  without  rendering  the  whole 
inept  or  useless.  I  say,  to  think  that  all  these  things  should 
happen  by  chance  to  be  thus  made  in  every  one  and  the 
same  animal,  and  not  designed  by  mind  or  counsel,  that  they 
might  jointly  concur  and  contribute  to  the  good  of  the  whole  : 
this  (supposition)  argues  the  greatest  insensibility  of  mind 
imaginable." 

As  an  argument  against  the  hypothesis  that  chance, 
or  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  produced,  not  only 
each  organ,  but  all  of  them  in  their  proper  places  and 
relations  in  the  same  animal,  this  is  perfectly  sound. 
But  the  Epicurean  poet  casts  the  objection  in  another 
form ;  viz.,  — 

"  '  That  eyes  could  not  be  first  of  all  made  intentionally  for 
the  use  of  seeing,  nor  ears  intentionally  for  the  use  of  hear- 
ing, and  so  for  the  rest ;  because,  forsooth,  these  things  were 
all  of  them,  in  order  of  time  and  nature,  before  their  several 
uses.  There  was  no  such  thing  as  seeing  before  eyes  were 
made,  nor  hearing  before  ears,  nor  speaking  before  the 
tongue.  But  the  origin  of  the  tongue  much  precedeth 
speech  ;  so  likewise  eyes  and  ears  were  made  before  there 
was  any  seeing  of  colors,  or  hearing  of  sounds.  In  like 
manner,  all  the  other  members  of  the  body  were  produced 
before  their  respective  uses.'  The  force  of  which  argument 
consisteth  in  this  proposition  :  that  whatsoever  is  made  for 
the  sake  of  another  thing  must  exist  in  time  after  that  other 
thing,  for  whose  sake  it  was  made ;  or  that  for  which  any 
thing  is  made  must  not  only  be  in  order  of  nature,  but  also 
of  time,  before  that  which  is  made  for  it.  And  this  that 
Epicurean  poet  endeavors  to  prove  by  sundry  instances : 
1  Darts  were  made  for  the  sake  of  fighting,  but  fighting  was 
before  darts,  or  else  they  had  never  been  invented.  Buck- 
lers were  excogitated  and  devised  for  the  keeping-off  of 
blows,  but  the  declining  of  strokes  was  before  bucklers. 
So  were  beds  contrived  for  the  sake  of  resting  and  sleeping : 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  119 

but  resting  and  sleeping  were  older  than  beds,  and  gave 
occasion  for  the  invention  of  them.  Cups  were  intended 
and  designed  for  the  sake  of  drinking,  which  they  would 
not  have  been  had  there  not  been  drinking  before.'  Accord- 
ing to  the  force  of  which  instances,  the  poet  would  infer 
that  whosoever  affirms  eyes  to  have  been  made  for  the  sake 
of  seeing  must  suppose,  in  like  manner,  there  was  some  kind 
of  seeing  or  other  before  eyes.  But,  since  there  was  no 
seeing  at  all  before  eyes,  therefore  could  not  eyes  be  madej 
for  the  sake  of  seeing.  .  .  .  But  it  is  evident  that  this  logic 
of  the  atheists  differs  from  that  of  all  other  mortals,  ac- 
cording to  which  [that  is,  according  to  the  logic  of  ordinary 
mortals]  the  end,  or  that  for  which  any  thing  is  made,  is 
only  in  intention  before  the  means,  or  that  which  is  made 
for  it,  but  in  time  and  execution  after  it.  And  thus  was  the 
more  effectual  way  of  fighting  and  doing  execution,  for 
whose  sake  darts  were  invented,  in  time  after  darts,  and 
only  in  intention  before  them.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  fight- 
ing in  general  was  before  darts,  sleeping  before  beds,  and 
drinking  before  cups  ;  and  thereby  did  they  give  occasion 
for  men  to  think  of  means  for  the  more  effectual  fighting, 
and  more  commodious  sleeping  and  drinking,  men  being 
commonly  excited  from  the  experience  of  things,  and  the 
sense  of  their  needs  and  wants,  to  excogitate  and  provide  fit 
means  and  remedies.  But  it  doth  not  follow  that  the  Maker 
of  the  world  could  not  have  at  once  beforehand  a  preven- 
tive knowledge  of  whatsoever  would  be  useful  and  for  the 
good  of  animals,  and  so  make  them  intentionally  for  those 
uses." 

This  is  a  satisfactory  rejoinder.  Because  the  func- 
tion arises  in  time  after  the  organ,  —  seeing  after  eyes 
were  made,  and  so  for  the  other  organs  and  functions, — 
it  does  not  from  this  fact  necessarily  follow  that  seeing 
might  not  have  been  thought  of  and  intended  before 
any  eye  existed.     Both  the  objection  and  the  response, 


120  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

however,  labor  under  some  difficulty  and  obscurity 
of  expression,  on  account  of  the  lack  of  a  clear  anal- 
ysis of  teleological  reasoning.  Cud  worth  might  have 
made  his  answer  much  more  clear  and  brief  if  he  had 
grasped  the  distinction  between  function  and  purpose, 
as  it  is  laid  down  in  the  introduction  to  this  volume. 
The  function  follows,  but  the  purpose  precedes,  the 
organ  in  the  order  of  time. 

He  justly  ridicules  some  of  the  consequences  of  the 
fortuitous-concourse-of-atoms  theory :  — 

4 'But  our  atomic  atheists  still  further  allege,  that,  though 
it  might  well  seem  strange  that  matter  fortuitously  moved 
should,  at  the  very  first  jump,  fall  into  such  a  regular  frame 
as  this  is,  having  so  many  aptitudes  for  uses,  so  many  cor- 
respondences between  several  things,  and  such  an  agreeing 
harmony  in  the  whole  ;  yet  it  ought  not  to  seem  a  jot  strange 
if  atoms,  by  motion,  making  all  possible  combinations  and 
contextures,  and  trying  all  manner  of  conclusions  and  experi- 
ments, should,  after  innumerable  other  freaks  and  discon- 
gruous  forms  produced,  in  length  of  time  fall  into  such  a 
system  as  this  is.  Wherefore  they  affirm  that  this  earth  of 
ours,  at  first,  brought  forth  divers  monstrous  and  irregular 
shapes  of  animals,  '  some  without  feet,  some  without  hands, 
some  without  a  mouth  and  face,  some  wanting  fit  muscles 
and  nerves  for  the  motion  of  their  members.'  And  the  old 
philosophic  atheists  were  so  lavish  herein,  that  they  stuck 
not  to  affirm,  that,  amongst  those  monstrous  shapes  of  ani- 
mals, there  were  once  produced  centaurs  and  scyllas  and 
chimoeras,  '  mixtly  boviform  and  nonuniform,'  biform  and 
triform  animals.  But  Epicurus,  a  little  ashamed  of  this,  as 
that  which  must  needs  look  oddly  and  ridiculously,  and 
seeming  more  cautious  and  castigate,  pretends  to  correct  the 
extravagancy  of  this  fancy :  '  Nevertheless,  there  were  not 
then  any  centaurs,  nor  biform  and  triform  animals  ; '  he  add- 
ing, that  they  who  feigned  such  things  as  these  might  as 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  121 

well  fancy  '  rivers  flowing  with  golden  streams,  and  trees 
budding  with  sparking  diamonds,  and  such  vastly  gigantean 
men  as  could  stride  over  seas,  and  take  up  mountains  in 
their  clutches,  and  turn  the  heavens  about  with  the  strength 
of  their  arms.'  [Epicurus  is  squirming  a  little  under  the 
consequences  of  his  theory ;  and  not  having  the  boldness  to 
face  it  out,  and  say  with  the  founders  of  his  school  that  Na- 
ture made  an  infinite  number  of  vain  and  silly  attempts 
before  she  produced  a  perfect  animal,  he  is  hedging,  and 
building  bridges  in  his  rear  to  make  good  his  retreat.  But 
Dr.  Cudworth  is  not  going  to  let  him  off  so  easily.  He  has 
caught  the  old  pagan  in  a  ridiculous  posture,  and  he  proposes 
to  pin  him  there.]  Against  all  which,  notwithstanding,  he 
gravely  gives  such  a  reason  as  plainly  overthrows  his  own 
principles  :  '  Because  things,  by  a  certain  covenant  of  nature, 
always  keep  up  their  specific  differences  without  being  con- 
founded together.'  For  what  covenant  of  nature  can  there 
be  in  infinite  chance?  or  what  law  can  there  be  set  to  the 
absolutely  fortuitious  motions  of  atoms  to  circumscribe  them 
by?  [Very  well  said,  doctor.  If  there  is  any  "  covenant 
of  nature"  about  it,  then  it  is  no  longer  a  fortuitous-con- 
course-of-atoms  theory,  but  an  evolution  theoiy,  proceed- 
ing by  fixed  laws.]  Wherefore  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that,  according  to  the  genuine  hypothesis  of  the  atomic 
atheism  [away  with  your  weak  Epicurean  dilutions  of  the 
genuine  old  theory  !]  all  imaginable  forms  of  inanimate  bodies, 
plants,  and  animals,  as  centaurs,  scyllas,  and  chimaeras,  are 
producible  by  the  fortuitous  motions  of  matter,  there  being 
nothing  to  hinder  it  [no  "covenant  of  nature,"  or  natural 
law] ,  whilst  it  doth  '  put  itself  into  all  kinds  of  combina- 
tions, play  all  manner  of  freaks,  and  try  all  possible  conclu- 
sions and  experiments.'  " 

Why,  then,  are  not  some  of  these  monstrous  shapes  still 
in  existence  ?  Here  comes  in  a  theory  of  natural  selec- 
tion much  more  ancient  than  that  of  Charles  Darwin :  — 


122  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

"  But  they  pretend  that  these  monstrous,  irregular  shapes 
of  animals  were  not  therefore  now  to  be  found,  because,  by 
reason  of  their  inept  fabric,  they  could  not  propagate  their 
kind  by  generation,  as  neither  indeed  preserve  their  own 
individual  existence.  And  that  this  atheistic  doctrine,  was 
older  than  Epicurus  appeareth  from  these  words  of  Aris- 
totle :  '  When  animals  happened  at  first  to  be  made  in  all 
manner  of  forms,  those  of  them  only  were  preserved,  and 
continued  to  the  present  time,  which  chanced  to  be  fitly 
made  [survival  of  the  fittest !]  ;  but  all  the  others  perished, 
as  Empedocles  affirmeth  of  the  partly  ox  and  partly  man 
animals.'  " 

Replying  to  the  objection  of  Descartes  that  it  is 
presumptuous  in  man  to  affect  a  knowledge  of  the  pur- 
poses of  God,  he  sa3'S,  — 

"  But  the  question  is  not  whether  we  can  always  reach  to 
the  ends  of  God  Almighty,  and  know  what  is  absolutely  best 
in  every  case,  and  accordingly  make  conclusions,  that  there- 
fore the  thing  is  or  ought  to  be  so ;  but  whether  any  thing 
at  all  were  made  by  God  for  ends  and  good,  otherwise  than 
would  have  resulted  of  itself  from  the  fortuitous  motion  of 
matter. ' ' 

A  very  different  question,  truly,  from  the  first.  It 
would  be  presumption  and  folly  for  man  to  affect  a 
knowledge  of  all  the  reasons  why  God  has  done  this  or 
that ;  but  when  one  or  more  of  his  reasons  seems  to  be 
thrust  in  our  very  faces,  as,  in  the  case  of  the  eye,  its 
function  of  sight  seems  to  be  so  obvious  a  reason  for  its 
existence,  then  Dr.  Cuclworth  thinks  very  justly  that  it 
is  no  presumption  at  all  to  open  our  eyes,  and  see  this 
purpose  of  the  Creator :  on  the  contrary,  it  would  be 
the  height  of  folly,  and  a  piece  of  affected  humility,  to 
close  our  eyes  to  it,  and  say  meekly  that  we  decline  the 
honor  of  knowing  God's  intentions.    But  this  misunder- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  123 

standing  of  the  real  question  at  issue,  this  notion  that 
the  teleologist  was  prying  into  the  remotest  corners 
and  most  ultimate  grounds  of  God's  purposes,  all  this 
trouble  grew  out  of  the  phrase  final  cause. 

' '  We  see  no  reason  at  all  why  it  should  be  thought  pre- 
sumption, or  intrusion  into  the  secrets  of  God  Almighty, 
to  affirm  that  eyes  were  made  by  him  for  the  end  of  seeing 
(and  accordingly  so  contrived  as  might  best  conduce  there- 
unto) ,  and  ears  for  the  end  of  hearing,  and  the  like.  This 
being  so  plain  that  nothing  but  sottish  stupidity  or  atheistic 
incredulity  (masked,  perhaps,  under  an  hypocritical  veil  of 
humility)  can  make  any  doubt  thereof." 

The  learned  doctor  is  rather  handy  with  his  epithets. 
"  Insensibility  of  mind,"  "  stupidity,"  "  sottishness,"  are 
some  of  the  pet  names  which  he  lavishes  upon  those 
mental  states  which  do  not  absorb  his  opinions  read- 
ily enough.  He  even  becomes  so  much  worried  and 
wrought  up  as  to  speak  of  "these  confounded  athe- 
ists." x  A  worthy  minister  of  the  gospel  once  expressed 
his  sense  of  the  desirableness,  in  certain  exasperating 
circumstances,  of  some  form  of  words  that  would  afford 
relief  to  pent-up  feelings  without  committing  the  sin 
of  profanity.  If  Cuclworth  did  not  completely  solve 
this  problem,  he,  at  all  events,  reached  a  proximate 
solution,  which  seemed  to  afford  him  great  content- 
ment, judging  from  the  frequency  with  which  he  ap- 
plied it  to  practice. 

1  "  That  these  confounded  atheists  themselves,  who  deny  that  there 
is  any  idea  of  God  at  all,  must,  notwithstanding,  of  necessity  suppose  the 
contrary;  because  otherwise,  denying  his  existence,  they  should  deny 
the  existence  of  nothing."  There  is  a  curious  sort  of  "double-back- 
action  "  in  that  argument.  The  heading  to  the  fifth  chapter,  from  which 
it  is  taken,  is,  by  the  way,  "  fearfully  and  wonderfully  "  gotten  up.  It 
occupies  twenty  closely  printed  pages ;  and  in  it  the  doctor  laid  put  so 
much  work  that  the  chapter  itself  occupies  more  than  seven  hundred 
pages. 


124  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Dr.  Cud  worth  gives  a  learned  and  very  interesting 
disquisition  upon  the  question,  How  far  is  it  true  that 
the  ancients  reached  a  conception  of  one  only  God? 
His  conclusion  is,  that  many  of  them  believed  in  a 
Supreme  Deity,  but  never  wholly  ricl  themselves  of  the 
notion  of  numerous  inferior  gods  ;  and  this  is  true  even 
of  Socrates,  of  whom  "  it  hath  been  frequently  affirmed, 
that  he  died  a  martyr  for  one  only  God."  "  And  how 
conformable  Socrates  was  to  the  pagan  religion  and 
worship  may  appear  from  those  last  dying  words  of  his 
(when  he  should  be  most  serious),  after  he  had  drunk 
the  poison,  wherein  he  required  his  friends  to  offer  a 
votive  cock  for  him  to  JEsculapius."  A  pagan  he  was, 
no  doubt,  every  inch  of  him,  and  to  the  last  gasp ;  but 
what  a  pagan  ! 


SPINOZA'S  CRITICISM  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  125 


CHAPTER   IV. 

SPINOZA'S  CRITICISM  OF  FINAL  CAUSES. 

The  human  mind  is  so  constituted,  that,  upon  every 
issue  which  takes  any  deep  hold  of  the  intellect  and 
the  emotions,  enemies  as  well  as  advocates  will  be 
found.  Whenever  any  large  body  of  literature  is  pro- 
duced in  favor  of  a  doctrine,  some  criticism  is  sure  to 
follow.  We  have  given  the  advocates  of  teleology  a 
hearing :  it  is  now  in  order  to  listen  to  the  other  side. 

The  "  Ethics  "  of  Benedictus  de  Spinoza,  published  in 
1677  (the  author  having  previously  died  in  the  same 
year),  contains  an  appendix  on  "  Final  Causes:  "  — 

"  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  to  lay  down  this  principle 
which  eveiTbody  ought  to  admit,  that  all  men  are  born  in 
ignorance  of  causes,  and  that  a  universal  tendency  of  which 
they  are  conscious  leads  them  to  search  for  that  which  is 
useful  to  themselves.  The  first  consequence  of  this  princi- 
ple is,  that  men  believe  themselves  to  be  free  because  they 
are  conscious  of  volitions  and  desires,  and  do  not  at  all  con- 
sider the  causes  which  influence  them  to  will  and  to  wish. 
It  results,  in  the  second  place,  that,  as  men  act  always  for  the 
sake  of  an  end,  —  namely,  the  good  or  advantage  which  is 
the  natural  object  of  their  desire,  —  so  they  come  to  demand 
always  to  know  only  the  final  causes  of  all  possible  actions  ; 
and  when  they  have  heard  these  they  are  satisfied,  not  having 
within  themselves  any  ground  for  further  doubt.  But,  if 
they  are  unable  to  learn  these  final  causes  from  some  one 
else,  nothing  remains  to  them  but  to  turn  in  upon  themselves, 


126  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  to  reflect  upon  the  ends  by  which  they  are  themselves 
wont  to  be  determined  to  similar  actions  ;  and  thus  they 
necessarily  judge  of  the  mind  of  another  by  their  own. 

"  Further,  as  within  themselves  and  out  of  themselves  they 
discover  many  means  which  are  highly  conducive  to  the  pur- 
suit of  their  own  advantage,  —  for  example,  eyes  to  see  with, 
teeth  to  masticate  with,  vegetables  and  animals  for  food,  the 
sun  to  give  them  light,  the  sea  to  nourish  fish,  etc.,  —  so  they 
come  to  consider  all  natural  things  as  means  for  their  bene- 
fit ;  and  because  they  are  aware  that  these  things  have  been 
found,  and  not  prepared  by  them,  the}'  have  been  led  to  be- 
lieve that  some  one  else  has  adapted  these  means  to  their 
use,  for,  after  considering  things  in  the  light  of  means,  they 
could  not  believe  these  things  to  have  made  themselves,  but 
they  must  conclude  that  there  is  some  ruler  or  rulers  of  na- 
ture endowed  with  freedom  like  men  who  have  provided  all 
these  things  for  them,  and  have  made  them  all  for  the  use  of 
men.  Moreover,  since  they  have  never  heard  any  thing  of 
the  mind  of  those  rulers,  they  must  necessarily  judge  of  this 
mind  also  by  their  own  ;  and  hence  they  have  argued  that 
the  gods  direct  all  things  for  the  advantage  of  man,  in  order 
that  they  may  subdue  him  to  themselves,  and  be  held  in  the 
highest  honor  by  him.  Hence  each  has  devised,  according 
to  his  character,  a  different  mode  of  worshipping  God,  in 
order  that  God  might  love  him  more  than  others,  and  might 
direct  all  nature  to  the  advantage  of  his  blind  cupidity  and 
insatiable  avarice.  Thus  this  prejudice  has  converted  itself 
into  superstition,  and  has  struck  deep  root  into  men's  minds  ; 
and  this  has  been  the  cause  of  the  universal  tendency  to 
frame  a  conception  of  final  causes,  and  to  search  for  them. 
But,  while  they  have  sought  to  show  that  nature  does  noth- 
ing in  vain,  —  that  is  to  say,  nothing  which  is  not  useful  to 
men,  —  they  seem  to  me  to  have  shown  nothing  else  than  that 
nature  and  the  gods  are  as  foolish  as  men.  And  observe,  I 
pray  you,  to  what  a  point  this  opinion  has  brought  them. 
Together  with  the  many  useful  things  in  nature,  they  neces- 


SPINOZA'S   CRITICISM   OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  127 

sarily  found  not  a  few  injurious  things ;  namely,  tempests, 
earthquakes,  diseases,  etc.  How  to  explain  these?  They 
thought  these  happened  because  the  gods  were  angry  on  ac- 
count of  offences  committed  against  them  by  men,  or  because 
of  faults  incurred  in  their  worship  ;  and  although  experience 
every  day  protests,  and  shows  by  infinite  examples  that  bene- 
fits and  injuries  happen  indifferently  to  pious  and  to  ungodly 
persons,  they  do  not  therefore  renounce  their  inveterate  pre- 
judice. For  it  was  easier  for  them  to  class  these  phenomena 
among  other  things,  the  cause  of  which  was  unknown  to 
them,  and  thus  retain  their  present  and  innate  condition  of 
ignorance,  than  to  destroy  all  the  fabric  of  their  belief,  and 
excogitate  a  new  one.  Men  have  therefore  maintained  that 
the  thoughts  of  God  far  exceed  the  limits  of  their  under- 
standing, and  that  opinion  has  kept  the  truth  hidden  from 
mankind  until  the  science  of  mathematics  taught  another 
means  of  discovering  it ;  for  everybody  knows  that  this  sci- 
ence does  not  proceed  upon  the  principle  of  final  causes,  but 
regards  solely  the  essence  and  the  properties  of  figures. 
Add  to  this  that,  besides  mathematics,  we  can  assign  other 
causes  (of  which  it  is  needless  to  make  an  enumeration  here) 
which  have  helped  to  open  men's  eyes  to  their  prejudices, 
and  to  lead  them  to  a  true  knowledge  of  things. 

"  These  considerations  will  serve  for  the  first  point  which 
I  promised  to  explain.  It  remains  to  be  shown  that  nature 
does  not  propose  to  itself  any  end  in  its  operations,  and  that 
all  final  causes  are  nothing  but  pure  fictions  of  human  imagi- 
nation. I  shall  have  little  trouble  to  demonstrate  this  ;  for 
it  has  already  been  solidly  established,  as  well  by  the  expla- 
nation just  given  of  the  origin  of  the  contrary  prejudice,  as 
by  Prop.  XVI.  and  the  corollary  to  Prop.  XXXII. ,  without 
mentioning  all  the  other  demonstrations  by  which  I  have 
proved  that  all  things  produce  themselves,  and  link  them- 
selves together  by  the  eternal  necessity  and  supreme  perfec- 
tion of  nature.  I  will,  however,  add  a  few  words  in  order 
to  accomplish  the  total  ruin  of  final  causes.     [Hear  !  hear  !] 


128  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

"  The  first  fallacy  is  that  of  regarding  as  a  cause  that  which 
is  an  effect,  and  vice  versa;  in  the  second  place,  that  which 
is  by  nature  anterior,  it  makes  posterior ;  and,  finally,  it 
debases  to  the  last  degree  of  imperfection  that  which  is 
most  elevated  and  most  perfect.  To  say  nothing  of  the  first 
two  points,  which  are  self-evident,  it  results  from  Props. 
XXI.,  XXII.,  and  XXIII.,  that  the  most  perfect  effect  is 
that  which  is  produced  immediately  by  God,  and  that  an 
effect  becomes  more  and  more  imperfect  in  proportion  as 
the  intermediate  causes  are  more  numerous.  But,  if  those 
things  which  God  produces  immediately  were  made  for  the 
sake  of  an  end  which  God  proposes  to  himself,  it  will  follow 
that  those  which  God  produces  last  will  be  the  most  perfect 
of  all,  the  others  having  been  made  for  the  sake  of  these." 

Which  would  be  contrary  to  Props.  XXI.,  XXII.,  and 
XXIII. :  therefore  final  causes  are  nothing  but  pure  fic- 
tions of  human  imagination,  quod  erat  demonstrandum  ! 

Lewes,  in  his  "  History  of  Philosophy  "  (ii.  207),  quotes 
the  first  part  of  this  passage,  in  which  Spinoza  vents 
his  spleen  at  final  causes  in  general  terms  and  wordy 
declamation  about  "  inveterate  prejudices ;  "  but  he  pru- 
dently omits  the  last  part,  containing  the  puerile  mathe- 
matical demonstration  of  the  fallacies  of  teleology,  and 
the  arrogant  boast  of  Spinoza  that  he  is  now  about  to 
"  destroy  that  whole  doctrine  of  final  causes." 

His  sixteenth  proposition  to  which  he  refers,  and 
which  I  give  in  order  to  do  the  fullest  justice  to  his 
mathematical  demonstration,  is  as  follows  :  — 

"  Of  necessity  there  must  flow  from  the  divine  nature  an 
infinity  of  things  infinitely  modified  ;  that  is  to  say,  every 
thing  which  can  fall  under  his  infinite  intelligence." 

The  thirty-second  proposition  is,  "  The  will  cannot 
be  called  a  free,  but  only  a  necessary  cause ; "  and  the 


SPINOZA'S  CRITICISM  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  129 

corollary  to  which  he  refers  is,  "  It  follows  from  this 
that  God  does  not  act  by  virtue  of  a  free  will."  l 

Granting  that  he  had  made  good  these  propositions, 
it  was  certainly  an  easy  task  to  make  a  complete  wreck 
of  final  causes.  If  all  natural  objects  flowed  from  God 
by  virtue  of  a  fatal  necessity,  and  if  he  exercised  no 
free  will  in  creating  any  thing,  of  course  it  would  be 
folly  to  look  for  any  traces  of  a  special  purpose  in  his 
work.  The  substance  of  the  other  three  propositions 
referred  to  by  Spinoza  is  stated  by  himself  in  the  above 
extract ;  viz.,  "  that  the  most  perfect  effect  is  that  which 
is  produced  immediately  by  God." 

This  refutation  of  final  causes  is  a  good  example  of 
the  famous  mathematical  method  of  Spinoza.  He  seeks 
to  give  the  effect  of  mathematical  certainty  to  his  con- 
clusions ;  but,  when  we  look  closer  to  see  how  he  does 
it,  we  perceive  that  the  mathematics  of  it  is  in  the  form, 
rather  than  the  internal  principle,  of  his  method.  It  is 
very  easy  to  frame  arbitrary  assertions,  label  them 
propositions  and  corollaries,  number  them  after  the 
fashion  of  a  text-book  of  geometry,  and  go  through  the 
motions  of  demonstrating  them,  and  referring  to  them 
by  number,  in  order  to  establish  something  else ;  but, 
when  all  is  done,  there  is  no  more  mathematical  cer- 
tainty about  it  than  if  it  were  not  cast  in  a  mathe- 
matical form.     Bad  logic  is  not  good  mathematics. 

There  is  another  point  in  respect  to  the  garbling  of 
this  passage  by  Lewes.  In  his  "  Prolegomena  "  to  the 
"  History  of  Philosophy  "  he  makes  an  elaborate  meta- 
physical attack  upon  design-arguments.  The  gist  of  it 
is,  that  design-advocates  are  guilty  of  the  fallacy  of 
vo-repov  irporepov,  or  "  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse." 

1  I  have  quoted  from  "CEuvres  de  Spinoza,  traduites  par  Emile 
Saisset :  "  Paris,  1801,  Vol.  III.     Ethics,  Book  I.,  and  Appendix. 


130  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

The  notion  of  a  plan,  says  he,  arises  in  the  mind  by  the 
contemplation  of  orderly  phenomena.  For  instance, 
the  notion  of  the  vertebrated  type  among  animals : 
the  animals  simply  grew  in  that  way,  and  the  notion  of 
a  plan  is  superinduced  upon  the  contemplation  of  such 
structures.  The  notion  is  posterior  to  the  objects  in 
the  order  of  time,  since  it  is  aroused  in  the  mind  by  the 
sight  of  these  objects.  But  men  invert  this  natural 
order  of  things,  and  say  that  the  plan  was  conceived 
first,  and  the  objects  were  made  to  conform  to  it ;  and 
this  is  "  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse." 

Now,  Spinoza  said  the  very  same  thing:  "That 
which  is  b}T  nature  anterior,  it  [the  doctrine  of  final 
causes]  makes  posterior."  Taken  in  connection  with 
all  that  he  had  said  about  the  origin  of  the  prejudice  in 
favor  of  final  causes,  it  is  very  plain  that  Spinoza  meant, 
that  while  the  objects  are  naturally  anterior  to  that 
human  conception  of  their  final  cause,  which  he  main- 
tains arises  simply  from  inveterate  prejudice,  and  is  a 
"pure  fiction  of  human  imagination,"  men  invert  this 
order,  and  make  this  tk  fiction  "  anterior  to  the  object, 
and  the  cause  of  it.  His  "  first  fallacy,  that  of  regard- 
ing as  a  cause  that  which  is  an  effect,  and  vice  versa" 
is  the  same  notion  under  the  aspect  of  cause  and  effect 
instead  of  chronological  sequence;  so  that,  if  Lewes 
had  gone  a  little  farther  in  his  quotation  from  Spinoza, 
the  source  of  his  inspiration  in  his  labored  attack  upon 
design-arguments  would  have  been  too  conspicuous. 
Not  that  any  particular  injustice  was  done  to  Spinoza 
in  this  matter.  It  was  not  his  property  that  Lewes 
appropriated.  He  got  the  notion  from  the  old  atheistic 
atomists.  It  is  essentially  the  same  question  to  which 
Cudworth  gave  a  tolerable  answer. 

Let  us,  however,  examine  the  specific  form  in  which 


SPINOZA'S  CRITICISM  OF  FINAL  CAUSES.  131 

Spinoza  and  Lewes  cast  this  old  objection.  Design- 
advocates,  say  they,  are  guilty  of  a  fallacy  of  inversion, 
in  that  they  project  their  own  conception  arising  from 
the  contemplation  of  an  object  beyond  the  object,  and 
previous  to  it,  as  its  cause,  or  as  the  plan  according  to 
which  it  was  shaped.  The  accusation  is  perfectly  valid 
upon  o?te  condition ;  viz.,  that  there  are  no  plans  or 
purposes  in  nature  back  of  the  object,  and  according  to 
which  it  was  shaped.  But  suppose  there  are  such  plans 
and  purposes  ?  Then  design-advocates  have  not  been 
guilty  of  the  fallacy  of  inversion.  The  plan  did  exist 
before  the  object ;  and  it  is  not  the  human  conception 
which  is  projected  back  into  eternity  as  the  Creator's 
thought,  but  that  thought  itself,  which  man  perceives 
upon  the  contemplation  of  the  object,  instead  of  con- 
ceiving it  as  a  "  fiction  of  his  imagination." 

But,  whether  there  are  any  such  plans  or  not,  one 
thing  is  plain :  Spinoza  and  Lewes  assume  that  there 
are  none.  The  charge  of  a  fallacy  of  inversion  is  valid 
only  on  that  condition :  hence,  in  making  that  charge, 
these  men  begged  the  question.  There  is  a  bald  fal- 
lacy of  petitio  prineipii  on  their  part,  at  any  rate,  no 
matter  whether  design-advocates  are  guilty  or  innocent 
of  a  fallacy.  And,  as  regards  the  latter  point,  the 
accusation  of  a  fallacy  of  inversion  is  not  pertinent. 
It  is  not  a  legitimate  attack.  Design-advocates  assert 
that  there  are  plans  and  purposes  in  nature.  That  is 
their  main  position.  The  fact  that  these  are  prior  in 
time  is  involved  in  this  fundamental  proposition.  Now, 
Spinoza's  attack  resolves  itself  into  this:  Upon  the 
assumption  that  your  fundamental  proposition  is  false, 
you  are  guilty  of  a  fallacy  of  inversion. 

As  regards  the  tendency  to  look  upon  the  whole 
universe  with  reference  to  its  utility  to  man,  Spinoza 


132  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

was  attacking  a  real  fallacy ;  and  his  exposure  of  it 
probably  helped  to  banish  it  from  teleology.  We  shall 
see  evidence  of  greater  care  on  this  point  in  the  next 
writer,  whose  work  appeared  after  the  publication  of 
Spinoza's  "  Ethics."  Considering  how  some  men  have 
in  all  ages  made  religion  a  cloak  for  "blind  cupidity 
and  insatiable  avarice,"  we  can  have  some  charity  for 
Spinoza's  remarks  on  that  head  also. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  133 


CHAPTER  V. 

NATURAL   THEOLOGY   IN   THE    SEVENTEENTH    CENTURY 
{CONTINUED) :  BOYLE  AND  RAY. 

Ten  years  after  the  publication  of  Cudworth's  "  In- 
tellectual System  of  the  Universe  "  —  namely,  in  1688  — 
appeared,  in  small  octavo,  a  less  pretentious,  but  more 
solid  and  sensible,  treatise  by  Robert  Boyle,  a  contem- 
porary of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  and  himself  holding  a  high 
and  honorable  place  as  a  scientist.  It  is  entitled  "  A 
Disquisition  about  the  Final  Causes  of  Natural  Things." 
His  friend,  Mr.  Henry  Oldenburgh,  secretary  of  the 
Royal  Society,  had  propounded  to  Mr.  Boyle  these  four 
questions :  — 

1.  Whether,  generally  or  indefinitely  speaking,  there 
be  any  final  causes  of  things  corporeal,  knowable  by 
naturalists. 

2.  Whether,  if  the  first  question  be  resolved  in  the 
affirmative,  we  may  consider  final  causes  in  all  sorts  of 
bodies,  or  only  in  some  peculiarly  qualified  ones. 

3.  Whether,  or  in  what  sense,  the  acting  for  ends 
may  be  ascribed  to  an  unintelligent  and  even  inanimate 
body. 

4.  How  far,  and  with  what  cautions,  arguments  may 
be  framed  upon  the  supposition  of  final  causes. 

He  opens  fire  at  once  upon  the  Epicureans  and  the 
Cartesians,  —  upon  the  former  because  they  "  think  the 
world  was  the  production  of  atoms  and  chance,  without 


184  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

any  intervention  of  a  Deity ;  "  upon  the  latter  because 
"they  judge,  with  Descartes,  that  God,  being  an 
omniscient  agent,  'tis  rash  and  presumptuous  for  men 
to  think  that  they  know,  or  can  investigate,  what  ends 
he  proposed  to  himself  in  his  actings  about  his  crea- 
tures." Inasmuch  as  the  Epicureans  have,  in  his  opin- 
ion, been  amply  refuted  already,  he  points  his  heaviest 
artillery  at  the  Cartesians.  At  the  same  time  he  speaks 
very  deferentially  of  Descartes  himself,  and  lays  the 
blame  of  his  rejection  of  teleology  upon  the  extrava- 
gances of  the  schoolmen :  — 

"Perhaps  one  thing  that  alienated  that  excellent  philoso- 
pher from  allowing  the  consideration  of  final  causes  in  phys- 
ics, was  that  the  school-philosophers,  and  many  other  learned 
men,  are  wont  to  propose  it  too  unwarily,  as  if  there  were  no 
creature  in  the  world  that  was  not  solely,  or  at  least  chiefly, 
designed  for  the  service  or  benefit  of  man:  insomuch  that 
I  remember  I  have  seen  a  body  of  divinity  published  by  a 
famous  writer,  wherein,  to  prove  that  the  world  would  be 
annihilated  after  the  day  of  judgment,  he  urgeth  this  argu- 
ment :  That,  since  the  world  was  made  for  the  sake  of  man 
in  his  travelling  condition  (liominis  viatoris  causa),  when 
once  man  is  possessed  of  his  everlasting  state  of  happiness 
or  misery,  there  will  be  no  further  use  for  the  world." 

But  twenty  years  earlier,  in  his  work  on  "  The  Use- 
fulness of  Experimental  Natural  Philosophy,"  Boyle 
had  himself  stated  the  purposes  of  creation  to  be,  (1) 
The  glory  of  God ;  (2)  The  service  of  man. 

In  view  of  these  abuses  of  the  doctrine  of  final 
causes,  Boyle  proceeds  to  an  analysis  and  classification 
of  the  ends  in  nature :  (1)  Universal  ends,  such  as 
the  displaying  of  the  wisdom  and  power  of  the  Creator ; 
(2)  Cosmical  ends,  such  as  may  be  involved  in  the  dis- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  135 

tribution  and  motions  of  celestial  bodies ;  (3)  Animal 
ends,  "  which  are  those  that  the  particular  parts  of  ani- 
mals are  clestinated  to,  and  for  the  welfare  of  the  animal 
itself;"  (4)  Human  ends,  which  are  further  divided 
into  mental  and  corporeal.  As  a  means  of  guarding 
against  the  abuse  referred  to  above,  this  classification 
of  ends  was  a  capital  idea.  It  enables  him  to  say  to 
the  Cartesians,  We  teleologists  don't  pretend  to  know 
all  of  God's  purposes,  but  only  some  of  them  ;  nor  do 
we  pretend  that  the  purpose  we  allege  in  any  instance 
is  the  only  one.  Thus,  in  respect  to  the  eye,  "  'Tis  not 
to  be  denied  that  he  may  have  more  uses  for  it  than 
one,  and  perhaps  such  uses  as  we  cannot  divine ;  but 
this  hinders  not,  but  that  among  its  several  uses,  this, 
to  which  we  see  it  so  admirably  adapted,  should  be 
one." 

But  still  more  obviously  does  it  meet  the  objection 
raised  by  Spinoza.  Here  is  one  teleologist,  who,  so  far 
from  regarding  the  whole  universe  with  reference  to 
human  ends,  makes  these  to  constitute  but  one  class 
out  of  four.  We  shall  find  from  this  time  onward,  that, 
notwithstanding  occasional  relapses  upon  the  part  of 
individuals,  teleologists  generally  maintained  a  cautious 
and  prudent  reserve  in  respect  to  the  extent  to  which 
nature  was  destined  for  human  uses. 

Boyle  answers  the  first  question  in  the  affirmative. 
There  are,  he  thinks,  "final  causes  of  things  corporeal, 
knowable  by  naturalists." 

Proceeding  to  the  second  question,  Whether  we  may 
consider  final  causes  in  all  sorts  of  bodies,  or  only  in 
some  peculiarly  qualified  ones,  he,  in  the  first  place, 
very  wisely  rejects  the  celestial  bodies  from  the  list  of 
things  whose  final  cause  we  may,  without  presumption, 
affect  to  understand :  — 


136  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

"I  am  apt  to  fear  that  men  are  wont,  with  greater  confi- 
dence than  evidence,  to  assign  the  systematical  ends  and  uses 
of  the  celestial  bodies,  and  to  conclude  them  to  be  made  and 
moved  only  for  the  service  of  the  earth  and  its  inhabitants." 

Very  naturally  he  pitches  upon  the  province  of  bi- 
ology as  containing  the  "  peculiarly  qualified "  bodies 
whose  final  causes  may  be  legitimately  inquired  after. 
And  in  this  province  he  selects  the  eye  as  the  best  in- 
stance of  all.  He  was  well  qualified  to  talk  about  the 
eye,  having  given  much  study  to  it;  and  there  was 
bound  up  within  the  same  covers  containing  his  "  Dis- 
quisition about  Final  Causes,"  a  treatise  with  the  title, 
"  Some  Uncommon  Observations  about  Vitiated  Sight." 
After  a  full  description  of  the  human  eye,  he  proceeds  to 
notice  some  peculiarities  in  the  eyes  of  other  animals, 
tracing  each  departure  from  the  human  type  to  some 
wise  purpose  in  respect  to  the  habitat  or  wants  of  the 
animal.  Thus,  in  regard  to  the  third  eyelid  of  the 
frog's  eye,  he  sa}rs,  — 

"  In  furnishing  frogs  with  this  strong  membrane,  the  provi- 
dence of  nature  seems  to  be  conspicuous  ;  for,  they  being 
amphibious  animals,  designed  to  pass  their  lives  in  watery 
places,  which  abound  with  sedges  and  other  plants  with 
sharp  edges  or  points,  and  the  progressive  motion  of  this 
animal  being  to  be  made,  not  by  walking,  but  by  leaping,  if 
his  eyes  were  not  provided  with  such  a  sheath  as  I  have  been 
mentioning,  he  must  either  shut  his  eyes,  and  so  leap  blindly, 
and  by  consequence  dangerously,  or,  by  leaving  them  open, 
must  run  a  venture  to  have  the  cornea  cut,  pricked,  or  other- 
wise offended,  by  the  edges  or  points  of  the  plants,  or  what 
may  fall  from  them  upon  the  animal's  eye  :  whereas  this 
membrane,  as  was  said,  is  like  a  kind  of  spectacle  that 
covers  the  eye  without  taking  away  the  sight,  and,  as  soon 
as  the  need  of  employing  it  is  past,  the  animal  at  pleasure 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  137 

withdraws  it  into  a  little  cell,  where  it  rests  out  of  the  way- 
till  there  be  occasion  to  use  it  again." 

Harvey  said  of  Lord  Bacon,  that  he  wrote  about  sci- 
ence like  a  lord  chancellor  :  that  is  not  Boyle's  style. 
Even  in  this  book  on  final  causes,  wherein  he  has  turned 
theologian  for  the  time  being,  he  writes  like  a  practical 
naturalist  on  familiar  ground.  Thus  he  goes  on  to  tell 
the  reader  how  to  verify  what  he  has  said  about  the 
nictitating  membrane  of  the  frog :  — 

"  This  you  may  see  if  you  apply  the  point  of  a  pin  or  a 
pen,  or  any  such  sharp  thing,  to  the  eye  of  a  frog  whilst 
you  hold  his  head  steady  ;  for  to  screen  his  eye  he  will  pres- 
ently cover  it  (at  least  the  greater  part)  with  this  membrane, 
whith,  when  the  danger  is  over,  he  will  again  withdraw." 

With  all  his  admirable  caution,  so  sharply  contrasted 
with  the  recklessness  of  many  other  teleologists,  he 
gives  some  very  dubious  examples.  For  instance,  he 
quotes  with  approval  the  opinion  of  "  an  ingenious  cul- 
tivator of  optics,"  that  the  reason  why  the  pupil  in  the 
eyes  of  horses  and  oxen  is  a  transverse  slit,  but  in  cats 
a  vertical  slit,  "  may  be  that  horses  and  oxen  being 
usually  to  find  their  food  growing  on  the  ground,  they 
can  more  conveniently  receive  the  images  of  the  lat- 
erally neighboring  grass,  etc.,  by  having  their  pupils 
transversely  placed ;  whereas  cats,  being  to  live  chiefly 
upon  rats  and  mice,  which  are  animals  that  usually 
climb  up  or  run  down  walls  and  other  steep  places, 
the  commodiousest  situation  of  their  pupil  for  readily 
discovering  and  following  these  objects  was  to  be  per- 
pendicular." 

To  be  able  to  accomplish  the  same  end  by  a  diversity 
of  means,  shows  a  high  degree  of  skill.  Thus,  argues 
Boyle,  it  is  a  proof  of  man's  wisdom  that  he  can  cause 


138  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  hours  to  be  measured  off  aud  designated  by  means 
of  weights  as  the  motive-power  in  clocks;  but  still 
more  skill  is  required  to  reach  the  same  end  in  several 
ways,  as  by  using  a  spring  for  the  motive-power  instead 
of  a  weight.  So  the  Creator's  wisdom  is  demonstrated 
in  that  he  has  reached  the  end  of  the  flight  of  animals 
in  the  air  by  means  of  the  feathered  wings  of  birds, 
the  skinny  membrane  of  bats,  and  even  by  means  of 
fins,  as  in  the  flying  fishes. 

Again  the  great  variety  of  exquisite  mechanical  con- 
trivances in  nature  carries  the  same  inference,  though 
they  be  not  all  for  the  same  end :  — 

"To  be  able  to  frame  both  clocks  and  watches  and  ships 
and  rockets  and  granadoes  and  pumps  and  mills,  ate, 
argues  and  manifests  a  far  greater  skill  in  an  artificer  than 
he  could  display  in  making  but  one  of  those  sorts  of  en- 
gines, bow  artificially  soever  be  contrived  it." 

This  question  of  degree  of  sk^l  manifested  in  the 
productions  of  nature  is  quite  another  affair  from  that 
with  which  teleology  usually  busies  itself;  viz.,  the 
proofs  of  God's  existence.  Boyle  seems  to  assume  the 
latter,  or  to  regard  it  as  certain  enough  upon  other 
grounds;  and  he  employs  teleology,  as  Cicero  did, 
solely  to  prove  the  wisdom  and  providence  of  God. 
It  does  not  appear  distinctly  from  any  thing  he  has 
written,  whether  he  supposed  he  was  proving  the  ex- 
istence of  God,  when,  in  fact,  he  was  only  giving  in- 
stances of  creative  skill,  and  of  the  providential  care 
of  his  creatures  exercised  by  a  being  whose  existence 
was  quietly  assumed  instead  of  being  demonstrated; 
or  whether  he  clearly  perceived  that  he  was  only  illus- 
trating the  wisdom  and  providence  of  God,  and  delib- 
erately chose  to  cast  his  teleology  in  that  form  instead 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  139 

of  making  it  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  God. 
Upon  the  first  supposition  he  was  guilty  of  a  petitio 
principii.  If  he  set  out  to  prove  God's  existence,  he 
begged  the  question.  It  would  be  too  harsh  to  so 
judge  him  without  ample  grounds  for  it ;  and,  so  far 
from  such  grounds  existing,  all  the  probabilities  are 
against  the  first  alternative.  He  was  answering  the 
question  whether  there  are  any  final  causes  at  all ;  and 
he  did  not  concern  himself  with  the  further  question, 
What  use  can  be  made  of  teleology,  supposing  there  is 
such  a  thing  ?  He  did  not  attempt  to  prove  God's  ex- 
istence by  means  of  it. 

Such,  I  say,  seems  to  be  the  probable  status  of  his 
mind  in  respect  to  what  he  was  attempting  to  do ;  and 
hence  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  accusing  him  of  a 
fallacy  of  the  sort  mentioned  above.  But  yet  we  can 
hardly  go  so  far  as  to  take  the  second  alternative,  and 
say  that  he  had  a  clear  notion  of  simply  illustrating 
God's  wisdom  as  displayed  in  nature.  It  is  probable, 
rather,  that  he  was  in  some  measure  involved  in  a 
fallacy  of  confusion  respecting  the  use  of  teleology. 
This  is  the  more  likely,  because,  as  we  shall  find  in  the 
sequel,  many  other  teleologists  did  set  out  with  a  con- 
fused notion  of  what  they  were  going  to  accomplish  by 
means  of  teleological  reasoning.  Teleology  is  generally 
regarded  as  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  and 
so  these  writers  view  it  in  the  abstract.  But  in  the 
practical  development  of  it  they  treat  it  as  a  means  of 
illustrating  the  perfections  of  a  being  whose  existence 
is  assumed ;  and  just  that  is  certainly  what  Boyle  has 
actually  done,  whatever  it  may  have  been  that  he  in- 
tended to  do.  It  is  really  a  curious  problem  to  study 
this  tendency  of  teleology.  It  was  manifested  so  early 
as  the  time  of  Socrates,  and  lias  cropped  out  all  along 


140  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  line  of  its  historical  development.  Men  suppose 
they  are  going  to  prove  the  proposition,  There  is  a 
God;  but,  when  all  is  done,  it  turns  out  that  they  have 
assumed  his  existence,  and  argued  for  his  wisdom  or 
providence. 

But  if  that  argument  is  sound,  if  they  have  made 
good  their  propositions,  God  is  wise,  or  God  exercises 
a  providence  over  his  creation  :  does  not  that  include 
the  proof  of  his  existence  ?  Certainly  it  does,  if  provi- 
dence and  wisdom  had  been  demonstrated  independ- 
ently ;  but  they  have  not.  The  argument  runs  in 
this  fashion :  These  structures  (being  God's  work)  are 
so  exquisitely  perfect,  and  so  exactly  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  animals,  that  God  must  be  both  wise  to  con- 
trive them,  and  kind  to  provide  his  creatures  with 
them.  The  words  in  parentheses  are  not  expressed  in 
the  teleological  reasonings  of  these  writers,  but  they 
are  understood.  There  would  be  no  pertinence  in  what 
•they  say  about  providence  and  wisdom,  except  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  structures  they  are  describing  are 
the  work  of  God.  Now,  it  is  perfectly  legitimate  to 
make  that  assumption,  if  their  aim  is  simply  to  prove 
providence  and  wisdom,  and  nothing  more.  It  amounts 
to  something  like  this  :  Grant,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  there  is  a  God,  and  I  will  prove  that  he  is  wise, 
and  cares  for  the  wants  of  his  creatures.  But,  having 
thus  proved  his  providence  and  wisdom  upon  the 
assumption  of  his  existence,  it  would  be  arguing  in  a 
circle  to  turn  about,  and  claim  that  such  a  method  of 
proving  his  providence  proves  also  his  existence. 

Boyle's  summary  of  his  answer  to  the  second  ques- 
tion is  as  follows :  — 

"  (1)  I  think,  that,  from  the  ends  and  uses  of  the  parts  of 
living  bodies,  the  naturalist  may  draw  arguments,  provided 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  141 

he  do  it  with  clue  cautions,  of  which  I  shall  speak  under  the 
fourth  question.  (2)  That  the  inanimate  bodies  here  below 
that  proceed  not  from  seminal  principles  have  a  more  parable 
texture  (if  I  may  so  speak) ,  as  earths,  liquors,  flints,  pebbles, 
and  will  not  easily  warrant  ratiocinations  drawn  from  their 
supposed  ends." 

His  third  point,  in  respect  to  celestial  bodies,  has  been 
given  already.  Biology  is,  in  his  opinion,  the  only 
legitimate  field  for  teleology. 

To  the  third  question,  "  Whether,  or  in  what  sense, 
the  acting  for  ends  may  be  ascribed  to  an  unintelligent 
and  even  inanimate  body,"  he  delivers  a  very  thoughtful 
and  prudent  answer.  It  is  to  the  effect,  that  such  bodies 
do  appear  to  act  for  ends,  but  without  themselves 
having  any  knowledge  whatever  of  what  they  do :  they 
are  mere  instruments  of  the  divine  will.  This  is  quite 
a  different  doctrine  from  the  "  plastic  nature  "  of  Cud- 
worth. 

In  respect  to  the  relation  of  matter  and  force  to 
the  divine  will,  modern  theologians  have  drawn  some 
fine  distinctions.  The  different  theories  vary  all  the 
way  from  ascribing  all  natural  phenomena  to  second 
causes,  up  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  ascribing  them 
all  to  the  immediate  agency  of  the  divine  will.  One 
must  walk  a  narrow  plank  among  all  these  sharp  dis- 
tinctions :  he  must  go  far  enough,  and  not  too  far.  If 
he  grants  too  much  to  second  causes,  his  system  becomes 
mechanical ;  if  too  little,  it  squints  towards  pantheism. 
Now,  in  what  I  said  about  the  prudence  of  Boyle's 
answer  to  the  third  question,  I  had  no  reference,  of 
course,  to  these  fine  distinctions.  Judged  by  them  he 
would  probably  be  set  down  as  too  mechanical.  He 
accounts  for  the  action  of  bodies  destitute  of  intelli- 
gence  in   such   manner  that   they    seem   to  work  out 


142  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

rational  results,  just  as  if  they  knew  and  intended  what 
they  do,  by  the  supposition  that  matter  was  so  consti- 
tuted in  the  beginning  as  that  such  actions  should 
follow,  the  results  being  foreseen  and  intended  by  the 
Creator  when  he  originally  imparted  to  matter  those 
properties  by  virtue  of  which  such  results  are  from 
time  to  time  wrought  out.  He  states  his  opinion  very 
briefly,  apologizing  for  its  brevity,  and  proposing  to  fill 
out  the  section  to  a  bulk'  proportionate  to  the  others 
by  inserting  some  thoughts  not  properly  coming  under 
the  head  of  a  response  to  the  third  question. 

One  is  tempted  to  wish  that  he  had  felt  strictly 
bound  by  "the  laws  of  method,"  which  he  admits 
would  have  required  him  to  stop  when  he  was  done ; 
For,  upon  examining  the  matter  thus  irrelevantly  thrown 
in  as  a  sort  of  stuffing,  or  padding,  we  find  that  it  is  a 
retraction  or  apology  for  excluding  the  celestial  bodies 
from  teleology,  as  he  had  done  in  delivering  his  re- 
sponse to  the  second  question.  Here  we  see  the  un- 
happy consequences  of  leaving  the  arguments  of  physi- 
co-theology  so  long  without  proper  analysis.  Boyle 
seemed  to  feel,  that  in  excluding  celestial  phenomena 
from  teleology  he  had  shut  them  out  altogether,  —  a 
thing  which  he  knew  would  give  offence,  besides  seem- 
ing in  opposition  to  the  Bible.  "  The  heavens  declare 
the  glory  of  God "  keeps  ringing  in  his  ears,  and  he 
must  find  some  use  for  the  stars  in  his  system.  Now,  if 
he  had  realized  that  the  bare  fact  of  celestial  harmony, 
irrespective  of  any  end  to  be  served  by  it,  is  a  good 
ground  for  argument,  then  he  might  have  quieted  his 
conscience  without  committing  the  blunder  of  bringing 
back  into  teleology  a  class  of  phenomena  which  he  had 
before  excluded  on  good  grounds.  The  heavens  do 
indeed  declare  the  wisdom  and  power  of  the  Creator ; 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  143 

but  it  is  simply  by  virtue  of  their  harmony  and  beauty, 
not  because  we  know  what  all  the  stars  are  good  for ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  argument  from  them  belongs  to 
eutaxiology  instead  of  teleology.  Boyle's  first  thoughts 
were  better  than  his  second  thoughts.  If  he  had  made 
the  analysis  of  physico-theological  reasoning,  and  drawn 
the  line  between  the  argument  from  order  and  the  argu- 
ment from  ends,  he  might  have  spared  himself  the  labor 
and  mortification  of  an  apology  for  excluding  teleology 
from  astronomy. 

But  some  one  will  say,  If  the  heavens  furnish  a 
good  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  that  in  itself 
is  an  excellent  end  which  they  serve ;  and  thus  we 
bring  celestial  phenomena  under  teleology  after  all! 
That  is,  in  fact,  the  very  device  to  which  Boyle  resorted. 
And  the  other  teleologists,  if  they  were  at  a  loss  in 
assigning  the  purpose  of  any  thing,  were  alwa}rs  ready 
to  fall  back  upon  the  notion,  that,  if  it  wasn't  good 
for  any  thing  else  so  far  as  they  knew,  at  all  events  it 
furnished  good  material  for  them  to  argue  from.  In 
that  way  they  brought  every  thing  in  heaven  and  earth 
under  teleology.  Teleology  was  synonymous  with  de- 
sign, and  design  was  nearly  synonymous  with  natural 
theology.  It  was  all  u  adaptation,"  "  contrivance  for  a 
purpose,"  "adjustment  of  means  to  ends,"  from  the 
opening  sentence  to  the  last  page  of  their  bo.oks. 

This  misplacing  of  arguments  was  something  more 
mischievous  in  its  consequences  than  simply  wasting 
good  material  by  putting  it  in  the  wrong  place.  It 
robbed  Peter  without  paying  Paul.  Eutaxiology  was 
despoiled  without  enriching  teleology :  on  the  contiary, 
teleology  was  visibly  and  disastrously  weakened  by  the 
mass  of  examples  thrust  bodily  in  where  they  did  not 
belong.     Reasoning  from    the  adaptation  of  means  to 


144  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ends  upon  the  strength  of  instances  in  which  the  end 
was  quite  out  of  sight  and  out  of  reach,  was  a  barren 
occupation.  The  temptation  to  assign  hypothetical  and 
fanciful  uses  was  constant  and  pressing.  Thus,  in  re- 
spect to  the  stars,  it  was  customary  to  argue  that  they 
must  be  inhabited  (unless  the  teleologist  took  the  view 
which  Boyle  deprecates,  that  the  whole  universe  was 
made  for  the  service  and  benefit  of  man) ;  for  otherwise 
they  would  be  in  vain,  and  nature  does  nothing  in  vain. 
It  would  have  been  a  fine  example  of  circulus  in  pro- 
bando  if  they  had  then  argued  the  wisdom  of  God  from 
the  provision  thus  made  for  so  many  more  rational  and 
happy  creatures.  Those  creatures  must  be  there,  be- 
cause God's  wisdom  would  be  impeached  by  the  suppo- 
sition of  any  useless  thing  in  nature ;  and  God  must  be 
wise  because  he  has  provided  habitations  for  them. 
They  did,  in  fact,  go  through  the  first  half  of  that  cir- 
cle, and  by  plain  implication  traversed  the  other  half 
also. 

Proceeding  to  the  fourth  question,  "  With  what  cau- 
tions final  causes  are  to  be  considered  by  the  natural- 
ists," Boyle  at  once  draws  a  useful  distinction  as  to 
the  kinds  of  arguments  which  may  be  drawn  "  from  the 
supposed  ends  of  things."  These  may  be  physical,  or 
physico-theological,  —  the  former  when  we  infer  the 
nature  of  bodies  from  their  supposed  ends,  "because  by 
this  and  not  by  that,  or  by  this  more  than  by  that,  the 
end  designed  by  nature  may  be  best  and  most  conven- 
iently attained ;  "  the  latter  when  "  from  the  uses  of 
things  men  draw  arguments  that  relate  to  the  Author 
of  nature."  He  regards  the  fourth  question  as  having 
to  do  chiefly  with  the  first,  or  the  physical  considera- 
tions and  inferences  from  supposed  ends ;  and  he  frames 
his  first  two  propositions  with  especial  reference  to  that 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  145 

interpretation  of  the  question.  The  first  proposition 
is,  in  substance,  that  we  cannot  infer  the  nature  of 
celestial  bodies  from  their  final  causes.  That  is  sound 
and  indisputable.  In  the  second  proposition  he  affirms, 
that,  in  respect  to  the  bodies  of  animals,  final  causes  are 
useful  as  a  guide  for  investigation  ;  and  here  occurs  the 
original  citation,  so  often  repeated  in  later  teleology,  of 
Harvey's  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood :  — 

"  And  I  remember,  that  when  I  asked  our  famous  Harvey, 
in  the  only  discourse  I  had  with  him  (which  was  but  a  while 
before  he  died),  what  were  the  things  that  induced  him  to 
think  of  a  circulation  of  the  blood,  he  answered  me,  that, 
when  he  took  notice  that  the  valves  in  the  veins  of  so  many 
several  parts  of  the  body  were  so  placed  that  they  gave  free 
passage  to  the  blood  towards  the  heart,  but  opposed  the  pas- 
sage of  the  venal  blood  the  contrary  way,  he  was  invited 
to  imagine  that  so  provident  a  cause  as  nature  had  not 
placed  so  many  valves  without  design  ;  and  no  design  seemed 
more  probable  than  that,  since  the  blood  could  not  well, 
because  of  the  interposing  valves,  be  sent  by  the  veins  to 
the  limbs,  it  should  be  sent  through  the  arteries,  and  return 
through  the  veins,  whose  valves  did  not  oppose  its  course 
that  way." 

We  have  shown  in  the  Introduction,  that  this  claim 
of  a  physiological  value  for  teleology  is  based  upon  a 
confusion  of  ideas  respecting  function  and  purpose.  If 
the  reader  will  glance  back  at  the  several  quotations  I 
have  given  from  Boyle,  he  will  see  that  this  author 
glides  from  uses  to  ends,  and  from  functions  to  purposes, 
without  appreciating  their  proper,  distinctness  of  mean- 
ing. Hence  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  he  would 
detect  the  fallacy  in  question. 

The  supposition  of  a  certain  end  having  been  de- 
signed, is  based  upon  the  structure  of  the  organ.     For 


146  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

instance,  the  purpose  of  the  venal  valves  to  guide  the 
blood  towards  the  heart  is  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
they  open  in  that  direction.  That  is  one  inference. 
Now,  says  Boyle,  we  go  on  and  infer  the  use  or  func- 
tion from  the  end.  But  the  fact  is,  that  we  make  only 
one  inference  instead  of  two.  We  go  directly  from 
the  structure  to  the  function,  instead  of  going  about 
the  circuit  of  inferring  the  end  from  the  structure, 
and  then  the  use  from  the  end.  There  is  no  need  of 
bringing  in  teleology  at  all,  so  far  as  the  mere  physi- 
ological investigation  is  concerned.  And,  if  it  ever 
comes  in,  it  will  be  subsequent  instead  of  antecedent  to 
the  determination  of  the  function.  After  we  have 
found  out  the  actual  use  of  a  thing,  we  may  then  go 
on  to  argue  that  it  was  intended  to  be  so  used  because 
of  its  eminent  fitness  for  that  function.  What  sort  of 
a  teleology  could  have  been  built  up  from  the  venal 
valves  before  their  function  was  discovered? 

In  the  third  proposition  he  comes  back  to  physico- 
theology :  — 

"  It  is  rational,  from  the  manifest  fitness  of  some  things 
to  cosmical  or  animal  ends  or  uses  [ends  and  uses  again 
spoken  of  as  if  they  were  synonymous] ,  to  infer  that  they 
were  framed  or  ordained  in  reference  thereunto  by  an  in- 
telligent and  designing  agent." 

Under  this  proposition  he  brings  in  the  great  body 
of  his  teleology.  As  in  the  question,  whether  there  are 
any  final  causes,  he  aimed  more  especially  at  the  Carte- 
sians ;  so  in  this  part  of  his  treatise  he  has  the  Epicu- 
reans more  in  view  :  — 

"But  because  I  observe,  not  without  grief,  that  of  late 
years  too  many  otherwise  perhaps  ingenious  men  have,  with 
the  innocent  opinions  of  Epicurus,  embraced  those  irreligious 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  147 

ones  wherein  the  Deity  and  Divine  Providence  are  quite  ex- 
cluded from  having  any  influence  upon  the  motions  of  mat- 
ter, all  whose  productions  are  referred  to  the  casual  con- 
course of  atoms :  for  this  reason,  I  say,  I  thought  it  a  part 
of  my  duty,  as  well  to  the  most  wise  Author  of  things,  as 
to  their  excellent  contrivance  and  mutual  subserviency,  to 
say  something,  though  briefly  yet  distinctly  and  expressly,  to 
show  that  at  least  in  the  structure  of  animals  there  are 
things  that  argue  a  far  higher  and  nobler  principle  than  is 
blind  chance.'" 

So  he  goes  on  to  construct  teleology  from  "  supera- 
bundant provision  for  casualties"  —  two  eyes,  for  instance, 
where  one  might  have  served,  —  "  in  short,  nature  has 
furnished  men  with  double  parts  of  the  same  kind ; " 
from  temporary  expedients,  as  the  foramen  ovale  in  the 
foetus,  giving  direct  passage  to  the  blood  from  the  right 
to  the  left  ventricle  of  the  heart,  without  passing  through 
the  lungs,  as  it  does  after  the  child  is  born ;  from  the  in- 
stincts of  animals,  especially  of  bees,  spiders,  birds,  and 
beavers ;  from  the  teeth,  an  old  topic,  but  more  largely 
and  skilfully  treated  by  him  than  by  any  previous 
writer ;  and  from  the  wings  of  bats,  the  mouths  of  va- 
rious animals,  the  eyes  of  fishes,  etc. 

The  fourth  proposition  is  judiciously  framed  as  a 
caution  both  to  the  theologian  and  the  naturalist :  — 

"  That  we  be  not  over-hasty  in  concluding,  nor  too  positive 
in  asserting,  that  this  or  that  must  be,  or  is,  the  particular 
destinated  use  of  such  a  thing,  or  the  motive  that  induced 
the  Author  of  nature  to  frame  it  thus." 

In  the  fifth  proposition  he  comes  again  upon  purely 
physical  grounds,  and  speaks  as  a  naturalist :  — 

"That  the  naturalist  should  not  suffer  the  search  or  the 
discovery  of  a  final  cause  of  nature's  works  to  make  him 


148  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

undervalue  or  neglect  the  studious  indagation1  of  their  effi- 
cient causes.' " 

Boyle's  treatise  did  much  to  rescue  teleology  from 
the  reproach  to  which  it  had  been  subjected  by  the 
incautious  zeal  of  its  advocates.  This  result  was  due, 
in  the  first  place,  to  the  judicious  handling  of  his  theme  ; 
but  that  would  not  have  availed  much  in  an  obscure 
author.  Boyle,  however,  was  a  prominent  figure  among 
the  scientists  of  his  day ;  and  the  adhesion  of  such  a  man 
to  their  cause  was  a  strong  point  for  the  teleologists,  — 
not  that  they  were  particularly  in  need,  however,  of  such 
support.  Teleology  was  the  fashion  among  English  sci- 
entists. The  very  next  writer,  and  the  last  of  the  anti- 
Cartesian  group  of  the  seventeenth  century,  was  no  less 
a  person  than  the  celebrated  botanist,  John  Ray.  His 
little  book  on  "  The  Wisdom  of  God  manifested  in  the 
Works  of  the  Creation  "  was  published  in  1691.  Like 
Boyle,  he  was  involved  in  some  degree  of  confusion  as 
to  the  function  of  teleology.  Was  it  to  be  used  to 
prove  God's  existence,  or  to  prove  his  wisdom  and 
providence  ?  Shall  teleology  be  our  premise,  and  God's 
existence  our  conclusion,  or  vice  versa  ?  In  the  follow- 
ing passage  he  takes  the  latter  alternative.  Granting 
that  God  exists,  then  he  must  have  intended  certain  re- 
sults. A  special  direction  has  been  purposely  given  to 
matter  and  force :  there  is  such  a  thing  as  teleology. 

"  Since,  we  find  materials  so  fit  to  serve  all  the  necessities 
and  conveniences,  and  to  exercise  and  employ  the  wit  and 
industry  of  an  intelligent  and  active  being,  and  since  there  is 
such  an  one  created  that  is  endued  with  skill  and  ability  to 
use  them,  and  who  by  their  help  is  enabled  to  rule  over  and 
subdue  all  inferior  creatures,  but  without  them  had  been  left 
necessitous,  helpless,  and  obnoxious  to  injuries  above  all 
1  Latin  indago,  to  search  out:  "indagation  "  is  obsolete. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  149 

others  ;  and  since  the  omniscient  Creator  could  not  but  know 
all  the  uses  to  which  they  might  and  would  be  employed  by 
man,  to  them  that  acknowledge  the  being  of  a  Deity,  it  is  little 
less  than  a  demonstration  that  they  were  created  intention- 
ally, I  do  not  say  only  for  those  uses." 

The  Italics  are  mine,  introduced  for  the  purpose  of 
drawing  attention  to  the  words  which  define  his  stand- 
point. He  is  arguing  for  teleology  rather  than  for  the 
existence  of  God,  just  as  Boyle  did  in  the  greater  part 
of  his  work.  But  in  the  following  passage  he  is  using 
teleology  in  the  customary  way  to  prove  the  existence 
God:  — 

"For  if  in  the  works  of  art,  as  for  example,  a  curious 
edifice  or  machine,  counsel,  design,  and  direction  to  an  end 
appearing  in  the  whole  frame  and  in  all  the  several  pieces  of 
it,  do  necessarily  infer  the  being  and  operation  of  some  intel- 
ligent architect  or  engineer,  why  shall  not  also  in  the  works 
of  nature,  that  grandeur  and  magnificence,  that  excellent 
contrivance  for  beaut}7,  order,  and  use  which  is  observable  in 
them,  wherein  they  do  as  much  transcend  the  effects  of  human 
art  as  infinite  power  and  wisdom  exceed  finite,  infer  the  ex- 
istence and  efficiency  of  an  omnipotent  and  all-wise  Creator?  " 

It  is  my  purpose  to  let  each  author  speak  for  himself 
as  much  as  possible.  It  may  be  that  I  am  inclined  to 
err  in  the  direction  of  quoting  too  much  ;  but  I  hope  I 
may  be  pardoned  for  that,  in  consideration  of  the  fact 
that  my  readers  thus  get  some  notion  of  the  style  of 
these  old  writers,  which  they  would  not  do  from  a  bare 
abstract  of  their  arguments,  however  accurate  that 
might  be.  Though  the  following  passage  is  long  for 
a  quotation,  there  is  a  piquancy  about  it  which  will 
repay  its  perusal :  — 

"  Methinks,  by  all  this  provision  for  the  use  and  service  of 
man,  the  Almighty  interpretatively  speaks  to  him   in   this 


150  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

manner  :  I  have  placed  thee  in  a  spacious  and  well-furnished 
world  ;  I  have  endued  thee  with  an  ability  of  understanding 
what  is  beautiful  and  proportionable,  and  have  made  that 
which  is  so  agreeable  and  delightful  to  thee  ;  I  have  provided 
thee  with  materials  whereon  to  exercise  and  employ  thy  art 
and  strength  ;  I  have  given  thee  an  excellent  instrument,  the 
hand,  accommodated  to  make  use  of  them  all ;  I  have  dis- 
tinguished the  earth  into  hills  and  valleys  and  plains  and 
meadows  and  woods,  all  these  parts  capable  of  culture  and 
improvement  by  thy  industry  ;  I  have  committed  to  thee,  for 
thy  assistance  in  thy  labors  of  ploughing  and  carrying  and 
drawing  and  travel,  the  laborious  ox,  the  patient  ass,  and  the 
strong  and  serviceable  horse  ;  I  have  created  a  multitude  of 
seeds  for  thee  to  make  choice  out  of  them  of  what  is  most 
pleasant  to  thy  taste,  and  of  most  wholesome  and  pleasant 
nourishment ;  I  have  also  made  great  variety  of  trees,  bearing 
fruit  both  for  food  and  physic,  those,  too,  capable  of  being 
meliorated  and  improved  by  transplantation,  stercoration,  in- 
sition,  pruning,  watering,  and  other  arts  and  devices.  Till 
and  manure  thy  fields,  sow  them  with  thy  seeds,  extirpate 
noxious  and  unprofitable  herbs,  guard  them  from  the  invasions 
and  spoil  of  beasts  ;  clear  and  fence  thy  meadows  and  pas- 
tures ;  dress  and  prune  thy  vines,  and  so  dispose  them  as  is 
most  suitable  to  the  climate  ;  plant  the  orchards  with  all  sorts 
of  fruit-trees  in  such  order  as  may  be  most  beautiful  to  the  eye, 
and  most  comprehensive  of  plants  [it  is  fortunate,  when  Provi- 
dence sets  out  to  speak  "interpretatively,"  that  she  speaks 
through  the  mouth  of  a  systematic  botanist]  ;  gardens  for  culi- 
nary herbs,  and  all  kinds  of  salletting  ;  for  delectable  flowers 
to  gratify  the  eye  with  their  agreeable  colors  and  figures,  and 
thy  scent  with  their  fragrant  odors  ;  for  odoriferous  and  ever- 
green shrubs  and  suffrutwes ;  for  exotic  and  medicinal  plants 
of  all  sorts,  and  dispose  them  in  that  comely  order  as  may 
be  both  pleasant  to  behold,  and  commodious  for  access.  I 
have  furnished  thee  with  all  materials  for  building,  as  stone 
and  timber  and  slate  and  lime  and  clay,  and  earth  whereof 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  151 

to  make  bricks  and  tiles.  Deck  and  bespangle  the  country 
with  houses  and  villages  convenient  for  thy  habitation,  pro- 
vided with  out-houses  and  stables  for  the  harboring  and 
sheltering  of  thy  cattle,  with  barns  and  granaries  for  the 
reception  and  custody  and  storing  up  of  thy  corn  and  fruits. 
I  have  made  thee  a  sociable  creature,  £G>ov  ttoXitlkov,1  for  the 
improvement  of  thy  understanding  by  conference  and  com- 
munication of  observations  and  experiments.  For  mutual 
help,  assistance,  and  defence,  build  thee  large  towns  and 
cities,  with  straight  and  well-paved  streets,  and  elegant  rows 
of  houses,  adorned  with  magnificent  temples  for  my  honor  and 
worship,  with  beautiful  palaces  for  thy  princes  and  grandees 
[a  truly  loyal  and  royal  sort  of  a  Providence  this],  with 
stately  halls  for  public  meetings  of  the  citizens  and  their 
several  companies,  and  the  sessions  of  the  courts  of  judica- 
ture, besides  public  porticos  and  aqueducts.  I  have  im- 
planted in  thy  nature  a  desire  of  seeing  strange  and  foreign, 
and  finding  out  unknown,  countries  for  the  improvement  and 
advancement  of  thy  knowledge  in  geography  by  observing 
the  bays  and  creeks  and  havens  and  promontories,  the 
outlets  of  rivers,  the  situations  of  the  maritime  towns  and 
cities,  the  longitude  and  latitude,  etc.,  of  those  places;  in 
politics,  by  noting  their  government,  their  manners,  laws, 
and  customs,  their  diet  and  medicine,  their  trades  and  manu- 
factures, their  houses  and  buildings,  their  exercises  and 
sports,  etc.  ;  in  physiology  or  natural  history,  by  searching 
out  their  natural  rarities,  the  productions  both  of  land  and 
water,  what  species  of  animals,  plants,  and  minerals,  of 
fruits  and  drougues,  are  to  be  found  there,  what  commodities 
for  bartering  and  permutation,2  whereby  thou  mayest  be 
enabled  to  make  large  additions  to  natural  history,  to  benefit 

1  Of  course  Providence  understands  the  classical  languages.  No 
wonder  she  can  speak  Greek;  but  ivould  she,  in  addressing  mankind  in 
general,  learned  and  ignorant  all  in  a  mass  ? 

2  "  Permutation,"  exchange  of  specimens.  Ray  was  a  great  travel- 
ler and  collector;  and,  when  Providence  speaks  through  him,  the  mes- 
sage is  slightly  tinged  with  his  personal  experiences  and  idiosyncrasies. 


152  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

those  other  sciences,  and  to  benefit  and  enrich  thy  country  by 
increase  of  its  trade  and  merchandise.  I  have  given  thee 
timber  and  iron  to  build  thee  hulls  of  ships,  tall  trees  for 
masts,  flax  and  hemp  for  sails,  cables  and  cordage  for  rig- 
ging ;  I  have  armed  thee  with  courage  and  hardiness  to 
attempt  the  seas,  and  traverse  the  spacious  plains  of  that 
liquid  element ;  I  have  assisted  thee  with  a  compass  to 
direct  thy  course  when  thou  shalt  be  out  of  all  ken  of  land, 
and  have  nothing  in  view  but -sky  and  water.  Go  thither  for 
the  purposes  before  mentioned,  and  bring  home  what  may  be 
useful  and  beneficial  to  thy  country  in  general,  or  thyself  in 
particular." 

Ray's  Providence  is  evidently  a  stout,  English, 
church-and-king  affair.  I  say  this  in  no  spirit  of  levity, 
nor  have  I  introduced  this  quotation  simply  for  its 
quaintness.  The  purpose  of  it  is  to  point  a  moral, 
rather  than  to  adorn  and  lighten  the  dry  pages  of  this 
review  of  obsolete  teleology.  The  moral  is  this :  Here 
is  a  man  telling  what  God  would  say  to  mankind,  re- 
hearsing the  divine  message  inscribed  upon  the  open 
page  of  nature ;  and  he  makes  the  Almighty  talk,  not 
only  like  a  man,  but  like  an  Englishman ;  not  only  like 
an  Englishman,  but  like  an  English  scientist  of  the 
seventeenth  century  ;  not  only  like  an  English  scientist 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  but  verily  like  a  sort  of 
sublimated  John  Ray  !  This  is  anthropomorphism  with 
a  vengeance  !  No  wonder  that  Hume  charged  teleolo- 
gists  with  fashioning  their  God  entirely  upon  the  human 
model  when  he  had  such  examples  as  this  before  him  ! 

He  opens  his  argument  by  an  attempt  to  show  that 
the  number  of  God's  creatures  is  infinite ;  this  being  "  a 
demonstrative  proof  of  the  unlimited  extent  of  the 
Creator's  skill,  and  the  fecundity  of  his  wisdom  and 
power."     To   get   at   this   point,  he    begins   with   the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  153 

acknowledged  fact  that  the  number  of  fixed  stars  is 
"  next  to  infinite  ;  "  secondly,  each  star  is  a  sun  "  with 
a  chorus  of  planets  circling  about  it ;  "  thirdly,  "  each  of 
these  planets  is  in  all  likelihood  furnished  with  as  great 
a  variety  of  corporeal  creatures,  animate  and  inanimate, 
as  the  earth  is."  That  would  give  us  a  "  prodigiously 
great  "  number  of  creatures,  without  question. 

Still  running  upon  the  idea  of  numbers  as  an  evi- 
dence of  divine  Wisdom,  he  next  gives  an  estimate  of 
terrestrial  species.  This  is  worth  quoting,  if  for  no 
other  reason,  simply  because  it  is  the  work  of  the  fore- 
most naturalist  of  his  day,  and  thus  exhibits  the  status 
of  natural  history  two  centuries  ago  as  compared  with 
what  it  is  to-day. 

Premising  that  "how  much  the  more  imperfect  any 
genus  or  order  of  beings  is,  so  much  the  more  numerous 
are  the  species  contained  under  it.  If  this  rule,  I  say, 
holds  good,  then  there  should  be  more  species  of  fossils,1 
or  generally  of  inanimate  bodies,  than  of  vegetables; 
of  which  there  is  some  reason  to  doubt,  unless  we  will 
admit  all  sorts  of  formed  stones  to  be  distinct  species." 

' '  Animate  bodies  are  divided  into  four  great  genera,  or 
orders,  —  beasts,  birds,  fishes,  and  insects. 

"The  species  of  beasts,  including  also  serpents,  are  not 
very  numerous ;  of  such  as  are  certainly  known  and  de- 
scribed, I  dare  say,  not  above  a  hundred  and  fifty. 

' '  The  number  of  birds  known  and  described  may  be  near 
five  hundred  ;  and  the  number  of  fishes,  secluding  shell-fish, 
as  many  ;  but,  if  shell-fish  be  taken  in,  more  than  double  the 
number.  How  many  of  each  genus  remain  yet  undiscovered 
one  cannot  certainly  nor  very  nearly  conjecture,  but  we  may 
suppose  the  whole  sum  of  beasts  and  birds  to  exceed  by 
a  third  part,  and  fishes  by  one-half,  those  known. 

1  He  takes  "  fossils  "  in  a  more  generic  sense  than  is  customary  now. 


154  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

"  The  insects,  if  we  take  in  the  exsanguious,  both  terres- 
trial and  aquatic,  may,  in  derogation  to  the  precedent  rule, 
for  number,  vie  even  with  plants  themselves.  For  the  ex- 
sanguious alone,  by  what  that  learned  and  critical  naturalist, 
my  honored  friend  Dr.  Martin  Lister,  hath  already  observed 
and  delineated,  I  conjecture,  cannot  be  fewer  than  eighteen 
hundred  or  two  thousand  species,  perhaps  many  more." 

This  being  the  number  of  "  the  exsanguious  alone," 
he  reaches,  by  conjecture  and  estimate,  the  conclusion 
that  "the  species  of  insects  in  the  whole  earth  (land 
and  water)  will  amount  to  ten  thousand;  and  I  do 
believe  they  rather  exceed  than  fall  short  of  that  sum." 

"  The  number  of  plants  contained  in  C.  Bauhin's  '  Pinax  ' 
is  about  six  thousand,  which  are  all  that  had  been  described 
by  the  authors  that  wrote  before  him,  or  observed  by  him- 
self." 

Ray  thinks  that  many  of  Bauhin's  species  were  not 
good  ones ;  they  being  erected  upon  the  supposition 
"that  different  color  or  multiplicity  of  leaves  in  the 
flower,  and  the  like  accidents,  were  sufficient  to  consti- 
tute a  specific  difference.  But,  supposing  there  had 
been  six  thousand  then  known  and  described,  I  cannot 
but  think  that  there  are  in  the  world  more  than  double 
that  number." 

Only  about  thirty  thousand  species  of  animals  and 
plants  altogether  !  Certainly  a  very  modest  estimate, 
considering  that  the  interests  of  his  argument  would  be 
served  best  by  making  the  number  as  large  as  possible. 

"What  can  we  infer  from  all  this?  If  the  number  of 
creatures  be  so  exceeding  great,  how  great,  nay  immense, 
must  needs  be  the  power  and  wisdom  of  him  who  formed 
them  all!  " 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  155 

In  opposition  to  Descartes'  exclusion  of  final  causes 
from  natural  philosophy,  Ray  says,  — 

"For  first,  seeing,  for  instance,  that  the  eye  is  employed 
by  man  and  all  animals  for  the  use  of  vision,  which,  as  they 
are  framed,  is  so  necessary  for  them  that  they  could  not  live 
without  it,  and  God  Almighty  knew  that  it  would  be  so  ; 
and  seeing  it  is  so  admirably  fitted  and  adapted  to  this  use 
that  all  the  wit  and  art  of  men  and  angels  could  not  have 
contrived  it  better,  if  so  well,  —  it  must  needs  be  highly 
absurd  and  unreasonable  to  affirm  either  that  it  was  not  de- 
signed at  all  for  this  use,  or  that  it  is  impossible  for  man  to 
know  whether  it  was  or  not." 

Here,  again,  he  is  arguing  for  the  existence  of  tele- 
ology, which  is  all  very  well  in  itself.  Teleology  had 
been  attacked,  and  it  was  entirely  proper  to  defend  it. 
But  mark  how  it  is  done.  "  God  Almighty  knew  that 
it  would  be  so,"  that  eyes  would  be  used  for  seeing : 
therefore  he  intended  them  for  this  end  ;  that  is  to  say, 
there  is  a  teleology.  Even  that  is  all  legitimate  enough, 
unless  he  proposes  to  use  teleology  to  prove  God's  ex- 
istence. Then  it  will  be  reasoning  in  a  circle.  But 
that  is  precisely  what  he  does  next.  His  first  argument 
against  Descartes  being  that  just  quoted,  the  second 
is,  "  How  can  man  give  thanks  and  praise  to  God  for 
the  use  of  his  limbs  and  senses  "  unless  he  knows  they 
were  intended  for  their  respective  functions?  And 
the  third  is  that  Descartes'  opinion  "  supersedes  and 
castrates  the  best  medium  we  have  to  demonstrate  the 
being  of  a  Deity."  It  is  plain  that  he  still  regards 
teleology  as  a  means  of  proving  God's  existence, 
although  he  is  compelled  to  assume  the  latter  in  order  to 
show  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  teleology. 

Ray  quotes  largely  from  Boyle  and  Cudworth,  and 
generally  with  approval.     But  he  attacks  Boyle's  hy- 


156  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

pothesis  of  an  original  endowment  of  matter  with  such 
properties  as  to  work  out  the  regular,  and,  so  to  speak, 
artful,  productions  of  nature.  He  thinks  that  these 
properties  and  motions  of  matter  need  to  be  constantly 
maintained  as  well  as  originally  imparted,  and  for  this 
service  he  brings  in  Cudworth's  "plastic  nature"  to 
supplement  Boyle's  doctrine.  He  thinks  that  the 
"  vegetative  soul "  of  plants  cannot  account  for  their 
growth  and  nutrition,  because  "  the  segments  and  cut- 
tings of  some  plants  —  nay,  the  very  chips  and  smallest 
fragments  of  their  body,  branches,  or  roots  —  will  grow, 
and  become  perfect  plants  themselves ;  and  so  the  vege- 
tative soul,  if  that  were  the  architect,  would  be  divisi- 
ble, and  consequently  no  spiritual  or  intelligent  being, 
which  the  plastic  principle,  must  be  as  we  have  shown. 
For  that  must  preside  over  the  whole  economy  of  the 
plant,  and  be  one  single  agent,  which  takes  care  of  the 
bulk  and  figure  of  the  whole,  and  the  situation,  figure, 
and  texture  of  all  the  parts,  root,  stalk,  branches, 
leaves,  flowers,  fruit,  and  all  their  vessels  and  juices. 
I  therefore  incline  to  Dr.  Cudworth's  opinion,  that  God 
uses  for  these  effects  the  subordinate  ministry  of  some 
inferior  plastic  nature,  as  in  his  works  of  providence 
he  doth  of  angels." 

He  thinks  it  still  more  incredible  "  that  the  bodies  of 
animals  can  be  formed  by  matter  divided  and  moved  by 
what  laws  you  will  or  can  imagine,  without  the  imme- 
diate presidency,  direction,  and  regulation  of  some 
intelligent  being.  .  .  .  You  will  ask  me  who  or  what 
is  the  operator  in  the  formation  of  bodies  of  man  and 
other  animals  ?  I  answer,  The  sensitive  soul  itself,  if  it 
be  a  spiritual  and  immaterial  substance,  as  I  am  inclin- 
able to  believe ;  but,  if  it  be  material,  as  I  can  hardly 
admit,  then  we  must  have  recourse  to  a  plastic  nature" 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  157 

He  is  even  more  positive  than  Cud  worth  that  the 
"  plastic  nature  "  is  intelligent ;  and  he  is  sure  it  must 
be  invoked  to  account  for  the  symmetrical  growth  of 
plants,  and  in  one  contingency  of  animals  also.  It  is 
strange  that  he  did  not  perceive  how  fatal  this  would 
be  to  teleology.  While  he  thus  leans  to  Cudworth  in 
respect  to  the  plastic  nature,  he  differs  from  that  learned 
divine  in  respect  to  the  composition  of  matter :  he 
" rather  inclines  to  the  atomic  hypothesis"  He  " can 
hardly  admit "  that  the  soul  is  material!  He  was  accused 
of  being  a  materialist,  and  such  doubtful  language  as 
that  almost  justifies  the  charge. 

He  makes  use  of  eutaxiology  as  well  as  teleology : 
"  For  the  celestial  or  heavenly  bodies,  the  equabilit}^  and 
constancy  of  their  motions,  the  certainty  of  their  peri- 
ods and  revolutions,  the  conveniency  of  their  order  and 
situations,  argue  them  to  be  ordained  and  governed  by 
wisdom  and  understanding;  yea,  so  much  wisdom  as 
man  cannot  easily  fathom  or  comprehend."  It  is  evi- 
dent, however,  that  he  was  unconscious  of  any  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  kinds  of  reasoning.  Practically 
it  was  all  teleology  to  him.  If  he  argued  from  the 
order  of  nature,  it  was  with  some  mental  reference  to 
an  end  after  all.  And  the  greater  part  of  his  work  is 
clearly  teleological.  Thus  he  goes  over  the  list  of  the 
elements,  —  fire,  water,  earth,  and  air,  —  giving  detailed 
statements  of  the  usefulness  of  each. 

"The  uses  of  fire  (I  do  not  here  speak  of  the  Peripa- 
tetics' elementary  fire  in  the  concave  of  the  moon,  which  is 
but  a  mere  figment,  but  our  ordinary  culinary)  are  in  a  man- 
ner infinite  for  dressing  and  preparing  of  victuals  baked, 
boiled,  aud  roast,"  etc.  "The  air  serves  us  all  and  all 
animals  to  breathe  in,  containing  the  fuel  of  that  vital  flame 
we  spake  of,  without  which  it  would  speedily  languish  and 


158  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

go  out.  .  .  .  "Water  is  one  part,  and  that  not  the  least,  of  our 
sustenance,  to  say  nothing  of  those  inferior  uses  of  washing 
and  bathing,  dressing  and  preparing  of  victuals.  But  if  we 
shall  consider  the  great  conceptacula  and  congregations  of 
water,  and  the  distribution  of  it  all  over  the  dry  land  in 
springs  and  rivers,  there  will  occur  abundant  arguments 
of  wisdom  and  understanding.  The  sea,  what  infinite  vari- 
ety of  fishes  doth  it  nourish!  .  .  .  Another  meteor  is  the 
wind,  which  how  many  uses  it  cloth  serve  to  is  not  easy  to 
enumerate,  but  many  it  cloth;  viz.,  to  ventilate  and  break 
the  air,  and  dissipate  noisome  and  contagious  vapors,  which 
otherwise,  stagnating,  might  occasion  many  diseases  in  ani- 
mals ;  and  therefore  it  is  an  observation  concerning  our  na- 
tive country,  Anglia  ventosa,  si  non  ventosa  venenosa." 

Speaking  of  the  symmetrical  forms  of  minerals,  — 

"Many  of  them  shoot  into  regular  figures,  as  crystal  and 
bastard  diamonds  into  hexagonal ;  others  into  those  that  are 
more  elegant  and  compounded,  as  those  formed  in  imitation 
of  the  shells  of  testaceous  fishes  of  all  sorts,  shark's  teeth, 
and  vertebrae,  etc.,  — if  these  be  originally  stones,  or  primary 
productions  of  nature  in  imitation  of  shells  and  fishes'  bones, 
and  not  the  shells  and  bones  themselves  petrified,  as  I  have 
sometimes  thought." 

He  had  a  faint  suspicion  of  the  true  nature  of  fos- 
sils. Toumefort  thought  they  grew  from  seeds  like 
plants. 

Having  thus  gone  through  with  the  elements  —  fire, 
water,  earth,  and  air  —  in  his  systematic  review  of  na- 
ture, he  comes  to  plants.  Here  he  is  on  familiar  ground, 
and  speaks  with  authority.  It  is  impossible  to  do  justice 
to  this  part  of  his  teleology  by  means  of  quotations.  To 
make  them  long  enough  to  exhibit  his  views  completely 
would  be  tedious ;  and  to  begin  to  quote  without  giving 
enough  would  be  unjust.     He  quotes  from  Dr.  More 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  159 

frequently,  but  his  own  views  are  much  sounder  than 
those  of  that  pioneer  in  the  teleological  work  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  Especially  is  he  to  be  commended 
for  the  total  rejection  of  More's  doctrine  of  the  signa- 
tures of  plants. 

Passing  on  to  the  animal  kingdom,  it  is  evident  at  a 
glance  that  he  is  less  guarded  in  his  selection  of  exam- 
ples just  in  proportion  to  the  inferior  degree  of  his  mas- 
tery of  the  principles  of  zoology  as  compared  with 
botany.  He  dwells  at  great  length  upon  those  animal 
actions  which  may  be  referred  to  instinct,  though  he 
does  not  so  refer  them  in  many  cases.  One  of  the 
elements  of  popularity  in  teleological  works  is  devel- 
oped in  this  part  of  his  book.  The  teleologist  has  a 
splendid  opportunity  to  select  the  curious  and  striking 
things  in  natural  history,  and  describe  them  in  popular 
language,  thus  making  his  book  attractive  to  readers 
whose  very  lack  of  scientific  training  is  the  best  quali- 
fication for  the  enjoyment  of  such  descriptions,  because 
they  read  them  with  a  vague  wonder  at  the  erudition 
of  the  author,  the  dexterity  of  nature,  and  the  wisdom 
of  the  Creator ;  and  also  with  a  complacent  feeling  that 
they  are  themselves  becoming  naturalists  by  virtue  of 
the  possession  of  a  heterogeneous  mass  of  the  curious 
secrets  of  nature.  And  as  the  lack  of  thorough  scien- 
tific knowledge  is  the  best  qualification  for  the  readers 
of  a  teleology  based  upon  such  examples,  so  it  is  of  the 
author  also.  The  amateur  in  science  whose  information 
is  bookish,  rather  than  observational,  is  the  very  man  to 
do  such  work  with  zeal  and  complacency.  Thus  we 
see  that  Ray  is  much  more  cautious  on  botanical  ground 
where  his  knowledge  was  extensive,  than  upon  zoologi- 
cal ground  where  it  was  much  less  complete.  He  de- 
scribes at  length  the  tongues  of  ant-eaters,  and  of  the 


160  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

chameleon,  and  of  the  woodpecker.  These  and  the  dis- 
position of  the  toes  of  the  woodpecker,  two  behind  and 
two  in  front,  so  favorable  to  the  climbing  habits  of  that 
species,  he  regards  as  very  striking  examples  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  Author  of  nature.  Besides  the  incon- 
gruity of  inferring  infinite  wisdom  from  isolated  and 
trivial  examples,  there  are  one  or  two  other  objections  to 
such  a  line  of  reasoning.  The  example  of  the  woodpeck- 
er's tongue  cuts  both  ways ;  being  so  nicely  adapted  for 
dragging  grub-worms  out  of  their  holes,  the  provision 
of  it  was  certainly  kind  to  the  bird,  but  hard  on  the 
worm.  And,  with  respect  to  the  tongues  of  toothless 
animals,  the  same  double-edged  quality  appears :  the 
ants  deserve  some  consideration  as  well  as  the  ant-eat- 
ers. But  beyond  that  objection  emerges  once  more  the 
singular  paradox  which  we  have  already  observed,  that 
the  old  teleologists  are  equally  happy  no  matter  whether 
the  event  turns  out  thus  and  so,  or  just  the  very  oppo- 
site. If  teeth  are  present,  it  was  wise  to  provide  them ; 
if  they  are  absent,  it  was  wise  to  do  without  them. 

Having  thus  taken  a  cursory  survey  of  the  whole 
universe,  he  proceeds  to  "  select  some  particular  pieces 
of  the  creation,  and  to  consider  them  more  distinctly. 
They  shall  be  only  two,  (1)  The  whole  body  of  the 
earth;  (2)  The  body  of  man."  His  teleological  bias 
leads  him  to  maintain  that  no  part  of  the  earth  is  use- 
less. The  polar  regions  support  great  multitudes  of 
fishes ;  and  "  we  know  that  the  chief  whale-fishing  is  in 
Greenland  [in  the  waters  adjacent,  I  suppose  he  meant], 
and  on  land,  bears  and  foxes  and  deer,  in  the  most 
northerly  country  that  was  ever  yet  touched ;  and, 
doubtless,  if  we  shall  discover  farther  to  the  very  North 
Pole,  we  shall  find  all  that  tract  not  to  be  vain,  useless, 
or  unoccupied."     The  same    extreme    claim  of   utility 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY.  161 

in  every  part  is  maintained  with  respect  to  the  human 
body :  4i  There  is  nothing  in  it  deficient,  nothing  super- 
fluous, nothing  but  hath  its  end  and  use." 

In  a  multitude  of  his  examples  he  is  grinding  over 
the  same  grist  which  had  already  been  through  the 
mills  of  previous  teleologists.  This  is  true  of  his  ex- 
tended discussion  of  the  eye  and  the  hand,  —  those  two 
favorite  examples,  which  cut  such  a  prominent  figure  in 
teleology  from  the  earliest  times  to  the  latest.  What- 
ever original  contributions  he.  added  to  the  science  we 
rind  in  like  manner  caught  up  by  his  successors,  and 
served  anew  with  some  tempting  adjuncts  in  the  form 
of  modern  phrases,  as  cooks  trick  out  their  warmed- 
up  dishes  with  fresh  and  attractive  trimmings.  Here 
is  a  piece  of  teleology  which  appears  in  Paley's  work  a 
century  later:  — 

"  The  great  wisdom  of  the  Divine  Creator  appears  in  that 
there  is  pleasure  annexed  to  those  actions  that  are  necessary 
for  the  support  and  preservation  of  the  indivicluum,  and  the 
continuation  and  propagation  of  the  species;  and  not  only 
so,  but  pain  to  the  neglect  or  forbearance  of  them.  For  the 
support  of  the  person  it  hath  annexed  pleasure  to  eating  and 
drinking,  which  else,  out  of  laziness  or  multiplicity  of  busi- 
ness, a  man  would  be  apt  to  neglect,  or  sometime  forget." 

Ray's  example  justifies  the  criticism  of  Brougham, 
that  the  earlier  writers  made  no  distinction  between 
natural  theology  and  natural  religion.  He  passes  ab- 
ruptly from  the  one  to  the  other ;  and  the  last  pages  of 
his  book  are  entirely  hortatory,  in  the  style  of  the  "  im- 
provements "  which  commentators  used  to  append  to 
their  exegeses. 


162  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

NEWTON,   GREW,  AND  DERHAM. 

The  eighteenth  century  abounds  in  teleological  pro- 
ductions. Some  of  the  greatest  minds  of  that  century 
lent  their  brilliant  powers  and  the  prestige  of  their 
names  to  the  construction  of  teleology,  and  its  propa- 
gation among  the  masses.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of 
the  most  acute  reasoners  and  profoundest  thinkers 
of  the  age  subjected  teleology  to  a  searching  criticism. 
Foremost  of  the  former  class  stands  Sir  Isaac  Newton ; 
among  the  latter,  Immanuel  Kant  and  David  Hume. 

The  service  which  Newton  rendered  was  more  that 
of  a  silent  than  an  active  partner.  He  wrote  very 
little  about  teleology ;  but  his  position  in  its  favor  was 
so  frankly  and  distinctly  avowed,  that  it  carried  over  to 
that  side  all  the  weighty  influence  which  his  great  name 
was  capable  of  exerting.  The  following  passage,  quoted 
from  his  "  Optics  "  (Book  III.,  Query  31),  published  in 
1721,  is  a  specimen  of  the  style  in  which  he  handled 
design-arguments :  — 

' '  For,  while  comets  move  in  very  eccentric  orbs  in  all 
manner  of  positions,  blind  fate  could  never  make  all  the 
planets  move  one  and  the  same  way  in  orbs  concentric.  .  .  . 
Such  a  wonderful  uniformity  in  the  planetary  system  must 
be  allowed  the  effect  of  choice.  And  so  must  the  uniformity 
in  the  bodies  of  animals,  they  having  generally  a  right  and 
left  side  shaped  alike,  and  on  either  side  of  their  bodies  two 


NEWTON,   GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  163 

legs  behind,  and  either  two  arms,  or  two  legs  or  two  wings, 
before  upon  their  shoulders  ;  and  between  their  shoulders  a 
neck  running  down  into  a  backbone,  and  a  head  upon  it ; 
and  in  the  head  two  ears,  two  eyes,  a  nose,  a  month,  and  a 
tongue  alike  situated." 

That  is,  situated  in  the  same  relative  positions  in  dif- 
ferent animals.  He  is  getting  at  the  notion  of  general 
morphology,  a  common  type  for  all  vertebrates.  This, 
of  course,  is  eutaxiology  rather  than  teleology,  as  is  the 
argument  drawn  by  him  from  celestial  phenomena.  It 
is  interesting  to  note  how  prominent  eutaxiology  be- 
comes in  his  treatment  of  design-arguments.  The  re- 
mainder of  this  passage  is  more  teleological ;  for  he  no 
doubt  uses  "  contrivance  "  in  the  conventional  sense  of 
teleologists,  —  that  of  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end. 
At  all  events,  he  framed  clear  examples  of  teleological 
reasoning  in  other  cases. 

' '  Also  the  first  contrivance  of  those  very  artificial  parts 
of  animals  —  the  eyes,  ears,  brain,  muscles,  heart,  lungs, 
midriff,  glands,  larynx,  hands,  wings,  swimming-bladders, 
natural  spectacles  [probably  he  has  reference  to  the  nictitat- 
ing membranes  of  birds  and  other  animals,  so  fully  discussed 
by  Boyle],  and  other  organs  of  sense  and  motion,  and  the 
instinct  of  brutes  and  insects  —  can  be  the  effect  of  nothing 
else  than  the  wisdom  and  skill  of  a  powerful,  ever-living 
Agent." 

Newton  belongs  as  much  to  the  seventeenth  century 
as  the  eighteenth,  —  more,  indeed,  as  regards  his  gen- 
eral work  and  influence.  He  was  lecturing  on  Optics 
at  Cambridge  in  1669,  1670,  and  1671,  when  Cuclworth 
was  writing  his  "  Intellectual  System  ;  "  and  his  great- 
est work,  the  "  Principia,"  came  out  two  years  before 
Boyle's  "  Disquisition  on  Final  Causes."     But  his  theo- 


164  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

logical  work  was  of  later  date,  and  falls  within  the  next 
century. 

It  is  a  great  descent  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton  to  Nehe- 
miah  Grew,  M.D.  The  "  Cosmologia  Sacra "  of  the 
latter  appeared  in  1701.  Book  I.  contains  his  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  God.  He  begins  with  the 
ontological  and  causal  arguments  in  the  first  chapter. 
In  the  second  chapter  he  recites  the  leading  facts  of 
astronomy  and  meteorology.  At  first  one  would  sup- 
pose that  he  was  constructing  a  eutaxiology ;  but,  in- 
stead of  arguing  simply  from  the  order  of  the  heavens, 
he  turns  it  all  into  a  teleology  by  claiming  that  the 
moon  and  all  the  planets  have  a  distribution  of  land 
and  water  similar  to  the  earth,  and  have  an  atmosphere 
with  rains,  dews,  and  snow,  "  and  herewithal  a  suitable, 
though  perhaps  a  different,  furniture  of  animals,  plants, 
and  mines."  He  even  extends  his  inference  to  the 
fixed  stars  with  all  their  planets.  For  "  there  can  be 
no  manner  of  symmetr}^  in  furnishing  so  small  a  part 
of  the  universal  expansion  with  so  noble  an  apparatus 
as  aforesaid,  and  letting  innumerable  and  far  greater 
intervals  lie  waste  and  void.  If,  then,  there  are  many 
thousands  of  visible  and  invisible  fixed  stars,  or  suns, 
there  are  also  as  many  planetary  systems  belonging  to 
them,  and  many  more  planetary  worlds.  For  we  can 
have  no  sight  nor  conception  of  the  utmost  bounds  of 
the  universe,  no  more  than  of  the  omnipotent  wisdom  by 
which  it  was  made."  He  goes  through  both  halves  of 
the  circulus  in  probando  referred  to  in  the  last  chapter.1 
He  infers  the  inhabitation  of  the  planets  from  divine 
wisdom,  and  the  boundless  extent  of  that  wisdom  from 
the  contemplation  of  the  countless  hosts  of  heaven  be- 
ing all  the  abodes  of  happy  creatures. 

1  See  p.  144  of  this  vol. 


NEWTON,   GREW,   AND  DERHAM.  165 

However,  in  the  third  chapter  he  does  construct  a 
eutaxiological  argument,  and  lets  it  stand  as  such, 
without  spoiling  it  by  referring  the  objects  which  he 
describes  to  the  principle  of  utility.  He  takes  up  the 
phenomena  of  crystallization,  describing  some  very 
beautiful  forms,  and  referring  to  a  paper  of  his  on  the 
subject  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Royal  Society. 

"Wherefore,  by  the  regularity  of  compounded  bodies 
which  we  see,  we  are  sure  of  it  [that  is,  sure  of  regularity] 
in  their  principles,  which  we  see  not.  Now  regularity,  which 
is  certain,  cannot  depend  upon  chance,  which  is  uncertain  ; 
for  that  were  to  make  uncertainty  the  cause  of  certainty. 
Suppose  we  then  that  any  figures  can  be  made  by  motion 
upon  matter,  yet  regular  figures  can  never  come  but  from 
motion  regulated,  and  therefore  not  casually  made;  for 
then  it  would  be  casually  regular,  or  by  rule  of  .chance,  which 
is  nonsense.  [The  phrase  "rule  of  chance"  is  nonsense, 
he  thinks,  because  self-contradictory :  rule  and  chance  are 
antagonistic,  and  mutually  destructive.]  It  is  therefore 
evident,  that,  as  matter  and  motion,  so  the  sizes  and  figures 
of  the  parts  of  matter,  have  their  original  from  a  divine 
Regulator,  —  the  curious  and  manifold  varieties  of  which 
[that  is,  of  the  sizes  and  figures  of  the  parts  of  matter,  if 
we  could  penetrate  to  its  most  intricate  recesses]  could  we 
see,  they  would  doubtless  make  as  fine  a  show  as  all  the 
beauties  of  nature  which  lie  before  us." 

In  the  fourth  and  fifth  chapters  his  reasoning  is  en- 
tirely teleological :  — 

•  ' '  What  can  be  more  admirable  than  for  the  principles 
[this  word  means  atoms,  or  molecules,  with  Dr.  Grew]  of 
the  fibres  of  a  tendon  to  be  so  mixed  as  to  make  it  a  soft 
body,  fit  to  receive  and  to  communicate  the  species  of  sense 
[that  is,  nervous  impressions],  and  to  be  easily  nourished  and 
moved,  and  yet  with  this  softness  to  have  the  strength  of 


166  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

iron  !  —  as  appears  it  hath  by  the  weight  which  the  tendon 
lying  on  a  horse's  gambrel  cloth  then  command,  when  he 
rears  up  with  a  man  upon  his  back.  [A  truly  remarkable 
case !] 

"  What  more  wonderful  than  to  see  two  humors  of  equal 
use  to  true  vision,  bred  so  near  together  as  to  be  contained 
within  one  common  coat,  yet  one  of  them  clear  as  crystal, 
the  other  black  as  ink?  " 

He  refers  to  the  crystalline  lens  and  the  black  pig- 
ment of  the  choroid  coat  of  the  eye. 

' '  How  great  a  comprehension  of  the  nature  of  things  did 
it  require  to  make  a  menstruum  that  should  corrode  all  sorts 
of  flesh  coming  into  the  stomach,  and  yet  not  the  stomach 
itself,  which  is  also  flesh  !  ' ' 

And  so  the  doctor  goes  on  with  an  abstract  of  human 
anatomy,  dwelling  especially  upon  the  ear  and  eye  :  — 

"Among  the  many  varieties  [variations?]  both  in  the 
inner  and  the  outer  ear,  those  which  appear  in  the  passage 
into  the  rock-bone  are  remarkable.  For  in  an  owl,  that 
perches  on  a  tree  or  beam,  and  harkens  after  the  prey  be- 
neath her,  it  is  produced  further  out  above  than  it  is  below, 
for  the  better  reception  of  the  least  sound.  But  in  a  fox, 
that  scouts  underneath  the  prey  at  roost,  it  is  for  the  same 
reason  produced  further  out  below.  In  a  polecat,  which  hark- 
ens straight  forward,  it  is  produced  behind  for  the  taking-in 
of  a  forward  sound  ;  whereas  in  a  hare,  which  is  very  quick 
of  hearing  and  thinks  of  nothing  but  being  pursued,  it  is 
supplied  with  a  bony  tube,  which,  as  a  natural  otocoustic,  is 
so  directed  backward  as  to  receive  the  smallest  and  most 
distant  sound  that  comes  behind  her.  And  in  a  horse,  which 
is  also  quick  of  hearing,  and  receives  the  sound  of  the 
driver's  voice  or  whip  behind,  the  passage  into  his  ear  is 
not  unlike  to  that  in  a  hare. 

"  Among  the  varieties  of  teeth  in  the  rabbit  and  hare  this 


NEWTON,   GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  167 

is  singular :  that  within,  or  behind  the  fore- teeth  of  the  up- 
per jaw,  there  stand  two  other  teeth,  which  may  be  called 
incudes.  These,  by  receiving  the  appulse  of  the  two  incisors 
or  chisels  in  the  nether  jaw,  do  thereby  secure  both  the 
gums  of  the  upper  from  being  contused,  and  the  muscles  of 
the  nether  from  being  strained,  by  over-shooting." 

One  thing  at  least  may  be  said  to  the  credit  of  Dr. 
Grew,  —  namely,  that  he  is  quite  original  in  his  illustra- 
tions ;  and,  considering  how  thoroughly  the  field  of  tele- 
ology had  already  been  ransacked  in  his  day,  this  is  a 
considerable  merit.  Another  noteworthy  thing  is,  that 
he  does  not,  strictly  speaking,  construct  any  argument 
whatever  from  his  examples.  He  is  content  to  say, 
"  This  is  very  singular ;  "  "  How  admirable  is  this  con- 
trivance ! "  "  What  a  stupendous  machine  is  the  eye, 
if  we  survey  the  muscles,  membranes,  and  humors, 
whereof  it  is  composed !  "  (p.  25.)  That,  by  the  way, 
is  not  an  original  example  of  teleology !  Thus  he  goes 
on  dealing  out  exclamations  and  notes  of  admiration, 
but  does  not  inform  us  either  what  conclusion  we  shall 
draw  from  these  examples,  or  by  what  logical  steps  he 
expects  us  to  reach  whatever  conclusion  he  desires.  It 
is  impossible  to  say  whether  he  means  to  use  teleology 
to  prove  God's  existence,  or,  assuming  that,  to  prove 
the  greatness  of  his  wisdom  and  the  minuteness  of  his 
providential  oversight  of  his  creatures. 

"What  a  catalogue  of  uses  hath  one  small  part,  the 
tongue  !  Sundry  whereof  anatomists  take  no  notice  of.  It 
is  so  necessary  unto  speech  as  to  assist  in  the  making  at 
least  eighteen  of  the  twenty-four  letters,  and  in  all  vocal 
music  helpeth  the  windpipe  to  modulate  the  sounds.  'Tis 
the  tasting  test  of  all  kinds  of  meats,  drinks,  and  medicines. 
No  sort  of  teeth  would    serve  us  to  eat  without  a  tongue, 


168  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

which  rolls  the  meat  from  one  side  of  the  mouth  to  the  other, 
and  puts  it  between  the  grinders  as  it  needs  them.  Children 
and  others  could  not  suck  without  it ;  for,  in  drawing  any 
liquid  into  the  mouth,  it  doth  the  same  as  the  sucker  of  a 
syringe  or  pump.  Nor  therefore  could  we  sup  or  swallow 
without  it,  while  [i.e.,  since]  it  helps  us  with  the  tip  end  to 
take  what  we  eat  and  drink  into  our  mouths,  and  by  the 
middle  or  vertical  part,  and  the  root,  to  convey  it  down  the 
throat ;  as  also  it  doth  to  cleanse  our  lips  and  teeth  when  we 
have  done.  No  man  could  spit  from  him  without  it,  but 
would  be  forced  to  drivel  like  some  paralytics  or  a  fool ;  the 
tougue  being  a  stop-cock  to  the  air,  till,  upon  its  sudden  re- 
moval, the  spittle  is  thereby  driven  away  before  it.  Nor 
would  any  one  be  able  to  snite *  his  nose,  or  to  sneeze  ;  in 
both  which  actions  the  passage  of  the  breath  through  the 
mouth  being  intercepted  by  the  tongue,  'tis  forced,  as  it 
then  ought  to  do,  to  go  through  the  nose.  Besides  the  uses 
it  hath  in  other  creatures,  as  in  the  woodpecker  to  catch  the 
prey,  as  is  before  described  ;  in  dogs  to  lick  and  lap,  which 
is  their  drinking ;  and  in  cats  for  scratching  and  combing 
their  hair,  the  tongue  of  a  cat  being  furnished  with  crooked 
prickles,  like  the  wires  of  a  card,  for  that  purpose. 

41  Nor  is  the  manifold  use  of  one  part  more  admirable 
than  to  see  how  many  parts  conspire  and  serve  together  unto 
one  use.  We  cannot  so  much  as  talk  without  the  concurrence 
of  twelve  or  thirteen  different  parts,  —  viz.,  the  nose,  lips, 
teeth,  palate,  jaw,  tongue,  weasand,  lungs,  muscles  of  the 
.chest,  diaphragm,  and  abdomen,  —  which  are  likewise  so 
many  systems  of  other  organical  parts  [that  is,  each  of  the 
dozen  parts  is  a  system  of  subordinate  parts,  making  the 
whole  business  still  more  complicated],  all  serving  to  make 
or  to  modulate  the  sound  ;  besides  the  ears,  which,  by  com- 
mission from  the  chamber  of  audience  in  the  brain,  set  all 
the  rest  on  work." 

1  "  To  snite  Lis  nose  ;  "  that  is,  to  blow  his  nose.  The  preterite's  not 
entirely  obsolete. 


NEWTON,   GREW,   AND  DERHAM.  169 

It  is  uncertain  just  what  he  means  by  the  ears  setting 
all  the  rest  at  work.  Does  he  refer  to  the  fact  that  the 
deaf  are  also  mute,  or  to  the  reflex  action  of  speech  in 
response  to  a  voice?  In  either  case  his  language  is 
inaccurate.  The  ears  do  not,  by  commission  from  the 
brain,  set  the  vocal  organs  in  motion  ;  although  it  is 
true  that  the  trained  movement  of  those  organs  in 
articulate  speech  depends  upon  hearing. 

"No  less  than  forty  or  fifty  muscles,  besides  all  other 
subservient  parts,  go  to  execute  that  one  act  of  laughter ; 
divers  of  those  in  the  nose,  lips,  cheeks,  and  chin  for  figur- 
ing the  face  ;  of  those  in  the  weasand,  chest,  diaphragm,  and 
abdomen  for  making  the  noise  by  the  explosion  of  the  air." 

He  makes  out  a  curious  mathematical  proportion  in 
respect  to  the  correlation  of  structures :  — 

"In  the  use  of  things  is  seen  that  relation  which  answers 
in  some  sort  unto  geometric  proportion.  So  those  creatures 
whose  motion  is  slow  are  blind,  but  those  which  have  a  quick 
motion  have  eyes  to  govern  or  determine  it ;  that  is,  as  blind- 
ness is  to  a  slow  motion,  so  is  sight  to  a  quick.  So  those 
animals  which  have  ears  have  also  lungs  ;  and,  vice  versa, 
those  which  have  no  ears  have  no  lungs :  for  as  eyes  are  to 
motion,  so  are  ears  to  speech. 

"This  relation  is  likewise  seen  in  the  agreeableness  be- 
tween man  and  other  parts  of  the  universe,  and  that  in  sun- 
dry respects.  With  respect  to  his  figure  ;  for  he  might  as 
easily  have  been  made  a  reasonable  beast  or  a  reasonable 
bird.  But,  had  he  been  a  quadruped,  his  figure  would  have 
wanted  that  majesty  which  is  suitable  to  his  dominion  over 
all  other  creatures.  His  fore-feet  would  also  have  hindered 
his  amicable  and  his  conjugal  embraces.  Had  he  been  a 
bird,  he  would  have  been  less  sociable  ;  for,  upon  every  true 
or  false  ground  of  fear  or  discontent,  and  other  occasions 
[occasions  enough  in  all  conscience],  he  would  have   been 


170  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

fluttering  away  to  some  other  place ;  and  mankind,  instead 
'of  cohabiting  in  cities,  would,  like  the  eagle,  have  built  their 
nests  upon  rocks.  And  in  both  cases  [beast  or  bird]  he 
must  have  wanted  hands.  As  also  with  respect  to  his  bulk  ; 
for,  had  he  been  a  dwarf,  he  had  scarce  been  a  reasonable 
creature.  For  he  must  then  have  either  had  a  jolt-head, 
and  so  there  would  not  have  been  body  or  blood  enough  to 
supply  his  brain  with  spirits  ;  or  he  must  have  had  a  small 
head,  answerable  to  his  body,  and  so  there  would  not  have 
been  brain  enough  for  his  business.  Certain  it  is  that  no 
man,  monstrously  great  or  little,  was  ever  known  to  be  very 
wise.  Or,  had  the  species  of  mankind  been  gigantic,  he 
could  not  have  been  so  commodiously  supplied  with  food ; 
for  there  would  not  have  been  flesh  enough  of  the  best  edible 
beasts  to  serve  his  turn.  And,  if  beasts  had  been  made 
answerably  bigger,  there  would  not  have  been  grass  enough. 
Boats  and  shipping,  likewise,  must  have  been  answerably 
bigger,  and  so  too  big  for  most  rivers  and  sea- coasts.  Nor 
would  there  have  been  the  same  use  and  discovery  of  his 
reason,  in  that  he  would  have  done  many  things  by  mere 
strength  for  which  he  is  ^  now  put  to  invent  innumerable 
engines,  and  so  far  he  had  been  reasonable  in  vain.  Neither 
could  he  so  conveniently  have  used  a  horse,  the  noblest  of 
all  beasts,  nor  divers  other  creatures,  had  he  been  much  less 
or  much  bigger  than  he  is.  But,  being  of  a  middle  bulk 
between  the  largest  and  the  least,  he  is  the  better  fitted 
to  manage  and  use  them  all.  For  no  other  cause  can  be 
assigned  why  a  man  was  not  made  five  or  ten  times  bigger 
than  he  is,  as  well  as  ten  times  bigger  than  a  fox  or  a  mon- 
key, but  his  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  universe." 

This  is  sound  enough  on  the  whole.  The  bulk  of 
man's  body  is  accommodated  to  his  environment ;  but, 
when  the  doctor  argues  that  he  could  not  use  his  reason 
so  well  if  his  own  strength  sufficed  for  that  which  now 
requires  the  invention  of  machinery,  he  enters  doubtful 


NEWTON,   GREW,   AND  DERHAM.  171 

territory.  If  man  were  really  much  stronger,  some 
teleologist  would  make  that  the  basis  of  a  design- 
argument.  Let  it  be  thus,  or  let  it  be  the  reverse : 
either  way  the  event  turns,  teleological  ingenuity  will 
make  it  the  basis  of  an  argument. 

The  remark  previously  made,  that  Grew  merely 
pours  out  a  flood  of  illustrations  and  examples  accentu- 
ated with  exclamation-points,  while  it  is  true  for  the 
most  part,  must  not  be  taken  in  the  most  sweeping 
sense.  He  gets  down  to  actual  argumentation  —  but 
it  is  a  queer  kind  of  argument,  after  all  —  in  respect  to 
the  correlation  of  animal  structures :  — 

"  Should  any  man,  then,  that  knows  not  the  admirable 
structure  of  an  eye  or  an  ear  [if  he  did  know  its  structure, 
the  doctor  thinks  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  think  it 
was  made  by  chance]  be  so  weak  as  to  think  it  possible  for 
matter  fortuitously  moved  or  mixed  to  hit  upon  the  making 
of  an  eye  or  an  ear,  yet  [suppose  some  man  is  foolish 
enough  for  that]  did  wings  design  the  making  of  an  eye 
[swift  motion  and  sight  being  correlative  as  he  had  before 
stated]  ?  Or  did  lungs  design  the  making  of  an  ear  [speech 
and  hearing  being  also  correlative]  ?  Did  no  teeth  —  that  is, 
nothing  —  design  the  making  of  three  stomachs  [birds,  for 
example,  being  toothless,  have  a  compensating  apparatus  in 
the  crop  and  gizzard]  ?  Did  the  eye  take  care  there  should 
be  light  for  it  to  see  by?  or  the  light  forecast  to  match 
itself  with  an  eye  ?  or  man  to  be  furnished  with  the  world 
about  him  ?  Nothing  can  be  more  vain  than  so  to  speak  or 
think.  We  must  therefore  conclude  that  there  is  a  most 
perfect  Reason  or  Mind,  infinitely  above  the  operation  of 
matter  and  chance,  which  is  apparent  both  in  the  make  or 
structure,  and  in  the  use  and  relation,  of  things." 

He  does  not  stop  with  the  inference  of  God's  exist- 
ence, but  goes  on  to  prove  his  benevolence  :  — 


172  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

"  The  nature  of  this  action  and  use,  in  not  being  any  way 
destructive  or  troublesome,  but  tending  in  each  thing  apart 
and  conspiring  in  many  together,  to  conserve  and  gratify, 
is  an  evidence  of  their  proceeding  from  the  greatest  good- 
ness. For  there  be  many  who  are  very  cunning  and  subtile 
in  the  invention  of  evil ;  and  engines  have  been  fitted  with 
a  great  deal  of  art  and  contrivance  for  the  tormenting  of 
men.  In  like  manner  it  had  been  altogether  as  easy  for  the 
Maker  of  the  world  to  have  stocked  it  with  all  sorts  of  crea- 
tures, had  he  so  pleased,  which  should  never  have  moved  so 
much  as  one  limb  without  pain  ;  which  should  never  have 
seen,  heard,  smelt,  tasted,  or  felt  any  one  thing  but  together 
with  the  greatest  torment,  nor  have  conceived  any  one  fancy 
but  with  melancholy  and  horror.  And  the  greatness  of  his 
understanding  would  have  been  demonstrated  in  the  contriv- 
ance, though  of  such  creatures  as  these.  But  in  that  he 
hath  made  so  many  kinds  of  creatures,  and  bestowed  among 
them  so  many  sorts  of  motion,  and  of  sense  and  cogitation, 
all  of  them,  so  far  as  natural  [that  is,  normal,  not  diseased], 
agreeable,  and  delightful ;  he  hath  herein  given  a  most  noble 
instance  that  his  goodness  is  equal  to  his  understanding ; 
that  he  hath  employed  his  transcendent  wisdom  and  power 
in  order  that  by  these  he  might  make  way  for  his  benignity 
as  the  end  wherein  they  ultimately  acquiesce." 

In  Book  II.  Dr.  Grew  announces  his  theory  of  a 
"vital  principle"  permeating  matter  in  general,  both 
organic  and  inorganic.  This  is  very  similar  to  the 
"plastic  nature"  of  Cudworth ;  and  the  two  theories 
were  coupled  together  in  the  lively  discussions  of  the 
early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  — one  party  claim- 
ing that  these  theories  promoted  atheism,  because  they 
furnished  a  mode  of  accounting  for  the  regular  and  art- 
ful structure  of  organized  bodies  without  a  creator  ;  the 
other  claiming  that  they  were  entirely  theistic,  because 
Grew  made  his  vital  principle,  and  Cudworth  made  his 


NEWTON,  GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  173 

plastic  nature,  subordinate  to  the  Deity,  as  a  mere  instru- 
ment in  his  hands.  The  following  account  of  the  "  vital 
principle  "  is  a  little  obscure,  but  it  is  the  best  I  can 
select  for  a  single  quotation  :  — 

' '  The  lowest  species  of  life  of  which  we  can  have  cog- 
nizance, is  such  a  sort  of  life  as  is  without  sense,  the 
being  whereof  is  not  impossible  ;  for  intellection,  which  is 
one  species  of  life,  is  absolutely  distinct  from  life,  as  shall 
be  proved.  But  a  distinction,  on  any  one  hand,  supposeth 
a  possibility  on  either  ;  and  it  seems  as  easy  to  conceive  the 
being  of  some  sort  of  life  without  sense,  as  the  being  of  any 
one  sense  without  another.  [That  can  hardly  be  granted.] 
Yet  neither  by  this  life,  nor  the  subject  of  it,  do  I  mean  a 
principle  of  motion  ;  the  universal  stock  of  motion,  as  that 
of  matter,  being  neither  increased  nor  diminished,  but  only 
transferred.  But  I  mean  a  certain  power  to  determine  the 
mauner  of  its  being  transferred,  or  of  returning  an  impres- 
sion upon  bodies  suitable  uuto  that  which  it  receives  ;  and 
more  especially  upon  the  principles  [molecules?]  of  bodies, 
wherewith  it  seemeth  chiefly  to  correspond. 

"  By  virtue  of  this  power,  I  suppose  it  is,  that  all  bodies 
have  their  sphere  of  activity,  whereby  they  operate  one  upon 
another  more  or  less  ;  that  there  are  dark  rays  as  well  as 
light  ones  ;  that  the  odors,  and  other  like  effluvia  of  bodies, 
which  waft  and  tend  to  dissolve  them,  depend  upon  an  ex- 
ternal force,  viz.,  the  air;  but  that  the  radiations  by  which 
bodies  are  united  depend  upon  a  force  internal.  And  there- 
fore, that,  as  the  congruity  between  life  and  motion  maketh 
the  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body,  so  the  congruity 
between  motion  and  motion  maketh  or  promoteth  the  union 
or  inclination  of  one  body  to  another.  This  aforesaid  power, 
from  whence  ariseth  the  sphere  of  activity,  is  more  conspicu- 
ous in  all  the  sorts  of  magnetic  inclination,  and  in  the  gravi- 
tation of  all  bodies,  but  is  that  also  wherewith  every  corporeal 
principle  [molecule]  may  probably  be  endowed,  or,  to  speak 


174  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

properly,  may  be  animated.  For  since  the  most  simple 
bodies,  having  a  certain  regular  and  immutable  size  and 
figure,  are  hereby  made  organs  or  instruments,  truly  and 
properly  so  called,  it  is  as  congruous  to  assign  such  a  vital 
principle  to  each  of  these  as  is  suitable  to  its  simple  organism, 
as  another  suitable  one  to  any  organ  more  compounded  ;  that 
is  to  say,  to  allow  like  to  like,  as  well  to  an  atom  as  to  a  man. 

"  Neither  can  we  ascribe  unto  atoms  any  innate  motion, 
as  some  do,  so  reasonably  as  a  certain  principle  of  life.  For 
although  it  be  true  that  all  bodies  are  some  way  or  other  in 
motion,  or  that  there  is  no  state  of  absolute  rest,  yet  a  rela- 
tive rest  there  is  and  must  be,  without  which  there  could  be 
no  union  of  bodies.  So  that  any  one  atom  having  lost  its 
proper  motion  by  its  union  with  another,  whatever  motion  it 
receives  afterwards  from  without  is  adventitious,  and  cannot 
be  called  innate.  Much  less  can  it  be  supposed  to  be  suit- 
able and  regular  without  such  a  vital  principle  as  aforesaid  to 
direct  it.  Of  which  principles  we  must  then  allow  a  stock, 
answerable  to  the  corporeal  as  one  moiety  of  the  universe. 
[That  is,  the  vital  principles  in  the  aggregate  constitute  one 
phase,  or  one  aspect,  or  one-half,  of  the  universe ;  and  the 
corporeal  principles  in  the  aggregate  constitute  the  other  half. 
The  universe  is  formed  of  life  and  matter.]  On  the  directive 
power  of  the  former,  and  the  regularity  of  the  latter,  whereby 
it  is  capable  of  direction,  depends  the  generation  of  all  bodies  ; 
the  said  power  being  one  and  the  same  vegetable  life  infused 
into  all  parts  of  corporeal  nature,  but  more  remarkably  into 
animals  and  plants. 

"  Book  III.  showeth  that  God  governs  the  universe  he 
hath  made,  and  in  what  manner. 

"Book  IV.  showeth  that  the  Bible,  and  first  the  Hebrew 
code  or  Old  Testament,  is  God's  positive  law. 

"  Book  V.  showeth  that  the  New  Testament  is  also  God's 
positive  law." 

The  next  writer  is  the  Rev.  William  Derham,  whose 
physic o-theology  appeared   in  1713.     This  was  one  of 


NEWTON,   GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  175 

the  most  popular  books  on  natural  theology  ever  pub- 
lished, running  rapidly  through  several  editions,  and 
being  translated  into  the  Continental  languages.  He 
takes  his  stand  clearly  for  that  view  of  design-arguments 
which  regards  them  as  a  means  of  proving  the  existence 
of  God,  as  well  as  illustrating  his  power,  wisdom,  and 
providence.  This  appears  in  his  full  title,  which  also 
brings  out  another  point  of  interest  in  connection  with 
this  book :  "  Physico-Theology  ;  or,  A  Demonstration 
of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God  from  his  Works  of 
Creation.  Being  the  Substance  of  Sixteen  Sermons 
preached  in  St.  Mary-le-Bow  Church,  London,  at  the 
Hon.  Mr.  Boyle's  Lectures  in  the  Years  1711  and  1712." 
In  a  foot-note  to  the  dedication  he  gives  a  short 
history  of  the  Boyle  lectures  :  — 

"It  may  not  only  gratify  the  reader's  curiosity,  but  also 
be  of  use,  to  give  the  following  account  of  Mr.  Boyle's 
lectures : — 

"  Mr.  Boyle  [the  same  Robert  Boyle  who  wrote  the  "  Dis- 
quisition about  Final  Causes  "],  by  a  codicil  dated  July  28, 
1691,  and  annexed  to  his  will,  charged  his  messuage  or  dwell- 
ing-house in  St.  Michael's  Crooked  Lane,  London,  with  the 
payment  of  the  clear  yearly  rents  aud  profits  thereof  to  some 
learned  divine  in  London,  or  within  the  bills  of  mortality,  to 
be  elected  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three  years,  by  his  Grace 
the  present  Lord  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  (then  Dr.  Teni- 
son),  Sir  Henry  Ashurst,  Sir  John  Rotherham,  and  John 
Evelyn,  Esq.  The  business  he  appointed  those  lecturers 
was,  among  others,  to  be  ready  to  satisfy  real  scruples,  and  to 
answer  such  new  objections  and  difficulties  as  might  be  started, 
to  which  good  ansivers  had  not  been  made;  and  also  to  preach 
eight  sermons  in  the  year,  the  first  Monday  of  January,  Feb- 
ruary, March,  April,  and  May,  and  of  September,  October, 
and  November." 


176  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

He  alludes  to  the  object  of  this  lecture  foundation  in 
the  preface  also  :  — 

' '  And  forasmuch  as  his  lectures  were  appointed  by  him  for 
the  proof  of  the  Christian  religion  against  atheists  and  other 
notorious  infidels,  I  thought,  when  I  had  the  honor  to  be 
made  his  lecturer,  that  I  could  not  better  come  up  to  his  in- 
tent than  to  attempt  a  demonstration  of  the  being  and 
attributes  of  God  in  what  I  may  call  Mr.  Boyle's  own  (that 
is,  a  physico-theological)  way.  And,  besides  that  it  was  for 
this  very  service  that  I  was  called  to  this  honor,  I  was  the 
more  induced  to  follow  this  method  by  reason  none  of  my 
learned  and  ingenious  predecessors  in  these  lectures  have 
done  it  otherwise  than  in  a  transient,  piecemeal  manner." 

Derham,  therefore,  aims  to  give  a  completeness  to 
physico-theology  which  it  never  possessed  before.  The 
problem,  as  he  seems  to  have  set  it  before  himself,  was 
to  review  the  circle  of  the  sciences,  and  digest  them  all 
into  a  system  of  theology.  That  was  practically  the 
same  thing  which  Ray  attempted,  and  the  same  which 
all  the  teleologists  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  of  the 
earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  also,  regarded  as 
their  proper  function  and  the  mission  to  which  they 
were  called.  Of  course  they  were  traversing  the  same 
ground  over  and  over.  Derham  says  that  he  "  industri- 
ously endeavored  to  avoid  doing  over  what  they  [Ray 
and  others]  had  before  done,  and  for  that  reason  did 
not  for  many  years  read  their  books  until  I  had  finished 
my  own.  If,  then,  the  reader  should  meet  with  any 
thing  mentioned  before  by  others,  and  not  accordingly 
acknowledged  by  me,  I  hope  he  will  candidly  think  me 
no  plagiary,  because  I  can  assure  him  I  have  all  along 
(where  I  was  aware  of  it)  cited  my  authors  with  their 
due  praise ;  and  it  is  scarce  possible,  when  men  write  on 
the  same  or  on  a  subject  near  akin,  and  the  observa- 


NEWTON,  GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  177 

tions  are  obvious,  but  that  they  must  often  hit  upon 
the  same  thing." 

Dr.  More  took  the  same  method  to  avoid  plagiarism 
and  repetition.  One  would  suppose  it  would  have  been 
better  to  read  all  the  previous  authors  diligently,  in- 
stead of  avoiding  the  perusal.  Did  they  fear  that 
course  would  leave  them  nothing  to  say?  If  so,  it 
would  have  been  as  well  not  to  say  any  thing.  If  they 
had  any  truly  original  contribution  to  make,  it  would 
have  been  done  all  the  more  intelligently  with  a  fresh 
and  thorough  knowledge  of  what  had  already  been 
accomplished.  The  course  which  they  adopted,  of  avoid- 
ing the  perusal  of  works  previously  written  upon  the 
subject  they  intended  to  handle,  reveals  two  facts  re- 
specting the  mental  attitude  in  which  they  stood  as 
they  contemplated  the  task  they  were  about  to  under- 
take. In  the  first  place  they  regarded  it  as  an  easy 
task.  Derham  speaks  of  the  "observations"  being 
"  obvious."  Let  us  see  how  far  it  was  easy,  or  the  re- 
verse. The  problem  was  to  digest  all  the  science  of 
the  period  into  a  system  of  natural  theology.  That  is 
what  the  admirers  of  Ray,  Derham,  and  Nieuwentyt 
claimed  that  these  writers  had  clone.  It  looks  difficult, 
rather  than  easy;  but,  when  we  observe  how  it  was 
clone,  the  matter  assumes  a  different  aspect. 

For  the  second  fact  regarding  the  mental  status  of 
these  writers  is,  that  they  had  very  loose,  vague,  and 
general  notions,  both  of  what  had  been  already  accom- 
plished in  teleology,  and  of  what  they  themselves  ex- 
pected to  accomplish,  and  how  they  expected  to  do  it. 
Most  of  them  set  out  with  the  expectation  of  demon- 
strating God's  existence :  but,  in  the  practical  handling 
of  their  theme,  they  assume  that  fundamental  fact,  and 
argue  for  the  greatness  of  his  wisdom  and  power,  and 


178  CRITIQUE  OP  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

the  benignity  of  his  providence ;  that  is,  if  they  argue 
at  all.  More  frequently  they  merely  grind  over  the 
huge  mass  of  stereotyped  examples ;  and  if  they  acid 
any  new  ones,  as  they  are  very  likely  to  do  by  reason 
of  new  discoveries  in  science,  these  are  of  the  same 
kind  as  the  old,  —  a  few  kernels  more  to  the  heap.  So 
that  their  work,  starting  with  such  conceptions  as  they 
do,  cannot  be  other  than  a  repetition ;  and  to  shut  their 
eyes  to  what  others  had  done,  think  out  the  same  series 
of  facts,  and  link  them  together  by  means  of  the  same 
"obvious  observations," — such  a  method  of  procedure 
as  this,  stupid  as  it  seems,  was  about  the  only  one  which 
would  correspond  to  their  initial  conception.  The  scien- 
tific knowledge  requisite  for  this  work  need  not  be  pro- 
found. The  very  statement  of  the  problem,  as  they 
viewed  it,  —  namely,  to  digest  all  the  science  of  their 
generation  into  a  system  of  theology,  —  is  sufficiently 
suggestive  of  the  sort  of  science  it  would  be,  and  of 
the  sort  of  theology  too. 

There  are  tolerably  recent  editions  of  Derham's  book ; 
and  it  is  upon  the  whole  so  much  better  known  than 
those  which  I  have  previously  reviewed,  that  it  is  scarce- 
ly necessary  to  quote  from  him  at  any  great  length  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  how  well  or  how  ill  he  did  his 
work,  as  judged  from  his  own  standpoint.  Suffice  it  to 
say,  that  in  the  general  survey  of  terrestrial  phenomena 
he  regards  them  all  —  winds,  rains,  oceans,  mountains, 
even  volcanoes  —  with  reference  to  their  utility.  He 
turns  them  all  in  to  the  account  of  teleology.  The  way 
he  manages  this  in  respect  to  such  a  fiery  and  intracta- 
ble thing  as  a  volcano  is  sufficiently  striking  and  char- 
acteristic to  justify  a  quotation  :  — 

"  To  instance  the  very  worst  of  all  the  things  named,  viz., 
the   volcanoes   and   ignivomous   mountains :    although   they 


NEWTON,  GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  179 

are  some  of  the  most  terrible  shocks  of  the  globe  and  dread- 
ful scourges  of  the  sinful  inhabitants  thereof,  and  may 
serve  them  as  emblems  and  presages  of  hell  itself,  yet  even 
these  have  their  great  uses  too  ;  being  as  spiracles  or  tunnels 
to  the  countries  where  they  are,  to  vent  the  fire  and  vapors 
that  would  make  dismal  havoc,  and  oftentimes  actually  do  so, 
by  dreadful  succussions  and  convulsions  of  the  earth.  Nay, 
if  the  hypothesis  of  a  central  fire  and  waters  be  true,  these 
outlets  seem  to  be  of  the  greatest  use  to  the  peace  and  quiet 
of  the  terraqueous  globe  in  venting  the  subterraneous  heat 
and  vapors,  which,  if  pent  up,  would  make  dreadful  and  dan- 
gerous commotions  of  the  earth  and  waters. 

' '  It  may  be  then  accounted  as  a  special  favor  of  the 
Divine  Providence,  as  is  observed  by  the  author  before 
praised,  '  That  there  are  scarcely  any  countries  that  are  much 
annoyed  with  earthquakes,  that  have  not  one  of  these  fiery 
vents.  And  these  (saith  he)  are  constantly  all  in  flames 
whenever  any  earthquake  happens ;  they  disgorging  that 
fire,  which,  whilst  underneath,  was  the  cause  of  the  disas- 
ter.' " 

The  naive  simplicity  of  this  style  of  argument  is 
something  admirable  and  touching.  A  very  bad  thing, 
volcanoes,  wards  off  a  worse  thing,  earthquakes :  there- 
fore the  first  is  "  a  special  favor  of  Divine  Providence." 
If  the  earthquakes  were  the  work  of  demons,  the  reason- 
ing might  hold ;  but,  considering  that  they,  too,  are 
God's  work,  the  argument  is  seen  to  be  of  the  flimsiest 
texture.  What  he  suggests  respecting  the  emblematic 
use  of  volcanoes  to  serve  as  "  presages  of  hell  "  is  quite 
as  sound  as  any  other  part  of  the  reasoning.  But  he 
had  still  another  arrow  in  his  quiver :  — 

"  Should  we  pretend  to  censure  what  God  doth?  Should 
we  pretend  to  amend  his  work,  or  to  advise  infinite  Wis- 
dom, or  to  know  the  ends  and  purposes  of  his  infinite  will, 
as  if  we  were  of  his  council  ?     No  :  let  us  bear  in  mind  that 


180  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

these  objections  are  the  products,  not  of  reason,  but  of  pee- 
vishness. They  have  been  incommoded  by  storms  and  tem- 
pests ;  they  have  been  terrified  with  burning  mountains  and 
earthquakes  ;  they  have  been  annoyed  by  the  noxious  animals, 
and  fatigued  by  the  hills  ;  and  therefore  they  are  angry,  and 
will  pretend  to  amend  these  works  of  the  Almighty.  But, 
in  the  words  of  St.  Paul,  we  may  sa}^,  '  Nay,  but,  O  man  ! 
who  art  thou  that  repliest  against  God  ? '  ' ' 

There  spoke  the  preacher  rather  than  the  physico- 
theologist.  If  he  could  not  silence  the  objector's  guns 
by  all  the  missiles  which  nature  and  reason  furnished 
to  his  hand,  he  would  quote  Scripture  at  him. 

The  first  four  books  contain  a  general  view  of  the 
earth  with  its  inhabitants ;  and  here  is  the  conclusion  of 
this  part  of  his  task  :  — 

"And  now  let  us  pause  a  little,  and  reflect.  And  upon 
the  whole  matter,  what  less  can  be  concluded  than  that  there 
is  a  Being  infinitely  wise,  potent,  and  kind,  able  to  contrive 
and  make  this  glorious  scene  of  things,  which  I  have  given 
only  a  glance  of?  For  what  less  than  Infinite  could  stock  so 
vast  a  globe  with  such  a  noble  set  of  animals,  all  so  con- 
trived as  to  minister  to  one  another's  help  in  some  way  or 
other,  and  most  of  them  serviceable  to  man  peculiarly,  the 
top  of  this  lower  world,  made  as  'twere  on  purpose  to  ob- 
serve, and  survey,  and  set  forth  the  glory  of  the  infinite 
Creator  manifested  in  his  works?  Who?  What  but  the 
great  God  could  so  admirably  provide  for  the  whole  animal 
world,  every  thing  serviceable  to  it,  or  that  can  be  wished 
for  either  to  conserve  its  species,  or  to  minister  to  the  being 
or  well-being  of  individuals?  Particularly,  who  could  feed 
so  spacious  a  world,  who  could  please  so  large  a  number  of 
palates,  or  suit  so  many  palates  to  so  great  a  variety  of  food, 
but  the  infinite  Conservator  of  the  world  ?  And  who  but  the 
same  great  He  could  provide  such  commodious  clothing  for 
every  animal,  such  proper   houses,   nests,   and  habitations, 


NEWTON,  GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  181 

such  suitable  armature  and  weapons,  such  subtilty,  artifice, 
and  sagacity,  as  every  creature  is   more  or  less  armed  and 
furnished  with,  to  fence  off  the  injuries  of  the  weather,  to 
rescue  itself  from  dangers,  to  preserve  itself  from  the  annoy- 
ances of  its  enemies,  and,  in  a  word,  to  conserve  itself  and 
its    species?     What   but   an   infinite   superintending    Power 
could  so  equally  balance  the  several  species  of  animals,  and 
conserve  the  numbers  of  the  individuals  of  every  species  so 
even,  as  not  to  over  or  under  people  the  terraqueous  globe? 
Who  but  the  infinitely  wise   Lord  of  the  world  could  allot 
every  creature  its  most  suitable  iilace  to  live  in,  the  most 
suitable  element  to  breathe  and  move  and  act  in  ?     And  who 
but  He  could  make  so  admirable  a  set  of  organs  as  those  of 
respiration  are  both  in  land  and  water  animals  ?    Who  could 
contrive  so  curious  a  set  of  limbs,  joints,  bones,   muscles, 
and  nerves,  to  give  to  every  animal  the  most  commodious 
motion  to  its  state  and  occasions?     And,  to  name  no  more, 
what  anatomist,  mathematician,  workman,  yea,  angel,  could 
contrive   and  make   so  curious,   so  commodious,  and  every 
way  so  exquisite  a  set  of  senses  as  the  five  senses  of  animals 
are,   whose   organs    are   so  dexterously  contrived,    so   con- 
veniently placed  in  the  body,  so  neatly  adjusted,  so  firmly 
guarded,  and  so  completely  suited   to  every  occasion,  that 
they  plainly  set  forth  the  agency  of  the  infinite  Creator  and 
Conservator  of  the  world  ? 

"  So  that  here,  upon  a  transient  view  of  the  animal  world 
in  general  only,  we  have  such  a  throng  of  glories,  such  an 
enravishing  scene  of  things,  as  may  excite  us  to  admire, 
praise,  and  adore  the  infinitely  wise,  powerful,  and  kind 
Creator;  to  coudemn  all  atheistical  principles;  and  with 
holy  David  to  conclude  that  he  is  in  good  earnest  a  fool  that 
dares  to  say,  There  is  no  God,  when  we  are  everywhere  sur- 
rounded with  such  manifest  characters  and  plain  demon- 
strations of  that  infinite  Being." 

Having  completed  his  general  survey  of  the  world 
and  its  inhabitants,  he  proceeds  to  a  more  particular 


182  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

account  of  "  the  tribes  of  animals,"  beginning  with  man. 
I  quote  from  the  last  two  chapters  of  Book  V. :  — 

"  Here  I  would  have  put  an  end  to  my  observations  relat- 
ing to  man,  but  that  there  are  three  things  so  expressly 
declaring  the  divine  management  and  concurrence,  that  I 
shall  just  mention  them,  although  taken  motice  of  more 
amply  by  others  ;  and  that  is,  the  great  variety  throughout 
the  world  of  men's  faces  (1),  voices  (2),  and  handwriting 
(3).  Had  man's  body  been  made  according  to  any  of  the 
atheistical  schemes,  or  any  other  method  than  that  of  the 
infinite  Lord  of  the  world,  this  wise  variety  would  never  have 
been  :  but  men's  faces  would  have  been  cast  in  the  same,  or 
not  a  very  different,  mould  ;  their  organs  of  speech  would  have 
sounded  the  same,  or  not  so  great  a  variety  of,  notes  ;  and 
the  same  structure  of  muscles  and  nerves  would  have  given 
the  hand  the  same  direction  in  writing.  And,  in  this  case, 
what  confusion,  what  disturbance,  what  mischiefs,  would  the 
world  eternally  have  lain  under !  No  security  could  have 
been  to  our  persons  ;  no  certainty,  no  enjoyment  of  our 
possessions  ;  no  justice  between  man  and  man  ;  no  distinc- 
tion between  good  and  bad,  between  friends  and  foes,  be- 
tween father  and  child,  husband  and  wife,  male  and  female  : 
but  all  would  have  been  turned  topsy-turvy  by  being  ex- 
posed to  the  malice  of  the  envious  and  ill-natured,  to  the 
fraud  and  violence  of  knaves  and  robbers,  to  the  forgeries  of 
the  crafty  cheat,  to  the  lusts  of  the  effeminate  and  de- 
bauched, and  what  not !  Our  courts  of  justice  can  abun- 
dantly testify  the  dire  effects  of  mistaking  men's  faces,  of 
counterfeiting  their  hands,  and  forging  writings.  But  now, 
as  the  infinitely  wise  Creator  and  Ruler  hath  ordered  the 
matter,  every  man's  face  can  distinguish  him  in  the  light, 
and  his  voice  in  the  dark ;  his  handwriting  can  speak  for 
him  though  absent,  and  be  his  witness,  and  secure  his  con- 
tracts in  future  generations,  —  a  manifest,  as  well  as  admira- 
ble, indication  of  the  divine  superintendence  and  manage- 
ment. 


NEWTON,  GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  183 

"  And  now  having  taken  a  view  of  man,  and  finding  every 
part  of  him  contrived  and  made  in  the  very  best  manner,  — 
his  body  fitted  up  with  utmost  foresight,  art,  and  care  ;  and 
this  body  (to  the  great  honor,  privilege,  and  benefit  of  man) 
possessed  by  a  divine  part,  the  soul,  a  substance  made  as  'twere 
on  purpose  to  contemplate  the  works  of  God  and  glorify  the 
great  Creator ;  and  since  this  soul  can  discern,  think,  reason, 
and  speak,  —  what  can  we  conclude  upon  the  whole  matter, 
but  that  we  lie  under  all  the  obligations  of  duty  and  grati- 
tude to  be  thankful  and  obedient  to,  and  to  set  forth  the 
glories  of,  our  great  Creator  and  noble  Benefactor?  And 
what  ungrateful  wretches  are  we,  how  much  worse  than  the 
poor  irrationals,  if  we  do  not  employ  the  utmost  power  of 
our  tongue,  and  all  our  members,  and  all  the  faculties  of  our 
souls,  in  the  praises  of  God  !  But,  above  all,  should  we,  who 
have  the  benefit  of  these  glorious  acts  and  contrivances  of 
the  Creator,  be  such  wicked,  such  base,  such  worse  than 
brutal  fools,  to  deny  the  Creator  in  some  of  his  noblest 
works?  Should  we  so  abuse  our  reason,  yea,  our  very 
senses  ;  should  we  be  so  besotted  by  the  Devil,  and  blinded 
by  our  lusts,  as  to  attribute  one  of  the  best  contrived  pieces 
of  workmanship  to  blind  chance,  or  unguided  matter  and 
motion,  or  any  other  such  sottish,  wretched,  atheistical  stuff, 
which  we  never  saw  nor  ever  heard  made  any  one  being  in 
any  age  since  the  creation?  No,  no!  But,  like  wise  and 
unprejudiced  men,  let  us  with  David  say,  '  I  will  praise  thee, 
for  I  am  fearfully  and  wonderfully  made.'  " 

Derham  reminds  us  of  Cudworth  in  his  free  use  of 
slashing  expletives.  In  the  passage  last  quoted  he  has 
wandered  from  the  "demonstration  of  the  being  and 
attributes  of  God,"  and  adopted  a  hortatory  and  homi- 
letical  style.  It  is  religion,  rather  than  theology,  that 
he  is  teaching  ;  and,  having  once  struck  this  note,  he 
sounds  it  out  louder  and  more  frequently  to  the  end  of 
this  book. 


184  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

In  Ins  "Astro-Theology,"  published  in  1715,  he  has 
the  good  sense  to  reject  "  the  old  vulgar  opinion  that  all 
things  were  made  for  man;"  and,  being  thus  freed  from 
one  temptation  to  bring  every  thing  under  teleology, 
he  goes  on  to  construct  a  very  respectable  eutaxiologi- 
cal  argument :  — 

"And  now  who  can  reflect  upon  these  things,  and  not 
perceive  and  admire  the  hand  that  acteth  in  them,  the  con- 
trivance and  power  of  an  infinite  Workman  ?  For  where  we 
have  such  manifest  strokes  of  wise  order  and  management, 
of  the  observance  of  mathematical  proportions,  can  we  con- 
clude there  was  any  thing  less  than  reason,  judgment,  and 
mathematical  skill  in  the  case?  or  that  this  could  be  effected 
by  any  other  power  but  that  of  an  intelligent  Being?  " 

Still  he  does  not  steer  entirely  clear  of  teleological 
hypotheses.  If  these  celestial  bodies  are  not  to  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  their  utility  to  man,  they  are 
probably  useful  to  each  other,  and  possibly  to  their 
hypothetical  inhabitants,  which  is  all  well  enough  as  a 
speculation,  but  of  no  substantial  value  as  an  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of  God.  We  will  dismiss  the 
Rev.  William  Derham  with  the  two  additional  quota- 
tions following :  — 

"  When,  therefore,  we  actually  see  and  feel  those  indul- 
gent provisions,  those  amazing  acts  of  the  great  Creator; 
when  we  have  views  of  their  extent  into  myriads  of  other 
the  most  distant  globes  ;  when  (to  go  no  farther)  we  see  in 
our  own  system  of  the  sun  such  a  prodigious  mass  of  fire 
placed  in  the  centre  to  scatter  away  the  darkness,  and  to 
warm  and  cherish  us  by  day,  and  such  a  noble  retinue  of 
moons  and  stars  attending  us  and  assisting  us  by  night; 
when  we  see  this  indulgence,  this  care,  of  the  Creator  ex- 
tended to  all  the  other  planets,  and  that,  according  to  their 
several  distances,  they  have  a  proportionate  provision  of  a 


NEWTON,   GREW,  AND  DERHAM.  185 

greater  number  of  moons,  and  Saturn  a  stupendous  ring 
besides,  to  supply  the  decrease  of  light  and  heat,  —  who  can 
be  otherwise  than  amazed  at  such  providential,  such  useful, 
such  well-contrived,  such  stately  works  of  God  ?  Who  can 
view  their  glories  and  partake  of  their  beneficial  influences, 
and  at  the  same  time  not  adore  the  wisdom  and  praise  the 
kindness  of  their  Contriver  and  Maker?  But,  above  all, 
should  there  be  any  found  among  rational  beings  so  stupid, 
so  vile,  so  infatuated  with  their  vices,  as  to  deny  these  works 
to  God,  and  ascribe  them  to  a  necessity  of  nature,  or  indeed 
a  mere  nothing,  namely,  chance  ?  But  such  there  are  to  be 
met  with  among  ourselves,  and  some  such  the  prophet  tells 
us  of,  —  men  that  had  so  debauched  themselves  with  drink, 
and  enervated  their  minds  by  pleasures,  that  '  they  regarded 
not  the  work  of  the  Lord,  neither  considered  the  operation 
of  his  hands.'  Such  persons,  having  led  their  lives  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  wish  that  there  was  no  God  to  call  them  to 
account,  would  then  persuade  themselves  there  is  none, 
and  therefore  stupidly  ascribe  those  manifest  demonstrations 
of  the  infinite  power  and  wisdom  of  God  to  a  mere  nothing, 
rather  than  to  their  great  Author.  But  may  we  not  with  as 
good  reason  imagine  a  lighted  candle,  a  well-made  culinary 
fire,  a  flaming  beacon  or  lighthouse,  to  be  the  work  of 
chance,  and  not  of  man,  as  those  glories  of  the  heavens  not 
to  be  the  works  of  God?  For  it  is  very  certain,  that  as 
much  wisdom,  art,  and  power  worthy  of  God  is  shown  in  the 
lights  of  the  heavens  as  there  is  in  those  upon  earth,  which 
no  man  can  doubt  were  contrived  and  made  by  man.  And 
if,  from  these  mean  contrivances  and  works  of  man,  we  con- 
clude them  to  be  the  works  of  man,  why  not  the  grand,  the 
amazing  works  of  the  heavens,  surpassing  all  the  wit  and 
power  of  man,  — why  not  these,  I  say,  — the  works  of  some 
Being  as  much  superior  to  man? 

"  As  God's  works  have  been  shown  to  be  a  manifest  dem- 
onstration of  his  existence,  so  they  are  no  less  of  his  per- 
fections,   particularly   of    his    infinite   power,    wisdom,    and 


186  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

goodness,  inasmuch  as  every  workman  is  known  by  his 
work.  A  palace  that  should  have  nothing  defective  in  situa- 
tion, beauty,  or  convenience,  would  argue  the  architect  to 
have  been  a  man  of  sagacity,  and  skilful  in  geometry,  arith- 
metic, optics,  and  all  other  mathematical  sciences  serving  to 
make  a  man  a  complete  architect,  — yea,  to  have  some  judg- 
ment in  physic  and  natural  philosophy  too.  And  so  this 
glorious  scene  of  God's  works,  the  heavens,  plainly  demon- 
strates the  Workman's  infinite  wisdom  to  contrive,  his  om- 
ni potency  to  make,  and  his  infinite  goodness  in  being  so 
indulgent  to  all  the  creatures  as  to  contrive  and  order  all  his 
works  for  their  good.  For  what  less  than  Infinite  could 
effect  all  these  grand  things  which  I  have  in  this  discourse 
shown  to  be  manifest  in  the  heavens?  What  architect  could 
build  such  vast  masses,  and  such  an  innumerable  company 
of  them,  too,  as  I  have  shown  the  heavens  do  contain? 
What  mathematician  could  so  exactly  adjust  their  distances? 
what  mechanic  so  nicely  adopt  their  motions,  so  well  con- 
trive their  figures,  as  in  the  very  best  manner  may  serve  to 
their  own  conservation  and  benefit,  and  the  convenience  of 
the  other  globes  also?  What  naturalist,  what  philosopher, 
could  impregnate  ever}7  globe  with  a  thing  of  that  absolute 
necessity  to  its  conservation,  as  that  of  gravit}7  is?  What 
optician,  what  chemist,  could  have  ever  hit  upon  such  a 
noble  apparatus  for  light  and  heat  as  the  sun  and  moon  and 
the  stars  are  ?  could  amass  together  such  a  pile  of  fire  as  the 
sun  is  ?  could  appoint  such  lights  as  the  moon  and  other  sec- 
ondaries are?  None  certainly  could  do  these  things  but 
God?" 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.     187 


CHAPTER    VII. 

NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,   AND    MAUPERTUIS. 

In  1716  appeared,  in  the  Low  Dutch  language,  a  trea- 
tise on  Natural  Theology  by  Dr.  Bernard  Nieuwentyt,  a 
mathematician  who  had  previously  made  himself  some- 
what notorious  by  attacking  the  accepted  principles 
of  the  calculus.  This  was  very  soon  translated  into 
English  by  John  Chamberlayne,  Esq.,  F.R.S.,  with  the 
full  title  as  follows :  "  The  Religious  Philosopher ;  or, 
The  Right  Use  of  contemplating  the  Works  of  the 
Creator.  I.  In  the  Wonderful  Structure  of  Animal 
Bodies,  and,  in  particular,  Man.  II.  In  the  no  less 
Wonderful  and  Wise  Formation  of  the  Elements,  and 
their  Various  Effects  upon  Animal  and  Vegetable 
Bodies.  And  III.  In  the  most  Amazing  Structure  of 
the  Heavens,  with  all  its  Furniture.  Designed  for  the 
Conviction  of  Atheists  and  Infidels ;  throughout  which 
all  the  Late  Discoveries  in  Anatomy,  Philosophy,  and 
Astronomy,  together  with  the  Various  Experiments 
made  Use  of  to  illustrate  the  Same,  are  most  copiously 
handled  by  that  Learned  Mathematician,  Dr.  Nieu- 
wentyt." 

This  titlepage  shows  plainly  enough  that  the  book 
is  in  the  conventional  style  of  the  period ;  that  is,  a 
compendium  of  the  sciences,  with  a  running  commen- 
tary of  pious  reflections,  and  notes  of  admiration.  The 
perusal  confirms  the  expectations  aroused  by  the  title  : 


188  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  doctor  has  not  only  happily  hit  the  prevailing  mode 
of  physico-theological  discussion,  but  he  has  fairly  out- 
done his  contemporaries.  He  is  not  only  in  the  fashion, 
but  somewhat  utterly  and  ultra  stylish. 

One  thing  we  have  to  thank  him  for.  Some  of  the 
English  teleolocrists  leave  us  in  doubt  about  two  things, 
—  their  aim  and  their  method.  Are  they  trying  to  prove 
God's  existence,  or  assuming  that,  and  arguing  for  his 
providence  ?  Is  it  their  purpose  to  use  teleology  as  a 
means  of  proving  something  else,  or  to  use  something 
else  to  prove  that  teleology  is  a  real  thing  in  nature  ? 
Nieuwentyt  relieves  us  at  once  on  these  points.  Pie  is 
going  to  prove  God's  existence  by  means  of  teleology: 
at  least  that  is'  one  thing  he  proposes  to  do.  In  the 
twenty  -ninth  section  of  his  preface  he  says,  — 

"After  having  fully  comprehended  all  the  foregoing, 
we  might  now  have  proceeded  to  the  contemplations  of  the 
world,  and  the  perfections  of  God,  in  the  composition,  parts, 
and  motions  thereof,  were  it  not  that  we  should  previously 
show  after  what  manner,  from  the  visible  world,  and  that 
which  we  see  pass  therein,  a  proof  may  be  formed  upon 
which  we  may  rely  and  be  assured,  —  first,  that  there  is  a  God, 
that  is  to  say,  a  wise,  powerful,  and  gracious  Maker  and 
Director  of  all  things  ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  Bible  (his 
revealed  word)  is  of  a  supernatural  and  divine  origin.  As 
to  the  manner  of  demonstrating  the  first  (i.e.,  God's  exist- 
ence), I  shall,  without  entering  into  deep  speculations,  like 
some  philosophers,  seriously  entreat  every  one  that  with  a 
composed  mind,  and  divesting  himself  of  his  passions  and 
prejudices,  he  would  silently  sit  down,  and  seriously  con- 
sider: First,  In  case  he  should  see  that,  (1)  not  one  but  a 
great  many,  (2)  and  various  or  different  (o)  things,  entirely 
ignorant,  or  unknowing  of  all,  and  even  of  themselves  too ; 
(4)  each  of  them  frequently  after  a  particular  manner,  (5) 
however,  always  unchangeably  and  observing  the  same  rule ; 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,   AND  MAUPERTUIS.     189 

(6)  do  act  and  move,  not  once,  but  upon  many  occasions  and 
times  ;  (7)  and  not  one  of  them  all  able  to  impart  such  mo- 
tion unto  itself ;  (8)  nor,  unless  they  thus  come  together,  of 
themselves  can  produce  one  single  effect  without  their  own 
knowledge  ;  (!))  in  the  production  of  which  effect  or  thing, 
if  some  few  circumstances  only,  or  oftentimes  but  one  single 
one  were  wanting,  it  could  not  either  be  produced  at  all,  or 
at  least  not  in  its  due  perfection;  (10)  and  although  that 
same  effect  should  in  itself  be  of  great  use  and  service,  and 
sometimes  of  the  utmost  importance.  Could  he  imagine 
Otherwise  than  that  all  these  things  are  formed  to  that  end, 
and  brought  together  with  that  design,  to  work  such  an 
effect  as  we  observe  to  be  produced  by  them? 

"  And,  secondly,  Supposing  this  first  to  be  true,  since  these 
things  are  in  themselves  ignorant  and  unknowing  of  all  that 
passes,  whether  everybody  must  not  agree  that  they  are  all 
produced,  and  made  to  concur  by  a  wise  and  understanding 
Agent,  who  had  such  an  end  and  design  in  his  view  ;  and 
whether  any  one  can  persuade  himself  that  mere  chance,  or 
unknowing  laws  of  nature,  or  other  causes  ignorantly  co- 
operating, could  have  place  herein,  and  could  have  directed 
and  governed  these  things  in  all  their  circumstances  and  mo- 
tions for  such  a  purpose. 

' '  That  this  may  be  shown  after  a  more  plain  and  not  less 
certain  manner,  let  us  apply  to  some  particular  thing  what 
has  been  just  now  advanced  in  general,  and  as  it  were  in  an 
abstracted  manner ;  and  let  us  suppose  that  in  the  middle  of 
a  sandy  down,  or  in  a  desert  and  solitary  place,  where  few 
people  are  used  to  pass,  any  one  should  find  a  watch,  show- 
ing the  hours,  minutes,  and  days  of  the  months,  and,  having 
examined  the  same,  should  perceive  so  many  different  wheels, 
nicely  adapted  by  their  teeth  to  each  other,  and  that  one  of 
them  could  not  move  without  moving  the  rest  of  the  whole 
machine  ;  and  should  further  observe  that  those  wheels  are 
made  of  brass  in  order  to  keep  them  from  rust ;  that  the 
spring  is  of  steel,  no  other  metal  being  so  proper  for  that 


190  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

purpose  ;  that  over  the  hand  there  is  placed  a  clear  glass,  in 
the  space  of  which,  if  there  were  any  other  but  a  transpar- 
ent matter,  he  must  be  at  the  pains  of  opening  it  every  time 
to  look  upon  the  hand.  Besides  all  which,  he  might  discover 
in  it  a  hole,  and  exactly  opposite  thereto  a  little  square  pin. 
He  would  likewise  see  hanging  to  this  same  watch  a  little 
key  composed  of  two  pieces,  making  a  right  angle  together  ; 
at  the  end  of  each  of  which  there  was  a  square  hole  so  or- 
dered that  one  of  them  was  exactly  adapted  to  the  little  pin 
in  the  said  hole,  which  being  applied  thereto,  a  chain  would 
be  wound  up,  and  a  spring  bent,  by  which  means  the  machine 
would  be  continued  in  motion,  which  otherwise  would  be  in 
an  entire  rest.  He  might  also  find  that  the  other  square  cavi- 
ty at  the  end  of  the  little  key  was  adapted  to  another  pin  or 
instrument,  which,  turned  this  way  or  that,  makes  the  hand 
move  faster  or  slower.  At  the  other  end  of  this  little  key 
there  would  be  a  flat  handle,  which,  being  movable  therein, 
might  give  him  the  conveniency  that  in  winding  it  up  he 
should  not  be  obliged  to  take  hold  of  it  at  every  turn  of  his 
fingers.  Lastly,  he  would  perceive  that  if  there  were  any 
defect  in  the  wheels,  spring,  or  any  other  parts  of  the  watch, 
or  if  they  had  been  put  together  after  any  other  manner,  the 
whole  watch  would  have  been  entirely  useless. 

"  Now,  the  question  is,  in  order  to  form  a  kind  of  demon- 
stration from  hence,  First,  Whether  anybody  can  imagine 
that  such  a  watch,  among  other  purposes  to  which  it  might 
perhaps  be  serviceable,  was  not  likewise  made  for  this  end, 
that  it  should  show  the  hours,  minutes,  and  day  of  the 
month.  Secondly,  Whether  he  should  make  the  least  scruple 
to  admit  it  for  a  truth,  that  such  a  machine  was  made  and 
put  together  by  an  understanding  artificer  for  this  very  pur- 
pose, who,  when  he  made  it,  himself  knew  that  aud  to  what 
end  he  had  made  it.  And,  thirdly,  Whether  it  be  possible 
that  he  can  persuade  himself  that  this  watch,  with  all  belong- 
ing to  it,  the  niceness  of  its  make,  figure  of  so  many  parts, 
and   other  contrivances    for  showing   the   time,  could   have 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.     191 

acquired  its  being  and  form  by  mere  chance  only,  which 
operated  indifferently,  one  way  or  another,  without  any  cer- 
tain rule  or  direction. 

"  Or,  otherwise,  whether  he  could  expect  to  pass  for  a  man 
of  sense  and  understanding,  if,  having  found  this  watch  in  a 
solitary  place,  he  should  pretend  to  believe  that  it  was  not 
made  by  a  skilful  workman,  nor  that  its  parts  were  put  to- 
gether with  judgment ;  but  that  there  was  a  certain  ignorant 
and  yet  necessary  law  of  nature  prevailing  in  the  world  that 
had  brought  into  a  regular  method  all  the  parts  of  which  this 
watch  consisted,  and  had  adapted  each  of  them  to  the  use 
of  showing  the  time  of  day  ;  and  especially  that  such  a  law  of 
nature  was  not  only  ignorant  and  unsensible  of  all  that  it  did 
or  brought  to  pass,  but  likewise  that  no  being  endued  with 
any  wisdom  or  understanding  had  established  and  produced 
this  law  at  the  beginning,  or  in  the  least  contributed  to  the 
making  of  the  several  parts  that  composed  a  machine  proper 
to  show  the  hours. 

' '  What  has  been  said  above  concerning  a  watch  is  not  less 
applicable  to  all  other  artificial  works.  It  will,  therefore,  be 
unnecessary  to  allege  any  further  examples  of  mills,  ships, 
sluices,  houses,  paintings,  etc,  — in  all  which  the  wisdom  and 
understanding  of  the  maker  does  equally  appear. 

"  Finally,  We  may  apply  all  that  has  been  said  above  to 
demonstrate  that  there  is  such  a  wise,  mighty,  and  merciful 
Being  as  God,  in  case  we  can  make  appear,  with  as  great 
(not  to  say  a  much  greater)  certainty  and  conviction  from 
the  construction  of  the  visible  world  and  all  that  passes  there- 
in, that  there  is  a  God  and  great  Creator  who  in  wisdom 
has  made  them  all ;  as  we  can  show  from  the  structure  of  a 
watch,  and  the  uses  that  result  from  the  same,  that  it  has 
been  made  and  put  together  by  a  judicious  and  skilful  work- 
man ;  and  this  we  doubt  not  of  doing  in  the  following  con- 
templations with  all  necessary  clearness." 

The  "  abstract  and  general "  propositions  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  quotation  present  as  fine  an  example  of 


192  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

teleological  reasoning  as  can  be  found  in  any  of  the  old 
writers.  As  for  the  watch  business,  the  length  of  the 
quotation  is  justified  by  the  fact,  that  this  is  the  illustra- 
tion, the  classical  one,  the  familiar,  ever-present,  old, 
reliable  illustration  of  teleology.  And  this  quotation 
contains  the  pure,  unadulterated,  original  presentation 
of  it.  All  who  used  that  watch  after  Dr.  Nieuwentyt 
found  it  "  in  the  middle  of  a  sandy  down  "  in  1716 
were  thieves  and  robbers.  Paley,  in  particular,  who 
pretends  that  he  found  it  in  1803  "in  crossing  a  heath," 
and  who  devotes  his  first  two  chapters  to  it,  was  un- 
questionably guilty  of  plagiarism.  In  fact,  he  is  ac- 
cused of  stealing  his  whole  book  from  the  "solid 
Dutchman." 

"Not  only  has  the  English  archdeacon,  it  is  alleged,  bor- 
rowed the  general  argument  of  the  Dutch  thinker,  he  has 
likewise  followed  his  arrangement,  appropriated  his  thoughts, 
made  use  of  his  form,  and  copied  his  details,  and  that  with- 
out any  thing  like  honorable  acknowledgment."  1  , 

Lord  Brougham,  however,  says  that  Paley  stole  his 
matter  from  Derham,  instead  of  Nieuwentyt.2  Now, 
while  I  cannot  deny  that  he  appropriated  the  watch 
illustration,  I  must  defend  my  old  friend,  whose  book  I 
read  with  so  much  delight  in  my  youth,  from  such 
sweeping  charges  of  plagiarism.  Our  historical  review 
of  natural  theology  enables  us  to  weigh  and  estimate 
such  charges  more  accurately  than  could  be  done  by 
those  who  made  them.  By  this  light  we  see  that  they 
were  substantially  all  in  the  same  boat.  If  Paley  was 
guilty  of  plagiarism,  so  were  Nieuwentyt  and  Derham, 
from  whom  it  is  claimed  that  he  filched  his  matter  and 

1  Encyc.  Brit.,  Art.  Nieuwentyt. 

2  Discourse  of  Natural  Theology,  p.  53. 


NIEUWENTYT,  WOLLASTON,   AND  MAUPERTUIS.     193 

method.  A  stock  of  teleological  materials  and  illustra- 
tions had  been  accumulating  from  the  earliest  ages,  and 
they  all  drew  from  the  common  storehouse. 

Nieuwentyt  divides  his  book  into  "contemplations" 
instead  of  chapters.  Contemplation  I.  is  "  Of  the  Vanity 
of  all  Worldly  Things ; "  the  second  contains  ontologi- 
cal  and  causal  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God ;  and 
the  third  is  teleological.  Here,  apropos  of  the  question 
of  plagiarism,  the  very  first  thing  we  strike  is  the  old, 
old  argument  about  the  position  and  character  of  the 
various  kinds  of  teeth.  It  must  be  admitted,  however, 
that  the  doctor  injects  some  originality  even  into  such 
a  threadbare  topic ;  but,  unfortunately  for  him,  the 
additions  he  makes  are  the  weakest  part  of  the  argu- 
ment :  — 

"  A  means  was  requisite  to  turn  solid  bodies  into  a  liquid 
matter,  and  even  such  as  should  be  proper  to  support  and 
nourish  us.  For  this  purpose  there  are  teeth  planted  iu  our 
mouths,  of  which  those  that  stand  foremost  are  sharp  and 
cutting  in  order  to  bite  off  a  part  of  that  food  which  is  taken 
in,  whose  semicircular  figure  is  wisely  adapted  to  a  just 
measure. of  the  piece  to  be  bitten,  and  so  to  be  afterwards 
chewed  with  the  most  conveniency,  as  every  one  may  expe- 
rience who  makes  his  biting  larger  or  smaller." 

This  notion  that  the  teeth  are  so  disposed  in  a  semi- 
circle as  to  enable  us  to  bite  off  just  enough  to  satisfy 
us  without  overstraining  the  muscles  of  the  jaw,  is  origi- 
nal. We  can  picture  the  learned  doctor  patiently  ex- 
perimenting on  "making  his  biting  greater  or  smaller," 
bravely  running  the  risk  of  choking  himself  in  the 
cause  of  natural  theology  ! 

"  But  herein  appear  yet  more  sensibly  the  design  and  wis- 
dom of  the  great  Artificer  in  ordering  the  food  to  pass  over 


194  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

the  orifice  of  the  windpipe  as  it  goes  to  the  throat ;  for,  if 
any  thing  falls  into  the  windpipe  (which  people  commonly 
call  going  the  wrong  way) ,  every  one  knows  what  disorder  it 
occasions  in  them,  so  great  sometimes  as  to  put  them  in 
danger  of  choking ;  wherefore  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  if 
we  would  eat  with  ease,  and  preserve  our  life  at  the  same 
time,  that  the  windpipe,  or  the  mouth  of  it,  should  be  closed 
when  we  swallow,  and  then  immediately  opened  again  in 
order  to  draw  our  breath.  Now,  can  anybody  be  so  dull 
as  not  to  observe  this  determinate  end  and  design  of  our 
wise  and  merciful  Creator?  Let  him  only  take  the  trouble 
of  viewing  the  upper  part  of  the  windpipe  of  a  sheep  or  a 
calf,  where  he  will  see  more  plainly  than  can  be  shown  him 
here  by  a  figure,  that  there  lies  a  cartilage,  called  the  epi- 
glottis, which,  being  pressed  down  by  the  food  when  'tis 
swallowed,  covers  the  orifice  of  the  windpipe  lying  under  it, 
by  which  means  the  food  passing  over  it,  as  if  it  were  a 
bridge  made  for  that  purpose,  in  its  way  to  the  throat  is  pre- 
vented from  falling  into  the  windpipe,  which  would  often 
occasion  coughing,  straining,  and  other  greater  inconven- 
iences. Now,  if  this  cartilage  should  remain  lying  thus  upon 
the  orifice  of  the  windpipe,  the  breath  would  be  stopped,  and 
the  living  creature  immediately  suffocated.  Do  we  not  here 
again  discover  a  wise  design,  —  that  this  epiglottis  is  so  con- 
trived as  to  rise  up  like  a  spring  that  has  been  pressed  down, 
or,  as  some  say,  drawn  up  by  muscular  fibres  after  the  food 
has  passed  over  it?  By  which  means  the  passage  of  the 
breath  is  immediately  opened  after  swallowing,  in  case  the 
elastical  force  of  the  said  epiglottis  should  be  weakened  by 
too  much  use." 

The  argument  here  runs  a  somewhat  devious  course. 
First,  Mr.  Atheist,  you  will  please  to  note  "  the  design 
and  wisdom  "  of  "  ordering  the  food  to  pass  over  the 
orifice  of  the  windpipe."  Secondly,  admire  the  skill 
with  which  the  mischief  incident  to  the  first  contrivance 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLL ASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.     195 

is  avoided  by  providing  the  epiglottis.  Thirdly,  sur- 
render, you  miscreant,  to  the  overwhelming  fact  that 
the  mischief  incident  to  the  second  contrivance  is  pre- 
vented by  the  springing  back  of  the  epiglottis  !  Surely 
he  must  have  been  a  "  most  obdurate  and  deplorable 
atheist  "  who  could  stand  all  that.  The  consideration 
that  God  was  the  Author  of  the  difficulties  overcome, 
as  well  as  of  the  contrivances  by  which  they  were  sur- 
mounted, seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  the  worthy 
Dutchman.  The  whole  argument  is  as  old  as  Cicero, 
at  least ;  and  the  Stoic  presented  it  in  better  shape 
than  Nieuwentyt  did,  since  he  makes  only  one  "de- 
sign "  out  of  it  instead  of  three,  each  for  the  purpose 
of  escaping  the  evil  consequences  of  the  previous  one. 

After  a  similar  fashion  he  goes  through  the  whole 
human  anatomy,  and  subsequently  through  the  whole 
circle  of  the  sciences  as  then  known.  To  a  modern 
scientist  his  discussions,  experiments,  speculations,  and 
guesses  possess  a  curious  interest  throughout,  though 
a  very  unequal  value.  His  astronomy,  for  instance,  is 
much  sounder  than  his  chemistry.  How  could  it  be 
otherwise,  considering  that  he  wrote  three-quarters  of 
a  century  before  Priestty  discovered  oxygen,  and  that 
he  reckoned  fire  as  an  element  ? 

"  The  Religion  of  Nature  Delineated,"  by  William 
Wollaston,  London,  1725,  is  a  thin  folio  volume  full  of 
pleasant  and  valuable  matter.  The  author  adheres  very 
closely  to  his  chosen  theme  *of  natural  religion  as  dis- 
tinguished from  natural  theology,  and  yet  not  exclu- 
sively. Section  V.,  on  "  Truths  relating  to  the  Deity," 
is  theological.  The  rest  of  the  book  is  a  treatise  on 
natural  ethics,  or  the  principles  of  just  and  right  action 
which  may  be  discovered  without  the  aid  of  revelation. 
But,  since  he  takes  a  broad  view  of  human  relations,,  the 


196  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

application  of  these  principles  leads  him  to  construct 
the  elements  of  political  science  and  sociology.  In 
those  early  days,  before  human  knowledge  was  mapped 
out  into  so  many  distinct  provinces,  it  was  natural  and 
almost  inevitable  for  an  author,  in  treating  any  subject 
of  fundamental  importance,  to  impinge  upon  the  terri- 
tory of  a  number  of  the  modern  sciences  in  a  single 
treatise. 

The  ground  principles  of  his  political  science  are  so 
sound  and  well  put,  that,  in  spite  of  the  incongruity 
with  the  general  purpose  of  this  historical  review,  I 
cannot  forbear  transcribing  two  of  his  propositions  : 
"  In  a  state  of  nature  men  are  equal  in  respect  of 
dominion."  "  No  man  can  have  a  right  to  begin  to 
interrupt  the  happiness  of  another." 

Those  sentences  sound  remarkably  like  the  words  of 
a  certain  document  which  astonished  the  world  half  a 
century  later,  —  "  free  and  equal,"  "  inalienable  rights," 
and  "  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness." 

Before  passing  to  consider  his  teleology,  which  is  the 
main  thing  aimed  at  in  this  notice  of  his  book,  let  us 
note  his  conclusion,  which  seems  to  me  an  admirable 
summary  of  natural  religion  :  — 

"  For  a  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter :  let  our  conversa- 
tion in  this  world,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  and  able,  be 
such  as  acknowledges  every  thing  to  be  what  it  is  (what  it  is 
in  itself,  and  what  with  regard  to  us,  to  other  beings,  to 
causes,  circumstances,  and  consequences)  ;  that  is,  let  us  by 
no  act  deny  any  thing  to  be  true  which  is  true  ;  that  is,  let 
us  act  according  to  reason ;  that  is,  let  us  act  according  to 
the  law  of  our  nature.  By  honestly  endeavoring  to  do  this 
we  shall  express  our  duty  to  him  who  is  the  Author  of  it 
and  of  that  law,  and  at  the  same  time  prosecute  our  own 
proper   happiness    (the   happiness  of    rational  beings)  ;  we 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,   AND  MAUPERTUIS.     197 

shall  do  what  tends  to  make  us  easy  here,  and  be  qualifying 
ourselves,  and  preparing  for  our  removal  hence  to  our  long 
home,  —  that  great  revolution,  which,  at  the  farthest,  cannot 
be  very  far  off. ' ' 

In  his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  Wollaston 
begins  with  the  causal  argument;  and  he  puts  that 
in  the  weakest  form,  namely,  as  a  series.  Z  is  moved 
by  Y,  Y  by  X,  X  by  W,  and  so  on  ;  but  the  series 
must  stop  with  some  term  whose  movement  is  self- 
motion,  uncaused  motion. 

He  handles  the  anthropological  argument  with  greater 
skill. 

The  general  proposition  with  which  he  introduces 
his  teleological  argument  is  the  following  :  — 

"  The  frame  and  constitution  of  the  world,  the  astonish- 
ing magnificence  of  it,  the  various  phenomena  and  kinds  of 
beings,  the  uniformity  observed  in  the  productions  of  things, 
the  uses  and  ends  for  which  they  serve,  etc.,  do  all  show 
that  there  is  some  Almighty  Designer,  an  infinite  wisdom 
and  power  at  the  top  of  all  these  things  :  such  marks  there 
are  of  both." 

Two  leading  ideas  run  through  this  statement :  the 
one  is  that  of  grandeur,  which  includes  subordinate 
elements,  as  that  of  beauty,  harmony,  unity  in  the 
midst  of  diversity  ;  and  the  other  is  that  of  contri- 
vance for  a  purpose.  In  other  words,  his  statement 
includes  elements  which  belong  to  eutaxiology  as  well 
as  to  teleology.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  detailed 
statements  by  which  he  seeks  to  establish  his  general 
proposition,  of  which  I  give  characteristic  paragraphs :  — ■ 

' '  In  order  to  prove  to  any  one  the  grandness  of  this  fabric  of 
the  world,  one  needs  only  to  bid  him  consider  the  sun  with  that 
insupportable  glory  and  lustre  that  surrounds  it ;  to  demon- 


198  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

strate  the  vast  distance,  magnitude,  and  beat  of  it ;  to  repre- 
sent to  him  the  chorus  of  planets  moving  periodically  by 
uniform  laws  in  their  several  orbits  about  it,  affording  a 
regular  variety  of  aspects,  — guarded  some  of  them  by  second- 
aiy  planets,  and  as  it  were  emulating  the  state  of  the  sun, 
and  probably  all  possessed  by  proper  iu  habitants  ;  to  remind 
him  of  those  surprising  visits  the  comets  make  us,  the  large 
trains  of  uncommon  splendor  which  attend  them,  the  far 
country  they  come  from,  and  the  curiosity  and  horror  they 
excite,  not  only  among  us,  but  in  the  inhabitants  of  other 
planets,  who  also  may  be  up  to  see  the  entry  and  progress  of 
these  ministers  of  fate  [unless  the  said  inhabitants  of  other 
planets  were  less  superstitious  than  mankind  in  early  ages, 
which  is  to  be  sincerely  hoped.  Why  not  suppose  that  they 
are  accomplished  astronomers  viewing  these  comets  with 
telescopes  and  spectroscopes  of  the  most  approved  pattern, 
instead  of  regarding  them  with  ' '  curiosity  and  horror ' '  as 
"  ministers  of  fate  "  ?]  ;  to  direct  his  eye  and  contemplation, 
through  those  azure  fields  and  vast  regions  above  him,  up  to 
the  fixed  stars,  that  radiant,  numberless  host  of  heaven  ;  and 
to  make  him  understand  how  unlikely  a  thing  it  is  that  they 
should  be  placed  there  only  to  adorn  and  bespangle  a  canopy 
over  our  heads  (though  that  would  be  a  piece  of  great  mag- 
nificence too),  and  much  less  to  supply  the  places  of  so 
many  glow-worms  by  affording  a  feeble  light  to  our  earth, 
or  even  to  all  our  fellow-planets  ;  to  convince  him  that  they 
are  rather  so  many  other  suns,  with  their  several  regions  and 
sets  of  planets  about  them  ;  to  show  him  by  the  help  of 
glasses  still  more  and  more  of  these  fixed  lights  ;  and  to 
beget  in  him  an  apprehension  of  their  unaccountable  num- 
bers and  of  those  immense  spaces  that  lie  retired  beyond 
the  utmost  reach  and  even  imagination.  I  say  one  needs  but 
to  do  this,  and  explain  to  him  such  things  as  are  now  known 
almost  to  everybody ;  and  by  it  to  show,  that,  if  the  world 
be  not  infinite,  it  is  infinite  similis,  and  therefore  sure  a 
magnificent  structure,  and  the  work  of  an  infinite  Architect. 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,   AND  MAUPERTUIS.     199 

But  if  we  could  take  a  view  of  all  the  particulars  contained 
within  that  astonishing  compass,  which  we  have  thus  hastily 
run  over,  how  would  wonders  multiply  upon  us  ?  Every  cor- 
ner, every  part  of  the  world,  is  as  it  were  made  up  of  other 
worlds.  If  we  look  upon  this  our  seat  (I  mean  this  earth), 
what  scope  is  here  for  admiration !  the  great  variety  of 
mountains,  hills,  valleys,  plains,  rivers,  seas,  trees,  plants  ! 
the  many  tribes  of  different  animals  with  which  it  is 
stocked !  the  multifarious  inventions  and  works  of  one 
of  these  ;  that  is,  of  us  men,  etc.  And  yet,  when  all  these 
(heaven  and  earth)  are  surveyed  as  nicely  as  they  can  be  by 
the  help  of  our  unassisted  senses,  and  even  of  telescopical 
glasses,  by  the  assistance  of  good  microscopes  in  very  small 
parts  of  matter,  as  many  new  wonders  may  perhaps  be  dis- 
covered as  those  already  observed,  —  new  kingdoms  of  ani- 
mals, new  architecture  and  curiosity  of  work.  So  that,  as 
before,  our  senses  and  even  conception  fainted  in  those  vast 
journeys  we  were  obliged  to  take  iu  considering  the  expanse 
of  the  universe  ;  so  here  again  they  fail  us  in  our  researches 
into  the  principles  and  constituent  parts  of  it.  Both  the 
beginnings  and  the  ends  of  things,  the  least  and  the  greatest, 
all  conspire  to  baffle  us  ;  and  which  way  ever  we  prosecute 
our  inquiries,  we  still  fall  in  with  fresh  subjects  of  amaze- 
ment, and  fresh  reasons  to  believe  that  there  are  indefinitely 
still  more  and  more  behind,  that  will  forever  escape  our 
eagerest  pursuits  and  deepest  penetration. 

4 'Lastly,  it  appears,  I  think,  plainly  enough  in  the  parts 
and  model  of  the  world,  that  there  is  a  contrivance  and  a 
respect  to  certain  reasons  and  ends.  How  the  sun  is  posited 
near  the  middle  of  our  system  for  the  more  convenient  dis- 
pensing of  his  benign  influences  to  the  planets  moving  about 
him  ;  how  the  plane  of  the  earth's  equator  intersects  that  of 
her  orbit,  and  makes  a  proper  angle  with  it,  in  order  to 
diversify  the  year,  and  create  a  useful  variety  of  seasons, 
and  many  other  things  of  this  kind,  though  a  thousand  times 
repeated,  will  always  be  pleasing  meditations  to  good  men 


200  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  true  scholars.  Who  can  observe  the  vapors  to  ascend, 
especially  from  the  sea,  meet  above  in  clouds,  and  fall  again 
after  condensation,  and  not  understand  this  to  be  a  kind  of 
distillation  in  order  to  clear  the  water  of  its  grosser  salts, 
and  then  by  rains  and  dews  to  supply  the  fountains  and 
rivers  with  fresh  and  wholesome  liquor  ;  to  nourish  the  vege- 
tables below  by  showers,  which  descend  in  drops  as  from  a 
watering-pot  upon  a  garden,  etc.  ?  Who  can  view  the  structure 
of  a  plant  or  animal ;  the  indefinite  number  of  their  fibres 
and  fine  vessels,  the  formation  of  larger  vessels  and  the  sev- 
eral members  out  of  them,  and  the  apt  disposition  of  all 
these  ;  the  way  laid  out  for  the  reception  and  distribution  of 
nutriment ;  the  effect  this  nutriment  has  in  extending  the  ves- 
sels, bringing  the  vegetable  or  animal  to  its  full  growth  or 
expansion,  continuing  the  motion  of  the  several  fluids,  re- 
pairing the  decay  of  the  body,  and  preserving  life  ?  Who  can 
take  notice  of  the  several  faculties  of  animals,  their  arts  of 
saving  and  providing  for  themselves,  or  the  ways  in  which 
they  are  provided  for ;  the  uses  of  plants  to  animals,  and  of 
some  animals  to  others,  particularly  to  mankind ;  the  care 
taken  that  the  several  species  should  be  propagated  out  of 
their  proper  seeds  without  confusion  [Foot-note.  —  "If  any 
one  sitting  upon  Mount  Ida  had  seen  the  Greek  army  com- 
ing on  in  proper  order,  he  ought  most  certainly  to  have  con- 
cluded there  was  some  commander  under  whose  conduct  they 
moved"]  ;  the  strong  inclinations  implanted  in  animals  for 
that  purpose,  their  love  of  their  young,  and  the  like?  I  say, 
who  can  do  this,  and  not  see  a  design  in  such  regular  pieces, 
so  nicely  wrought  and  so  preserved  ?  If  there  was  but  one 
animal,  in  that  case  it  could  not  be  doubted  but  that  his  eyes 
were  made  that  he  might  see  with  them,  his  ears  that  he 
might  hear  with  them,  and  so  on,  through  at  least  the  most 
considerable  parts  of  him.  If  it  can  be  much  less  doubted, 
when  the  same  things  are  repeated  in  the  individuals  of  all  the 
tribes  of  animals  ;  if  the  like  observations  ma}^  be  made  with 
respect  to  vegetables,  and  other  things  ;  and  if  all  these  kinds 


NIEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,   AND  MAUPERTUIS.     201 

of  things,  and  therefore  much  more  their  particulars,  upon 
and  in  the  earth,  waters,  air,  are  unconceivably  numerous  (as 
most  evidently  they  are) ,  one  cannot  but  be  convinced  from 
that,  which  is  so  very  obvious  to  every  understanding,  and 
plainly  runs  through  the  nobler  parts  of  the  visible  world, 
that  not  only  they,  but  other  things,  even  those  that  seem  to 
be  less  noble,  have  their  ends  too,  though  not  so  well  under- 
stood. And  now,  since  we  cannot  suppose  the  parts  of  mat- 
ter to  have  contrived  this  wonderful  form  of  a  world  among 
themselves,  and  then  by  agreement  to  have  taken  their  re- 
spective posts,  and  pursued  constant  ends  by  certain  methods 
and  measures  concerted  (because  these  are  acts  of  which  they 
are  not  capable) ,  there  must  be  some  other  being  whose  wis- 
dom and  power  are  equal  to  such  a  mighty  work  as  is  the 
structure  and  preservation  of  the  world.  There  must  be 
some  almighty  Mind  who  models  and  adorns  it,  lays  the 
causes  of  things  so  deep,  prescribes  them  such  uniform  and 
steady  laws,  destines  and  adapts  them  to  certain  purposes, 
and  makes  one  thing  to  fit  and  answer  to  another." 

The  inference  of  "an  infinite  Architect"  from  the 
structure  of  a  universe  which  is  almost  infinite,  "  infi- 
nite* similis"  is  something  of  a  leap,  but  no  greater 
than  design-advocates  frequently  make  or  attempt. 
Wollaston  evidently  has  outgrown  the  "inveterate 
prejudice  "  attributed  to  teleologists  by  Spinoza;  name- 
ly, regarding  the  whole  universe  as  contrived  for  the 
benefit  of  man.  If  the  stars  were  so  designed,  they  are 
no  better  than  so  many  "glow-worms."  The  strong 
current  of  eutaxiology  which  runs  through  these  quo- 
tations is  noteworthy.  He  was  strongly  impressed  with 
the  regularity  and  constancy  of  nature.  The  illustra- 
tion in  the  foot-note  of  an  army  in  battle-array,  thrown 
in  at  the  point  where  he  is  speaking  of  the.  preserva- 
tion of  the  several  distinct  species  without  confusion, 


202  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

shows  how  fully  he  appreciated  the  goodly  and  orderly 
array  of  the  animal  kingdom. 

Joseph  Butler,  Bishop  of  Durham,  published  his  fa- 
mous "  Analogy  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion  "  in 
1736.  Excellent  as  this  work  is,  it  requires  no  more 
than  a  mere  mention  here.  It  is  not  an  argument  for 
the  existence  of  God,  but  is  addressed  to  theists.  Its 
aim  is  simply  to  show  that  whatever  difficulties  and 
objections  arise  in  the  rational  criticism  of  revealed  re- 
ligion, the  same  difficulties  arise  also  in  the  contempla- 
tion of  nature. 

The  "Discourses  on  all  the  Principal  Branches  of 
Natural  Religion  and  Social  Virtue,"  by  James  Foster, 
D.D.,  London,  1749,  also  contains  little  that  needs  any 
comment  in  this  place,  except  his  opinion  respecting 
the  importance  of  natural  religion  and  its  relation  to 
Christianity.  He  relies  wholly  upon  the  causal  argu- 
ment to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  stating  it  in  very 
much  the  same  terms  as  Wollaston ;  so  that  we  have 
here  no  design-arguments  to  subject  to  analysis. 

In  order  to  vindicate  for  natural  religion  the  high 
place  which  he  thinks  it  ought  to  occupy,  he  urges 
several  considerations,  of  which  I  quote  the  first :  — 

"  First,  that  all  the  essential  principles  of  the  religion  of 
nature,  and  the  moral  duties  connected  with  and  obviously 
resulting  from  it,  must  also  be  included  in  the  religion  of  the 
gospel,  as  most  important  and  essential  branches  of  that  like- 
wise, because  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that  there  should 
he  any  religion  at  all  but  what  is  founded  on  these  original 
truths  and  obligations.  There  can  in  nature  be  no  other 
ground  for  the  authority  of  God  over  rational  creatures,  nor 
for  any  homage  and  duty  to  be  paid  him." 

In  1748tMoreau  de  Maupertuis  published  his  "Essai 
de   Cosmologie."      The  titlepage   bears  this  admirable 


NIEUWENTYT,  WOLLASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.      203 

motto  from  the  fourth  book  of  Virgil's  JEneid,  Mens 
agitat  molem.  In  the  preface  he  "examines  the  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God ;  "  and  here  he  sounds  the  first 
note  of  that  chorus  of  criticisms  of  natural  theology 
which  marked  the  middle  and  latter  part  of  the  last 
century. 

He  passes  over  three  arguments,  (1)  the  ontological, 
(2)  the  general  consent  of  mankind.  (3)  the  anthropo- 
logical, with  a  bare  allusion,  remarking  that  "  they  are 
all  very  strong,  but  not  of  the  kind  he  proposes  to  ex- 
amine." 

' '  In  all  ages  proofs  of  the  wisdom  and  power  of  him  who 
governs  the  universe  have  been  found  by  those  who  applied 
themselves  to  the  study  of  it.  The  greater  the  progress  in 
physics,  the  more  numerous  have  these  proofs  become.  Some, 
struck  with  amazement  at  the  divine  tokens  which  we  behold 
every  moment  in  nature,  others  through  a  zeal  misnamed  re- 
ligious, have  given  certain  proofs  greater  weight  than  they 
ought  to  have,  and  sometimes  taken  for  proof  that  which 
was  not  conclusive." 

He  thinks  the  genuine  arguments  are  numerous  and 
strong  enough,  without  the  attempt  to  multiply  them 
by  an  overstrained  zeal. 

He  passes  over  the  argument  "  which  the  ancients 
drew  from  the  beauty,  order,  and  arrangement  of  the 
cosmos,"  with  the  remark,  "  I  attach  myself  to  a  phi- 
losophy which,  by  its  grand  discoveries,  is  far  more  com- 
petent to  judge  of  those  marvels,  and  whose  reasonings 
are  far  more  precise  than  theirs."  One  of  these  "grand 
discoveries,"  of  which  Maupertuis  was  very  proud,  was 
the  oblateness  of  the  spheroidal  form  of  the  earth.  He 
was  chairman  of  a  committee  of  the  Academy  which 
measured  a  degree  of  longitude,  and  thence  deduced 
this  conclusion,  —  an  achievement  for  which,  or  on  ac- 


204  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

count  of  his  vanity  about  it,  Voltaire  ridiculed  him 
most  unmercifully,  styling  him  the  "flattener  of  the 
earth." 

The  argument  of  the  ancients  thus  summarily  dis- 
posed of  was  eutaxiological.  He  immediately  passes 
on  to  criticise  the  views  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  appar- 
ently without  recognizing  them  as  of  the  same  piece 
with  the  eutaxiology  of  the  ancients :  — 

"That  great  man  believed  that  the  movements  of  the 
celestial  bodies  sufficiently  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
Him  who  governs  them  :  such  uniformity  must  result  from 
the  will  of  a  Supreme  Being.  The  sublimest  objects  seem 
to  have  furnished  him  with  the  strongest  arguments." 

To  this  he  proposes  two  objections  :  First,  though 
the  probabilities  that  chance  governed  the  forms  of  the 
orbits  and  the  relative  distances  of  the  planets  is  very 
small  (he  figures  out  the  ratio  1419856:1;  and  he  was 
a  great  mathematician),  still  chance  has  some  chance 
left.  He  handles  this  objection  very  gingerly,  as  if  he 
knew  how  light  a  missile  it  was  against  a  weighty  argu- 
ment. Secondly,  there  may  be  a  physical  cause  for  all 
the  celestial  phenomena.  This,  of  course,  Newton 
would  admit ;  but  the  next  question  would  be  whether 
all  the  physical  causes  were  not  dominated  by  mind. 
This  objection  only  shifts  the  ground  of  the  controversy. 

Respecting  Newton's  argument  from  morphological 
symmetry  among  animals,  Maupertuis'  criticisms  simply 
show  that  he  did  not  comprehend  it.  He  thought  that 
Newton  claimed  a  uniformity  of  animal  structures 
throughout. 

"If  the  uniformity  which  one  observes  in  many  animals 
is  one  proof,  is  that  not  overthrown  by  the  infinite  diversity 
which  one  observes  in  others?" 


NIEUWENTYT,  WOLLASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.     205 

And  so  away  he  goes  on  a  false  scent,  comparing  an 
eagle  with  a  fly,  a  stag  with  a  snail,  etc.,  to  overthrow 
the  idea  of  uniformity. 

« '  The  argument  drawn  from  the  fitness  of  the  different 
organs  of  animals  for  their  uses  appears  stronger.  Were 
not  their  feet  made  for  walking,  their  wings  for  flying,  their 
mouths  for  eating,  their  eyes  for  seeing,  their  other  parts  for 
reproduction?  Does  not  all  that  indicate  an  intelligence 
and  a  purpose  which  has  presided  in  their  construction? 
That  argument  struck  the  ancients  as  it  did  Newton  ;  and 
it  is  in  vain  that  the  enemy  of  Providence  replies  that  the 
function  was  not  intentional,  but  followed  from  the  construc- 
tion of  the  organs ;  that  chance  formed  eyes,  ears,  and 
tongue,  from  which  resulted  sight,  hearing,  and  speech." 

He  seems  to  think  there  is  a  good  deal  in  teleology, 
if  it  is  properly  handled.  But  he  immediately  falls 
afoul  of  its  advocates  for  their  mismanagement  and 
abuse  of  it :  — 

"Almost  all  the  modern  authors  in  physics  and  natural 
history  have  done  little  else  than  expand  the  proofs  drawn 
from  the  organization  of  animals  and  plants,  and  push  them 
in  the  small  details  of  nature.  ...  A  crowd  of  physicists 
since  Newton  have  found  God  in  stars,  in  insects,  in  plants, 
and  in  water  ;  not  to  mention  those  who  find  him  in  the  wrin- 
kles of  the  rhinoceros's  hide.  .  .  .  Leave  such  bagatelles  to 
those  who  do  not  perceive  their  folly." 

His  foot-notes  enable  us  to  see  that  these  telling  shots 
were  aimed  at  Derham,  in  part  at  least.  He  quite  as 
pointedly  condemns  all  who  go  to  the  opposite  extreme 
of  denying  all  final  causes. 

"  Those  see  intelligence  everywhere  ;  these  nowhere.  They 
think  a  blind  mechanism  has  been  able  to  form  the  bodies 
of  animals  and  plants,  and  to  produce  all  the  wonders  we  see 
in  the  cosmos. 


206  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

» 

"  It  must  be  confessed  that  these  proofs  have  been  abused. 
Some  have  given  them  greater  weight  than  they  deserve ; 
others  have  expanded  them  too  much.  Natural  theology  is 
full  of  such  stuff  as  this :  Observe  the  hatching  of  a  fly  or 
an  ant ;  admire  the  care  of  Providence  for  the  eggs  of  insects, 
for  the  nurture  of  the  young,  for  the  chrysalis  so  long  shut 
up  in  its  case,  for  the  metamorphoses  of  insects,  etc. 

"  The  bodies  of  animals  and  plants  are  machines  too  com- 
plex, whose  obscure  parts  too  easily  escape  us,  whose  use 
and  end  we  too  little  understand,  to  be  able  to  judge  of  the 
wisdom  and  power  needed  for  their  construction." 

No  one  ever  claimed  that  we  could  determine  precisely 
how  much  wisdom  and  power  were  needful,  —  certainly 
a  great  deal  more  than  man  is  able  to  command,  or  even 
to  comprehend.  Maupertuis  dwells  somewhat  upon 
the  topic  of  the  evils  and  imperfections  in  the  world. 
Some  animals  are  highly  perfect  in  structure,  others 
very  rude  and  sketchy  beings.  Some  are  wholly  use- 
less ;  some  injurious,  as  serpents  for  example ;  but  these 
are  furnished  with  all  that  is  needful,  and  cared  for  by 
Providence  precisely  like  the  most  beautiful  and  useful 
creatures.  Suffering,  disorder,  and  crime  abound  :  how 
are  all  these  things  to  be  reconciled  with  a  benefi- 
cent Providence?  "Some  to  preserve  His  wisdom 
seem  to  limit  His  power,  saying  that  he  made  the  world 
as  well  as  He  could."  Here  the  reference  is  to  Leibnitz, 
who  does  say  something  like  that  in  his  "  Theodicy." 
Maupertuis  stirs  up  these  doubts  and  objections  respect- 
ing evil,  and  leaves  them  so. 

"I  review  the  proofs  drawn  from  the  contemplation  of 
nature,  and  I  add  a  reflection :  it  is,  that  those  which  have 
greatest  strength  have  not  been  sufficiently  examined  as 
regards  their  validity  and  extent.  That  the  cosmos  presents 
trains   of   agencies   converging   to   an   end   on   a   thousand 


NTEUWENTYT,   WOLLASTON,  AND  MAUPERTUIS.     207 

occasions,  is  no  proof  of  intelligence  and  design :  it  is  in 
the  purpose  of  these  contrivances  that  we  must  search  for 
wisdom.  Skill  in  the  execution  is  not  sufficient :  the  purpose 
must  be  rational. 

"It  is  not  in  petty  details,  but  in  those  phenomena  whose 
universality  suffers  no  exception,  and  whose  simplicity  is  such 
that  they  are  wholly  within  our  comprehension,  that  we  are 
to  search  for  the  proofs  of  a  Supreme  Being.  It  is  true 
that  this  research  will  be  more  difficult  than  that  which  con- 
sists in  the  examination  of  an  insect,  a  flower,  or  something 
else  of  that  sort.  .  .  .  The  organization  of  animals,  the 
multiplicity  and  minuteness  of  the  parts  of  insects,  the 
immensity  of  celestial  bodies,  their  distances  and  revolutions, 
are  better  suited  to  astonish  the  mind  than  to  enlighten  it. 
.  .  .  Let  us  search  for  Him  in  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
cosmos,  in  those  universal  principles  of  order  which  underlie 
the  whole,  rather  than  in  the  complicated  results  of  those 
laws." 

This  "  reflection,"  which  he  appends  to  his  review  of 
the  reasonings  in  natural  theology,  is  for  the  most  part 
eminently  sound  and  judicious.  After  reading  it  we 
turn  with  new  interest  to  see  what  sort  of  an  argument 
Maupertuis  himself  is  going  to  make,  after  slashing 
about  so  freely  at  those  of  other  people.  His  method 
is  peculiar,  and  our  eagerness  speedily  turns  to  disap- 
pointment. He  frames  a  definition  of  the  Supreme 
Intelligence,  and  then  deduces  from  this  a  suite  of  cos- 
mical  laws.  Comparing  these  with  the  actual  laws  of 
nature,  and  rinding  them  to  agree,  he  infers  that  the 
Being  from  whom  his  laws  were  deduced  has  a  real 
existence,  and  is  the  Author  of  the  actual  cosmos.  His 
method  is  so  manifestly  foredoomed  to  failure  that  it 
is  not  necessary  to  follow  him  through,  and  point  out 
the  very  spot  where  he  stumbled. 


208  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

RETMARUS,  KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID. 

Hermann  Samuel  Reimarus,  professor  at  Ham- 
burg, published  at  various  times,  about  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  ten  essays  on  the  "  Principal  Truths 
of  Natural  Religion."  They  were  collected,  and  pub- 
lished in  book-form,  in  1754.  Reimarus  is  a  thoughtful 
and  suggestive  writer.  Kant  gives  him  a  very  appre- 
ciative notice  in  his  "Enquiry  into  the  Grounds  of 
Proof  for  the  Existence  of  God."  Kant's  work  was 
critical,  and  mostly  of  the  nature  of  destructive  criti- 
cism. Comparing  his  own  with  the  work  of  Reimarus, 
he  gives  the  palm  to  the  latter  for  practical  value ;  its 
merit  consisting  "  in  an  unartificial  use  of  a  sound  and 
fine  reason." 

The  first  four  essays  contain  his  transcendental  the- 
ology, or  the  arguments  from  a  priori  conceptions,  and 
the  causal  argument.  The  fifth  is  teleological.  In  this 
he  dwells  especially  upon  animal  instincts :  — 

"But  what  shall  we  say  of  the  chamois  and  mountain 
o-oat?  No  cliff  too  high  or  too  steep  for  them  to  ascend, 
and  thence  to  make  the  most  astonishing  leaps  to  some  other 
point  hanging  in  the  abyss.  Who  has  given  them  that  exact 
estimation  of  the  distance,  so  that  they  neither  overleap  nor 
fall  short  of  the  mark  ?  Who  has  taught  them  to  break  the 
fall  with  their  horns  when  they  make  a  long  leap  downwards  ? 
Who  has  instructed  them  that  it  was  within  their  power  to 


REIMARUS,   KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID.  209 

whirl  over  backwards  in  mid-air  in  such  an  unnatural  fashion, 
and  still  preserve  the  equilibrium  of  their  bodies  ?  Who  has 
made  them  so  courageous  and  daring  that  they  shrink  at  no 
abyss,  fear  no  fall,  but,  like  the  elements,  trust  themselves  to 
their  untried  skill  ? 

"  Is  there  not  a  marvellous  diversity  of  wise  contrivances 
which  all  minister  to  one  grand  purpose, — the  propagation 
and  perpetuation  of  the  species  of  animals  ?  In  what  school 
of  life  have  animals  acquired  so  many  artful  expedients  and 
devices  ?  Or  how  is  it  that  each  one  has  chosen  that  which 
was  most  suitable  and  brought  it  to  perfection  ?  Do  not  say 
Nature  has  taught  them  :  that  expression  has  no  meaning. 
...  I  should  become  tedious  if  I  touched  upon  all  the 
modes  of  propagation  of  the  various  orders,  — with  what  art 
and  circumspection  birds  construct  nests  beforehand  for  their 
eggs  and  young ;  with  what  foresight  insects  deposit  their 
eggs,  sometimes  in  a  lump  when  the  young  are  gregarious, 
sometimes,  on  the  contrary,  scattering  them  one  by  one,  glu- 
ing them  fast  here,  shoving  them  in  yonder,  wherever  their 
offspring  will  find  its  natural  element  and  proper  nutriment, 
although  the  mother  may  not  be  at  all  accustomed  to  that 
element  or  nutriment,  and  gives  herself  not  the  slightest 
concern  about  her  eggs  after  they  are  laid  ;  how  fishes  seek 
the  fresh  and  shallow  waters  when  they  spawn,  and  deposit 
the  roe  among  the  reeds  at  the  water's  edge,  or  in  a  shallow 
nest  at  the  bottom  ;  how  some  aquatic  animals  and  birds  lay 
their  eggs  in  the  bare  sand,  to  be  hatched  by  the  sun,  while 
others  keep  them  warm  and  hatch  them  in  nests,  and  then 
most  tenderly  cherish  their  young,  feeding  them  from  their 
own  crops,  or  bringing  food  to  them  ;  how  among  bees,  wasps, 
and  ants  neither  father  nor  mother,  but  the  sterile  females, 
busy  themselves  with  the  nursing  and  feeding  of  the  young  ; 
to  make  no  mention  of  many  other  expedients  and  contri- 
vances of  animals  which  contribute  to  the  preservation, 
defence,  pleasure,  and  welfare  of  themselves  or  their  species. 
A  man  must  be  very  perverse  if  he  will  not  see  that  these 


210  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

things  are  so  contrived  for  a  wise  purpose,  and  that   they 
have  their  origin  in  an  infinite  mind  and  will." 

Immanuel  Kant's  "  Enquiry,  Critical  and  Metaphysi- 
cal, into  the  Grounds  of  Proof  of  the  Existence  of 
God, "  was  published  in  1763.  To  him  belongs  the 
merit  of  systematizing  and  naming  the  arguments  for 
the  existence  of  God.  He  is  not,  however,  entirely 
consistent  in  his  nomenclature.  He  first  distinguishes 
between  the  ontological  argument,  "  that  by  which 
the  internal  possibility  of  all  things  is  considered  as 
something  that  gives  to  presuppose  some  one  exist- 
ence," and  the  cosmological,  in  which  "the  proof  is 
given  by  the  properties  perceived  in  the  things  of  the 
world  and  the  casual  order  of  the  universe."  Here  he 
includes  under  the  term"  cosmological,"  not  only  the  ar- 
gument for  a  First  Cause,  but  all  design-arguments,  and 
all  arguments  whatever  which  are  drawn  "from  what 
experience  teaches  us  of  existing  things ; "  in  other 
words,  all  a  posteriori  arguments  are  cosmological. 

That  this  is  true,  especially  as  regards  design-argu- 
ments being  included  under  the  term  "  cosmological," 
appears  further  from  the  following  quotation  :  — 

' '  In  our  humble  opinion  this  cosmological  proof  is  as  old 
as  the  reason  of  man.  It  is  so  natural,  so  engaging,  and 
enlarges  our  reflection  so  much  with  the  progress  of  our  in- 
sights, that  it  must  last  as  long  as  there  exists  anywhere  a 
rational  creature  who  wishes  to  partake  of  the  noble  con- 
templation of  knowing  God  by  his  works.  In  this  respect 
the  endeavors  of  Derham,  Nieuwentyt,  and  many  others, 
though  they  sometimes  betray  much  vanity  in  giving  all  sorts 
of  physical  insights  or  even  chimeras  a  venerable  semblance 
by  the  signal  of  religious  zeal,  do  human  reason  honor." 

But  in  Part  VIII.  of  this  "  Enquiry  "  he  separates  the 
design-arguments  of  physieo-theology  from  the  cosmo- 


REIMARUS,  KANT,  HUME,  AND  REID.  211 

logical  argument,  leaving  the  latter  term  to  apply  only 
to  the  causal  argument :  — 

' '  There  can  be  but  three  sorts  of  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God  from  speculative  reason,  — the  physico-theological,  in 
which  we  begin  with  the  determinate  experience  and  the 
thereby  known  peculiar  quality  of  our  sensible  world,  and 
mount  from  it,  according  to  laws  of  causation,  to  the  very 
Supreme  Cause  out  of  the  world  ;  the  cosmological,  in  which 
we  lay  indeterminate  experience  only,  that  is,  any  one  exist- 
ence, empirically  as  a  ground  ;  and  the  ontological." 

It  is  true  that  this  statement  alone  gives  but  a  faint 
notion  of  what  he  means  to  include  under  each  argu- 
ment; but  it  shows,  at  all  events,  that  he  has  aban- 
doned his  first  position  of  including  all  a  posteriori 
arguments  under  the  term  "  cosmological."  Turning 
over  to  the  more  careful  statement  of  each  argument 
just  before  he  proceeds  to  his  destructive  criticism  of 
it,  we  get  further  light  upon  his  meaning.  Speaking 
of  the  cosmological  proof,  he  says,  — 

"It  runs  thus:  If  something  exists,  an  absolutely  neces- 
sary Being  must  exist.  Now  I,  at  least,  exist  myself  :  there- 
fore an  absolutely  necessary  Being  exists. 

' '  The  main  points  of  the  physico-theological  proof  are 
as  follows  :  1 .  Everywhere  in  the  world  there  are  distinct 
marks  of  an  arrangement  according  to  a  determined  design, 
executed  with  great  wisdom,  and  in  a  whole  of  indescriba- 
ble variety,  as  well  as  of  unbounded  greatness  of  sphere. 
2.  This  arrangement,  so  answerable  to  the  end,  is  quite  foreign 
to  the  things  of  the  world,  and  adheres  to  them  fortuitously 
only;  that  is,  the  nature  of  the  different  agencies  could  not 
agree  of  its  own  accord  in  determinate  designs  by  so  various 
uniting  means,  were  it  not  chosen  and  disposed  for  that  pur- 
pose entirely  by  a  rational  Principle  ordering  it  according  to 
ideas  laid  as    a   foundation.     3.   Therefore   there   exists    a 


212  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

sublime  and  wise  Cause  (or  more  of  them) ,  which  must  be 
that  of  the  world,  not  only  as  blind,  working  all-powerful 
nature  by  fertility,  but,  as  an  intelligence,  by  liberty. 
4.  This  Cause's  unity  may  be  inferred  from  the  unity  of  the 
reciprocal  reference  of  the  parts  of  the  world  as  members 
of  an  artificial  structure,  in  that  to  which  our  observation 
reaches  with  certainty  [that  is,  inferred  with  certainty. 
These  Germans  thrust  so  many  clauses  and  qualifications 
between  subject  and  predicate,  that  one  must  have  a  long 
memory  and  a  clear  head  if  he  will  keep  track  of  the  rela- 
tion between  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  one  of  their  sen- 
tences], but  farther,  on  all  the  principles  of  analogy,  with 
probability."  [That  is,  the  analogical  inference  carries  us 
beyond  the  sphere  of  observation,  but  gives  only  a  proba- 
bility instead  of  a  certainty.] 

I  have  quoted  more  than  was  needed  to  show  that 
his  physico-theology  is  co-extensive  with  design-argu- 
ments, or  with  eutaxiology  and  teleology ;  and  that, 
although  he  first  included  these  under  the  cosmological 
proof,  he  has  here  excluded  them.  That  is  one  point  I 
wish  to  establish  ;  but  I  shall  use  the  quotation  for  other 
purposes  also,  and  hence  have  extended  it  more  than 
would  have  been  otherwise  necessary.  Upon  this  first 
point,  however,  I  wish  to  remark,  that  those  theologians 
who  have  adopted  the  later  classification  of  Kant,  in 
which  he  restricts  the  term  "  cosmological  "  to  the  argu- 
ment for  a  First  Cause,  have,  in  so  doing,  followed  his 
worse,  rather  than  his  better,  thought.  The  design- 
arguments  are  both  unquestionably  cosmological,  in 
that  they  draw  their  facts  from  external  nature ;  and 
the  eutaxiological  proof  is  the  cosmological  one  par  ex- 
cellence, because  the  principle  of  order  is  of  the  very 
essence  of  a  cosmos  as  distinguished  from  a  chaos. 

A  singular  fact  appears  in  the  above  quotation  :  Kant 


REIMARUS,   KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID.  213 

resolves  the  design-arguments  into  causal  arguments. 
This  is  all  the  more  remarkable,  because  he  excludes 
them,  in  this  part  of  his  treatise,  from  a  place  under 
the  term  "  cosmological."  That  is  a  causal  argument  as 
he  employs  it  here  ;  and,  if  the  design-arguments  also 
proceed  according  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  it 
would  seem  that  he  had  an  additional  reason  in  this 
fact  for  adhering  to  his  first  plan  of  including  them  all 
under  one  name.  But  the  resolution  of  design-argu- 
ments into  cause-and-effect  arguments  is  a  part  of  his 
general  plan  of  attack.  He  turns  them  all  into  one,  in 
order  to  sweep  them  all  away  at  one  stroke.  He  re- 
solves the  physico-theological  proof  into  the  cosmologi- 
cal, the  cosmological  into  the  ontological,  and  then 
proceeds  to  demolish  the  ontological  proof.  One  is  re- 
minded of  that  rural  practitioner  whose  first  step  in 
every  case  was  to  throw  the  patient  into  convulsions, 
because,  while  he  was  ignorant  of  the  proper  remedies 
for  other  diseases,  he  knew  how  to  cure  "  fits." 

I  am  not  concerned  about  the  attack  upon  the  onto- 
logical proof:  let  others  defend  that  if  they  choose. 
But  I  contend  that  the  design-arguments  are  distinct 
lines  of  reasoning,  not  capable  of  being  resolved  into 
any  other.  The  first  step  in  proving  the  existence  of 
God  by  means  of  them  is  to  establish  the  proposition 
that  intelligence  has  been  concerned  in  the  orderly 
disposition  of  the  cosmos.  The  farther  steps  from  an 
intelligent  World-Orderer  to  an  infinite  God  (steps 
which  are  generally  ignored,  but  which  are  quite  as 
necessary  as  the  first)  I  shall  not  discuss  at  present. 
But  how  are  we  to  take  the  first  step  ?  Kant  says,  by 
proceeding  upon  the  principle  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
order  of  nature  is  an  effect  whose  cause  must  be  intelli- 
gent.    I  say  that  we  need  not  resort  to  the  principle 


214  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  causation  at  all.  The  reasoning  properly  proceeds 
(I  speak  of  that  one  of  the  design-arguments  which  I 
have  named  eutaxiological)  upon  the  principle  of  iden- 
tification by  means  of  marks.  The  quality  a  is  a  mark, 
an  invariable  attribute  of  the  substance  A:  therefore 
the  presence  of  a  enables  us  to  infer  the  presence  of  A. 
Now,  mind  has  its  marks,  one  of  which  is  order.  The 
order  of  the  cosmos  therefore  justifies  the  inference  of 
an  intelligent  World-Orderer. 

But  it  may  be  answered,  that  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion is  there,  whether  you  bring  it  out  in  the  statement 
of  the  proof  or  not.  Intelligence  was  the  cause  of 
order.  That  I  cannot  deny,  but  there  are  some  con- 
siderations which  set  this  undeniable  fact  in  a  new 
light.  The  principle  of  causation  is  involved  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  way  and  to  the  same  extent  in  all  rea- 
soning. Suppose  a  lawyer  is  trying  to  convict  a  man  of 
murder  b}^  means  of  certain  stains  upon  a  knife  in  his 
possession  when  he  was  arrested.  He  claims  that  they 
are  blood-marks  ;  and,  very  likely,  the  reasoning  will  be 
conclusive  enough  to  convince  the  court  and  jury  that 
the  man  ought  to  be  hung.  Here  the  law  of  cause  and 
effect  is  involved.  Blood  was  the  cause  of  the  marks. 
But  does  that  make  it  a  causal  argument?  Suppose  the 
advocate  for  the  defence  should  claim  that  it  was  a 
causal  argument,  and  proceed  to  throw  doubt  upon  it 
by  rehearsing  the  metaphysical  disputes  respecting  cau- 
sation. Is  the  judgment  that  every  event  has  a  cause, 
an  intuition,  or  an  induction  from  experience  ?  May  it 
please  the  court,  gentlemen  of  the  jury,  Hume  says  this 
about  it,  and  Reid  says  that.  The  case  of  Mill  v. 
McCosh  must  be  thoroughly  examined  before  we  hang 
this  man.  How  long  would  the  judge  permit  that  sort 
of  quibbling  to  go  on  ?     But  it  would  be  just  as  reason- 


REIMARUS,  KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID.  215 

able  as  it  is  to  resolve  design-arguments  into  causal 
arguments,  because,  forsooth,  the  principle  of  causation 
underlies  them,  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  the  nexus 
between  order  and  intelligence  may  be  viewed  as  causal 
if  we  choose  to  do  so. 

Why  should  we  not  so  choose  ?  It  seems  from  what 
has  been  said,  that  it  is  possible  to  resolve  design-argu- 
ments into  causal  arguments, — possible  upon  just  the 
same  grounds  that  would  apply  to  all  sorts  of  reason- 
ing. The  considerations  thus  far  urged  go  to  show 
only  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  do  it.  If  there  is  an 
option  in  the  matter,  what  objection  is  there  to  this 
resolution  of  these  arguments,  —  a  course  which  tends 
to  simplify  the  whole  problem  of  theology  ?  Simplicity 
is  certainly  a  good  thing  in  most  cases.  It  depends 
somewhat  upon  circumstances,  however,  whether  this 
party  or  that  is  to  be  benefited  by  it.  For  the  tyrant 
who  wished  to  behead  all  his  subjects  at  one  blow,  the 
resolution  of  all  necks  into  one  would  have  been  a 
capital  thing ;  but  not  so  for  his  subjects.  So  it  might 
be  a  capital  thing  for  the  atheists  to  reduce  all  theistic 
arguments  into  one,  but  not  a  good  thing  for  the  oppo- 
site party. 

Eutaxiology  is,  in  fact,  a  distinct  argument;  and  every 
attempt  to  resolve  it  into  some  other  form  of  proof  is 
of  the  nature  of  legal  quibbling.  The  inference  from 
mind-marks  to  mind  is  direct  and  certain.  It  does  not 
at  all  depend  upon  the  principle  of-  causation.  That 
may  be  a  matter  of  intuition  or  a  matter  of  experience  : 
it  is  entirely  a  matter  of  indifference  which  it  is,  so  far  as 
this  order-argument  is  concerned.  So  of  any  other  diffi- 
culties which  the  causal  argument  encounters :  whether 
they  are  trivial  or  fatal,  it  matters  not  to  eutaxiology, 
because  that  stands  upon  its  own  independent  basis. 


216  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Kant,  as  we  all  know,  was  far  from  being  an  atheist. 
How  did  it  happen,  then,  that  he  assailed  theistic  argu- 
ments with  such  energy?  I  suppose  it  resulted  from 
his  peculiar  psychology.  He  parcelled  out  the  mind 
into  sharply  defined  faculties,  and  walled  them  off  in 
separate  compartments.  He  had  his  "  speculative " 
reason  and  his  "  practical  "  reason.  It  was  by  the  light 
of  the  former  that  he  framed  his  destructive  criticism 
of  the  proofs  of  God's  existence.  But  his  practical 
reason  accepted  these  very  arguments  as  valid,  and 
enabled  him  to  look  up  with  all  reverence  and  Chris- 
tian humility  to  a  heavenly  Father.  If  one's  speculative 
and  practical  reason  were  really  so  distinct  as  he  made 
them,  might  it  not  happen  that  the  one  should  bring  up 
at  the  wrong  port  in  eternity,  while  the  other  came  out 
all  right  ? 

But  let  us  be  thankful  that  Kant  had  a  practical  rea- 
son as  well  as  a  speculative  one ;  for  by  means  of  it  he 
was  enabled,  not  only  to  be  a  good  Christian,  but 
to  make  some  very  sound  suggestions  respecting  the 
strengthening  and  improvement  of  design-arguments. 
The  most  remarkable  thing  in  these  suggestions  is, 
that,  although  he  'did  not  distinguish  eutaxiology  from 
teleology  so  far  as -to  give  it  a  distinct  name,  he  pitches 
upon  the  order  of  nature  for  especial  emphasis  at  the 
very  beginning,  and  holds  it  forth  prominently  to  the 
very  end.  Manifestly  his  physico-theology  is  mostly 
eutaxiology,  while  that  of  his  predecessors  and  con- 
temporaries was  mostly  teleology. 

"  The  following  considerations,  then,  may  tend  to  improve 
this  method  (namely,  the  physico-theological  proof).  Order 
and  harmony,  though  they  are  necessary,  denote  an  intelli- 
gent Author.     Nothing  can  be  more  disadvantageous  to  the 


REIMARUS,  KANT,  HUME,   AND  REIT).  217 

thought  of  a  Divine  Author  of  the  universe,  or  more  ir- 
rational, than  always  to  be  ready  to  ascribe  a  great  fertile 
rule  of  regularity,  of  utility,  and  of  harmony,  to  accident. 
The  klinomen  of  atoms  in  the  systems  of  Democritus  and 
Epicurus  is  of  this  nature.  Without  dwelling  on  the  absurd- 
ity and  the  premeditated  illusion  of  this  way  of  judging,  as 
they  are  already  made  sufficiently  evident  by  others,  we  have 
to  observe,  that  the  perceived  necessity  in  the  reference  of 
things  to  regular  connections,  and  the  coherence  of  useful 
laws  with  a  necessary  unity,  yield,  as  well  as  the  casual  and 
arbitrable  arrangement,  a  proof  of  a  wise  Author,  though 
the  dependence  upon  him  in  this  point  of  view  must  be  repre- 
sented in  another  way.  In  order  to  see  this  properly,  we 
perceive  that  order  and  various  advantageous  harmonies  in 
general  denote,  even  before  we  reflect  whether  this  reference 
is  necessary  or  casual  to  the  things,  an  intelligent  Author. 
According  to  the  judgments  of  common,  sane  reason,  the 
course  of  the  alterations  of  the  world,  or  that  connection  in 
whose  stead  another  is  possible,  has,  though  it  affords  a 
clear  proof  of  casualty,  little  effect  in  occasioning  the 
understanding  of  the  presumption  of  an  author.  Thereto 
philosophy  is  required,  and  even  its  use  in  this  case  impli- 
cated and  uncertain  ;  whereas  great  regularity  and  harmony 
in  a  great  multifarious  whole  astonish,  and  common  reason 
itself  never  can  find  them  possible  without  an  intelligent 
Author.  Let  the  things  themselves  be  necessary  or  contin- 
gent, let  the  one  rule  of  regularity  essentially  lie  in  the  other 
or  be  arbitrariously  conjoined  with  it,  it  is  directly  found 
impossible  that  order  and  regularity  should  thus  have  place 
of  themselves  (sjoonte)  either  by  accident,  or  among  many 
things  which  have  their  separate  existence  ;  for  the  possi- 
bility of  extensive  harmony  or  agreement  without  an  intelli- 
gent ground  never  is  sufficiently  given." 

Kant's  thought  is  not  easy  to  follow,  either  in  the 
above  or  in  the  next  quotation.     It  is  not  all  on  the 


218  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

surface  :  it  is  subtile  and  deep,  not  to  say  a  trifle  muddy 
sometimes.  One  key  to  the  comprehension  of  his  sug- 
gestions for  the  improvement  of  design-arguments  is  to 
observe  his  antithesis  between  what  is  "necessary"  and 
what  is  u  casual  and  arbitrable."  He  has  a  profound 
comprehension  of  the  contrast  between  that  which  is 
settled,  fixed,  unbending,  and  'universal  in  the  cosmos, 
and  that  which  is  flexible  and  tends  to  specialization. 
In  other  words,  he  knew  the  difference  between  eutaxi- 
ology  and  teleology;  and  it  is  a  pity  that  he  did  not 
emphasize  it  more,  and  nail  it  down  by  giving  each 
argument  a  distinct  name.  The  attempt  to  distinguish 
the  one  as  "  necessary,"  and  the  other  as  "  casual,"  be- 
sides its  awkwardness,  is  open  to  several  other  objec- 
tions. It  is  not  essential  to  eutaxiology  to  admit  fatality 
to  the  extent  which  he  seems  willing  to  grant.  But, 
although  these  terms  are  not  the  best,  they  serve  to 
distinguish  the  two  arguments  after  a  fashion,  and  to 
show  what  prominence  Kant  gives  to  eutaxiology. 

With  these  hints  to  aid  in  their  interpretation,  I  hope 
the  reader  may  ponder  Kant's  six  "  rules  "  with  as  much 
profit  and  satisfaction  as  I  have  :  — 

"We  shall  comprise  the  improved  method  of  physico- 
theology  in  the  following  short  rules  :  Guided  by  a  confidence 
in  the  fertility  of  the  universal  laws  of  nature,  because  of 
their  dependence  upon  the  Divine  Being,  let  us  — 

"1.  Seek  the  causes  of  even  the  most  advantageous  con- 
stitutions in  universal  laws,  which,  with  a  necessary  unity, 
bear,  besides  other  regular  consequences,  a  reference  to  the 
productions  of  these  effects. 

"2.  Observe  what  is  necessary,  in  this  connection  of  vari- 
ous fitnesses  in  one  ground  ;  because  the  way  of  thence  con- 
cluding the  existence  of  God  is  distinct  from  that  which  has 
the  artificial  and  chosen  unity  in  view,  as  well  as  the  conse- 


REIMARUS,   KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID.  219 

quence  according  to  constant  and  necessary  laws  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  accident.1 

"3.  Presume  greater  necessary  unity  than  is  directly  ob- 
vious, not  only  in  unorganized  but  in  organized  bodies  ;  for 
even  in  the  structure  of  an  animal  it  is  presumable  that  a 
single  predisposition  has  a  productive  fitness  for  many  useful 
consequences,  for  which  we  at  first  might  find  various  par- 
ticular arrangements  necessary.  This  attention  is  very 
suitable  to  philosophy,  as  well  as  advantageous  to  the  phys- 
ico-theological  consequence. 

"  4.  Make  use  of  the  manifestly  artificial  order  thence  to 
infer  the  wisdom  of  an  Author  as  a  ground ;  but,  of  the 
essential  and  necessary  unity  in  the  laws  of  nature,  thence 
to  conclude  a  wise  Being  by  means,  not  of  his  wisdom,  but 
of  that  in  him  which  must  accord  with  it. 

"5.  From  the  casual  combinations  in  the  world  conclude 
of  the  Author  of  the  way  in  which  the  universe  is  composed ; 
but,  from  the  necessary  unity,  of  the  very  same  Being  as  the 
author  of  matter  itself,  or  of  the  very  elemental  or  con- 
stituent parts  of  all  the  things  of  nature.     And  let  us  — 

"6.  Enlarge  this  method  by  universal  rules  which  can' 
render  intelligible  the  grounds  of  the  regularity  of  what  is 
mechanically  or  even  geometrically  necessary,  and  not  neglect 
to  consider  under  this  point  of  view  the  properties  of  space, 
and  from  the  unity  of  its  great  multifariousness  to  illustrate 
the  same  chief  conception." 

David  Hume's  "  Dialogues  concerning  Natural  Reli- 
gion "  appeared  in  1779,  three  years  after  the  death  of 
the  author.  His  motive  in  adopting  the  form  of  a  dia- 
logue is  thus  stated  :  — 

"There  are  some  subjects,  however,  to  which  dialogue- 
writing  is  peculiarly  adapted,  and  where  it  is  still  preferable 
to  the  direct  and  simple  method  of  composition. 

1  In  this  rule  he  is  pulling  hard  towards  a  clear  distinction  between 
eutaxiology  and  teleology;  but  his  keel  sticks  a  little  in  the  gravel. 


220  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS- 

' '  Any  point  of  doctrine  which  is  so  obvious  that  it  scarcely 
admits  of  dispute,  but  at  the  same  time  so  important  that  it 
cannot  be  too  often  inculcated,  seems  to  require  some  such 
method  of  handling  it,  —  where  the  novelty  of  the  manner 
may  compensate  the  triteness  of  the  subject,  where  the  vivaci- 
ty of  the  conversation  may  enforce  the  precept,  and  where  the 
variety  of  lights,  presented  by  various  personages  and  char- 
acters, may  appear  neither  tedious  nor  redundant. 

"Any  question  of  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
is  so  obscure  and  uncertain  that  human  reason  can  reach  no 
fixed  determination  with  regard  to  it,  if  it  should  be  treated 
at  all,  seems  to  lead  us  naturally  into  the  style  of  dialogue 
and  conversation.  Reasonable  men  may  be  allowed  to  differ 
where  no  one  can  reasonably  be  positive.  Opposite  senti- 
ments, even  without  any  decision,  afford  an  agreeable 
amusement ;  and,  if  the  subject  be  curious  and  interesting, 
the  book  carries  us,  in  a  manner,  into  company,  and  unites 
the  two  greatest  and  purest  pleasures  of  human  life,  —  study 
and  society. 

"Happily  all  these  circumstances  are  to  be  found  in  the 
subject  of  Natural  Religion.  What  truth  so  obvious,  so 
certain,  as  the  being  of  God,  which  the  most  ignorant  ages 
have  acknowledged,  for  which  the  most  refined  geniuses  have 
ambitiously  striven  to  produce  new  proofs  and  arguments? 
What  truth  so  important  as  this,  which  is  the  ground  of  all 
our  hope,  the  surest  foundation  of  morality,  the  firmest  sup- 
port of  society,  and  the  only  principle  which  ought  never  for 
a  moment  to  be  absent  from  our  thoughts  and  meditations  ? 
But,  in  treating  of  this  obvious  and  important  truth,  what 
obscure  questions  occur  concerning  the  nature  of  that  Divine 
Being, — his  attributes,  his  decrees,  his  plan  of  providence? 
These  have  been  always  subjected  to  the  disputations  of  men. 
Concerning  these,  human  nature  has  not  reached  any  certain 
determination.  But  these  are  topics  so  interesting  that  we 
cannot  restrain  our  restless  inquiry  with  regard  to  them, 
though   nothing   but   doubt,   uncertainty,   and   contradiction 


REIMARUS.   KANT,   HUME,   AND  REID.  221 

have,    as    yet,    been   the   result    of    our  most   accurate  re- 
searches." 

The  conversational  method  was  certainly  well  suited 
to  Hume's  genius.  He  was  vain  of  his  fertility  in 
raising  objections,  and  this  method  gave  him  the  oppor- 
tunity to  display  that  faculty  without  incurring  the 
opprobrium  of  being  personally  responsible  for  opinions 
he  puts  into  the  mouth  of  some  dashing  sceptic  in  the 
dialogue.  It  gave  him  even  the  opportunity,  which  he 
did  not  fail  to  improve,  of  complimenting  himself  in  his 
own  book !  His  Clean thes  praises  his  Philo  for  "  the 
fertility  of  his  invention  in  raising  doubts  and  objec- 
tions." As  these  are  mere  imaginary  personages  in- 
vented to  carry  out  the  form  of  a  dialogue,  this  is 
simply  Hume  praising  Hume. 

Another  reason  why  the  dialogue  form  suited  Hume 
was,  that  it  furnished  an  excuse  for  leaving  many  things 
unsettled.  Something  is  said  on  both  sides  of  every 
controversy  raised.  This  gives  a  double  opportunity  for 
brilliant  writing,  first  on  one  side,  and  then  on  the 
other ;  but,  when  all  is  done,  you  are  wholly  in  the  dark 
as  to  what  Hume  himself  believed.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  he  knew  himself  what  he  believed.  What  he 
advances  with  apparent  conviction  in  one  essay,  he 
overthrows  in  another.  We  have  an  illustration  of  this 
in  respect  to  the  very  topic  of  these  dialogues.  In  the 
"  Natural  History  of  Religion,"  published  in  1757,  he 
speaks  of  design-arguments  as  presenting  "invincible 
reasons  "  for  the  inference  that  there  is  "  one  Supreme 
Deity  ;  "  while  in  the  "  Dialogues  "  he  raises  all  manner 
of  doubts  and  objections  against  them. 

The  parties  to  the  conversation  are  Demea,  who  rep- 
resents a  sturdy  orthodoxy ;  Cleanthes,  who  personates 


222  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

a  sober  and  reverent  rationalism  ;  and  Philo,  a  brilliant, 
dashing,  and  reckless  sceptic.  At  the  end  Pamphilus, 
who  records  the  dialogue,  says,  — 

"  Upon  a  serious  review  of  the  whole,  I  cauuot  but  think 
that  Philo's  principles  are  more  probable  than  Demea's, 
but  that  those  of  Cleanthes  approach  still  nearer  to  the 
truth." 

That  is  to  say,  Hume  wished  it  to  be  understood  that 
Cleanthes  most  nearly  expressed  his  own  opinions, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  he  recalled  with  complacency 
the  brilliant  conversational  exploits  of  Philo. 

Cleanthes  is  the  spokesman  for  teleology  ;  and,  singu- 
larly enough,  the  ultra-orthodox  Demea  and  the  ultra- 
sceptical  Philo  unite  their  forces  against  Cleanthes. 
Demea  does  this  because  the  rational  proofs  of  God's  ex- 
istence yield  only  a  probability,  and  not  a  certainty,  of 
it ;  and  he  is  shocked  at  the  audacity  of  even  starting 
such  an  inquiry.  He  thinks  "  that  each  man  feels,  in  a 
manner,  the  truth  of  religion  within  his  own  breast." 
The  only  proper  question  to  be  raised  pertains  not  to 
"  the  being  but  the  nature  of  God."  And  even  on  this 
question  silent  adoration  is  the  proper  attitude  of  the 
mind,  for  God's  nature  is  "  altogether  incomprehensible 
and  unknown  to  us."  Philo,  the  sceptic,  of  course 
chimes  in  with  this  opinion  so  far  as  the  incomprehen- 
sibility of  the  Deity  is  concerned,  though  he  is  not  so 
strong  on  the  point  of  silent  adoration.  He  and  Demea 
go  on  together  in  a  very  lovely  manner  for  a  time, 
having  the  demolition  of  the  teleology  of  Cleanthes  for 
a  common  object  and  point  of  sympathy ;  but  finally 
his  ribald  scepticism  proves  too  much  for  the  orthodox 
champion,  and  Demea  retires  in  disgust. 

The  teleological  proof  is  thus  stated  by  Cleanthes  :  — 


REIMARUS,  KANT,   HUME,  AND  REID.  223 

"  Look  round  the  world  ;  contemplate  the  whole  and  every 
part  of  it:  you  will  find  it  to  be  nothing  but  one  great 
machine,  subdivided  into  an  infinite  number  of  lesser  ma- 
chines, which  again  admit  of  subdivisions  to  a  degree  beyond 
what  human  faculties  can  trace  and  explain.  All  these 
various  machines,  and  even  their  most  minute  parts,  are 
adjusted  to  each  other  with  an  accuracy  which  ravishes  into 
admiration  all  men  who  have  ever  contemplated  them.  The 
curious  adapting  of  means  to  ends  resembles  exactly,  though 
it  much  exceeds,  the  productions  of  human  contrivance,  of 
human  designs,  thought,  wisdom,  and  intelligence.  Since, 
therefore,  the  effects  resemble  each  other,  we  are  led  to  infer, 
by  all  the  rules  of  analogy,  that  the  causes  also  resemble, 
and  that  the  Author  of  nature  is  somewhat  similar  to  the 
mind  of  man,  though  possessed  of  much  larger  faculties 
proportioned  to  the  grandeur  of  the  work  which  he  has  exe- 
cuted. By  this  argument  d  posteriori,  and  by  this  argument 
alone,  do  we  prove  at  once  the  existence  of  a  Deity,  and 
his  similarity  to  human  mind  and  intelligence. " 

The  first  point  in  this  argument  which  Philo  selects 
for  his  attack  is  the  logical  method.  He  claims  that  the 
analogy  is  a  very  weak  one  because  of  the  dissimilarity 
of  the  productions  of  art  and  nature. 

' '  After  having  experienced  the  circulation  of  the  blood  in 
human  creatures,  we  make  no  doubt  that  it  takes  place  in 
Titius  and  Msevius.  [But  that  is  not  a  case  of  analogy  at 
all:  it  is  an  induction.]  But  from  its  circulation  in  frogs 
and  fishes,  it  is  only  a  presumption,  though  a  strong  one, 
from  analogy,  that  it  takes  place  in  men  and  other  animals. 
The  analogical  reasoning  is  much  weaker  when  we  infer  the 
circulation  of  sap  in  vegetables  from  our  experience  that 
the  blood  circulates  in  animals  ;  and  those  who  hastily  fol- 
lowed that  imperfect  analogy  are  found,  by  more  accurate 
experiments,  to  have  been  mistaken.  [Not  entirely  mis- 
taken:  the  sap  does  circulate.]     If  we  see  a  house,  Clean- 


224  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

thes,  we  conclude,  with  the  greatest  certainty,  that  it  had  an 
architect  or  builder,  because  that  is  precisely  that  species  of 
effect  which  we  have  experienced  to  proceed  from  that 
species  of  cause.  But  surely  you  will  not  affirm  that  the 
universe  bears  such  a  resemblance  to  a  house  that  we  can 
with  the  same  certainty  infer  a  similar  cause,  or  that  the 
analogy  is  here  entire  and  perfect.  The  dissimilitude  is  so 
striking  that  the  utmost  you  can  here  pretend  to  is  a  guess, 
a  conjecture,  a  presumption,  concerning  a  similar  cause ; 
and  how  that  pretension  will  be  received  in  the  world,  I 
leave  you  to  consider. 

"  When  two  species  of  objects  have  always  been  observed 
to  be  conjoined  together,  I  can  infer,  by  custom,  the  exist- 
ence of  one  wherever  I  see  the  existence  of  the  other  ;  and 
this  I  call  an  argument  from  experience.  But  how  this  ar- 
gument can  have  place  where  the  objects,  as  in  the  present 
case,  are  single,  individual,  without  parallel,  or  specific  re- 
semblance, may  be  difficult  to  explain.  And  will  any  man 
tell  me,  with  a  serious  countenance,  that  an  orderly  universe 
must  arise  from  some  thought  and  art,  like  the  human,  be- 
cause we  have  experience  of  it?  To  ascertain  [he  means 
verify"]  this  reasoning,  it  were  requisite  that  we  had  experi- 
ence of  the  origin  of  worlds  ;  and  it  is  not  sufficient,  surely, 
that  we  have  seen  ships  and  cities  arise  from  human  art  and 
contrivance." 

In  the  last  quotation  he  passes  from  the  first  to  the 
second  point  of  attack.  The  animus  of  this  is  to  be 
found  in  his  principles  of  psychology.  He  belonged  to 
the  sensational  school,  admitting  no  innate  or  intuitive 
elements  of  mind,  but  holding  that  all  knowledge 
comes  from  without  through  the  senses.  But  let  him 
state  this  for  himself :  — 

"All  the  perceptions  of  the  human  mind  resolve  them- 
selves into  two  distinct  kinds,  which  I  shall  call  Impressions 
and  Ideas.     The  difference  betwixt  these  consists  in  the  de- 


REIMARUS,   KANT,  HUME,   AND  REID.  225 

grees  of  force  and  liveliness  with  which  they  strike  upon  the 
mind,  and  make  their  way  into  our  thought  or  consciousness. 
Those  perceptions  which  enter  with  most  force  and  violence 
we  may  name  impressions ;  and  under  this  name  I  compre- 
hend all  our  sensations,  passions,  and  emotions,  as  they 
make  their  first  appearance  in  the  soul.  By  ideas  I  mean 
the  faint  images  of  these  in  thinking  and  reasoning."  1 

As  he  held  that  all  knowledge  comes  through  experi- 
ence by  the  channel  of  the  senses,  it  was  inevitable 
that  he  should  deny  any  possibility  of  inferring  an  in- 
telligent world-builder  unless  we  had  actually  witnessed 
the  process  of  world-building.  Reid  took  a  clever  turn 
upon  him  at  this  point  by  showing,  that,  on  this  ground, 
he  could  not  know  that  any  mind  at  all  existed,  even 
of  his  most  intimate  and  gifted  companions  !  He  could 
not  obtain  any  knowledge  of  it  through  the  senses ;  and, 
according  to  his  own  principles,  he  could  not  therefore 
be  sure  of  the  existence  of  any  intelligence  except  his 
own. 

Hume  himself,  speaking  through  Cleanthes,  indicates 
the  wild  and  boundless  sweep  of  such  a  style  of  objec- 
tions. Upon  the  same  grounds  that  we  reject  any  in- 
ference of  intelligence  in  the  structure  of  worlds  un- 
less we  had  seen  their  origin,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
us  to  receive  any  revelation  of  God's  existence  con- 
veyed in  any  manner  whatsoever. 

"'Suppose,'  says  Cleanthes,  'that  an  articulate  voice 
were  heard  in  the  clouds,  much  louder  and  more  melodi- 
ous than  any  which  human  art  could  ever  reach ;  suppose 
that  this  voice  were  extended  in  the  same  instant  over  all 
nations,  and  spoke  to  each  nation  in  its  own  language  and 
dialect ;  suppose  that  the  words  delivered,  not  only  contain  a 
just  sense  and  meaning,  but  convey  some  instruction  alto- 

1  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  initio. 


226  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

gether  worthy  of  a  benevolent  being,  superior  to  mankind: 
could  }Tou  possibly  hesitate  a  moment  concerning  the  cause 
of  this  voice,  and  must  you  not  instantly  ascribe  it  to  some 
design  or  purpose  ?  Yet  I  cannot  see  but  all  the  same  ob- 
jections (if  they  merit  that  appellation)  which  lie  against 
the  S37stem  of  theism  may  also  be  produced  against  this  in- 
ference. Might  you  not  say  that  all  conclusions  concerning 
fact  were  founded  on  experience  ;  that  when  we  hear  an  ar- 
ticulate voice  in  the  dark,  and  thence  infer  a  man,  it  is  only 
the  resemblance  of  the  effects  which  leads  us  to  conclude  that 
there  is  a  like  resemblance  in  the  cause  ?  But  this  extraordi- 
nary voice,  by  its  loudness,  extent,  and  flexibility  to  all 
languages,  bears  so  little  analogy  to  any  human  voice,  that 
we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  any  analogy  in  their  causes  ; 
and  consequently  that  a  rational,  wise,  coherent  speech  pro- 
ceeded, you  know  not  whence,  from  some  accidental  whistling 
of  the  winds,  not  from  any  divine  reason  or  intelligence. 
You  see  clearly  your  own  objections  in  these  cavils  ;  and  I 
hope,  too,  you  see  clearly  that  they  cannot  possibly  have 
more  force  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other.'  " 

Very  true :  we  should  have  to  reject  the  testimony  ot 
God  himself  speaking  in  an  audible  voice  from  heaven 
on  Philo's  principles.  The  recoil  of  such  a  style  of  ob- 
jection does  more  damage  than  its  projectile  force. 

It  should  be  observed  that  Cleanthes'  statement  of 
the  teleological  argument  contains  little  of  the  strength, 
but  all  the  vices  and  weakness,  of  the  teleology  cur- 
rent in  Hume's  day.  It  is  grossly  mechanical:  the 
world  is  "one  great  machine,  subdivided  into  an  infi- 
nite number  of  lesser  machines,  which  again  admit  of 
subdivisions."  It  proceeds  by  analogy,  whereas  the  fun- 
damental propositions-  of  ph}Tsico-theology  are  reached 
by  induction.  The  causal  element  is  constantly  thrust 
forward.     "  Like  effects  prove  like  causes,"  is  the  text 


REIMARUS,   KANT,   HUME,  AND  REID.  227 

of  his  discourse.  Philo  takes  this  up,  and  easily  shows 
that  it  leads  to  anthropomorphism ;  that,  the  effects  be- 
ing finite,  the  cause  is  also  finite  ;  that  as  there  are  slips, 
evils,  and  monstrosities  in  nature,  so  there  must  be  in 
God ;  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  infer  the  unity  of  the 
Deity,  since  in  human  production  a  ship,  for  example, 
is  the  work  of  many  hands.  Having  such  a  feeble  and 
vicious  statement  of  teleology  to  attack,  it  is  no  wonder 
that  Philo  makes  more  havoc  than  Cleanthes  is  able  to 
repair.  The  whole  matter  is  finally  hammered  down 
to  this  insignificant  conclusion  :  — 

' '  The  whole  of  natural  theology  resolves  itself  into  this 
proposition,  That  the  cause  or  causes  of  order  in  the  universe 
probably  bear  some  remote  analogy  to  human  intelligence." 

Thomas  Reicl,  D.D.,  published  his  "  Essays  on  the 
Intellectual  Powers  of  Man "  in  1785.  In  this  he 
gives  some  space  to  teleology  with  particular  refer- 
ence to  Hume's  attack  upon  it :  — 

"The  argument  from  final  causes,  when  reduced  to  a 
syllogism,  has  these  two  premises :  First,  That  design  and 
intelligence  in  the  cause  ma}T,  with  certainty,  be  inferred 
from  marks  or  signs  of  it  in  the  effect.  This  is  the  principle 
we  have  been  considering,  and  we  may  call  it  the  major 
proposition  of  the  argument,  The  second,  which  we  call 
the  minor  proposition,  is,  that  there  are  in  fact  the  clearest 
marks  of  design  and  wisdom  in  the  works  of  nature  ;  and  the 
conclusion  is,  that  the  works  of  nature  are  the  effects  of  a 
wise  and  intelligent  Cause." 

This  argument  would  be  much  stronger  if  stated 
without  any  reference  to  the  principle  of  cause  and 
effect.  Mind  may  be  inferred  from  mind-marks  wher- 
ever and  in  whatsoever  these  may  be  found.  The 
only  question  is,  whether  they  are  mind-marks ;   and, 


228  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

in  the  determination  of  that,  the  law  of  causation  is 
not  concerned  in  any  way  or  degree  whatever. 

Reid  says  that  the  ancients  denied  the  minor  prem- 
ise ;  but  "  the  gradual  advancement  made  in  the 
knowledge  of  nature  hath  put  this  opinion  quite  out 
of  countenance.  When  the  structure  of  the  human 
body  was  much  less  known  than  it  is  now,  the  famous 
Galen  saw  such  evident  marks  of  wise  contrivance  in 
it,  that,  though  he  had  been  educated  an  Epicurean,  he 
renounced  that  s}Tstem,  and  wrote  his  book  of  the  use 
of  the  parts  of  the  human  body,  on  purpose  to  convince 
others  of  what  appeared  so  clear  to  himself,  that  it  was 
impossible  that  such  admirable  contrivance  should  be 
the  effect  of  chance.  Those,  therefore,  of  later  times, 
who  are  dissatisfied  with  this  argument  from  final 
causes,  have  quitted  the  stronghold  of  the  ancient 
atheists,  which  had  become  untenable,  and  have  chosen 
rather  to  make  a  defence  against  the  major  proposition." 

The  method  he  adopts  for  the  purpose  of  establish- 
ing this  major  premise  is  to  assert  that  it  is  an  intuitive 
truth.  Having  turned  Hume's  position  against  Hume's 
own  objection,  by  showing  to  what  absurdities  it  led, 
he  was  perhaps  inclined  to  go  too  far  in  the  opposite 
direction.  He  was  not  content  with  meeting  Hume's 
sensationalism  by  the  assertion  that  there  are  some 
intuitive  convictions,  but  magnified  his  office  of  cham- 
pioning intuitions  by  claiming  some  things  to  be  intui- 
tive which  were  not.  The  safest  ground  for  design- 
arguments  is  that  of  induction.  Nevertheless,  Reid's 
contribution  to  teleology  is  valuable,  being  directed  as 
it  is  to  a  scrutiny  of  its  logical  validity,  instead  of  piling 
up  new  examples  or  rehearsing  old  ones. 


PALEY,   STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  229 


CHAPTER   IX. 

PALEY,   STEWART,  AND   CROMBIE. 

In  the  "  Natural  Theology  "  of  William  Paley,  D.D., 
which  appeared  in  1803,  we  are  at  once  impressed  with 
the  exaggerated  importance  which  he  attaches  to  those 
appearances  in  nature  which  most  nearly  resemble  the 
productions  of  human  art.  The  mechanical  school  of 
teleology  has  in  him,  I  was  about  to  say,  reached  its 
culmination ;  but  the  method  was  too  ancient  to  be 
merely  in  full  bloom  :  it  had  gone  to  seed. 

"  I  contend,  therefore,  that  there  is  mechanism  in  animals  ; 
that  this  mechanism  is  as  properly  such  as  it  is  in  machines 
made  by  art ;  that  this  mechanism  is  intelligible  and  certain  ; 
that  it  is  not  the  less  so  because  it  often  begins  or  terminates 
with  something  which  is  not  mechanical ;  that,  whenever  it  is 
intelligible  and  certain,  it  demonstrates  intention  and  contri- 
vance as  well  in  the  works  of  nature  as  in  those  of  art;  and 
that  it  is  the  best  demonstration  which  either  can  afford. 

"  Our  business  is  with  mechanism.  In  the  panorpa,  tribe 
of  insects,  there  is  a  forceps  in  the  tail  of  the  male  insect, 
with  which  he  catches  and  holds  the  female.  Are  a  pair  of 
pincers  more  mechanical  than  this  provision  in  their  struc- 
ture? or  is  any  structure  more  clear  and  certain  in  its  de- 
sign? 

' '  For  my  part,  I  take  my  stand  in  human  anatomy  ;  and 
the  examples  of  mechanism  I  should  be  apt  to  draw  out 
from  the  copious  catalogue  which  it  supplies  are  the  pivot 


230  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

upon  which  the  head  turns,  the  ligament  within  the  socket 
of  the  hip-joint,  the  pulley  or  trochlear  muscle  of  the  eye, 
the  epiglottis,  the  bandages  which  tie  down  the  tendons  of 
the  wrist  and  iustep,  the  slit  or  perforated  muscles  at  the 
hands  and  feet,  the  knitting  of  the  intestines  to  the  mesen- 
tery, the  course  of  the  chyle  into  the  blood,  and  the  consti- 
tution of  the  sexes  as  extended  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
animal  creation.  To  these  instances  the  reader's  memory 
will  go  back  as  they  are  severally  set  forth  in  their  places. 
There  is  not  one  of  the  number  which  I  do  not  think  decisive, 
—  not  one  which  is  not  strictly  mechanical ;  nor  have  I  read  or 
heard  of  any  solution  of  these  appearances,  which,  in  the 
smallest  degree,  shakes  the  conclusion  that  we  build  upon 
them." 

Probably  the  emphasis  which  he  lays  upon  the  notion 
of  mechanism  and  artificialness  was  partly  induced  by 
the  illustration  of  the  watch  with  which  he  sets  out, 
and  on  account  of  which  he  has  been  so  severely  ex- 
coriated as  a  plagiarist. 

An  evolutionist  cannot  read  Paley  with  any  patience. 
The  mechanical  view  of  nature  has  been  set  aside,  and 
in  its  place  we  have  now  the  dynamical  conception. 
The  necessary  complement  of  the  mechanical  theor}^ 
which  makes  the  world  a  vast  machine  made  up  of  a 
multitude  of  lesser  machines,  is  a  deus  ex  macliina,  a 
God  outside  of  the  machine  to  set  it  in  motion,  and  to 
stop  it,  regulate  it,  repair  it,  all  by  abrupt  intrusion  of 
arbitrary  divine  power,  wholly  severed  from  the  custom- 
ary action  of  natural  forces.  The  dynamical  concep- 
tion, upon  the  contrary,  represents  natural  forces  as 
permanently  united  to  the  divine  energy  as  the  means 
by  which  the  latter  produces  its  results.  God  thus 
becomes  immanent  in  nature,  though  at  the  same  time 
transcendent  above  it.     This  view  of  nature  is  largely 


PALEY,   STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  231 

the  fruit  of  the  theory  of  evolution ;  and  yet  it  is  more 
widely  received,  and  stands  upon  a  surer  foundation, 
than  evolution  itself.  Paley  is  so  thoroughly  imbued 
with  the  mechanical  conception,  that,  if  his  work  had 
no  other  defect,  this  alone  would  render  it  obsolete. 

In  the  opening  of  his  discussion  of  final  causes, 
Dugald  Stewart  says,  — 

"The  study  of  final  causes  may  be  considered  in  two 
different  points  of  view,  —  first,  as  subservient  to  the  evi- 
dences of  natural  religion  ;  and,  secondly,  as  a  guide  and 
auxiliary  in  the  investigation  of  physical  laws.  Of  these 
views  it  is  the  latter  alone  which  is  immediately  connected 
with  the  principles  of  the  inductive  logic ;  and  it  is  to  this, 
accordingly,  that  I  shall  chiefly  direct  my  attention  in  the 
following  observations." 

He  proceeds  to  fortify  with  elaborate  argumentation 
the  position  that  teleology  "  has  proved  a  powerful,  and 
perhaps  indispensable,  organ  of  physical  discovery."  In 
this  he  makes  the  same  mistake  as  Whewell,  of  not  dis- 
tinguishing between  use  and  end,  function  and  purpose, 
—  a  neglect  which  was  indeed  quite  essential  in  order 
to  make  out  his  case,  but  which,  none  the  less,  convicts 
him  of  building  upon  a  shallow  fallacy. 

"To  understand  the  structure  of  an  animal  body,  it  is 
necessary  not  only  to  examine  the  conformation  of  the  parts, 
but  to  consider  their  functions ;  or,  in  other  words,  to  con- 
sider their  ends  and  uses.  Nor,  indeed,  does  the  most  accu- 
rate knowledge  of  the  former,  till  perfected  by  the  discovery 
of  the  latter,  afford  satisfaction  to  an  inquisitive  and  scien- 
tific mind.  Every  anatomist  according^,  whatever  his  meta- 
physical creed  may  be,  proceeds  in  his  researches  upon  the 
maxim,  that  no  organ  exists  without  its  appropriate  destina- 
tion ;  and,  although  he  may  often  fail  in  his  attempts  to 
ascertain  what  this  destination  is,  he  never  carries  his  scepti- 


232  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

cism  so  far  as  for  a  moment  to  doubt  the  general  principle. 
I  am  inclined  to  think,  that  it  is  in  this  way  the  most  impor- 
tant steps  in  physiology  have  been  gained  ;  the  curiosity  being 
constantly  kept  alive  by  some  new  problem  in  the  animal 
machine,  and  at  the  same  time  checked  in  its  wanderings  by 
an  irresistible  conviction  that  nothing  is  made  in  vain." 

To  consider  their  functions,  or,  in  other  ivords,  to 
consider  their  ends  and  uses  !  No  difference  whatever 
recognized  between  functions  and  ends  !  Quite  easy  to 
make  out  his  case  for  the  physiological  value  of  tele- 
ology on  those  terms.  Thus  he  quotes  with  great  satis- 
faction :  — 

"If  we  find  one  common  effect  constantly  produced, 
though  in  a  very  different  way,  we  may  safely  conclude  that 
this  is  the  use  or  function  of  the  part.  This  reasoning  can 
never  betray  us  if  we  are  but  sure  of  the  facts." 

An  anatomist  need  only  mention  the  use  or  function 
of  an  organ,  and  Stewart  takes  it  as  testimony  to  the 
value  of  teleology,  just  as  much  as  if  he  had  said  end 
or  purpose. 

He  is  to  be  commended  for  his  dislike  of  the  term 
final  cause,  but  not  for  the  timidity  which  made  him 
retain  it,  in  spite  of  his  dislike,  because  it  had  been 
"consecrated  in  the  writings  of  Newton,"  nor  for  the 
method  he  proposed  for  gradually  getting  rid  of  it. 

"  After  all,  it  were  to  be  wished  that  the  scholastic  phrase 
final  cause  could,  without  affectation,  be  dropped  from  onr 
philosophical  vocabulary,  and  some  more  unexceptionable 
mode  of  speaking  be  substituted  instead  of  it.  In  this 
elementary  work  I  have  not  presumed  to  lay  aside  entirely  a 
form  of  expression  consecrated  in  the  writings  of  Newton 
and  of  his  most  eminent  followers  ;  but  I  am  fully  sensible 
of    its  impropriety,  and   am   not  without  hopes  that  I  may 


PALEY,   STEWART,   AND  CROMBIE.  233 

contribute  something  to  encourage  the  gradual  disuse  of  it 
by  the  indiscriminate  employment  of  the  words  ends  and  uses 
to  convey  the  same  idea." 

He  was  altogether  too  "  indiscriminate  "  in  the  em- 
ployment of  the  words  "  ends/'  "  uses,"  "functions,"  and 
"  purposes." 

The  quotations  given  above  are  from  the  third  vol- 
ume of  his  works,  as  collected  and  edited  by  Sir  William 
Hamilton  (p.  335,  seq.').  In  the  sixth  volume  of  the 
same  collection  he  has  more  teleological  matter.  In  a 
chapter  headed  "  The  Evidences  of  Design  exhibited 
in  the  Universe,'"  he  begins  a  section  with  the  sen- 
tence, — 

' '  The  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  drawn  from  the 
order  of  the  universe  is  commonly  called  the  argument  from 
final  causes." 

This  shows  that  his  notions  of  teleology  were  ex- 
tremely vague.  He  threw  in  all  sorts  of  design-argu- 
ments under  final  cause.  In  this,  of  course,  he  was  no 
more  to  be  blamed  than  Paley  and  the  rest,  unless  by 
reason  that  his  great  powers  of  mind  and  high  rank  in 
metaphysical  science  entitle  us  to  expect  better  things 
of  him.  If  "  final  cause "  ever  had  any  legitimate 
meaning,  it  had  reference  to  an  end,  finis ;  that  is,  its 
meaning  was  teleological.  "  The  proof  of  the  existence 
of  God  drawn  from  the  order  of  nature  "  is  not  tele- 
ological, and  therefore  does  not  belong  to  the  doctrine 
of  final  causes.  Neither  is  the  expression  "argument 
from  final  causes  "  an  accurate  one. 

The  greater  part  of  Stewart's  design-arguments  are 
brought  into  his  "  Philosophy  of  the  Moral  Powers " 
(vol.  vii.  of  his  works,  edited  by  Hamilton).  He 
regards    teleology   as    resting    upon    the    principle    of 


234  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

causation,  and  accordingly  spends  most  of  his  force  in 
defending  that  against  the  opinion  of  Hume,  that  the 
judgment,  "  Every  event  has  a  cause,"  is  a  matter  of 
experience.  Stewart  maintains  that  it  is  an  intuition. 
Many  of  his  arguments  to  support  this  view  are  repeti- 
tions of  those  advanced  by  Reid.  In  the  course  of 
this  discussion  he  quotes  with  approval  from  Dr. 
Clarke  an  opinion  which  amounts  to  a  complete  denial 
of  second  causes  :  — 

"The  course  of  nature,  truly  and  properly  speaking,  is 
nothing  else  but  the  will  of  God  producing  certain  effects 
in  a  continued,  regular,  constant,  and  uniform  manner ; 
which  course  or  manner  of  acting,  being  in  every  moment 
perfectly  arbitrary,  is  as  easy  to  be  altered  at  any  time  as  to 
be  preserved." 

Besides  maintaining  that  the  law  of  causation  is  ap- 
prehended intuitively,  he  further  follows  Reid  in  the 
opinion  that  the  inference  of  design  from  its  effects  is 
intuitive  also.  An  intuitive  inference  is  a  contradiction 
of  terms  ;  and  Stewart  guards  his  language  so  as  to  avoid 
this  self-contradiction,  but  Reid  does  not.  These  two 
important  judgments  being,  in  his  opinion,  reached 
without  reasoning,  it  follows  logically  that  design- 
arguments  ought  not  to  be  employed  to  prove  God's 
existence.  It  would  be  nonsense  to  construct  elaborate 
arguments  to  convince  a  man  of  that  which  he  per- 
ceives by  intuition.  -  Accordingly,  Stewart  not  only 
declines  to  use  design-arguments  in  this  way,  but  com- 
plains of  the  evil  consequences  of  such  use  of  them  by 
others :  — 

"It  appears  to  me  that  the  evidences  of  design  in  the 
universe  are  alike  obvious  to  the  savage  and  to  the  philoso- 
pher ;   and  that  they  are  much  more  forcibly  impressed  ou 


PALEY,  STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  235 

the  minds  of  those  whose  understandings  have  been  per- 
verted by  sceptical  sophistry,  by  general  views  of  nature, 
than  by  examining  her  works  in  detail.  Or,  if  any  person 
should  think  otherwise,  it  must  at  least  be  granted  that  any 
one  organized  and  animated  body  furnishes  just  as  complete 
evidence  of  this  truth  (i.e.,  design)  as  could  be  obtained 
from  the  most  accurate  examination  of  all  the  different  sub- 
jects of  natural  history.  The  proper  use  of  such  speculations 
is  not  to  refute  the  atheist,  but  to  illustrate  the  wisdom  and  the 
unity  of  design  displayed  in  the  material  and  moral  worlds  ; 
or  rather  to  enlighten  and  exalt  our  own  understandings  by 
tracing  with  humility  and  reverence  the  operations  of  a 
wisdom  which  is  infinite  and  divine.  If  there  be  any  prin- 
ciple whatever  which  a  philosopher  is  entitled  to  take  for 
granted,  it  is  certainly  this,  that  there  are  marks  of  design 
in  the  objects  around  us  and  in  our  own  frame  ;  and  to  write 
large  volumes  in  order  to  prove  it,  is  to  offer  an  insult  to 
human  reason. 

"I  would  not  be  understood  by  these  remarks  to  detract 
from  the  merit  of  the  authors  to  whom  they  refer.  I  only 
complain  of  the  form  in  which  they  have  presented  their 
observations  to  the  world,  —  as  demonstrations  that  a  design- 
ing cause  or  designing  causes  exist,  and  not  as  an  humble 
attempt  to  display  to  those  who  are  already  impressed  with 
this  conviction  a  few  of  those  manifold  indications  of  benefi- 
cent wisdom  which  the  Author  of  all  things  has  been  pleased 
for  our  instruction  to  place  within  the  reach  of  our  researches. 
Many  of  the  observations  which  they  have  collected  in  the 
course  of  their  inquiries  are  of  inestimable  value  ;  but  they 
have  been  frequently  applied  to  an  improper  purpose,  and 
hence  very  serious  inconveniences  have  arisen.  Among  these 
inconveniences,  there  are  two  of  such  magnitude  that  I  think 
it  of  importance  to  state  them  explicitly. 

"  First,  The  size  and  number  of  the  publications  in  ques- 
tion have  led  superficial  thinkers  to  imagine  that  the  exist- 
ence of   God  was  a  truth  which  required  a   multiplicity  of 


236  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

proofs ;  and  in  consequence  of  this  apprehension  they  have 
found  their  faith  in  it  rather  weakened  than  confirmed. 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  those  who  were  already  convinced 
of  this  truth  have  turned  aside  with  disgust  from  the  perusal 
of  so  tedious  a  demonstration  leading  to  so  obvious  a  conclu- 
sion. No  expedient  more  effectual  could  have  been  devised 
for  destroying  that  interest  which  the  mind  spontaneously 
takes  in  the  details  of  natural  philosophy  and  natural  history, 
than  to  state  them  merely  as  premises  subservient  to  the 
proof  of  the  most  incontestable  of  all  propositions.  Whereas, 
if  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  Cause  be  taken  for  granted, 
and  if  we  study  his  works  not  as  proofs  of  design,  but  as 
manifestations  of  his  wisdom  and  revelations  of  his  will, 
these  branches  of  knowledge  open  inexhaustible  sources  of 
instruction  and  of  delight  to  the  mind.  In  the  works  of  God 
we  study  the  operations  of  his  wisdom  and  goodness,  as  we 
study  in  the  conduct  and  discourse  of  our  fellow-creatures 
the  peculiarities  of  their  genius  and  characters ;  and,  in  pro- 
portion as  our  knowledge  extends,  we  find  our  acquaintance 
with  the  plans  of  his  providence  become  more  intimate,  and 
our  conceptions  of  his  nature  more  elevated  and  sublime. 
Secondly,  When  we  accumulate  a  number  of  particular  ob- 
servations as  proofs  of  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  Cause, 
we  rest  this  important  principle  on  a  ground  extremely  open 
to  the  cavils  of  sceptics.  In  most  cases,  when  we  speculate 
concerning  final  causes,  we  are  unable  to  do  more  than  to 
suppose  and  to  conjecture  ;  and  we  are  extremely  apt,  by  in- 
dulging imagination  too  far,  to  bring  ridicule  on  the  cause 
we  mean  to  support.  Sometimes,  too,  it  has  happened  that 
conjectures  which  at  first  appeared  extremely  plausible  have 
been  afterwards  discovered  to  proceed  on  a  misapprehension 
of  facts.  Such  accidents  never  fail  to  furnish  matter  of 
triumph  to  the  sceptic,  as  if  the  mistakes  to  which  our  limited 
faculties  are  liable  in  studying  the  works  of  God  afforded 
any  just  ground  for  ascribing  them  to  chance  or  to  an 
unintelligent  necessity.     But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  acqui- 


PALEY,   STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  237 

esce  in  those  evidences  of  design  which  a  general  survey  of 
nature  affords  to  the  most  common  observer,  the  mistakes 
we  may  commit  in  the  subsequent  examination  of  her  works 
will  have  no  effect  in  suggesting  doubts  or  scruples  with 
respect  to  the  truths  of  religion  ;  but,  impressed  with  a  firm 
conviction  that  nothing  is  made  in  vain,  we  will  consider 
every  difficulty  we  meet  with  as  a  new  reason  of  humility  to 
ourselves,  and  a  new  illustration  of  the  unsearchable  wisdom 
displayed  in  the  universe. 

' '  I  have  thought  proper  to  premise  these  general  reflections 
to  the  remarks  I  am  now  to  make,  in  order  to  point  out  the 
particular  purpose  to  which  I  mean  to  apply  them,  —  uot  as 
proofs  that  there  exist  designing  and  intelligent  causes  in 
nature,  but  as  illustrations  of  that  unity  of  design  which 
connects  together  things  the  most  remote  and  apparently 
insulated  as  parts  of  one  system,  and  of  that  infinite  wisdom 
which  contrived  and  which  superintends  the  whole." 

These  views  of  the  proper  function  of  physico-the- 
ology,  and  of  the  mischiefs  arising  from  a  misconception 
of  it,  are  highly  interesting  and  suggestive.  They  are 
also  in  a  considerable  measure  correct,  but  not  alto- 
gether sound,  as  I  shall  try  to  show  in  a  subsequent 
chapter. 

The  argument  which  Stewart  proceeds  to  construct, 
having  thus  premised  that  he  is  arguing  for  the  wisdom 
and  unity,  not  for  the  existence,  of  God,  is  chiefly 
an  argument  of  adaptation :  — 

"  (1)  Adaptation  of  the  bodies  and  of  the  instincts  of 
animals  to  the  laws  of  the  material  world. 

"  (2)  Adaptation  of  the  bodies  and  instincts  of  animals 
to  those  particular  climates  and  districts  of  the  earth  for 
which  they  are  destined." 

This  is,  of  course,  teleological ;  but  he  employs  eu- 
taxiology  also,  or  such  elements  of  reasoning  as  properly 


238  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

fall  under  that  head,  though  he  does  not  erect  them 
into  a  distinct  argument.  Thus,  for  example,  he  brings 
in  the  facts  of  morphology  under  the  head  of  "  analo- 
gies which  are  observable  in  the  structure  of  different 
tribes  of  animals  :  "  — 

"  To  all  this  we  may  add  the  analogy  among  many  of  the 
phenomena  and  laws  of  the  material  world,  a  satisfactory 
proof  of  which  may  be  derived  from  the  effects  which  philo- 
sophical habits  and  scientific  pursuits  have  in  familiarizing 
the  mind  to  the  order  of  nature,  and  in  improving  its  pene- 
tration and  sagacity  in  anticipating  those  parts  of  it  which 
are  yet  unknown." 

Having  so  pointedly  condemned  the  use  of  design- 
arguments  to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  and  so  em- 
phatically declared  and  set  forth  the  mischiefs  resulting 
from  such  use,  he  seems  to  fear  that  he  may  himself  be 
suspected  of  doing  the  very  thing  he  condemns.  Ac- 
cordingly he  puts  in  this  disclaimer :  — 

"I  have  only  to  add  further,  before  leaving  this  subject, 
that  the  various  remarks  and  reasonings  which  I  have  offered 
on  the  two  general  principles  of  our  nature  formerly  men- 
tioned, are  not  to  be  considered  as  forming  any  part  of  the 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  which,  as  I  have  said, 
is  an  immediate  and  necessary  consequence  of  those  princi- 
ples. What  I  had  in  view  was,  not  to  confirm  this  important 
truth  by  reasoning,  but  to  obviate  the  sceptical  cavils  which 
have  been  raised  against  it." 

The  "  two  general  principles  "  alluded  to  are  the  law 
of  causation,  and  the  perception  of  design  by  intuition. 
The  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  flows  out  of  these 
as  "  an  immediate  and  necessary  consequence  ;  "  and  he 
is  not  so  foolish  as  to  argue  for  the  truth  of  an  intui- 
tion.    Oh,  no !    all  he  has  been  doing  is  to  "  obviate 


PALEY,   STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  239 

sceptical  cavils."  All  the  reasoning  ever  employed  on 
this  subject  might  be  fairly  brought  under  the  head  of 
answering  the  cavils  of  sceptics ;  for  the  mass  of  man- 
kind have  always  firmly  believed  in  God,  in  spite  of  all 
the  illogical  demonstrations  of  his  existence,  just  as 
many  people  live  to  a  good  age  in  spite  of  medical 
quackery. 

Stewart  really  stood  in  need  of  such  a  disclaimer  as 
he  makes  in  the  last  quotation.  Without  it  no  one 
would  ever  dream  that  he  was  doing  any  thing  else  than 
arguing  for  the  existence  of  God.  The  whole  discus- 
tion  is  entitled,  "The  Existence  of  God  —  Proof  a  pos- 
teriori;" and  that  is  all  along  the  running-title  at  the 
top  of  the  page.  In  Section  III.,  "  Conclusion  of  the 
Argument  for  the  Existence  of  God,"  the  first  sentence 
is,— 

' '  The  observations  which  have  been  made  not  only  estab- 
lish the  existence  of  a  Deity,  but  contain  the  evidences  of  his 
unity,  of  his  power,  and  of  his  wisdom." 

Was  he,  after  all,  suspicious  that  this  vitally  impor- 
tant truth  was  not  an  intuition  ?  Did  h@,  with  Scotch 
shrewdness,  think  to  shape  matters  so  that  it  would  be 
all  right  on  either  alternative  ?  If  it  was  not  intuitive, 
he  had  contributed  an  argument  for  it ;  if  it  was  intui- 
tive, he  had  put  in  his  disclaimer  to  save  him  from  the 
double  reproach  of  arguing  for  an  intuition,  and  doing 
himself  what  he  condemned  in  others. 

The  "  Natural  Theology "  of  the  Rev.  Alexander 
Crombie  (London,  1829)  is  of  a  higher  type  than  the 
majority  of  such  works.  The  ontological  and  causal 
arguments  are  lightly  esteemed  by  him.  He  makes 
much  of  the  anthropological  proof,  and  employs  both 
of  the  design-arguments. 


240  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

' '  Wherever  we  find  order  and  regularity  obtaining  either 
uniformly,  or  in  a  vast  majority  of  instances,  where  the  pos- 
sibilities of  disorder  are  indefinitely  numerous,  we  are  justi- 
fied in  inferring  from  this  fact  an  intelligent  cause." 
(I.  386.) 

He  makes  great  use  of  the  calculus  of  probabilities 
in  establishing  this  proposition.  However,  he  thinks 
that  no  such  computation  of  the  chances  is  required  in 
the  ordinary  mental  process  of  inferring  intelligence 
from  orderly  arrangement.  The  conclusion  is  reached 
instantly  by  those  who  are  incompetent  to  compute  the 
probabilities. 

"It  may  be  asked,  What  is  the  ground  of  this  belief? 
Why  do  we  infer  intelligence  from  order  and  regularity  ?  Is 
the  conclusion  founded  in  reason,  or  is  it  the  result  of  ex- 
perience ?  The  inference  is  immediate  and  irresistible  ;  the 
perception  is  as  clear,  and  the  conviction  as  strong,  as  that 
a  less  number  cannot  be  equal  to  a  greater,  —  certainly,  in 
many  cases,  as  strong  as  an  immeasurable  preponderance  of 
evidence  can  produce.  It  is  intuitively  obvious,  that,  out 
of  any  given  number  of  equally  possible  results,  the  chance  of 
one  taking  place  in  exclusion  of  the  rest  must  be  as  1  to 
the  number  of  the  others. 

"It  is  not  imagined  that  the  inference  depends  on  any 
nice  calculation  of  the  chances,  nor  is  a  scientific  computa- 
tion necessary  to  the  conclusion.  A  person  wholly  unac- 
quainted with  arithmetical  science  may  be  unable  to  calculate 
the  chance  that  the  letters  of  the  alphabet  shall  be  acci- 
dentally thrown  into  their  regular  order,  but  he  perceives  in- 
tuitively that  the  chances  against  it  prodigiously  overbalance 
those  in  its  favor.  This  is  sufficient  for  his  conviction." 
(I.  394) 

Dr.  Crombie  does  not  fairly  meet  the  question  whether 
tliis  conviction  is  intuitive  or  not.     I  am  not  greatly 


PALEY,   STEWART,  AND  CROMBIE.  241 

concerned  about  overthrowing  his  position,  though  I 
think  the  judgment  that  order  is  an  invariable  mark  of 
mind  is  an  induction.  If  it  is  an  intuition,  it  is  even 
more  certain ;  that  is,  it  is  absolutely  certain,  because 
the  marks  of  an  intuitive  truth  are,  that  it  is  self-evi- 
dent, necessary,  and  universal.  But  the  judgment  in 
question  does  not  meet  these  conditions ;  and  there  is 
nothing  to  gain,  but  every  thing  to  lose,  by  claiming  in- 
tuitive certainty  for  a  proposition  which  is  only  reached 
by  induction.  The  manner  in  which  Crombie  makes  it 
appear  intuitive  is  fallacious.  Even  as  against  the  al- 
ternative of  chance,  his  own  statements  show  that  the 
conviction  is  not  intuitive  ;  for,  though  there  may  not  be 
a  rigid  computation  of  the  chances,  there  is,  he  thinks, 
a  rough  estimate  of  them.  But  the  simple  exclusion  of 
chance  does  not  establish  the  proposition.  Many  other 
considerations  are  involved  in  the  judgment  that  order 
is  a  mark  of  intelligence,  —  so  that  it  seems  unwarrant- 
able to  class  it  as  an  intuition. 

Crombie  fairly  deserves  the  credit  of  being  the  first 
of  modern  writers  to  frame  a  clear  and  unmixed  eu- 
taxiological  argument. 

His  teleology  is  much  the  same  as  that  of  Paley. 
One  point,  however,  deserves  notice;  namely,  his  at- 
tempted modification  of  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"  end  :  "  — 

"  The  reader  is  here  requested  to  observe  that  the  term 
end  is  not  here  employed  as  equivalent  to  purpose  or  design, 
—  for,  in  this  sense,  we  should  beg  the  question,  —  but  in  its 
strict  and  primitive  signification,  as  denoting  simply  issue, 
or  effect." 

This  is  a  foot-note  appended  to  a  sentence  (I.  400) 
in  which  he  speaks  of  "  concurrences  of  means  to  ends," 


242  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

from  which  we  may  infer  design.  His  attempt  is  a  fail- 
ure. Supposing  that  he  could  change  the  meaning  of 
a  word  which,  in  teleology,  has  never  had  but  one 
meaning,  by  simply  saying  that  he  would  use  it  differ- 
ently, still  he  would  not  thus  escape  from  the  fallacy 
he  wishes  to  avoid,  because  the  correlative  "  means  " 
would  have  to  be  emasculated  of  its  usual  sense  as  well 
as  end.  Whenever  these  two  words  are  coupled  to- 
gether, a  teleological  force  is  imparted  to  both  of  them. 
The  mental  contemplation  of  something  as  a  means  in- 
volves the  correlative  notion  of  an  end  to  be  accom- 
plished. Hence  the  "  concurrence  of  means  "  is  just 
as  dangerous  an  expression  alone,  or  with  some  other 
ending  than  "  to  an  end,"  as  it  is  with  this  ending,  and 
leaving  the  ordinary  teleological  force  of  "  end  "  to  at- 
tach to  it. 

Crombie  deserves  credit  for  making  this  attempt,  al- 
though it  was  a  failure.  It  is  an  evidence  that  he  felt 
conscious  of  a  radical  difficulty  in  the  logic  of  the  old 
teleology.  He  criticises  Paley's  expression  ,  "  Design  im- 
plies a  designer,"  and  he  saw  that  his  own  proposition 
was  subject  to  the  same  condemnation  unless  he  used 
the  terms  in  some  unusual  sense.  So  he  proposes  to 
give  this  new  force  to  the  word  end.  The  remedy  is 
ineffectual :  it  is  a  shallow  device,  whereas  the  evil  it 
was  aimed  at  was  deeply  seated.  The  true  solution  of 
this  whole  problem  of  the  logic  of  teleology  will  be 
found  in  the  seventeenth  chapter  of  this  volume.  In 
the  mean  time  let  us  give  Crombie  due  praise  for  being 
one  of  the  first  to  suspect  the  existence  of  some  radical 
vice  in  the  logic  of  teleolog}^  although  his  diagnosis 
was  incomplete,  and  his  remedy  only  skin-deep. 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  243 


CHAPTER   X. 

THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES. 

The  Bridgewater  Treatises  were  produced  under  the 
following  circumstances :  — 

"  The  Right  Hon.  and  Rev.  Francis  Henry,  Earl  of 
Bridgewater,  died  in  the  month  of  February,  1829  ;  and 
by  his  last  will  and  testament,  bearing  date  the  25th  of 
February,  1825,  he  directed  certain  trustees,  therein  named, 
to  invest  in  the  public  funds  the  sum  of  eight  thousand 
pounds  sterling ;  this  sum,  with  the  accruing  dividends 
thereon,  to  be  held  at  the  disposal  of  the  president,  for  the 
time  being,  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  to  be  paid  to 
the  person  or  persons  nominated  by  him.  The  testator  fur- 
ther directed,  that  the  person  or  persons  selected  by  the  said 
president  should  be  appointed  to  write,  print,  and  publish 
one  thousand  copies  of  a  work  on  the  power,  wisdom,  and 
goodness  of  God,  as  manifested  in  the  creation;  illustrating 
such  work  by  all  reasonable  arguments,  as,  for  instance,  the 
variety  and  formation  of  God's  creatures  in  the  animal, 
vegetable,  and  mineral  kingdoms;  the  effect  of  digestion,  and 
thereby  of  conversion ;  the  construction  of  the  hand  of  man, 
and  an  infinite  variety  of  other  arguments;  as  also  by  dis- 
coveries, ancient  and  modem,  in  arts,  sciences,  and  the  whole 
extent  of  literature.'''' 

Eight  treatises  were  the  result  of  this  bequest  of 
eight  thousand  pounds  sterling.  The  writers  were 
Thomas    Chalmers,    D.D.,   John    Kidd,  M.D.,  William 


244  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Whewell,  M.A.,  Sir  Charles  Bell,  K.H.,  Peter  M. 
Roget,  M.D.,  William  Bucklancl,  D.D.,  Rev.  William 
Kirb}T,  and  William  Prout,  M.D. 

Chalmers  had  previously  published  his  "  Astronomi- 
cal Discourses."  These  were  not  of  the  nature  of  de- 
sigh-arguments.  The  existence  of  God  is  assumed,  and 
the  tone  is  hortatory  and  sentimental.  The  following 
sentence  (p.  227-8)  gives  a  fair  notion  of  the  aim  of 
these  discourses,  "  to  regale  the  imagination,"  "  to  waft 
the  soul,"  and  "raise  it  to  an  elevated  calm."  It  also 
gives  a  fair  example  of  the  style  of  Chalmers,  which 
has  been  much  praised  for  its  eloquence  and  sublimity, 
but  is  somewhat  turgid  withal. 

"  The  sublime  and  interesting  topic  which  has  engaged 
us,  however  feebly  it  may  have  been  handled  ;  however  in- 
adequately it  may  have  been  put  in  all  its  worth  and  in  all 
its  magnitude  before  you ;  however  short  the  representation 
of  the  speaker  or  the  conception  of  the  hearers  may  have 
been  of  that  richness,  and  that  greatness,  and  that  loftiness, 
which  belong  to  it,  —  possesses  in  itself  a  charm  to  fix  the 
attention,  and  to  regale  the  imagination,  and  to  subdue  the 
whole  man  into  a*  delighted  reverence  ;  and,  in  a  word,  to 
beget  such  a  solemnity  of  thought  and  emotion  as  may 
occupy  and  enlarge  the  soul  for  hours  together,  as  may 
waft  it  away  from  the  grossness  of  ordinary  life,  and  raise 
it  to  a  kind  of  elevated  calm  above  all  its  vulgarities  and  all 
its  vexations." 

Neither  does  his  Bridgewater  Treatise  on  "  The 
Adaptation  of  External  Nature  to  the  Moral  and  In- 
tellectual Constitution  of  Man,"  contain  any  physico- 
theology  properly  speaking.  It  is  a  somewhat  rambling 
discourse  on  moral  philosophy  chiefly,  though  he  mean- 
ders freely  in  the  fields  of  political  science  and  sociol- 
ogy.    The  vague  and  general  title  of  his  treatise  gave 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  245 

him  license  for  diffuseness,  and  a  sort  of  justification 
for  it.  Quite  unexpectedly  lie  takes  "  external  na- 
ture," chiefly  in  the  sense  of  society,  as  surrounding 
the  individual  man.  Thus  his  first  instance  of  adapta- 
tion of  external  nature  to  the  moral  constitution  of 
man  is,  that  the  voice  of  individual  conscience  is  re- 
echoed* by  society. 

' '  And  first,  in  regard  to  the  power  and  sensibility  of  con- 
science, there  is  a  most  important  influence  brought  to  bear 
on  each  individual  possessor  of  this  faculty  from  without, 
and  by  his  fellow-men."      (I.   162.) 

It  is  in  Book  II.  of  his  "  Institutes  of  Theology  " 
that  we  find  a  characteristic  development  of  the  views 
of  Dr.  Chalmers  on  natural  theology.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  his  discussion  he  condemns  the  ontological  and 
causal  arguments,  and  rests  his  case  upon  teleology. 

"  Such  dispositions  are  innumerable.  Every  animal  and 
vegetable  structure  teems  with  them.  Among  the  first  that 
occur,  let  me  instance  the  eyelashes,  of  the  greatest  use 
where  they  are  placed,  and  which  they  could  be  nowhere 
else,  for  the  protection  of  this  delicate  organ  ;  and  the  nails, 
in  the  very  position  where  they  are  most  serviceable,  instead 
of  being  protruded  as  useless  excrescences  on  other  parts  of 
the  body ;  and  the  thumb  in  relation  to  its  counterpart  fingers 
for  the  purposes  of  holding  ;  and  the  cutters  and  grinders, 
which,  were  they  to  change  places,  would  be  far  less  com- 
modious for  the  act  of  eating  ;  and  a  countless  host  of  other 
collocations,  whether  in  plants  or  in  bodies  of  living  crea- 
tures,—  all  of  indispensable  utility,  and  all  of  which  are 
most  obviously  distinguishable  from  laws.  Now,  what  we 
affirm  is,  that  even  though  we  should  admit  matter,  with  all 
Its  laws,  to  be  eternal,  if  ever  these  dispositions  had  a  be- 
ginning, it  is  not  the  laws,  the  blind  headlong  forces  or  laws, 
which  could  ever  have  originated  them ;    or,   on  the  other 


246  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

hand,  should  these  dispositions  ever  be  destroyed,  it  is  not 
the  laws  which  can  replace  them.  Herein  lies  the  main 
strength  of  our  argument  for  a  God  as  furnished  by  the 
contemplation  of  external  nature." 

The  antithesis  which  he  sets  up  between  collocations 
and  laws  is  extremely  unfortunate.  It  would  condemn 
his  argument  at  once  in  the  mind  of  all  evolutionists ; 
whereas  there  is  really  a  valuable  thought  in  his  doc- 
trine of  collocations  if  he  had  given  it  a  different 
expression,  not  setting  it  up  in  contrast  to  law.  Most 
of  the  collocations  or  dispositions  of  matter,  which  he 
specifies  as  exceptions  to  law,  have  since  been  shown 
to  conform  to  law ;  and,  if  there  are  others  which  have 
not  been,  perhaps  can  never  be,  as  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  sup- 
poses probable  in  respect  to  certain  collocations  of  forces 
in  astronomy,  the  proof  of  intelligence  is  none  the  less 
conclusive  in  the  cases  which  have  been  reduced  under 
law,  and  no  more  conclusive  in  those  cases  which  have 
not  been  reduced  under  law. 

Chalmers  thought  little  of  the  causal  argument ;  and 
the  distinction  he  set  up  between  matter  with  its  laws 
and  the  arbitrary  dispositions  of  matter,  had  for  its  aim 
the  avoidance  of  any  necessity  of  proving  the  non-eter- 
nity of  matter. 

"This  distinction  of  ours  between  the  dispositions  of 
matter  and  its  laws  serves  for  a  mighty  disencumbrance  of  the 
whole  argument,  relieving  it  of  much  that  is  weak  and  obscure 
and  questionable.  We  affirm  not  the  eternity  of  matter, 
save  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  out  our  conclusion.  When 
reasoning  on  the  present  order  of  things,  we  do  not  need  to 
prove  its  non-eternity,  —  an  attempt  on  which  a  deal  of  most 
unsatisfactory  metaphysics  has  been  expended." 

The  last  remark  is  quite  true ;  and  every  sound  and 
healthy  mind  must  sympathize  with  Chalmers  in  his 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  247 

desire  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  such  speculations.  But, 
in  avoiding  one  questionable  thing,  he  involved  the 
argument  in  another  difficulty  not  less  fatal,  but  rather 
more  so.  The  proof  of  the  non-eternity  of  matter  is 
not  quite  a  forlorn  hope,  while  the  antithesis  of  colloca- 
tions to  laws  makes  Chalmers's  argument  very  much  like 
a  mass  of  scoria  heaved  up  by  a  submarine  eruption, 
—  the  waves  are  eating  it  away  hour  by  hour,  and  the 
only  question  of  its  entire  demolition  is  whether  there 
is  any  core  of  hardened  lava  in  the  centre.  Every  col- 
location which  yields  before  the  inarch  of  law  is  so 
much  lost  to  his  argument  in  the  form  in  which  he  cast 
it.  If  there  are  original  adjustments  of  matter  which 
can  never  be  explained,  but  must  ever  stand  simply  as 
ultimate  facts,  these  have  no  additional  force  imparted 
to  them  by  contrasting  them  with  law  and  order ;  while 
the  antithesis  is  ruinous  to  the  argument  in  so  far  as  it 
rests  upon  collocations  which  are  explicable  by  natural 
laws. 

Dr.  Kidd's  treatise  is  "  On  the  Adaptation  of  Exter- 
nal Nature  to  the  Physical  Condition  of  Man."  It  is 
not  much  of  a  surprise  to  find  him  trenching  upon  the 
kindred  topic  assigned  to  Chalmers ;  but  we  are  some- 
what astonished  that  he  did  not  leave  Sir  Charles  Bell 
in  quiet  possession  of  that  little  nook  in  the  broad 
domain  of  physico-theology  which  had  been  allotted  to 
him,  namely,  the  hand.  Kick!  has  a  whole  chapter  on 
that  topic,  made  up  chiefly  of  quotations  from  Galen. 
Let  it  not  be  imagined  that  I  blame  him  for  quoting : 
I  commend  him.  He  might  have  inserted  the  substance 
of  Galen's  matter  without  acknowledgment,  which 
would  have  been  worse  than  quoting,  though  not  en- 
tirely without  precedent. 

He  is  not  so  absorbed  in  design-arguments  but  that 


248  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

he  can  turn  aside  to  deliver  to  his  British  audience  an 
invective  against  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  As  regards  the 
argument  itself,  it  will  certainly  do  him  no  injustice  to 
let  him  sum  it  up  for  himself:  — 

"This,  then,  is  the  sum  of  the  whole  argument.  The 
Creator  has  so  adapted  the  external  world  to  the  moral  as 
well  as  the  physical  condition  of  man,  and  these  two  condi- 
tions act  so  constantly  and  reciprocally  on  each  other,  that, 
in  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  relation  between  the  external 
world  and  man,  we  cannot  easily  lose  sight  of  that  most 
important  connection." 

If  there  is  any  thing  disappointing  in  this  summary, 
any  suspicion  that  the  sentence  concludes  lamely  and 
inconsequently,  it  may  fairly  be  said  —  however  para- 
doxical it  sounds  —  that,  considered  as  a  summary  of 
Kidd's  argument,  it  is  all  the  better  for  that :  otherwise 
it  would  not  correspond  to  the  argument. 

The  third  Bridge  water  Treatise  is  by  the  Rev.  Wil- 
liam Whewell.  The  title  is  "  On  Astronomy  and  Gen- 
eral Physics."  Professor  Baden  Powell  gives  the  palm 
to  this  over  all  the  other  volumes  in  this  series,  espe- 
cially for  "  vindicating,  for  the  principle  of  the  reduction 
of  facts  under  laws,  the  high  position  it  ought  to  occupy 
in  the  general  argument."  1  This  commendation  is,  in 
some  measure,  just.  Not  only  in  this  work,  but  else- 
where, Whewell  gives  great  and  deserved  prominence 
to  the  principles  of  eutaxiolog}^.  He  had  some  notion 
of  the  order  of  nature  as  the  basis  of  a  distinct  argu- 
ment, yet  never  reached  a  clear  conception  of  Ic,  and 
never  thought  of  making  it  independent  of  teleologj\ 
There  was  constant  reference  to  some  jjurpose  or  aim. 
Thus,  in  the  "  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences  " 
(I.  628),  he  says,  — 

i  Order  of  Nature,  p.  200. 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  249 

"  It  has  appeared  to  some  persons,  that  the  mere  aspect  of 
order  and  symmetry  in  the  works  of  nature  —  the  contempla- 
tion of  comprehensive  and  consistent  law  —  is  sufficient  to 
lead  us  to  the  conception  of  a  design  and  intelligence  pro- 
ducing the  order,  and  carrying  into  effect  the  law.  Without 
here  attempting  to  decide  whether  this  is  true,  we  may  dis- 
cern, after  what  has  been  said,  that  the  conception  of  de- 
sign arrived  at  in  this  manner  is  altogether  different  from 
that  idea  of  design  which  is  suggested  to  us  by  organized 
bodies,  and  which  we  describe  as  the  doctrine  of  final  causes. 
The  regular  form  of  a  crystal,  whatever  beautiful  symmetry 
it  may  exhibit,  whatever  general  laws  it  may  exemplify, 
does  not  prove  design  in  the  same  manner  in  which  design  is 
proved  by  the  provisions  for  the  preservation  and  growth  of 
the  seeds  of  plants  and  of  the  }7oung  of  animals.  The  law 
of  universal  gravitation,  however  wide  and  simple,  does  not 
impress  us  with  the  belief  of  a  ^rpose  as  does  that  pro- 
pensity by  which  the  two  sexes  of  each  animal  are  brought 
together.  If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  sjunmetrical  struc- 
ture of  a  flower  results  from  laws  of  the  same  kind  as  those 
which  determine  the  regular  forms  of  crystals,  or  the  mo- 
tions of  the  planets,  the  discovery  might  be  very  striking  and 
important ;  but  it  would  not  at  all  come  under  our  idea  of 
final  cause." 

Certainly  not :  the  principles  of  eutaxiology  are  radi- 
cally different  from  those  of  teleology,  and  quite  stub- 
bornly refuse  to  "  come  under  our  idea  of  final  cause," 
although  the  whole  army  of  teleologists  have  been  try- 
ing for  a^es  to  dragoon  them  into  their  service.  This 
quotation  shows  clearly  enough  that  Whewell  saw  a 
difference  between  the  two  lines  of  argument ;  but  it 
shows,  too,  that  he  was  so  much  enamoured  of  teleology, 
that  he  would  not  suffer  any  rival  to  claim  his  regard. 
The  whole  passage  is  disparaging  to  the  proposed  proof 
from  the  order  of  nature.     And  from  WhewelFs  point 


250  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  view  the  depreciation  of  it  is  inevitable :  he  wanted 
to  reduce  every  thing  under  "  our  idea  of  final  cause," 
and  those  phenomena  which  resisted  his  desire  were 
naturally  regarded  with  less  favor.  A  universal  law, 
as  gravitation,  or  celestial  harmony,  as  in  "the  motions 
of  the  planets,"  was  of  less  consequence  to  him  than 
the  sexual  instinct,  because,  forsooth,  they  do  not  so 
strongly  "  impress  with  the  belief  of  apu?yose  ;  "  that  is, 
they  are  not  so  teleological. 

WhewelFs  sensitiveness  about  bringing  in  any  thing 
else  as  a  rival  to  teleology,  and  his  horror  of  any  thing 
hostile  to  it,  prevented  him  from  entertaining  a  just 
view  of  the  relations  of  morphology  to  teleology :  what- 
ever was  non-teleological  he  took  to  be  anti-teleological. 
If  it  could  be  tortured  into  the  service  of  teleology  in 
some  way,  well  and  good ;  if  not,  he  would  have  none 
of  it.  The  following  is  from  his  "  Philosophy  of  the 
Inductive  Sciences  "  (I.  630)  :  — 

"The  opinions  which  have  been  put  forward  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  principle  of  final  causes  have,  for  the  most  part, 
been  stated  vaguely  and  ambiguoush7.  Among  the  most 
definite  of  such  principles  is  that,  which,  in  the  history  of 
the  subject,  I  have  termed  '  the  principle  of  metamorphosed 
and  developed  symmetiy,'  upon  which  has  been  founded  the 
science  of  morphology.  The  reality  and  importance  of  this 
principle  are  not  to  be  denied  by  us.  We  have  shown  how 
they  are  proved  by  its  application  in  various  sciences,  and 
especially  in  botany.  But  those  advocates  of  this  principle 
who  have  placed  it  in  antithesis  to  the  doctrine  of  final 
causes  have,  by  this  means,  done  far  more  injustice  to  their 
own  favorite  doctrine  than  damage  to  the  one  which  they 
opposed.  The  adaptation  of  the  bones  of  the  skeleton  to 
the  muscles  ;  the  provision  of  fulcrums,  projecting  processes, 
channels,  so  that  the  motions  and  forces  shall  be  such  as  the 


THE  BRIDGE  WATER  TREATISES.  251 

needs  of  life  require,  —  cannot  possibly  become  less  striking 
and  convincing  from  any  discovery  of  general  analogies  of 
one  animal  frame  with  another,  or  of  laws  connecting  the 
development  of  different  parts.  Whenever  such  laws  are 
discovered,  we  can  only  consider  them  as  the  means  of  pro- 
ducing that  adaptation  which  we  so  much  admire.  Our 
conviction  that  the  artist  works  intelligently  is  not  de- 
stroyed, though  it  may  be  modified  and  transferred,  when  we 
obtain  a  sight  of  his  tools.  Our  discovery  of  laws  cannot 
contradict  our  persuasion  of  ends :  our  morphology  cannot 
prejudice  our  teleology." 

This  is  all  sound  and  true,  except  that  he  insists  on 
making  morphology  the  mere  servant  of  teleology. 
The  "typical  forms"  have  no  meaning  to  him,  except 
as  they  do  service  to  "  special  ends ; "  that  is,  while  he 
sees  a  difference  in  the  ideas,  he  refuses,  in  this  in- 
stance, to  give  to  the  notion  of  order  "  the  high  posi- 
tion it  ought  to  occupy  in  the  general  argument."  He 
regards  the  placing  of  morphology  "in  antithesis  to 
the  doctrine  of  final  causes "  as  an  act  of  hostility, 
perhaps  of  treachery:  whereas  they  are  in  fact  anti- 
thetical, without  any  regard  to  what  their  advocates  do 
or  neglect  to  do. 

His  tender  regard  for  teleology  prevented  him  from 
seeing  the  whole  bearing  of  the  discussion  between 
Cuvier  and  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire  respecting  "  unity  of 
plan  "  in  the  animal  kingdom.  All  he  could  make  out 
of  it  was  a  hostile  movement  against  his  favorite  final 
causes ;  and  it  did  indeed  touch  them,  but  it  had  wider 
issues,  which  kept  widening  until  Charles  Darwin 
summed  them  up  in  one  comprehensive  formula  of 
evolution. 

We  have  seen  in  the  Introduction  what  exaggerated 
views   of   the  value  of  teleology  in   physiological   re- 


252  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

search  Whewell  entertained.  His  strong  instance  for 
the  confirmation  of  this  view  was  that  of  Harvey's 
great  discovery.  On  that  he  was  impregnable  ;  because 
he  had  Harvey's  own  word  for  it,  as  reported  by  Boyle. 
But  in  another  famous  instance  it  is  not  so  clear  that 
he  got  any  real  support.  I  refer  to  the  case  of  Baron 
Cuvier.  Whewell  claims  that  his  method  of  recovering 
or  reconstructing  the  whole  animal  by  means  of  a  min- 
ute fossil  fragment  was  an  illustration  of  the  value  of 
teleology.  When  we  attempt  to  affix  a  definite  value 
to  this  claim  by  referring  to  the  statements  of  Cuvier 
himself,  we  find,  in  the  first  place,  that  his  notion  of 
what  are  "  vulgarly  called  final  causes "  is  somewhat 
wide  and  flexible. 

"  Zoology  has  a  principle  of  reasoning  which  is  peculiar 
to  it,  and  which  it  employs  with  advantage  on  many  occa- 
sions :  this  is  the  principle  of  the  conditions  of  existence, 
vulgarly  called  the  principle  of  final  causes.''  1 

Remarking,  as  we  pass  on,  that  "the  conditions 
of  existence "  is  a  thoroughly  Darwinian  and  anti- 
Whewellian  phrase,  we  want  to  see,  in  the  next  place, 
how  he  applies  "  the  principle  of  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence, vulgarly  called  the  principle  of  final  causes,"  in  that 
special  research  which  has  done  more  than  any  other 
for  his  fame  as  a  naturalist.  Turning  to  his  "  Re- 
searches on  Fossil  Bones,"  we  find  that  his  "peculiar 
principle  "  has  there  resolved  itself  into  the  law  of  cor- 
relation of  structures. 

"In  a  word,  the  formation  of  the  tooth  bespeaks  the 
structure  of  the  articulation  of  the  jaw,  that  of  the  scapula 
that  of  the  claws,  just  as  the  equation  of  the  curve  involves 
all  its  properties  ;  and,  in  taking  each  property  separately  as 

1  Animal  Kingdom,  p.  5. 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  253 

the  basis  of  a  particular  equation,  we  should  find  again  both 
the  ordinary  equation  and  all  the  other  certain  properties  :  so 
the  claw,  the  scapula,  the  articulation  of  the  jaw,  the  thigh- 
bone, and  all  the  other  bones  separately  considered,  require 
the  certain  tooth,  or  the  tooth  requires  them  reciprocally ; 
and,  beginning  with  any  one,  he  who  possessed  a  knowledge 
of  the  laws  of  organic  economy  would  detect  the  whole 
animal  "  (p.  62). 

"It  is  by  this  method  alone  that  we  have  been  guided, 
and  have  always  found  it  sufficient  to  classify  each  bone 
with  its  species,  when  it  was  a  living  species  ;  to  its  genus, 
when  it  was  an  unknown  species  ;  to  its  order,  when  it  was 
of  a  new  genus  ;  and,  finally,  to  its  class,  when  it  belonged 
to  an  order  not  yet  established  "  (p.  65). 

Now,  this  law  of  correlation  has  somewhat  mixed 
affinities.  The  modification  of  the  organ  A,  in  re- 
sponse to  some  special  condition  of  existence,  might 
be  viewed  as  teleological ;  and  if  the  organs  B  and  C 
also  varied  with  an  obvious  reference  to  the  same  con- 
dition, or  series  of  conditions,  which  determined  the 
form  of  A,  the  whole  group  of  changes  would  be  as 
much  teleological  as  if  one  organ  only  were  concerned. 
But  if,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the  organs  B  and  C 
vary  without  any  reference  to  external  conditions,  but 
simply  because  A  has  varied,  then  it  would  seem  to  be 
in  response  to  some  inner  principle  of  sympathy  or 
symmetry.  But  that  is  only  the  dynamical  side  of 
the  problem :  the  statical  elements  of  it  have  still  less 
to  do  with  teleology.  There  is  an  original  correspond- 
ence of  the  parts  in  an  animal,  independent  of  any 
question  of  their  varying  together  or  separately. 
This  primitive  harmony  in  the  animal  frame  is  a 
matter  of  morphology,  not  of  teleology  ;  and,  as  re- 
gards coincident  and  sympathetic  variations  of  different 


254  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

organs,  that  also,  if  not  clearly  morphological,  is  cer- 
tainly eutaxiological  :  so  that  the  preponderance  of 
relations  in  this  affair  is  decidedly  in  the  direction  of 
eutaxiology  rather  than  teleology.  There  is,  therefore, 
no  sufficient  ground  for  Whe well's  claim,  that  teleology 
furnished  to  Cuvier  the  clew  to  the  complex  labyrinth 
of  fossil  remains. 

Turning  now  to  Whewell's  Bridgewater  Treatise,  we 
note,  in  the  first  place,  his  divisions :  — 

"  The  two  portions  of  the  subject  may  be  treated  as  cos- 
mical  arrangements  and  terrestrial  adaptations.  We  shall 
begin  with  the  latter  class  of  adaptations  ;  because  in  treat- 
ing of  these  the  facts  are  more  familiar  and  tangible,  and 
the  reasonings  less  abstract  and  technical,  than  in  the  other 
division  of  the  subject.  Moreover,  in  this  case  men  have 
no  difficulty  in  recognizing  as  desirable  the  end  which  is 
answered  by  such  adaptations,  and  they  therefore  the  more 
readily  consider  it  as  an  end. ' ' 

He  sounds  the  teleological  note  at  the  start.  While 
he  does  indeed,  as  Powell  says,  make  much  of  the 
phenomena  of  law  and  order,  it  is  all  by  way  of  sub- 
ordination to  teleology.  In  his  discussion  of  terrestrial 
adaptations  he  covered  much  of  the  same  ground  which 
Kidd  also  traversed. 

"  The  length  of  the  year  is  so  determined  as  to  be 
adapted  to  the  constitution  of  most  vegetables  ;  or  the  con- 
struction of  vegetables  is  so  adjusted  as  to  be  suited  to  the 
length  which  the  year  really  has,  and  unsuited  to  a  duration 
longer  or  shorter  by  any  considerable  portion.  The  vege- 
table clock-work  is  so  set  as  to  go  for  a  year. ' ' 

He  regards  each  of  these  adjustments  as  independent 
of  the  other,  and  the  coincidence  of  the  two  as  a  strong 
proof  of  wisdom. 


THE  BRIDGET ATER  TREATISES.  255 

"In  the  existing  state  of  things  the  duration  of  the 
earth's  revolution  round  the  sun,  and  the  duration  of  the  revo- 
lution of  the  vegetable  functions  of  most  plants,  are  equal. 
These  two  periods  are  adjusted  to  each  other.  .  .  .  Now, 
such  an  adjustment  must  surely  be  accepted  as  a  proof  of 
design  exercised  in  the  formation  of  the  world"  (p.  28). 

"  The  same  kind  of  argument  might  be  applied  to  the  ani- 
mal creation.  The  pairing,  nesting,  hatching,  fledging,  and 
flight  of  birds,  for  instance,  occupy  each  its  peculiar  time  of 
the  year"  (p.  32). 

In  like  manner  lie  shows  that  the  functions  and 
habits  of  plants  and  animals  are  adjusted  to  the  alter- 
nations of  day  and  night.  He  rejects  with  scorn,  as 
"  an  arbitrary  and  baseless  assumption,"  the  suggestion 
"  that  the  astronomical  cycle  has  occasioned  the  physi- 
ological one  "  (p.  37).  Nevertheless,  that  is  probably 
the  true  explanation. 

On  p.  142  he  enumerates  nineteen  examples  of  ter- 
restrial adaptation,  which  have  been  often  quoted.  One 
writer  names  them  as  absolutely  essential  conditions, 
any  one  of  which  failing,  the  whole  population  of  the 
earth  would  instantly  perish.  Whewell  is  much  more 
moderate  in  his  statement ;  claiming  only,  that  by  virtue 
of  these  the  world  "  is  fitted  for  the  support  of  vege- 
tables and  animals  in  a  manner  in  which  it  could  not 
have  been  if  the  properties  and  quantities  of  the  ele- 
ments had  been  different  from  what  they  are."  Which 
we  must  all  admit  without  question :  it  is  equivalent  to 
the  classical  remark  of  Jack  Bunsby,  "  Circumstances 
alter  cases." 

Book  II.,  on  "  Cosmical  Arrangements,"  is  much  the 
best  part  of  this  treatise.  But  also  in  Book  III.,  on 
"  Religious  Views,"  where,  reasoning  from  the  analogy 
of  other  writers,  we  should  expect  to  find  only  some 


256  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

excellent  reading  for  a  Sunday  afternoon,  we  in  fact 
find  some  of  his  best  arguments.  Here  he  comes 
nearer  to  a  complete  emancipation  from  his  too  partial 
attachment  to  teleology  than  anywhere  else.  In  chap- 
ter iv.  he  constructs  an  almost  purely  eutaxiological 
argument :  — 

"  To  most  persons  it  appears,  that  the  mere  existence  of  a 
law  connecting  and  governing  any  class  of  phenomena  im- 
plies a  presiding  intelligence  which  has  preconceived  and 
established  the  law.  When  events  are  regulated  by  precise 
rules  of  time  and  space,  of  number  and  measure,  men  con- 
ceive these  rules  to  be  the  evidence  of  thought  and  mind, 
even  without  discovering  in  the  rules  any  peculiar  adapta- 
tions, or  without  supposing  their  purpose  to  be  known" 
(p.  295). 

' '  The  connection  of  the  laws  of  the  material  world  with 
an  intelligence  which  preconceived  and  instituted  the  law, 
which  is  thus,  as  we  perceive,  so  generally  impressed  on  the 
common  apprehension  of  mankind,  has  also  struck  no  less 
those  who  have  studied  nature  with  a  more  systematic  atten- 
tion, and  with  the  peculiar  views  which  belong  to  science. 
The  laws  which  such  persons  learn  and  study  seem,  indeed, 
most  naturally  to  lead  to  the  conviction  of  an  intelligence 
which  originally  gave  to  the  law  its  form. 

"  What  we  call  a  general  law  is,  in  truth,  a  form  of  ex- 
pression including  a  number  of  facts  of  like  kind.  The 
facts  are  separate :  the  unity  of  view  by  which  we  associate 
them,  the  character  of  generality  and  of  law,  resides  in 
those  relations  which  are  the  object  of  the  intellect.  The 
law,  once  apprehended  by  us,  takes  in  our  minds  the  place 
of  the  facts  themselves,  and  is  said  to  govern  or  determine 
them,  because  it  determines  our  anticipations  of  what  they 
will  be.  But  we  cannot,  it  would  seem,  conceive  a  law, 
founded  on  such  intelligible  relations,  to  govern  and  deter- 
mine the  facts  themselves,  any  otherwise  than  by  supposing 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  257 

also  an  intelligence  by  which  these  relations  are  contem- 
plated and  these  consequences  realized.  We  cannot,  then, 
represent  to  ourselves  the  universe  governed  by  general  laws, 
otherwise  than  by  conceiving  an  intelligent  and  conscious 
Deity,  by  whom  these  laws  were  originally  contemplated, 
established,  and  applied. 

"This,  perhaps,  will  appear  more  clear  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  the  laws  of  which  we  speak  are  often  of  an 
abstruse  and  complex  kind,  depending  upon  relations  of 
space,  time,  number,  and  other  properties  which  we  perceive 
by  great  attention  and  thought.  These  relations  are  often 
combined  so  variously  and  curiously,  that  the  most  subtle 
reasonings  and  calculations  which  we  can  form  are  requisite 
in  order  to  trace  their  results.  Can  such  laws  be  conceived 
to  be  instituted  without  any  exercise  of  knowledge  and  in- 
telligence? Cnn  material  objects  apply  geometry  and  calcu- 
lation to  themselves?"  (300). 

This  is  a  fair  specimen  of  eutaxiology.  But  in  chap- 
ter vii.  he  returns  to  his  first  love,  "  final  causes."  In 
his  effort  to  turn  to  their  advantage  even  Bacon's  irrev- 
erent simile,  he  fairly  "  rises  into  poetry,"  as  another 
author  has  remarked. 

"  Bacon's  comparison  of  final  causes  to  the  vestal  virgins 
is  one  of  those  poignant  sayings,  so  frequent  in  his  writings, 
which  it  is  not  easy  to  forget.  'Like  them,'  he  says,  'they 
are  dedicated  to  God,  and  are  barren.'  But  to  any  one  who 
reads  his  work  it  will  appear  in  what  spirit  this  was  meant. 
'  Not  because  those  final  causes  are  not  true,  and  worthy  to 
be  inquired,  being  kept  within  their  own  province.'  If  he 
had  had  occasion  to  develop  his  simile,  full  of  latent  mean- 
ing as  his  similes  so  often  are,  he  would  probably  have  said, 
that  to  these  final  causes  barrenness  was  no  reproach,  seeing 
they  ought  to  be,  not  the  mothers,  but  the  daughters,  of  our 
natural  sciences  ;  and  that  they  were  barren,  not  by  imperfec- 
tion of  their  nature,  but  in  order  that  they  might  be  kept 


258  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

pure  and  undented,   and  so  fit  ministers  in  the  temple  of 
God." 

The  character  of  the  work  of  Sir  Charles  Bell  on 
"  The  Hand :  Its  Mechanism  and  Vital  Endowments  as 
evincing  Design,"  is  sufficiently  indicated  in  his  own 
words  at  the  close  of  the  first  chapter :  — 

"In  the  following  pages  I  shall  treat  the  subject  com- 
paratively, and  exhibit  a  view  of  the  bones  of  the  arm, 
descending  from  the  human  hand  to  the  fin  of  a  fish.  I  shall, 
in  the  next  place,  review  the  actions  of  the  muscles  of  the 
arm  and  hand  ;  then,  proceeding  to  the  vital  properties,  I  shall 
advance  to  the  subject  of  sensibility,  leading  to  that  of  touch  ; 
afterwards  I  shall  show  the  necessity  of  combining  the  mus- 
cular action  with  the  exercise  of  the  senses,  and  especially 
with  that  of  touch,  to  constitute  in  the  hand  what  has  been 
called  '  the  geometrical  sense.'  I  shall  describe  the  organ  of 
touch,  the  cuticle  and  skin,  and  arrange  the  nerves  of  the  hand 
according  to  their  functions.  I  shall  then  inquire  into  the 
correspondence  between  the  capacities  and  endowments  of 
the  mind  and  the  external  organs,  and  more  especially  the 
properties  of  the  hand  ;  and  conclude  by  showing  that  ani- 
mals have  been  created  with  a  reference  to  the  globe  they 
inhabit ;  that  all  their  endowments  and  various  organization 
bear  a  relation  to  their  state  of  existence  and  to  the  ele- 
ments around  them ;  that  there  is  a  plan  universal  extend- 
ing through  all  animated  nature,  and  which  has  prevailed  in 
the  earliest  condition  of  the  world  ;  and  that,  finally,  in  the 
most  minute  or  most  comprehensive  study  of  those  things 
we  everywhere  see  prospective  design." 

It  appears  that  Peter  Mark  Roget,  M.D.,  has  a  double 
aim  in  his  Bridgewater  Treatise ;  viz.,  to  teach  science 
and  natural  theology  both  at  the  same  time  :  — 

k'  My  endeavors  have  been  directed  to  give  to  the  subject 
that  unity  of   design   and    that   scientific   form  which   are 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  259 

generally  wanting  in  books  professedly  treating  of  natural 
theology  published  prior  to  the  present  series,  not  except- 
ing even  the  unrivalled  and  immortal  work  of  Paley.  By 
furnishing  those  general  principles  on  which  all  accurate  and 
extensive  knowledge  must  substantially  be  founded,  I  am 
not  without  a  hope  that  this  compendium  will  prove  a  useful 
introduction  to  the  study  of  natural  history  ;  the  pursuit  of 
which  will  be  found  not  only  to  supply  inexhaustible  sources 
of  intellectual  gratification,  but  also  to  furnish  to  contem- 
plative minds  a  rich  fountain  of  religious  instruction." 

He  appears  to  have  counted  very  largely  upon  the 
"contemplative  mind"  of  his  reader  for  the  theologi- 
cal or  religious  effect  of  his  work.  It  is  the  most 
voluminous  of  the  Bridgewater  Treatises,  but  all  the 
natural  theology  in  it  is  comprised  in  the  introductory 
and  closing  chapters.  The  rest  is  a  compendium  or 
text-book  of  "  Animal  and  Vegetable  Physiology." 

The  Rev.  William  Buckland,  D.D.,  was  fortunate  in 
the  assignment  of  his  subject.  Geology  was  an  almost 
untrodden  field  for  the  theologian.  He  had  indeed  a 
difficulty  to  encounter  at  the  start,  from  the  fact  that 
the  new  science  was  making  sad  havoc  with  the  old 
chronology.  He  had  to  reconcile  geology  and  Genesis. 
This  he  does  by  injecting  a  long  period  between  the 
first  and  second  verse  of  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis. 
Matter  was  first  created,  and  it  passed  through  all  the 
long  catalogue  of  changes  recorded  in  historical  geol- 
ogy ;  then  some  cataclysm  threw  it  into  the  confusion 
which  is  described  in  the  second  verse ;  then  followed 
the  creation  in  six  literal  days  of  twenty-four  hours 
each.  This  mode  of  reconciliation  was  the  favorite  one 
for  a  long  time  after  Buckland's  treatise  appeared. 

Now,  this  preliminary  obstacle  being  removed,  there 
was  a  whole  "new  world"  to  conquer.     In  truth,  there 


260  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

were  several  new  worlds,  —  a  long,  receding  series  of 
terrestrial  and  marine  faunas  and  floras,  each  replete 
with  brand-new  (notwithstanding  they  were  so  old) 
illustrations  of  design.  There  were  the  dinotherium 
and  the  megatherium  and  the  paleotherium,  and  the 
ichthyosaurs  and  the  plesiosaurs  and  the  megalosaurs, 
and  the  pterodactyls,  and  the  ammonites  and  the 
belemnites  and  the  ichthyodorulites,  and  the  forami- 
nated  polythalmous  shells ;  to  say  nothing  of  the  lepi- 
dodendrids,  sigillarids,  and  equisetacese.  All  these,  and 
many  more,  appear  in  their  due  order ;  and  their  long- 
resounding  and  almost  jaw-breaking  names  impart  a 
novel  flavor  to  physico-theology. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Buckland's  book  made  a 
strong  impression,  —  the  greatest  perhaps  of  any  of  the 
Briclgewater  Treatises.  Besides  an  attractive  style,  he 
was  handling  new  matter  in  a  new  field.  Of  course  it 
would  be  asking  too  much  of  one  man  to  contribute  a 
new  method  as  well  as  new  matter.  Accordingly  we 
find  that  his  argument  is  the  same  old  mechanical  one 
which  Paley  used.  One  feature,  however,  of  really 
great  importance  appears  in  his  work,  —  not  to  be 
credited  especially  to  him  though,  for  it  was  due  to  the 
prominence  assumed  by  geology  at  this  period.  The 
new  science  compelled  theologians  to  take  more  account 
of  the  element  of  time  than  they  had  previously  done. 
The  long  seons  of  historical  geology  offered  a  striking 
contrast  to  the  six  literal  days  of  the  old  scheme,  and 
led  to  broader  and  truer  views  of  creation. 

The  seventh  treatise  is  by  the  Rev.  William  Kir  by, 
on  "  The  History,  Habits,  and  Instincts  of  Animals." 
He  takes  the  account  of  the  Deluge  literally,  and  frames 
a  bold  hypothesis  to  help  the  animals  of  America  and 
Australia  back  into  their  respective  countries  after  their 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  261 

voyage  with  Noah.  He  supposes  "  that,  immediately 
subsequent  to  the  Deluge,  America  and  New  Holland, 
and  the  various  other  islands  that  are  inhabited  by 
peculiar  animals,  were  once  connected  with  Asia  and 
Africa  by  the  intervention  of  lands  that  have  since 
been  submerged."  The  indefinite  "  once "  and  the 
definite  "immediately  subsequent  to  the  Deluge,"  do 
not  exactly  harmonize ;  but  we  will  not  be  captious 
about  that.  We  ought  to  be  generous  in  the  matter  of 
time  with  a  hard-pressed  theologian  who  is  heaving 
up  a  continent  to  serve  as  a  bridge  for  his  diluvian 
creatures. 

He  argues  at  length  against  the  geological  doctrine 
that  there  was  once  an  age  of  reptiles :  — 

"I  have  been  led  into  this  discussion  by  Mr.  Mantell's 
hypothesis  of  an  age  of  reptiles,  which  I  have  seen  only 
in  an  extract  from  one  of  the  Sussex  advertisers  for  last 
year,  which  he  was  so  kind  as  to  send  me,  in  which  he 
supposes  that  the  saurians  were  the  mighty  masters,  as  well 
as  monsters,  of  the  primeval  animal  kingdom,  and  the  lords 
of  the  creation  before  the  existence  of  the  human  race. 
Since  this  hypothesis,  as  stated  in  the  above  extract,  cannot 
be  reconciled  with  the  account  of  the  creation  of  animals  as 
given  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis,  I  shall  not  be  wander- 
ing from  the  purpose  of  the  present  essay  if  I  devote  a  few 
pages  to  the  consideration  of  it.  .  .  .  Setting  aside  these 
arguments  upon  the  uncertain  facts  on  which  this  hypothesis 
is  built,  if  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
who  can  think  that  a  Being  of  unbounded  power,  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  should  create  a  world  merely  for  the  habitation 
of  a  race  of  monsters,  without  a  single  rational  being  in 
it  to  serve  and  glorify  him?  The  supposition  that  these 
animals  were  a  separate  creation,  independent  of  man,  and 
occupying  his  eminent  station  and  throne  upon  our  globe 
long  before  he  was  brought   into   existence,  interrupts   the 


262  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

harmony  between  the  different  members  of  the  animal  king- 
dom, and  dislocates  the  beautiful  and  entire  sjTstem  recorded 
with  so  much  sublimity  and  majestic  brevity  in  the  first 
chapter  of  Genesis."      (I.  39.) 

When  Mr.  Kirby  thus  attempted  to  sit  down  upon 
and  crush  out  of  existence  Mr.  Mantell's  big  reptiles, 
he  must  have  found  it  an  unpleasant  seat :  for  the  said 
reptiles  are,  so  to  speak,  still  alive  and  sprawling  upon 
the  pages  of  every  text-book  of  geology ;  while  Mr. 
Kirby 's  book  has  passed  into  an  oblivion  which  is  well 
deserved,  since  it  is  the  most  worthless  of  the  Bridge- 
water  series. 

If  Dr.  Buckland  was  fortunate  in  his  subject,  William 
Prout,  M.D.,  the  last  of  the  eight,  seems  to  have  been 
rather  unfortunate.  The  title  "  Chemistry,  Meteorology, 
and  Digestion  "  looks  somewhat  mixed  and  heteroge- 
neous as  an  assignment  of  a  subject,  —  apparently  the 
scraps  and  ends  of  the  business.  His  notion  of  his 
function  as  a  natural  theologian  is  similar  to  that  of  Dr. 
Roget.  He  makes  an  almost  purely  scientific  treatise, 
and  relies  upon  the  "  contemplative  mind  "  of  the  reader 
for  the  natural  theology.  However,  he  gives  an  example 
of  how  it  should  be  done  in  his  introduction :  — 

"Animals  in  cold  climates  have  been  provided  with  a 
covering  of  fur.  Men  in  such  climates  cover  themselves 
with  that  fur.  In  both  cases,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
end  or  intention,  no  one  can  deny  that  the  effect  at  least  is 
precisely  the  same :  the  animal  and  the  man  are  alike  pro- 
tected from  the  cold.  Now,  since  the  animal  did  not  clothe 
itself,  but  must  have  been  clothed  by  another,  it  follows  that 
whoever  clothed  the  animal  apparently  knew  what  the  man 
knows,  and  reasoned  like  the  man  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  clother 
of  the  animal  knew  that  the  climate  in  which  the  animal  is 
placed  is  a  cold  climate,  and  that  a  covering  of  fur  is  one  of 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  263 

the  best  means  of  warding  off  the  cold  :  he  therefore  clothed 
his  creature  in  this  very  appropriate  material. 

' '  The  man  who  clothes  himself  in  fur  to  keep  off  the  cold 
performs  an  act  directed  to  a  certain  end  ;  in  short,  an  act 
of  design.  So  whoever,  directly  or  indirectly,  caused  the 
animal  to  be  clothed  with  fur  to  keep  off  the  cold,  must 
likewise  have  performed  an  act  of  design.  But  under  the 
circumstances  the  clother  of  the  animal  must  be  admitted 
to  have  been  also  the  creator  of  the  animal ;  and,  by  extend- 
ing the  argument,  the  creator  of  man  himself,  —  of  the 
universe.  Moreover,  the  intelligence  the  Creator  has  dis- 
played in  clothing  the  animal,  he  has  deigned  to  impart  to 
man,  who  is  thus  enabled  to  recognize  his  Creator's  design." 

He  uses  "  design  "  usually  in  the  sense  of  "  adaptation 
of  means  to  an  end."  The  topic  of  his  introduction 
makes  them  synonymous :  "  Of  the  Leading  Argument 
of  Natural  Theology,  that  Design,  or  the  Adaptation  of 
Means  to  an  End,  exists  in  Nature."  Remembering 
this  synonymy,  I  wish  the  reader  to  note  his  "classes 
of  objects,"  all  of  which,  he  thinks,  prove  design ;  that 
is,  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end :  — 

"  The  argument  of  design,  therefore,  in  its  general  sense, 
embraces  at  least  three  classes  of  objects  :  — 

"  1.  Those  objects  regarding  which  the  reasoning  of  man 
coincides  with  the  reasoning  evinced  by  his  Creator,  as  in 
the  simple  adaptation  of  clothing  above  mentioned  ;  or  those 
objects  in  which  man  is  able  to  trace,  to  a  certain  extent, 
his  Creator's  designs,  as  in  the  various  phenomena  amenable 
to  the  laws  of  quantity ;  viz.,  mechanics,  etc." 

This  first  class  includes  two  divisions,  —  first,  those 
cases  where  the  means  and  end  are  both  in  plain  sight ; 
and,  secondly,  those  in  which  they  are  not  so  clear: 
but  we  are  still  "  able  to  trace  the  Creator's  designs  to  a 


264  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

certain  extent."     This  subdivision  runs  into  his  second 
division :  — 

"  2.  Those  objects  in  which  man  sees  no  more  than  the 
preliminaries  and  the  results,  or  the  end  and  design  accom- 
plished, without  being  able  to  trace,  through  their  details, 
the  means  of  that  accomplishment ;  as  in  all  the  phenomena 
and  operations  of  chemistry. 

"3.  Those  objects  in  which  design  is  inferred,  but  in  which 
the  design,  as  well  as  the  means  by  which  it  is  accomplished, 
are  alike  concealed ;  as  in  the  existence  of  fixed  stars,  of 
comets,  of  organic  life,  and  indeed  in  all  the  great  and 
more  recondite  phenomena  of   nature." 

His  three  classes  are  not  well  defined ;  but  it  would 
seem  that  he  means  something  like  this :  in  one  class  of 
those  objects  upon  which  the  argument  of  design  is 
based,  we  see  plainly  both  the  end  and  the  means ;  in 
another,  the  end  only ;  and,  in  the  third,  neither  the  end 
nor  the  means  is  ascertainable.  Now,  remembering  that 
he  associates  "  design  "  with  teleology  exclusively,  we 
have  here  a  remarkable  example  of  the  principles  by 
which  teleologists  managed  to  bring  all  possible  phe- 
nomena under  teleology.  Prout  thinks  we  can  apply 
the  teleological  method  in  cases  where  we  see  only  the 
result  without  knowing  the  means  of  its  accomplish- 
ment ;  and  —  still  more  astonishing — he  will  bring  in  also 
those  cases  where  means  and  end  "are  alike  concealed." 
The  old  teleologists  quite  generally  acted  upon  such 
principles,  but  Prout  distinctly  avows  them. 

That  is,  he  will  bring  all  these  classes  of  objects 
under  teleology,  provided  we  are  right  about  what  he 
meant  by  "  design."  He  certainly  starts  out  with  the 
meaning  "adaptation  of  means  to  an  end,"  as  in  the 
heading  of  his  introduction  given  above.  But  in  his 
definition   of  the  second  class  of  objects  embraced  in 


THE  BRIDGEWATER  TREATISES.  265 

design-arguments,  where  he  speaks  of  the  design  being 
"accomplished,"  he  evidently  means  purpose ;  and  the 
same  meaning  applies  best  in  the  definition  of  the  third 
class, —  that  or  end,  —  which  would  answer  just  as  well 
as  purpose.  So  we  have  here  a  fine  example  of  the  am- 
biguities of  design.  But  these  ambiguities  do  not  de- 
feat the  conclusion  that  he  associated  design  with  tele- 
ology ;  for,  notwithstanding  the  shifting  senses  in  which 
he  used  that  word,  the  associated  words  "  means  "  and 
"ends"  give  the  teleological  flavor  to  all  his  three 
classes.  Therefore  it  is  indubitable  that  Prout  con- 
sidered stars,  comets,  "  and  indeed  all  the  great  and 
more  recondite  phenomena  of  nature,"  good  material 
for  teleology,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  end  of 
their  existence  might  be  wholly  unknown,  as  well  as 
the  means  by  which  that  end  was  accomplished. 

Now,  when  we  remember  that  "  fitness  in  the  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  an  end  "  was  considered  the  strong 
point  of  teleology  by  all  its  advocates  of  the  old  school, 
we  are  curious  to  know  what  they  could  make  of  the 
argument  when  either  the  means  or  the  end  was  un- 
known, much  more  when  both  "  are  alike  concealed." 
We  know  that  they  did  often  make  a  lame  attempt  to 
frame  arguments  from  such  examples  as  are  included  in 
Prout's  third  class ;  but,  if  we  attempt  to  discover  the 
logic  of  their  reasoning,  it  baffles  all  our  research. 
Most  of  them,  as  we  have  seen,  thought  it  sufficient  to 
recite  the  facts,  and  then  exclaim,  "  How  admirable  is 
all  this ! " 

Of  course  the  grand  mistake  under  which  Prout  was 
laboring  was  the  failure  to  distinguish  between  eutaxi- 
ology  and  teleology,  and  the  attempt  which  grew  out 
of  that  to  force  the  facts  of  eutaxy  into  the  service  of 
teleology ;  and  this  mistake  crippled  the  efforts  of  de- 


266  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

sign-advocates  for  centuries.  It  appears  more  or  less 
distinctly  in  all  of  the  Bridgewater  Treatises,  even  in 
that  of  Whewell,  the  ablest  man  among  them,  and  the 
only  one  who  came  anywhere  near  framing  a  distinct 
eutaxiological  argument. 

Another  fact  about  these  treatises,  regarding  them 
collectively,  is  that  the  writers  seem  to  be  in  some  de- 
gree uncertain  whether  their  aim  is  to  prove  God's  ex- 
istence, or  simply  his  "power,  wisdom,  and  goodness." 
It  was  the  latter  they  were  appointed  to  do ;  and  in 
doing  that  the  first  point  would  be  included,  provided 
they  did  not  assume  his  existence  in  order  to  prove  his 
attributes ;  in  that  case  it  would  not  follow  that  they 
accomplished  both  things  by  one  effort.  However,  it 
seems  that  they  did  suppose  they  had  done  both.  Dr. 
Prout,  apparently  speaking  for  them  all,  says,  — 

"  The  intention  of  these  treatises  is  to  point  out  the  va- 
rious evidences  of  design  among  the  objects  of  creation, 
and  to  deduce  from  them  the  existence  and  the  attributes  of 
the  Creator." 

Still  they  do  not,  any  of  them,  attack  the  problem  of 
proving  his  existence  with  specific  directness.  They 
seem  to  think  their  proofs  of  his  attributes  involve  the 
point  of  his  existence,  and  establish  it  indirectly. 

The  whole  Bridgewater  series  answers  in  the  aggre- 
gate to  that  conception  of  a  "  natural  theology  "  which 
Derham,  Nieuwentyt,  and  Paley  entertained,  and  which 
they  attempted  to  realize  in  their  respective  works. 
That  conception  or  ideal  was  to  "digest  all  the  sci- 
ence of  their  day  into  a  system  of  natural  theology." 
What  each  of  them  attempted  singly  the  eight  Bridge- 
water  essayists  united  their  strength  to  accomplish. 
What  was  the  result  ?     We  have  seen,  that,  in  the  case 


THE  BRIDGE  WATER  TREATISES.  2G7 

of  those  wno  singly  attempted  the  whole  task,  the  prod- 
uct was  very  indifferent,  considered  either  as  science 
or  as  theology.  Is  it  any  better  when  eight  men  join 
hands  in  the  work?  Candidly,  we  cannot  say  it  is. 
The  conception  is  radically  wrong,  and  the  results  of 
working  upon  a  false  ideal  can  never  be  very  valuable. 
Wherein  was  the  conception  at  fault?  Chiefly  in  the 
assumption  that  the  argument  is  strengthened  by  every 
added  example  of  design.  That  is  true  only  within 
very  narrow  limits.  Ten  examples  are  better  than 
one,  and  a  hundred  better  still.  But,  when  it  comes 
to  an  indefinitely  great  number  of  similar  examples,  all 
comprised  under  the  same  logical  formula  of  argumen- 
tation, the  vast  unwieldy  mass  is  a  burden  rather  than 
a  help.  But  to  digest  all  the  science  of  a  given  gen- 
eration into  a  system  of  natural  theology  is  simply  a 
process  of  piling  up  endless  examples  and  illustrations 
all  of  the  same  kind. 

But  are  they  all  alike  ?  Does  not  the  march  of  sci- 
ence constantly  open  new  fields?  Did  not  Buckland 
strike  an  entirely  new  vein  by  reason  of  the  erection  of 
geology  into  a  science  ?  So  he  did  ;  and  there  is  some- 
thing still  to  be  done  in  that  direction  by  popular 
writers  applying  old  formulas  to  new  facts.  That  is 
really  an  inviting  field  for  those  who  like  that  kind  of 
work.  But  at  bottom  it  is  only  a  process  of  piling  up 
new  examples  where  we  have  already  millions  at  hand 
-for  each  one  that  can  really  be  of  any  use.  Design-ar- 
guments can  be  constructed  just  as  well  upon  the  basis 
of  a  single  science  as  upon  a  whole  encyclopaedia  of  the 
sciences.  What  is  needed  is  a  reconstruction  of  the 
logic  of  design,  instead  of  a  new  batch  of  illustrations. 

There  is  every  indication  that  the  Bridgewater  es- 
sayists were  working  to  the  very  ideal  of  which  I  have 


268  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

just  endeavored  to  show  the  error.  In  the  aggregate 
they  cover  the  field  of  science  with  tolerable  complete- 
ness ;  and  the  scrappy  mixture  of  topics  which  fell  to 
the  eighth  man  looks  as  if  he  had  to  take  what  was 
deemed  necessary  to  make  the  work  exhaustive.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  a  similar  attempt  will  never  be  made 
again.  There  is  a  sameness,  a  dead  level  of  monotony, 
about  these  eight  treatises  which  is  seldom  realized, 
because  only  two  or  three  of  them  are  well  known,  but 
which  becomes  painful  when  they  are  all  examined 
together.  There  is  an  individuality  about  the  style; 
but  there  is  the  same  general  undertone,  the  same  sus- 
picion of  a  set  task,  the  same  kind  of  argument,  and 
the  same  conclusion,  in  all  of  them. 

Did  they  not  do  some  good  in  their  day  ?  Unques- 
tionably :  as  did  also  the  similar  efforts  of  their  prede- 
cessors. Several  of  these  "  Natural  Theologies  "  were 
extremely  popular,  and  brought  much  fame  and  some 
money  to  their  authors.  That  was  certainly  a  good 
thing  for  them,  and  their  readers  were  benefited  also. 
They  were  good  books  in  their  clay,  and  of  their  kind ; 
but  the  kind  is  happily  obsolete.  They  did  some  harm 
as  well  as  good.  That  conception  of  teleology  which 
Whewell  presented  under  the  name  of  the  doctrine  of 
final  causes,  was  provocative  of  that  wave  of  hostility  to 
teleology  among  men  of  science  which  is  just  now  sub- 
siding, and  which  swept  many  of  them  into  infidelity. 
The  repetition  of  a  similar  style  of  argument  in  this 
generation  would  be  wholly  mischievous.  According 
to  Dugald  Stewart,  the  multiplication  of  such  works 
was  mischievous  even  in  their  own  day,  by  reason  that 
they  created  an  impression  of  God's  existence  as  being 
a  very  doubtful  question,  which  required  a  great  deal 
of  argument  to  establish. 


THE  BRIDGE  WATER  TREATISES.  269 

The  "  Ninth  Brigewater  Treatise,"  by  Charles  Bab- 
bage,  Esq.,  seems  to  have  been  inspired  by  the  desire 
of  the  author  to  prove  that  a  man  of  high  attainments 
in  pure  mathematics  could  write  on  natural  theology. 
Whewell  had  spoken  disparagingly  of  "mechanical 
philosophers  and  mathematicians,"  as  being  less  likely 
than  men  engaged  in  other  pursuits  "  to  make  any  clear 
advance  towards  such  a  subject  of  speculation."  Bab- 
bage's  argument  is  a  singular  one,  and  is  illustrated  by 
means  of  the  "  Calculating  Engine." 


270  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER   XL 

BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE   BURNETT  PRIZES. 

Henry  Lord  Brougham  published  his  "  Discourse 
of  Natural  Theology"  iu  1835. 

"This  discourse  is  not  a  treatise  of  natural  theology:  it 
has  not  for  its  design  an  exposition  of  the  doctrines  whereof 
natural  theology  consists.  But  its  object  is,  first,  to  explain 
the  nature  of  the  evidence  upon  which  it  rests, — to  show 
that  it  is  a  science,  the  truths  of  which  are  discovered  by 
induction,  like  the  truths  of  natural  and  moral  philosophy ; 
that  it  is  a  branch  of  science  partaking  of  the  nature  of 
each  of  those  great  divisions  of  human  knowledge,  and  not 
merely  closely  allied  to  them  both.  Secondly,  the  object  of 
the  discourse  is  to  explain  the  advantages  attending  this 
study.     The  work,  therefore,^ is  a  logical  one." 

Here  is  one  man  at  last  who  is  going  to  look  into  the 
logic  of  design,  instead  of  piling  up  new  examples,  or 
warming  over  the  old  ones.  We  are  especially  inter- 
ested in  his  opinion  that  design-arguments  rest  upon 
induction.     How  does  he  make  this  out  ? 

'kBut  let  us  examine  further  this  matter.  The  position 
which  we  reach  by  a  strict  process  of  induction  is  common 
to  natural  philosophy  and  natural  theology ;  namely,  that  a 
given  organ  performs  a  given  function,  or  a  given  arrange- 
ment possesses  a  certain  stability  by  its  adaptation  to 
mechanical  laws.     We  have  said  that  the  process  of   rca- 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE  BURNETT  PRIZES.     271 

soning  is  short  and  easy,  by  which  we  arrive  at  the  doctrine 
more  peculiar  to  natural  theology  ;  namely,  that  some  power, 
acquainted  with  and  acting  upon  the  knowledge  of  those 
laws,  fashioned  the  organ  with  the  intention  of  having  the 
function  performed,  or  constructed  the  system  so  that  it 
might  endure.  Is  not  this  last  process  as  much  one  of  strict 
induction  as  the  other  ?  It  is  plainly  only  a  generalization 
of  many  particular  facts, — a  reasoning  from  things  known 
to  things  unknown  ;  an  inference  of  a  new  or  unknown  rela- 
tion from  other  relations  formerly  observed  and  known.  .  .  . 
When  we  see  that  a  certain  effect — namely,  distinct  vision  — 
is  performed  by  an  achromatic  instrument,  the  eye,  why  do 
we  infer  that  some  one  must  have  made  it?  Because  we 
nowhere  and  at  no  time  have  had  any  experience  of  any  one 
thing  fashioning  itself,  and  indeed  cannot  form  to  ourselves 
any  distinct  idea  of  what  such  a  process  as  self-creation 
means  ;  and,  further,  because  when  we  ourselves  would  pro- 
duce a  similar  result,  we  have  recourse  to  like  means.  Again, 
when  we  perceive  the  adaptation  of  natural  objects  and  opera- 
tions to  a  perceived  end,  and  from  thence  infer  design  in  the 
maker  of  these  objects  and  superintender  of  these  opera- 
tions, why  do  we  draw  this  conclusion?  Because  we  know 
by  experience,  that,  if  we  ourselves  desired  to  accomplish  a 
similar  purpose,  we  should  do  so  by  the  like  adaptation. 
We  know  by  experience  that  this  is  design  in  us,  and  that 
our  proceedings  are  the  result  of  such  design.  We  know 
that  if  some  of  our  works  were  seen  by  others,  who  neither 
were  aware  of  our  having  made  them,  nor  of  the  intention 
with  which  we  made  them,  they  would  be  right  should  they, 
from  seeing  and  examining  them,  both  infer  that  we  had 
made  them,  and  conjecture  why  we  had  made  them.  The 
same  reasoning,  by  the  help  of  experience,  from  what  we 
know  to  what  we  cannot  know,  is  manifestly  the  foundation 
of  the  inference,  that  the  members  of  the  body  were  fash- 
ioned for  certain  uses  by  a  maker  acquainted  with  their 
operations,  and  willing  that  those  uses  should  be  served." 


272  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

The  whole  matter  would  be  much  clearer  if  Brougham 
had  framed  a  definite  proposition  embodying  the  results 
of  the  inductive  process  which  he  claims  to  be  involved 
in  design-arguments.  Let  us  note  the  fact,  however, 
that  he  has  here  proposed  an  entirely  new  view  of  the 
logic  of  design.  All  the  old  writers  made  it  a  process 
of  analogy. 

He  uses  "  design  "  and  other  colloquial  expressions  in 
the  same  loose  way  as  previous  writers  had  done.  Set- 
ting out  as  he  did  to  write  a  logical  discourse,  a  little 
sharp  analysis  and  discrimination  in  the  use  of  terms 
would  have  been  entirely  in  order.  He  did  not  dis- 
criminate at  all  between  the  argument  from  order  and 
the  argument  from  ends,  or  between  eutaxiology  and  tele- 
ology :  he  makes  design  synonymous  with  teleology.  One 
thing,  however,  he  did  which  comports  well  with  his 
logical  ideal :  he  drew  the  distinction  between  natural 
theology  and  natural  religion,  which,  as  he  remarks, 
all  the  older  authors  had  neglected.  As  regards  the 
boundaries  of  natural  theology,  he  includes  in  it  the 
moral  or  anthropological  argument.  In  this  he  is  un- 
doubtedly correct.  Several  previous  writers  had  done 
the  same,  —  Sebonde,  for  instance,  whose  example  has  the 
more  value  because  he  was  the  first  to  use  the  term 
"natural  theology."  Brougham's  comments  on  the  work 
of  his  predecessors  in  this  respect,  and  frank  expres- 
sions about  Paley's  plagiarism,  are  worth  quoting  :  — 

' '  Hitherto  our  argument  has  rested  upon  a  comparison  of 
the  truths  of  natural  theology  with  those  of  physical  science. 
But  the  evidences  of  design  presented  by  the  universe  are 
not  merely  those  which  the  material  world  affords.  The  intel- 
lectual system  is  equally  fruitful  in  proofs  of  an  intelligent 
cause,  although  these  have  occupied  little  of  the  philosopher's 
attention,  and  may,  indeed,  be  said  never  to  have  found  a 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE   BURNETT   PRIZES.     273 

place  among  the  speculations  of  the  natural  theologian. 
Nothing  is  more  remarkable  than  the  care  with  which  all  the 
writers  on  this  subject,  at  least  among  the  moderns,  have 
confined  themselves  to  the  proofs  afforded  by  the  visible  and 
sensible  works  of  nature,  while  the  evidence  furnished  by  the 
mind  and  its  operations  has  been  wholly  neglected.  The  cele- 
brated book  of  Ray  on  '  The  Wonders  of  Creation  ' 1  seems 
to  assume  that  the  human  soul  has  no  separate  existence,  — 
that  it  forms  no  part  of  the  created  system.2  Derham  has 
written  upon  astro-theology  and  physico-theology  as  if  the 
heavens  alone  proclaimed  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  earth 
only  showed  forth  his  handiwork  ;  for  his  only  mention  of 
intellectual  nature  is  in  the  single  chapter  of  the  '  Physico- 
Theology '  on  the  soul,  in  which  he  is  content  with  two  ob- 
servations,—  one  on  the  variety  of  man's  inclinations,  and 
another  on  his  inventive  powers  —  giving  nothing  which  pre- 
cisely proves  design.  Dr.  Paley,  whose  work  is  chiefly  taken 
from  the  writings  of  Derham,  deriving  from  them  its  whole 
plan  and  much  of  its  substance,  but  clothing  the  harsher 
statements  of  his  original  in  an  attractive  and  popular  style, 
had  so  little  of  scientific  habits,  so  moderate  a  power  of 
generalizing,  that  he  never  once  mentions  the  mind,  [truly  a 
strange  reason  to  give  for  his  neglect  to  mention  the  mind !] 
or  any  of  the  intellectual  phenomena,  nor  ever  appears  to 
consider  them  as  forming  a  portion  of  the  works  or  opera- 
tions of  nature." 

Brougham  is  mistaken  in  the  opinion  that  "  all  the 
writers  on  this  subject,  at  least  among  the  moderns, 
have    confined   themselves   to    the   proofs   afforded  by 

1  A  very  loose  citation  of  a  title.  "  The  Wisdom  of  God  manifested 
in  tlie  Works  of  Creation  "  is  the  book  he  referred  to. 

2  Entirely  too  severe.  Ray  had  some  queer  notions,  —  that  of  the 
"plastic  nature,"  for  example,  —  and  some  of  his  expressions  are  un- 
guarded; hut  he  was  no  materialist.  The  fact  that  he  did  not  frame  any 
arguments  from  the  human  faculties  is  no  proof  that  he  did  not  believe 
in  their  "  separate  existence." 


274  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

the  visible  and  sensible  works  of  nature,  while  the 
evidence  furnished  by  the  mind  and  its  operations 
has  been  wholly  neglected."  Socrates,  Sebonde,  More, 
Cudworth,  Wollaston,  and  Crombie  employed  the  an- 
thropological argument ;  and  Kant  laid  great  emphasis 
upon  it.  Even  Lord  Brougham  set  up  for  a  natural 
theologian,  without  knowing  much  about  what  had 
already  been  done  in  that  field. 

"  The  Whole  Doctrine  of  Final  Causes,"  by  William 
J.  Irons,  Curate  of  St.  Mary's,  appeared  in  1836.  After 
the  flood  of  Bridgewater  Treatises,  it  might  be  expected 
that  there  would  be  an  ebb  in  the  tide.  Irons  makes  an 
elaborate  attack  upon  final  causes,  but  in  the  interest  of 
theism  and  revealed  religion.  He  denies  that  natural 
theology  can  add  any  thing  to  our  knowledge  of 
God:  — 

"  I  venture  to  affirm,  that,  although  natural  conscience 
may  lead  a  man  to  feel  the  want  of  some  religion,  it  will 
not  teach  him  the  precise  nature  of  religious  obligation ; 
neither  will  natural  reasouiug  be  able  to  prove,  with  cer- 
tainty, any  single  theological  truth,  even  the  unity  or  per- 
sonality of  God,  or  the  reasonableness  of  worship,  —  all  which 
points  are  indispensable  to  religion  "  (p.  34)  . 

"I  conclude,  therefore,  that  though,  without  a  revelation, 
we  might  arrive  at  a  certain  knowledge  that  there  was  a 
cause  (or  causes)  for  all  things  in  nature,  yet  we  could 
never  tell  whether  there  was  only  one  cause,  or  whether 
there  were  many.  We  could  not  know  even  the  personality 
of  any  such  cause,  nor  the  moral  character  of  it :  we  must 
disbelieve  either  in  its  wisdom,  its  goodness,  or  its  power. 
So  that  not  one  truth  of  theology  could  by  any  possibility 
be  arrived  at  on  natural  principles  "  (p.  143). 

He  maintains  that  the  teleologists  have  reversed  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes  as  it  was  propounded  by  Aris- 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE  BURNETT  PRIZES.     275 

totle,  and  used  by  the  ancients  generally.  Their  aim 
was  to  discover  the  ultimate  tendencies  of  things,  the 
end,  by  an  induction  of  facts  ;  and  they  never  thought  of 
starting  with  the  end,  and  thence  deducing  a  Supreme 
First  Cause.  But  the  latter  method  is  the  one  adopted 
by  the  moderns ;  so  that  the  teleologists  start  with  the 
end  in  order  to  reach  the  beginning,  while  the  ancients 
started  with  an  induction  of  facts  in  order  to  reach  the 
end,  where,  says  Irons,  they  stopped  contented. 

This  is  only  partially  true.  The  ancients  did  not 
rest  content  always  with  the  discovery  of  the  end, 
but  sought  to  make  inferences  beyond  that,  using  it 
as  the  ground  of  further  deductions ;  and  the  modern 
teleologists  did  not  neglect  the  induction  of  facts  by 
any  means.  They  piled  up  facts  mountain  high  to 
prove  design,  in  order  that  thence  they  might  prove 
a  designer. 

But  does  "  design  imply  a  designer  "  ?  Irons  attacks 
this  truism  of  Paley's  with  fatal  effect.  The  similar 
expression,  "  There  cannot  be  contrivance  without  a 
contriver,"  shares  the  same  fate.  But,  when  he  comes 
to  the  declaration  of  Paley,  that  there  cannot  be  "  order 
without  choice,"  he  resorts  to  an  evasion. 

"  I  prefer  to  bring  this,  as  well  as  every  other  matter,  to 
every  man's  individual  knowledge  and  experience ;  and  I 
ask  whether  the  '  order '  of  a  man's  actions  is  always  the 
result  of  'choice.'  No!  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  this 
proposition  has  been  linked  to  two  or  three  evident  truisms, 
and  has  passed  as  one  itself." 

The  "  order  of  a  man's  actions  "  is  simply  the  sequence 
of  them  :  that  is  quite  a  different  notion  from  the  eu- 
taxy,  the  established  order  of  the  cosmos.  The  order 
of  nature  might  mean  the  sequences  of  nature  :  possibly 


276  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Paley  meant  that,  but  it  is  not  at  all  likely.  Irons  was 
dealing  with  a  very  different  proposition  here  from  those 
"  easy  "  ones,  —  easy  to  demolish,  —  "  Design  implies  a 
designer,"  etc.  He  ought  not  to  have  supposed  he 
could  demolish  it  witli  a  wave  of  the  hand,  simply 
because  he  found  it  associated  with  certain  patent 
and  easily  demonstrated  fallacies. 

It  will  be  observed  that  he  speaks  of  God  uniformly 
as  a  cause.  He  makes  all  design-arguments  causal,  just 
as  Kant,  Reid,  Stewart,  and  McCosh  do  ;  and  he  does 
not  entertain  the  conception  of  any  other  design-argu- 
ment than  teleology.  If  he  had  not  been  so  summary 
with  the  statement  that  order  implies  choice  in  its  es- 
tablishment, he  might  have  been  led  to  a  more  respect- 
ful view  of  natural  theology.  His  criticisms  are  very 
damaging  to  the  teleology  of  Paley  and  the  Bridge- 
water  Treatises,  but  they  do  not  touch  eutaxiology  at 
all.  The  only  point  he  makes  which  could  have  any 
bearing  that  way  is,  the  evasion  of  turning  the  wide- 
spread and  deep  harmonies  of  the  cosmos  into  a  mere 
sequence  of  events. 

He  thinks,  notwithstanding  all  its  fallacies,  there  is 
some  use  for  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  if  you  keep  it 
within  due  bounds,  and  in  the  hands  of  proper  persons. 
He  shows  that  Voltaire  and  other  infidels  thought  favor- 
ably of  design-arguments.  They  would  be  glad  to  set 
up  natural  religion  as  a  rival  to  supplant  revealed  re- 
ligion, knowing  that  man  will  have  a  religion  of  some 
sort.  To  all  such  persons  who  want  thus  to  employ 
teleology,  he  sternly  cries,  "  Hands  off !  " 

"  The  believer  in  revelation  alone  has  any  right  to  enter- 
tain the  doctrine  of  design.  When,  on  higher  and  more 
substantial   grounds,  the  Christian  has   embraced   his   holy 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE  BURNETT  PRIZES.     277 

religion,  this  doctrine  may  be  brought  forward  to  illustrate 
the  revealed  character  of  God." 

The  Burnett  prizes  were  provided  for  by  the  bequest 
of  John  Burnett,  Esq.,  a  merchant  of  Aberdeen.  They 
were  to  be  awarded,  at  intervals  of  forty  years,  to  the 
authors  of  the  two  best  treatises  upon  the  evidence  of 
God's  existence,  and  the  refutation  of  objections  against 
his  wisdom  and  goodness.  Upon  the  first  occasion  of 
their  award,  in  1815,  the  first  prize  of  £1,200  was  ob- 
tained by  William  Laurence  Brown,  D.D.  ;  and  the  sec- 
ond prize  was  obtained  by  the  Rev.  John  Bird  Sumner, 
afterwards  Archbishop  of  Canterbury.  Upon  the  sec- 
ond occasion  of  their  award,  in  1855,  the  first  prize  of 
XI, 800  was  adjudged  to  the  Rev.  R.  A.  Thompson,  and 
the  second  prize  of  £600  was  adjudged  to  the  Rev.  John 
Tulloch,  D.D. 

Dr.  Brown's  treatise  is  entitled  "  An  Essay  on  the 
Existence  of  a  Supreme  Creator."  Some  expressions 
in  his  introduction  imply  that  he  was  but  slightly 
acquainted  with  the  large  body  of  literature  already 
in  existence  upon  the  subject  he  was  about  to  han- 
dle :  — 

"  Of  the  many  systems  of  Christian  theology  which  have 
been  communicated  to  the  public,  comparatively  few  unfold, 
in  a  clear  and  detailed  manner,  the  proofs  of  the  existence 
and  attributes  of  the  Deity.  .  .  .  Young  persons  are  hurried 
into  the.  particular  doctrines  of  Christianity,  and  generally 
into  the  particular  tenets  of  that  church  or  sect  of  which  they 
are  destined  to  be  members.  These  points  they  are  taught 
to  consider  as  much  more  interesting  than  the  fundamentals 
of  all  religion  ;  and,  accordingly,  in  this  channel  religious 
study  and  improvement  are  directed  in  succeeding  life. 
Hence,  while  a  considerable  number  know  the  chief  differ- 
ferences  between   Papists   and   Protestants,    Calvinists  and 


278  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Lutherans,  Presbyterians  and  Episcopalians,  Trinitarians 
and  Unitarians,  the  Church  of  Scotland  and  Seceders, 
comparatively  few  are  capable  of  offering  a  judicious  and 
solid  answer  to  the  objections  of  a  deist  or  of  an  atheist " 
(I.  ix.). 

It  is  no  doubt  true,  that  sectarian  differences  are  bet- 
ter understood,  and  more  frequently  form  the  topic  of 
conversation  among  Christians,  than  the  proofs  of  God's 
existence.  But  this  does  not  surely  result  from  any 
dearth  of  treatises  on  the  latter  subject.  Sectarian  con- 
troversies are  living  and  lively  issues,  and  they  are  level 
to  the  comprehension  of  all ;  while  the  paucity  of  real 
atheists,  and  the  secure  confidence  in  the  inherent 
strength  of  their  position  felt  by  all  theists,  make  that 
issue  theoretical  and  speculative  rather  than  practical. 
The  fundamental  and  vital  importance  of  theism  is  not 
able  to  prevent  the  contest  over  it  from  being  a  languid 
and  bloodless  one,  as  compared  with  the  hot  and  fierce 
skirmishes  between  rival  sects.  It  is  not  only  that 
there  are  few  atheists,  and  that  theists  feel  the  ground 
very  solid  under  their  feet  no  matter  how  the  specula- 
tive battle  may  turn,  but  theistic  arguments  must  in 
the  nature  of  things  always  be  in  a  high  degree  ab- 
struse, recondite,  and  to  be  thoroughly  comprehended 
by  a  relatively  small  number  of  persons. 

Dr.  Brown  relies  almost  wholly  upon  the  ontological, 
causal,  and  moral  arguments,  referring  the  reader  to 
"  Payley  (szV),  Ray,  and  Derham  "  for  design-arguments. 

Sumner's  Burnett  prize  essay  is  simply  an  apology, 
or  treatise  upon  the  evidences  of  Christianity. 

The  Burnett  prize-essay  of  the  Rev.  R.  A.  Thomp- 
son is  entitled  "  Christian  Theism :  the  Testimony  of 
Reason  and  Revelation  to  the  Existence  and  Character 
of  the  Supreme  Being."    Book  L,  on  "  First  Principles  of 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE  BURNETT  PRIZES.     279 

Knowledge,"  is  psychological  and  metaphysical.  Book 
II.,  on  "  The  Direct  Evidences  of  Natural  Theism,"  is 
the  one  in  which  we  are  specially  interested.  He  re- 
gards the  physico-theological  argument  as  complemen- 
tary to  the  causal  or  cosmological. 

"The  cosmological  proof  states  the  procedure  of  the 
mind  in  giving  its  first  matter  to  this  empty  conception,  and 
raises  it  to  the  positive  conception  of  the  source  of  all  being 
and  power.  It  is  where  this  proof  ends  that  the  physico- 
theological  proof,  or  argument  from  design,  has  its  com- 
mencement. The  cosmological,  when  properly  stated,  infers 
a  Cause  of  causes,  a  Source  of  all  reality,  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  world  as  a  unity  of  diversities.  The  physico- 
theological  examines  the  nature  of  these  diversities ;  and 
from  their  harmnoy,  their  beauty,  their  marvellous  adapta- 
tions to  ends,  in  the  order  of  the  material,  the  intellectual, 
and  the  moral  worlds,  draws  its  conclusions  respecting  the 
nature  and  attributes  of  that  Eternal  Power  who  is  the 
source  of  all  being"  (I.  293). 

As  regards  this  attempt  to  link  causal  and  design 
arguments  together,  I  have  nothing  to  say  but  to  com- 
mend it.  Thompson  maintains,  that  there  is  but  one 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  that  each  of  the  sev- 
eral arguments  contributes  something  to  this,  and  that 
the  correct  treatment  of  them  all  is  to  link  them  to- 
gether into  one  consecutive  argument.  This  is  an 
interesting  and  commendable  suggestion ;  though  as  to 
its  practicability,  and  as  to  the  details  of  the  scheme,  — 
which  argument  is  fundamental,  and  which  are  subsidi- 
ary ;  what  does  this  proof  contribute  to  the  whole  re- 
sult, and  how  shall  it  be  linked  with  that  proof,  —  there 
would  be  room  for  wide  differences  of  opinion.  And 
we  care  less  about  how  Mr.  Thompson  himself  would 
carry  out  his  suggestion  when  we  observe  how  vague 


280  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  confused  are  his  notions  of  physico-theology.  He 
speaks  of  it  as  the  argument  from  design ;  he  mixes 
eutaxiology  and  teleology  together  in  the  expression 
"marvellous  adaptations  to  ends  in  the  order"  of  the 
world,  and  makes  the  bald  truism,  "Design  implies  a 
designer,''  the  major  premise  of  his  argument.  "  It  is 
the  argument  of  natural  theology,  that  design  must 
imply  a  designer,  and  that  that  which  designs  is  mind  " 
(I.  303). 

The  Burnett  prize-treatise  of  the  Rev.  John  Tul- 
loch,  D.D.,  was  published  in  1855. 

His  argument  is  more  distinctly  eutaxiological  than 
that  of  any  other  writer  before  or  since.  His  syllo- 
gistic statement  of  it  is,  — 

' '  Order  universally  proves  mind.  The  works  of  nature  dis- 
cover order.     Therefore  the  works  of  nature  prove  mind." 

This  is  well  enough  to  start  with;  but  what  is  inscru- 
table to  an  ordinary  mind  is  the  motive  which  led  him 
almost  to  ignore  his  syllogism,  and  ramble  off  on  a  long 
discussion  of  the  principle  of  causation.  The  only 
plausible  solution  is,  that,  like  Stewart  and  others,  he 
held  that  causation  underlies  the  whole  argument, 
though  he  does  not  say  so.  He  thinks,  with  Reid  and 
Stewart,  that  the  fundamental  inference  is  an  intuition. 

"  Why  is  it  that  we  apprehend  everywhere  in  phenomena 
of  order  the  operation  of  a  rational  will  or  mind  ?  Simply 
because  we  cannot  help  doing  so ;  because  the  laws  of  our 
rational  being  compel  us  to  do  so.  These  will  not  permit  us 
to  rest  short  of  mind  as  the  ultimate  explanation  of  such 
phenomena.  The  theistic  position,  therefore,  is  based  on  an 
inherent  rational  necessity." 

If  the  perception  that  "order  universally  proves 
mind  "  is  intuitive,  what  is  the  need  of  resting  the  argu- 


BROUGHAM,  IRONS,  AND  THE  BURNETT  PRIZES.      281 

ment  upon  the  law  of  causation,  or  bringing  that  in  at 
all?  But  Tulloch  spoils  his  eutaxiology,  not  only  by 
this  gratuitous  delivery  of  it  over  to  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect,  with  all  the  doubtful  issues  which  attach  to 
that  law,  but  also  by  retaining  the  term  final  cause, 
which  he  fails  to  comprehend,  and  by  using  the  word 
design  with  all  its  fertile  ambiguities.  In  his  discussion 
of  causation  he  arrives  at  the  same  conclusion  with 
•  Irons ;  viz.,  that  mind  is  the  only  cause.  What,  then,  is 
the  difference  between  efficient  and  final  causes  if  both 
are  mental?  No  one  could  ever  find  out  from  Tulloch. 
In  his  whole  discussion  of  final  cause  he  is  perfectly 
contented  when  he  has  traced  it  to  mind;  but,  having 
traced  all  efficient  cause  to  the  same  point,  one  would 
suppose  he  would  tell  us  the  difference  between  these 
two  mental  causes. 

A  fundamental  obtuseness  to  the  meaning  of  terms 
appears  in  the  fact,  that,  making  his  argument  rest  upon 
the  order  of  nature  as  he  does,  he  still  brings  it  under 
the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  which  always  has  reference 
to  an  end  Q  finis),  nor  is  he  any  more  discriminating  in 
the  use  of  the  word  "  design."  In  commenting  upon  the 
passage  which  I  have  quoted  from  Whewell1  respecting 
the  perception  of  "  design  "  from  "  the  mere  aspect  of 
order  and  symmetry  in  the  works  of  nature,"  as  com- 
pared with  the  perception  of  it  "  which  is  suggested  to 
us  by  organized  bodies,"  he,  like  Whewell,  seems  to  be 
grgping  in  the  twilight,  dimly  conscious  that  there  is 
a  difference  in  the  two  cases,  but  unable  to  comprehend 
it  clearly  or  state  it  precisely.  If  the  reader  will  refer 
to  the  analyses  of  eutaxiology  and  teleology  in  my  Intro- 
duction, and  to  the  discussion  of  the  word  "design," 
he  will  find  the  distinction  which  Whewell    and  Tul- ' 

i  P.  249  of  this  work. 


282  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

loch  were  groping  after.  The  teleological  meaning  of 
design  is  "adaptation  of  means  to  an  end:  "  its  meaning 
in  eutaxiology  is  plan.  Tulloch  differs  from  Whewell 
in  this,  that  he  thinks  the  evidence  of  design  is  just  as 
clear  in  one  case  as  in  the  other,  while  Whewell's  com- 
ments are  wholly  disparaging  to  eutaxiology.  hi  re- 
spect to  the  just  appreciation  of  this  line  of  argument, 
Tulloch  is  therefore  clear  in  advance  of  any  previous 
writer.  But  inasmuch  as  he,  like  the  others,  was  still 
entangled  in  the  ambiguities  of  design,  which  prevented 
him  from  making  the  clear  distinction  between  teleology 
and  eutaxiology,  the  praise  which  we  might  otherwise 
bestow  without  qualification  must  be  expressed  with 
some  reserve. 

We  have  had  frequent  illustrations  in  the  course  of 
this  historical  review  of  the  fact  that  theological  dis- 
cussion is  apt  to  take  tone  and  coloring  from  some 
dominant  antagonism.  In  the  seventeenth  century 
teleology  was  anti-Cartesian  ;  in  the  eighteenth  centur}^ 
Hume  was  the  objective  point  of  the  antagonistic  ani- 
mus, and  still  continued  to  be  in  the  early  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  But,  when  Tulloch  wrote  his 
"  Theism,"  a  new  target  for  polemic  theology  had  been 
furnished  by  the  philosophy  of  positivism;  and  his 
treatise  takes  its  tone  from  that,  as  does  also  that  of 
his  colleague,  Mr.  Thompson. 


McCOSH,  POWELL,   AND  COOKE.  288 


CHAPTER   XII. 

McCOSH,  POWELL,  AND  COOKE. 

"  Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation,"  by 
James  McCosh,  LL.D.,  and  George  Dickie,  M.D.,  Edin- 
burgh, 1856,  is  the  most  admirable  design-argument 
ever  produced.  The  motto  is  tvttos  koI  t£\os,  "  Type  and 
End."  The  two  grand  principles  of  order  and  adapta- 
tion, eutaxy  and  teleology,  are  carried  along  side  by  side 
throughout  the  work.  This  fact  is  illustrated  by  the 
section-headings,  —  "  I.  Traces  of  Order  in  the  Organs 
of  Plants."  "  II.  Traces  of  Special  Adaptation  in  the 
Organs  of  Plants."  "  I.  Order  in  the  Number,  Form, 
and  Structure  of  Teeth."  "  II.  Special  Adaptations  in 
the  Number,  Form,  and  Structure  of  Teeth."  Thus  it 
runs  through  the  whole  of  Book  II.,  which  is  the  special 
contribution  of  Dr.  Dickie.  But  Dr.  McCosh,  the 
author  of  Books  I.  and  III.,  is  probably  responsible  for 
the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  book,  Dickie's  function 
being  to  furnish  the  facts.  I  shall  take  the  liberty, 
therefore,  of  speaking  of  the  principles  of  the  work  as 
those  of  McCosh. 

In  the  "  Analysis  of  the  Order  of  Nature  "  he  brings 
out  the  elements  of  number,  time,  color,  and  form. 
The  latter  element  assumes  very  great  importance  in 
the  book,  from  the  fact  that  so  large  a  part  of  it  is 
biological,  the  doctrine  of  morphology  being  thus 
brought  to  the  front.     Bat  there  is  a  chapter  on  terres- 


284  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

trial  bodies,  and  one  on  "  The  Heavens ; "  so  that  the 
principle  of  order  takes  a  wider  range  than  that  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  "morphology,"  and  requires,  there- 
fore, a  more  generic  term.  For  this  purpose  he  again 
proposes  the  word  "  cosmology,"  and  without  that  re- 
serve which  marked  his  first  suggestion  of  this  term  : 
"  We  need  a  word  to  embrace  the  whole,  and  we  pro- 
pose that  this  be  cosmology  ;  that  is,  the  science  of  the 
order  in  the  universe." 

In  my  Introduction  I  have  given  reasons  which  seem 
to  me  sufficient  to  prevent  the  acceptance  of  this  sug- 
gestion ;  and  I  have  proposed  the  term  "  eutaxiology," 
instead  of  "  cosmology."  It  is  a  matter  of  regret  that 
McCosh's  suggestion  could  not  be  accepted  without 
danger  of  involving  the  order-argument  in  some  confu- 
sions of  the  same  kind  which  have  beset  teleology  from 
the  use  of  ambiguous  terms.  Next  to  Professor  Owen, 
who  has  done  more  for  the  morphological  phase  of 
eutaxiology  than  any  other  living  man,  McCosh  would 
be  the  fittest  godfather  to  name  the  new  argument 
which  he  employed  with  such  skill.  He  has  indeed 
named  it,  as  we  have  seen ;  but  he  made  the  suggestion 
very  gingerly  in  the  first  place  ; 1  and,  though  he  repeats 
it  more  confidently  in  the  volume  before  us,  still  he  did 
not  have  the  courage  of  his  convictions  sufficiently  to 
use  it  himself. 

And,  in  regard  to  the  use  of  terms,  it  is  to  be  regretted 
that  he  did  not  rid  his  teleology  of  the  ambiguities  inci- 
dent to  the  word  "  design  "  and  the  phrase  "  final  cause." 
He  saw  the  fallacy  of  the  truism,  "  Design  implies  a 
designer  "  (p.  39)  ;  but  he  uses  the  word  himself  without 
discriminating  between  its  teleological  aud  its  eutaxio- 
logical   meanings.     One    of    the   infelicities    of    "  final 

1  Metb.  of  Div.  Gov.,  1850.    See  also  p.  4  of  this  volume. 


McCOSH,   POWELL,   AND  COOKE.  285 

cause  "  appears  in  the  following  sentence :  "  Every  or- 
ganic object  is  constructed  after  a  type,  and  is,  at  the 
same  time,  made  to  accomplish  a  final  cause."  How 
awkwardly  it  sounds  to  speak  of  accomplishing  a  cause  ! 

McCosh  agrees  witli  Kant,  lleid,  and  Stewart  in 
making  the  whole  argument  from  nature  rest  ultimately 
upon  the  principle  of  causation;  and,  like  Reid  and 
Stewart,  he  thinks  the  judgment  that  every  event  has  a 
cause  is  intuitive.  He  differs  from  these  authors,  how- 
ever, in  not  regarding  the  existence  of  God  as  an  intui- 
tion. He  regards  teleology  and  eutaxiology  both  as 
good  proofs  of  the  divine  existence,  but  is  inclined  to 
subordinate  the  latter  to  the  former.  He  has  not  es- 
caped wholly  from  the  old  prejudice  in  favor  of  tele- 
ology; for  he  attempts  to  resolve  his  order-argument 
into  a  sort  of  higher  teleology :  "  Every  thing  has,  after 
all,  a  final  cause.  The  general  order  pervading  nature 
is  just  a  final  cause  of  a  higher  and  more  archetypal 
character"  (440). 

His  special  notion  of  what  the  "  final  cause "  of 
morphology  is  may  be  gathered  from  the  following :  — 

"  While  the  special  modifications  or  adaptations  investi- 
gated so  carefully  by  Cuvier  are  intended  to  promote  the 
well-being  of  the  particular  species  of  animal,  the  archetypal 
plan  investigated  by  Owen  is  fitted  to  make  the  animal  intel- 
ligible by  the  intelligent  creation.  Owen  has  developed  — 
to  some  extent  perhaps  unconsciously,  but  to  a  far  greater 
extent  consciously  —  a  teleology  of  a  higher  order  than 
Cuvier  "  (441). 

It  is  only  in  a  vague,  rhetorical  metaphor  that  you 
can  thus  transform  morphology  into  teleology ;  and, 
without  adverting  to  some  stronger  reasons  for  avoiding 
such  expressions,  which  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  the 


286  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

mischievous  effect  of  them  is  obvious  enough  when  we 
connect  them  with  the  persistent  abuse  of  teleology  all 
through  its  history  in  the  matter  of  wild,  conjectural 
purposes  assigned  to  this  or  that  thing,  in  order  to  con- 
struct a  teleological  argument  upon  it.  That,  of  course, 
was  not  the  doctor's  object  in  this  case :  he  was  not 
really  trying  to  transform  eutaxiology  into  teleology, 
but  only  to  harmonize  them.  That  can  be  done,  how- 
ever, without  reducing  one  to  a  form  of  the  other. 

In  commenting  upon  the  doctrine  of  "  collocations  " 
of  Dr.  Chalmers,  I  expressed  the  opinion  that  there 
was  something  valuable  in  it  if  divorced  from  the 
antithesis  to  natural  law.  McCosh's  appreciation  of 
eutaxiology  as  a  distinct  argument  ought  to  have  en- 
abled him  to  set  that  doctrine  in  its  true  light,  and  to 
develop  all  that  was  useful  in  it.  And  he  has  undoubt- 
edly improved  very  decidedly  upon  the  previous  state- 
ment of  it.  He  does  not  make  it  the  antithesis  of 
natural  law. 

"It  will  be  necessary  in  this  place  to  state  an  important 
distinction  which  Dr.  Chalmers  had  the  merit  of  introducing 
into  natural  theology  in  a  formal  manner.  He  calls  on  us 
to  notice  how,  the  laws  of  matter  being  as  they  are,  the 
results  might  have  been  different  if  a  different  set  of  collo- 
cations had  been  made  of  the  bodies  obeying  these  laws. 
Thus  the  law  of  gravitation  still  being  as  it  is,  the  planetary 
bodies  would  have  been  moving  in  a  very  different  manner 
from  what  they  do,  had  they  been  differently  situated  with 
reference  to  the  sun  and  to  one  another.  Had  they  not,  for 
example,  revolved  in  nearly  one  plane,  they  might  in  their 
revolutions  have  come  into  violent  and  destructive  collision 
with  each  other.  This  is  prevented  by  their  being  so  dis- 
posed that  their  spheres  can  never  intersect  each  other  ;  that 
is,  by  their  skilful   collocation.     Dr.  Chalmers  thinks  that 


McCOSH,   POWELL,   AND  COOKE.  287 

the  argument  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  God  should  be 
founded  on  the  collocations  of  matter  rather  than  the  laws 
of  matter.     The  distinction  is  undoubtedly  a  sound  one." 

Here  he  seems  to  take  the  doctrine  just  as  Chalmers 
left  it,  the  antithesis  to  law  included.  But,  being  really 
dispossessed  of  the  prejudice  in  favor  of  arbitrary  inter- 
ferences as  the  only  proof  of  divine  activity,  he  avoids 
the  antithesis  to  law  by  introducing  a  distinction  be- 
tween original  properties  of  matter  and  derivative  laws, 
the  latter  being  the  results  of  collocations. 

"If  these  remarks  be  just,  we  are  entitled  to  argue,  that 
there  has  been  adaptation,  not  only  in  two  or  more  bodies 
being  so  arranged  as  to  produce  an  isolated  effect  of  a  benign 
character,  but  also  in  their  being  so  disposed  as  to  produce 
general  laws  or  general  results,  these  being  wide-spread  and 
continuous,  stretching  through  extensive  regions  of  space, 
and  prolonged  through  many  successive  ages,  such  as  the 
seasons,  and  the  regular  forms  and  periods  of  plants  and 
animals.  These  —  indeed,  all  the  principles  of  order  in 
respect  of  number,  time,  color,  and  form  —  are  entitled  to 
be  called  laws.  But  they  are  not  original :  they  are  deriva- 
tive laws,  not  simple  but  composite,  and  the  result  of  arrange- 
ments." 

This  distinction  between  original  properties  and  the 
laws  resulting  from  collocations  was  convenient  for  the 
purpose  of  rescuing  the  doctrine  of  Chalmers  from  its 
fatal  opposition  to  natural  law ;  but  otherwise  it  has 
little  value  in  physico-theology.  It  is  not  essential 
to  draw  the  line  between  what  was  originally  imparted  to 
matter,  and  what  flowed  as  a  consequence  from  this ; 
and,  if  it  were  essential,  it  would,  in  the  present  state  of 
science,  be  practically  impossible. 

If  Dr.  McCosh  erred  in  the  direction  of  giving  too 


288  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

high  a  place  to  teleology  in  relation  to  eutaxiology, 
Professor  Baden  Powell  was  inclined  to  the  opposite 
extreme  of  ignoring  teleology  altogether. 

"The  argument,  as  popularly  pursued,  proceeds  upon  the 
analog)'  of  a  personal  agent,  whose  contrivances  are  limited 
by  the  conditions  of  the  case  and  the  nature  of  his  materials, 
and  pursued  by  steps  corresponding  to  those  of  human  plans 
and  operations,  —  an  argument  leading  only  to  the  most  un- 
worthy and  anthropomorphic  conceptions.  Yet  such  have 
been  the  now  confessedly  injudicious  modes  of  expression 
adopted  by  some  approved  writers  on  the  subject.  The  sat- 
isfactory view  of  the  whole  case  can  only  be  found  in  those 
more  enlarged  conceptions  which  are  furnished  by  the  grand 
contemplation  of  cosmical  order  and  unity,  and  which  do 
not  refer  to  inferences  of  the  past,  but  to  proofs  of  the  ever- 
present  mind  and  reason  in  nature."  ' 

The  last  point  in  this  quotation  is  obscure :  it  seems 
impossible  to  separate  the  tokens  of  "ever-present," 
active  intelligence  from  "inferences  of  the  past."  One 
element  of  the  order  of  nature  is  time.  An  orderly 
sequence  of  events  is  as  striking  a  proof  of  intelligent 
arrangement  as  those  orderly  dispositions  of  matter 
which  exist  simultaneously.  If  we  are  studying  the 
celestial  harmonies,  we  can  have  no  indications  of  intel- 
ligent adjustments  which  do  not,  in  strictness,  refer  to 
the  past ;  for  the  light  of  those  bodies,  by  which  alone 
we  can  learn  any  thing  about  them,  may  have  been 
millions  of  years  on  its  way  to  us.  The  whole  of 
nature  is  so  linked  together,  that  every  token  of  present 
intelligence  must  be  linked  with  inferences  of  the  past. 

But  the  main  point  of  the  quotation  is  clear  enough. 
Powell  relies  upon  the  principle  of  order  rather  than 
that  of  special  adaptation.     This  appears  in  many  forms 

1  Order  01  Nature,  237. 


McCOSH.  POWELL.  AND  COOKE.  289 

and   in   numberless  passages,  besides   dominating   the 
whole  plan  and  tone  of  his  books. 

"  The  instances  in  which  we  can  trace  a  use  and  a,  purpose 
in  nature,  striking  as  they  are,  after  all,  constitute  but  a  very 
small  and  subordinate  portion  of  the  vast  scheme  of  univer- 
sal order  and  harmony  of  design  which  pervades  and  con- 
nects the  whole.  Throughout  the  immensely  greater  part  of 
nature  we  can  trace  symmetry  and  arrangement,  but  not  the 
end  for  which  the  adjustment  is  made.  But  this  is  in  no  way 
a  less  powerful  proof  of  design  and  intelligence  than  the 
former.  The  most  exact  and  recondite  adaptation  of  means 
to  accomplish  an  obvious  end  is  no  more  peculiarly  an  evi- 
dence of  design,  than  the  universal  arrangement  according 
to  determinate  laws  which  pervades  the  depths  of  cosmical 
space,  where  we  are  least  able  to  trace  any  end.  Symme- 
try and  beauty  are  results  of  mind  of  at  least  as  high  an 
order  as  mechanical  efficiency.  A  mere  numerical  relation 
invariably  preserved,  but  no  further  connected  with  any 
imaginable  purpose,  or  a  systematic  arrangement  of  useless 
parts  or  abortive  organs  on  a  regular  plan,  are  just  as  forci- 
ble indications  of  intelligence  as  any  results  of  immediate 
practical  utility.1 

1 '  The  old  and  limited  view  of  final  causes  will  not  meet 
the  increasing  demands  of  scientific  enlightenment.  It  will 
not  suffice  now  to  argue  solely  on  the  adaptation  of  means 
to  a  known  purpose,  or  a  practical  design  evinced,  and  an 
obvious  end  answered.  We  may  speak  of  '  design '  with  ref- 
erence solely  to  '  order  '  and  t  arrangement,'  without  looking 
to  the  idea  of  practical  utility.  Such  modes  of  expression 
are  far  preferable,  as  not  leading  the  mind  to  any  undue 
expectation  of  what  it  will  not  realize. 

"  Paley  expressly  held  that  the  mechanism  of  the  heavens 
was  a  branch  of  science  the  least  susceptible  of  this  kind  of 
application  [that  is,  least  fitted  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  de- 

l  Unity  of  Worlds,  135. 


290  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

sign-arguments].  According  to  the  principles  here  advo- 
cated, it  forms  the  highest  and  most  satisfactory. 

' '  But  a  more  special  argument  has  been  raised  on  the 
ground  that  the  planetary  perturbations  have  been  shown  so 
to  compensate  each  other,  that  no  permanent  derangement 
can  arise ;  and  La  Place  pointed  out  that  this  stability  of  the 
planetary  s}Tstem  is .  the  necessary  consequence  of  certain 
conditions,  not  themselves  necessary;  namely,  the  smallness 
of  the  inclinations  and  eccentricities,  the  motions  of  all  in 
the  same  direction,  the  comparatively  vast  mass  of  the  sun, 
and  the  incommensurability  of  the  periods. 

"  Professor  Pla}7fair  justly  enlarges  upon  this  as  an  argu- 
ment for  design;  but,  if  the  conditions  thus  assigned  were 
necessary  (i.e.,  necessary  consequences  of  each  other  or  some- 
thing else) ,  he  thinks  we  could  not  infer  design.  They,  how- 
ever, are  not  necessary :  each  might  be  otherwise,  the  rest  re- 
maining. Their  existence  then,  he  argues,  not  arising  from 
necessity,  nor  from  mechanical  causes,  nor  from  chance,  must 
be  from  design  and  intelligence. 

"But  I  would  ask,  suppose  they  ivere  necessary  conse- 
quences of  each  other  or  of  some  higher  principle,  or  did 
arise  from  mechanical  causes,  would  not  that  higher  princi- 
ple, or  those  causes  so  arranged  as  to  produce  them,  be  an 
equal  proof  of  design,  or  even  a  higher?  So  singularly  deep- 
seated  is  the  prejudice,  that  design  can  only  be  inferred 
when  we  cease  to  trace  laws,  or  when  conditions  appear  ar- 
bitrary "  (142). 

This  passage  shows  his  thorough-paced  reliance  upon 
law  and  order.  Not  only  does  he  take  these  as  the  best 
manifestations  of  intelligence,  but  he  thinks  every  in- 
terruption and  anomaly  obscures  the  evidence  instead 
of  making  it  stronger. 

"To  speak  of  apparent  anomalies  and  interruptions  as 
special  indications  of  the  Deity,  is  altogether  a  mistake.  In 
truth,  so  far  as  the  anomalous  character  of  any  phenomenon 


McCOSH,  POWELL,  AND  COOKE.  291 

can  affect  the  inference  of  presiding  intelligence  at  all,  it 
would  rather  tend  to  diminish  and  detract  from  that  evi- 
dence." 

Manifestly,  Powell's  beau  ideal  mark  of  intelligence 
is  universal,  unchanging,  inflexible  law.  With  such  an 
ideal  we  can  understand  a  fact  which  would  otherwise 
be  rather  surprising.  He  wrote  before  the  publication 
of  Darwin's  "  Origin  of  Species,"  and  yet  he  was  ready 
to  accept  evolution.  Whatever  extended  the  reign  of 
law  as  distinguished  from  the  sphere  of  special  inter- 
ventions was  welcome  to  him. 

Powell  devotes  a  large  part  of  his  latest  volume  to  a 
historical  sketch  of  the  progress  of  the  human  mind 
towards  a  broad  and  just  conception  of  the  order  of 
nature.  This  is  admirably  conceived  as  an  introduction 
to  eutaxiology ;  and  the  conception  is  well  carried  out 
on  the  whole.  But  in  a  few  points  his  statements  are 
inaccurate.  Speaking  of  the  natural  theology  of  the 
seventeenth  and  of  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  he  says  it  was  "  of  the  abstract,  d  priori  cast, 
typified  in  the  writings  of  Locke,  S.  Clarke,  Cud  worth, 
and  Wollaston,  who,  setting  out  from  high,  abstruse, 
first  principles,  attempted  a  deductive  system  of  tech- 
nical and  formal  propositions,  embodying  precise  views 
of  the  divine  nature  and  attributes,  and  thence  the 
moral  scheme  of  man's  relation  to  his  Creator,  and  of 
his  condition  in  this  life  to  that  in  another." 1 

I  should  give  More,  Boyle,  Ray,  Derham,  and  Nieu- 
wentyt  as  typical  expounders  of  the  natural  theology 
of  that  period,  rather  than  those  he  mentions.  He  says 
that  Boyle  "  believed  the  whole  universe  subservient  to 
the  well-being  of  man  ;  "  citing  a  passage  in  "  The  Use- 

1  Order  of  Nature,  123. 


292  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

fulness  of  Experimental  Natural  Philosophy,"  published 
in  1664,  but  not  quoting  Boyle's  exact  language. 
Turning  to  the  place  in  question  (p.  24),  we  find  this  : 
"  That  much  of  this  visible  world  was  made  for  the  use 
of  man  may  appear  not  only  from  the  time  of  his 
creation,  etc."  "  Much  of  this  visible  world,"  and  the 
"  whole  universe,"  are  not  quite  equivalent  terms.  Still, 
Boyle  advanced  in  his  views  on  this  point  in  the  course 
of  a  quarter  of  a  century ;  for,  when  he  published  his 
work  on  "  Final  Causes  "  in  1688,  he  had  thoroughly  out- 
grown the  vulgar  notion  that  all  things  were  made  for 
man,  and  even  indulges  in  a  little  satire  at  the  expense 
of  a  certain  learned  divine  who  thought  the  earth  was 
made  for  the  sake  of  man  in  his  travelling  condition, 
and  would  therefore  be  destroyed  after  the  Day  of 
Judgment.  In  the  earlier  work  he  speaks  of  "  God's 
making  those  noble  and  vast  luminaries,  and  other 
bodies  that  adorn  the  sky,  to  give  light  upon  the  earth ; " 
and  this  may  account  for  his  vacillating  course  in  his 
"  Disquisition,"  where  he  first  excludes  the  fixed  stars 
as  unsuitable  material  for  teleology,  and  subsequently 
retracts  that  sound  opinion.  Some  desire  to  be  consis- 
tent with  himself  may  have  influenced  this  change  for 
the  worse. 

Barring  these  slight  inaccuracies,  Powell's  showing  of 
the  progress  of  the  human  mind  towards  a  full  compre- 
hension of  the  order  of  nature  is  not  only  deeply  in- 
teresting, but  exceedingly  valuable.  It  shows  plainly 
that  the  data  for  the  construction  of  eutaxiology  have 
been  slowly  and  gradually  accumulated  as  the  various 
sciences  were  created  and  perfected. 

"  Religion  and  Chemistry,"  by  Professor  Josiah  P. 
Cooke  of  Harvard  University,  presents  fair  examples 
of  eutaxiological  reasoning  :  — 


McCOSH,   POWELL,  AND  COOKE.  293 

"The  illustrations  of  the  attributes  of  God  which  may 
be  drawn  from  the  constitution  of  matter  are  conveniently 
divided  iuto  two  classes,  —  first,  those  which  appear  in  the 
adaptation  of  various  means  to  a  particular  end  ;  and,  sec- 
ond, those  which  are  to  be  found  in  the  unity  of  plan,  ac- 
cording to  which  the  whole  frame  of  nature  has  been  con- 
structed. The  first  class  are  exhibited  by  the  properties  of 
matter,  the  second  by  the  so-called  physical  laws  and  forces  " 
(p.  5.) 

This  distinction  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  be- 
tween teleology  and  eutaxiology.  It  is  noteworthy,  that 
he  does  not  use  either  kind  of  reasoning  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God,  but  simply  as  "illustrations  of  his 
attributes." 

It  is  not  entirely  clear  which  kind  of  proof  he  regards 
as  the  best.  In  the  following  passage  it  seems  to  be  the 
eutaxiological :  — 

"We  can  see  that  each  property  of  water  has  been  de- 
signed for  some  specific  purpose.  .  .  .  [But]  the  strength 
of  our  argument  lies  not  so  much  in  the  fact  that  each 
property  has  been  skilfully  adjusted  to  some  specific  end, 
as  it  does  in  the  harmonious  working  of  all  the  separate 
details. 

"  To  me  the  laws  of  nature  afford  the  strongest  evidences 
of  the  existence  of  a  God ;  and  in  their  uniformity  I  see 
merely  the  constant  action  of  an  omnipotent  Creator,  who 
acts  with  perfect  regularity  because  he  acts  consistently  with 
infinite  wisdom.  I  believe  that  all  parts  of  nature  are  cor- 
related by  laws,  and  that  the  wider  our  knowledge  becomes 
the  more  universal  these  laws  will  appear.  I  do  not,  there- 
fore, regard  the  constitution  of  water  as  something  apart 
from  law  [he  has  reference  more  especially  to  the  excep- 
tional property  of  expansion  near  and  at  the  freezing-point, 
which  theologians  have  often  cited  as  a  wonderful  proof  of 
design  because  of  its  anomalous  character],  and  as  the  evi- 


294  CRITIQUE  OP  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

dence  of  a  power  coming  down  as  it  were  upon  law  to  make 
an  exception  to  it  "  (161). 

Notwithstanding  these  strong  expressions  of  appre- 
ciation of  those  elements  of  his  argument  which  are 
plainly  eutaxiological,  the  ancient  and  deep-seated  pre- 
judice in  favor  of  teleology  still  sways  his  mind:  — 

"I  do  not,  of  course,  regard  analogies  as  proofs,  nor  do 
I  believe  that  this  argument  from  general  plan  could  supply 
the  place  of  the  great  argument  from  design.  The  last  lies 
at  the  basis  of  natural  theology,  and  all  the  rest  is  merely 
subsidiary  to  the  great  central  light." 

That  he  means  teleology  by  the  phrase  "argument 
from  design,"  appears  from  the  marginal  note :  "  It  is 
subsidiary  to  the  argument  from  special  adaptation  " 
(318). 

How  disappointing,  not  to  say  provoking,  to  see  a 
man  construct  a  good  piece  of  eutaxiology,  and  then 
give  it  all  away  by  making  it  subsidiary  to  teleology  ! 
He  thinks  the  latter  is  not  only  the  "great  central 
light  "  of  natural  theology,  but  also  that  it  is  simpler 
and  easier  to  comprehend  than  the  argument  from  gen- 
eral plan. 

"  Moreover,  while  the  argument  from  design  comes  home 
to  every  man's  understanding,  these  analogies  appeal  with 
their  full  force  only  to  the  few  who  are  able  to  study  the 
processes  of  nature  for  themselves,  as  they  alone  are  famil- 
iar with  the  phenomena  in  which  the  resemblances  are  seen. 
But  to  the  student  whose  life  has  been  passed  in  successful 
investigation,  and  whose  soul  has  been  brought  into  sympathy 
with  the  harmonies  of  nature,  these  tokens  are  constantly 
assuring  him  of  the  presence  of  his  God.  Every  discoverer 
feels  —  when  in  the  presence  of  a  great  truth  he  cannot  re- 
sist   the    feeling  —  that  in   discovering   a  law  he   has   been 


McCOSH,   POWELL,   AND  COOKE.  295 

brought  nearer,  not  to  a  blind  agency,  but  to  Omnipotence 
itself." 

Great  discoverers  may  have  a  monopoly  of  great 
emotions  of  that  sort ;  but,  happily,  the  perception 
that  mind  has  produced  the  order  of  nature  is  not 
limited  to  them.  This  passage,  as  well  as  the  last, 
suggests  the  point  that  Cooke  uses  the  word  "  anal- 
ogy "  in  some  very  recondite  and  unusual  sense.  He 
says  the  argument  from  design  is  based  on  analogy,  in 
which  he  is,  of  course,  sustained  by  a  host  of  teleolo- 
gists  ;  but  he  also  declares  that  "  all  scientific  generali- 
zation is  based  on  analogy  "  (249).  It  must  be  that  he 
uses  analogy  to  designate  that  process  which  is  usually 
called  induction.  In  the  practical  development  of  his 
eutaxiology,  or  "argument  from  general  plan,"  he 
makes  much  of  the  phenomena  of  crystallization  as 
an  example  of  symmetry,  also  of  combining  propor- 
tions in  chemistry  and  phyllotaxy  in  botany. 

He  adopts  the  theory  that  all  force  is  a  manifestation 
of  the  divine  will. 

"According  to  this  view,  the  energy  which  sustains  the 
universe  is  the  will  of  God,  and  the  law  of  conservation  is 
only  the  manifestation  of  his  immutable  being,  —  '  the  same 
yesterday,  and  to-day,  and  forever  '  "  (340). 

He  thinks  that  "  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  author 
of  nature,  infinite  in  wisdom  and  absolute  in  power,  may 
be  proved  from  the  phenomena  of  the  material  world 
with  as  much  certainty  as  can  any  general  truth  of 
science."  But  he  is  not  so  clear  about  proving  per- 
sonality, and  is  positive  that  the  goodness  of  the  Deity 
cannot  be  proved  from  nature. 

"I  do  not  believe,  however,  in  any  sense,  that  nature 
proves  the  goodness  of  God.   ...  So  prominent,  indeed,  is 


296  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  evil  in  nature,  and  so  insidiously  and  mysteriously  does 
it  prevade  the  whole  system,  that  an  argument  to  prove  the 
malignity  of  God  could  be  made  to  appear  quite  as  plausible 
as  the  arguments  which  are  frequently  urged  to  prove  his 
pure  beneficence. 

' '  God  is  love  ;  but  nature  could  not  prove  it,  and  the 
Lamb  was  '  slain  from  the  foundation  of  the  world '  to 
attest  it." 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  297 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW. 

Recent  publications  on  natural  theology  have  all 
hinged  more  or  less  closely  upon  Darwinism  and  evo- 
lution. As  I  propose  to  devote  a  chapter  to  each  of 
those  topics,  it  will  be  convenient  to  range  the  later 
productions  on  the  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  ques- 
tion of  hostility  or  amicable  relations  to  these  very 
striking  and  revolutionary  doctrines  of  biology,  instead 
of  treating  them  in  the  form  of  a  historical  review,  as 
I  have  done  with  previous  writers.  That  portion  of 
nry.task  which  consists  in  showing  what  had  been  done 
in  natural  theology  up  to  about  that  time  when  the 
"  Origin  of  Species  "  appeared,  is  completed.  I  have 
not  attempted  to  make  it  exhaustive  ;  and  even  consid- 
ering that  fact,  considering  that  my  aim  was  only  to 
mention  the  leading  writers  and  delineate  the  most 
characteristic  phases  of  theological  speculation,  I  am 
painfully  conscious  how  imperfectly  this  purpose  has 
been  accomplished.  Still,  the  data  for  certain  conclu- 
sions respecting  the  course  and  development  of  physico- 
theology  have  been  furnished  by  the  preceding  chapters ; 
and  it  is  now  desirable  to  gather  these  up,  and  present 
them  in  a  connected  view,  in  order  to  fix  and  crystallize 
the  impressions  which  they  may  have  made. 

One  impression,  which  took  a  deep  hold    upon    my 
own   mind  in  this    investigation,    was    the    proficiency 


298  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  the  ancients  in  natural  theology.  That  portion  of 
my  sketch  has  less  pretensions  to  exhaustiveness  than 
any  other  ;  and  yet  it  exhibits  a  range  and  accuracy  of 
thought,  and  a  practical  skill  and  judgment  in  the 
management  and  application  of  the  reasoning,  which 
may  well  challenge  comparison  with  any  thing  in 
modern  theology.  So  that  a  very  pertinent  question 
is  sprung  upon  us  at  the  very  threshold  of  our  inquiry 
into  the  results  of  the  historical  review  :  this,  namely, 
Has  there  been  any  real  growth  of  natural  theology 
through  all  these  centuries  ? 

When  we  consider  the  fact,  that  there  has  been  a 
tiresome  and  almost  nauseating  repetition  of  arguments 
and  illustrations,  it  might  seem  justifiable  to  answer 
this  question  in  the  negative.  But  that  would  be  a 
superficial  view  of  the  matter.  Amid  all  this  monoto- 
nous harping  upon  the  well-worn  strings,  there  has  been, 
after  all,  a  real  improvement  in  the  music.  In  order  to 
verify  this  statement,  let  us  consider,  in  the  first  place, 
the  charge  brought  against  teleology  by  Spinoza,  that 
its  advocates  regarded  the  whole  universe  with  refer- 
ence to  its  utility  to  man. 

The  ancients  undoubtedly  did  look  upon  every  natu- 
ral object,  terrestrial  or  celestial,  with  an  eye  to  human 
uses  ;  and  up  to  a  certain  period  we  find  the  same  tend- 
ency very  strong  among  modern  theologians.  That 
period  coincides  very  closely  with  the  time  when  Spino- 
za's criticism  appeared ;  and  this  may  be  taken  as  an 
illustration  of  the  value  of  criticism,  even  when  its 
animus  is  hostile.  Indeed,  it  is  questionable  whether 
friendly  criticism  is  ever  so  efficacious,  even  when  it  is 
very  searching.  Some  men  will  never  be  reformed  by 
any  thing  short  of  the  whipping-post;  and  some  rea- 
soners  will  never  wake  up  to  the  consciousness  of  their 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  299 

fallacies  till  the  lash  is   laid   on    in   good,    downright 
earnest. 

A  recent  writer  on  natural  theology,1  with  reference 
to  its  relations  to  evolution,  repeats  Spinoza's  criticism, 
charging  the  fault  in  question  upon  the  Briclgewater 
Treatises,  and  upon  natural  theology  in  general :  — 

"  An  ichneumon  fly,  had  it  reasoning  powers,  might  easily 
conclude  that  caterpillars  were  beneficently  designed  for  its 
use  as  being  the  place  where  it  should  lay  its  eggs.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  caterpillar  would  have  a  very  different  view 
of  the  beneficence  of  that  Being  who  made  both  itself  and 
the  ichneumon.  I  repeat,  therefore,  to  bring  forward  in- 
stances of  advantages,  or  even  blessings  to  one  creature, 
even  if  we  select  man,  as  proofs  of  the  wisdom  and  benefi- 
cence of  God,  is,  and  must  be,  a  partial  and  one-sided  view 
of  creation ;  and  this,  if  I  understand  them  aright,  is  an 
unmistakably  weak  point  in  the  arguments  of  the  Bridge- 
water  Treatises,  and  of  natural  theologians  in  general  " 
(p.  161). 

This  is  one  more  example  of  a  sweeping  and  whole- 
sale accusation  brought  by  one  natural  theologian 
against  all  the  rest,  without  having  made  a  careful  ex- 
amination of  the  facts.  No  doubt  some  of  the  Bridge- 
water  essayists  were,  in  a  measure,  involved  in  this 
strong  tendency  even  to  deny  the  existence  of  that 
which  was  not  obviously  useful  to  mankind.  The  case 
of  the  Rev.  Mr.  Kirby's  hostility  to  Mantell's  theory  of 
an  age  of  reptiles  will  recur  to  the  reader's  memory. 

1  "  The  Theory  of  Evolution  of  Living  Things,"  by  the  Rev.  George 
Henslow.  This  is  another  prize  essay.  Writers  on  natural  theology 
have  had  considerable  stimulus  of  this  kind.  Hannah  Acton  gave 
£1,000,  from  the  income  of  which  £105  is  to  be  given  every  seven  years 
for  "the  best  essay  illustrative  of  the  wisdom  and  beneficence  of  the 
Almighty  in  such  department  of  science  as  the  committee  of  managers 
shall  in  their  discretion  select." 


300  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

But  Kirby  is  the  least  advanced,  the  least  representa- 
tive, the  most  mediaeval,  of  that  group.  The  rest  are 
quite  as  enlightened  upon  the  point  in  question  as  the 
majority  of  intelligent  people  of  the  present  genera- 
tion,—  as  much  so,  in  fact,  as  Mr.  Henslow  himself. 
For,  after  such  a  criticism  of  "natural  theologians  in 
general,"  we  are  really  amazed  at  his  own  conclusion 
respecting  the  purpose  and  aim  of  this  sublunary 
world  :  — 

' '  This  phenomenon  of  the  existence  of  a  mixture  of  good 
and  evil,  which  is  of  very  wide  application,  is  a  result  of  that 
struggle  for  existence  which  is  a  well-recognized  law  of 
nature,  and  is  applicable  to  all  kinds  of  life.  To  a  partial 
or  restricted  view  this  law  may  appear  as  a  '  fatal '  result 
of  undirected  natural  forces  ;  but  I  maintain,  though  God 
chose  to  establish  such  laws  as  a  condition  of  life  on  the 
earth,  he  had  a  motive  in  so  doing ;  and  that  motive  was,  in 
its  ultimate  bearings,  to  surround  man  with  inideal1  circum- 
stances, and  so  render  his  life  on  earth  probationary  in  every 
way." 

That  is  about  as  comprehensive  a  scheme  for  bringing 
the  whole  world  under  that  point  of  view  which  makes 
it  all  have  reference  to  man,  as  we  can  find  anywhere 
among  the  ancients  or  moderns ;  and,  if  Mr.  Henslow  is 
to  stand  as  the  type  of  a  modern  natural  theologian,  I 
should  have  to  recant  my  opinion  that  there  has  been 
any  real  growth  in  this  particular.  In  his  view  all  the 
physical  evils  which  affect  the  brute  creation,  and  have 
harassed  them  with  pain  and  suffering,  and  done  them 
to  death  by  millions  during  long  ages  before  man  ap- 
peared upon  the  scene,  —  all  this  was  for  the  sake  of 
surrounding  man  with  inideal  circumstances.     This  may 

1  "Inideal"  is  a  word  of  Henslow's  coining,  and  means  relatively 
perfect,  as  opposed  to  ideally  perfect. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  301 

be  very  orthodox  theology,  but  it  is  derived  from  some 
other  source  than  nature. 

And  this  raises  the  question  how  far  it  is  an  unseemly 
prejudice  which  ought  to  be  outgrown,  and  how  far  it 
is  really  true,  that  things  were  made  for  the  benefit  of 
man.  Spinoza's  criticism  was  just  in  this  respect,  that 
theologians  were  too  prone  to  ascribe  human  utilities 
to  all  objects  with  a  view  to  teleological  argumenta- 
tion. The  ascription*  was  often  a  dubious  one  to  start 
with ;  and,  when  they  proceeded  to  build  an  argument 
upon  such  a  foundation,  the  ridiculous  flimsiness  of 
the  whole  fabric  was  obvious  to  all  but  themselves. 
For  illustration,  let  us  take  this  doctrine  propounded 
by  Henslow,  that  the  whole  world  has  been  made  a 
scene  of  mixed  good  and  evil,  in  order  that  it  might  be 
a  perfect  place  of  probation  for  man.  Moral  probation 
is  the  end ;  the  mixture  of  good  and  evil,  of  joy,  com- 
fort, hope,  and  gladness,  with  sin,  disease,  crime,  despair, 
and  death,  is  the  means.  And  the  theologian  proceeds 
to  argue  from  the  fitness  in  the  adaptation  of  the 
means  to  the  end,  that  there  is  a  God  !  The  absurdity 
of  it  —  one  absurdity,  for  there  are  several  —  is,  that 
almost  any  rational  being  would  accept  the  conclusion 
quicker  than  he  would  the  premises.  But  precisely 
the  same  thing  is  true  of  a  great  deal  of  teleological 
reasoning.  The  end  assigned  to  this  or  that  thing  is 
far  more  doubtful  than  the  existence  of  God. 

But  detach  such  speculations  respecting  the  purpose 
of  this  world  from  teleology,  make  no  attempt  to  use 
them  for  any  ulterior  purpose  of  argument,  then  they 
assume  a  more  reasonable  phase.  So  far  as  the  earth  is 
concerned,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  much  of  its  pres- 
ent condition  and  past  history  finds  its  true  explanation 
in  its  occupation  by  a  rational  animal.     So  the  charge 


302  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

of  referring  often  to  human  uses  may  have  very  little 
condemnation  in  it,  though  sustained  by  the  facts. 
Since  the  time  of  Robert  Boyle,  writers  on  physico- 
theology  have  been  reasonably  cautious  in  this  par- 
ticular. Derham  is  especially  severe  upon  the  vulgar 
prejudice  that  celestial  bodies  were  all  made  for  our 
benefit. 

Indeed  it  is  unquestionably  true  that  these  writers 
have  been  in  advance  of  the  sentiments  even  of  well- 
informed  people  in  the  general  community  in  their  own 
day,  or  even  at  the  present  moment.  Since  I  have  been 
eno-ao-ed  in  writing  this  book,  several  persons  have  sug- 
gested  examples  of  what  they  regarded  as  good  proofs  ot 
design ;  and  invariably  the  end  was  one  which  had  refer- 
ence to  human  utilities,  and  not  always  of  the  highest 
order.  Upon  the  whole,  there  has  been  a  decided  ad- 
vance in  natural  theology  since  the  time  of  Cicero,  not 
only  as  regards  this  human  prejudice  in  favor  of  human- 
ity, but  also  as  regards  the  degree  of  caution  exercised 
in  the  general  interpretation  of  the  Creator's  intentions. 
The  very  thought  of  asserting  that  this  or  the  other  was 
God's  purpose  ought  to  make  men  go  slow,  and  tread 
softly  ;  and  they  have  learned  a  little  caution  in  the 
course  of  ages. 

In  the  matter  of  selecting  examples  to  illustrate  their 
doctrine,  the  course  of  teleologists  has  been  a  devious 
one.  Instead  of  a  steady  improvement,  there  was  an 
actual  retrogression,  and  then  a  very  great  advance. 
Nothing  in  Socrates,  Cicero,  or  Galen  is  so  ridiculous  as 
Dr.  More's  argument  from  the  "  signatures  "  of  plants. 
Derham  was  an  improvement  on  More ;  but  his  argu- 
ment from  volcanoes  was  not  an  eminent  success. 
Nieuwentyt  has  some  very  feeble  examples,  such  as 
the  size  of  a  man's  bite,  and  the  wisdom  of  making  the 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  303 

food  pass  over  the  glottis  on  its  way  to  the  pharynx. 
Paley,  with  all  his  panorpa  forceps  and  woodpeckers' 
tongues  (borrowed  ones :  Ray  was  the  first  to  intro- 
duce that  example),  was  more  judicious  in  his  selec- 
tion ;  and  more  recent  writers  have  gone  beyond  him 
in  the  dignified  good  taste  they  have  exhibited  in  their 
illustrations. 

It  would  have  been  more  unpardonable  in  them  than 
in  writers  a  century  ago  not  to  have  done  so,  consid- 
ering the  wealth  of  good  material  which  advancing 
scientific  discovery  was  constantly  pouring  upon  them. 
Whatever  improvement  there  has  been  in  the  sifting 
and  selection  of  illustrations  may  be  traced  directly  to 
the  growth  of  physical  science.  Science  has  taken  the 
lead  in  every  instance  and  in  every  particular ;  and  not 
only  has  physico-theology  been  a  follower,  instead  of  a 
leader,  but  it  has  been  in  some  particulars  a  lagging 
and  far-distant  follower. 

Especially  has  this  been  true  in  respect  to  its  nomen- 
clature, and  the  analysis  of  its  arguments.  Long  Greek 
compounds  are  not  agreeable  to  the  ear ;  and  there  is 
always  a  smack  of  pedantry  about  them  when  first 
introduced,  which  continues,  indeed,  until  they  are 
thoroughly  naturalized  and  acclimated.  (It  is  with 
a  full  consciousness  of  this  fact  that  I  have  ventured 
to  launch  a  new  name  for  the  order-argument.)  But 
they  are  indispensable  to  every  true  science.  Accu- 
racy, not  elegance  or  euphony,  is  the  grand  desid- 
eratum ;  and  this  can  only  be  attained  by  the  use 
of  technical  terms,  —  that  is,  words  selected  from  the 
classical  languages,  of  appropriate  primitive  meaning, 
but,  above  all,  accurately  defined  when  first  introduced, 
and  then  rigidly  restricted  to  their  technical  and  uni- 
form   sense.     Kant   was   the    first   who    attempted   to 


304  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

equip  theology  with  a  complete  technical  nomencla- 
ture. His  terms  have  been  largely  adopted ;  but  in 
one  case,  where  he  used  the  same  term  ("cosmologi- 
cal ")  in  two  different  senses,  the  less  accurate  one  was 
selected. 

Not  only  have  there  been  delay  and  partial  failure  in 
the  matter  of  furnishing  an  equipment  of  good  techni- 
cal terms,  but  there  has  been  the  ambiguous  use  of 
common  words  such  as  "  design,"  and  the  distorted 
application  of  scholastic  phrases  such  as  "  final  cause." 
In  respect  to  the  latter,  there  has  been  an  improvement. 
Many  of  the  later  authors  who  use  it  do  so  with  ex- 
pressions of  regret  and  dissatisfaction.  But  in  regard 
to  "  design,"  while  several  have  detected  the  fallacy  of 
the  proposition  that  "  design  implies  a  designer,"  not 
one  has  pointed  out  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  itself, 
or  made  any  discrimination  in  respect  to  its  teleological 
and  its  eutaxiological  meaning. 

But  the  halting  movement  and  desultory  course  of 
development  of  physico-theology,  in  comparison  with 
other  sciences,  is  at  no  point  more  conspicuous  than  in 
the  analysis  and  use  of  its  arguments.  The  elements 
of  eutaxiology  and  teleology  have  been  more  or  less 
involved  in  the  arguments  of  physico-theology  from 
the  earliest  time  to  the  latest;  but,  while  this  is  es- 
pecially true  of  the  ancients,  they  failed  utterly  to 
distinguish  these  elements,  or  to  give  them  separate 
names  and  a  distinct  treatment.  For  a  long  time  the 
order-argument  was  almost  ignored,  though  not  so  com- 
pletely ignored  as  the  remark  of  Dr.  McCosh,  in  his 
"  Method  of  Divine  Government,"  would  imply.  Dur- 
ing the  present  century,  through  the  labors  of  Crombie, 
Tulloch,  Powell,  McCosh,  and  Cooke,  eutaxiology  has 
been  in  a  measure  advanced  to  its  true  position.     But 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  305 

even  some  of  these  have  seemed  half  ashamed  of  it, 
and  ready  to  merge  it  into  "  the  great  central  light  "  of 
teleology.  So  feebly  has  it  been  set  forth,  that  I  seri- 
ously question  whether  the  average  theologian  is  at  this 
moment  conscious  of  the  existence  of  but  one  kind  of 
design-argument,  and  that  one  is  teleology. 

But  supposing  that  eutaxiology  had  been  fully  de- 
veloped by  the  middle  of  the  present  century,  while  it 
would  have  been  most  opportune  in  relation  to  the 
spread  of  Darwinism,  it  would  have  still  been  a  cen- 
tury too  late  in  relation  to  scientific  progress.  From 
the  time  when  Copernicus  announced  the  true  theory 
of  the  solar  system,  and  Galileo  made  his  discoveries  in 
physics,  thus  affording  a  new  and  broader  view  of  celes- 
tial harmonies  and  terrestrial  order,  —  from  that  time, 
three  centuries  ago,  eutaxiology  ought  to  have  dated 
its  birth,  or  its  resurrection  if  we  grant  that  the  an- 
cients developed  a  true  and  distinct  argument  for  the 
existence  of  God  from  the  order  of  nature.  And,  from 
the  time  when  Newton  discovered  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion, the  order-argument  ought  to  date  its  full  develop- 
ment. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  the  two  great  minds 
of  the  last  century,  Newton  and  Kant,  did  make  use  of 
this  argument.  But  theologians  in  general  were  too 
much  absorbed  in  the  subtilities  of  the  doctrine  of 
final  causes,  even  to  perceive  the  new  departure,  much 
less  to  appreciate  its  significance. 

Being  so  enamoured  of  teleology  we  should  expect 
that  they  would  at  least  know  all  about  that.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  they  made  no  analysis  of  the  concep- 
tions involved  in  it ;  no  logical  scrutiny  of  its  validity 
and  its  limitations  ;  no  discrimination  in  the  use  of  its 
leading  terms  ;  and,  finally,  they  are  wholly  uncertain, 


306  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

and  all  at  loggerheads  among  themselves,  about  the 
proper  use  to  be  made  of  teleology  when  they  have  once 
got  it  constructed  after  a  bungling  fashion.  Shall  we  use 
teleology  to  prove  God's  existence,  or  use  his  assumed 
existence  to  prove  his  intentions, — that  is,  to  prove 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  teleology  ?  One  cries  one 
thing,  and  another  cries  another  thing.  There  is  no 
uniformity  either  in  opinion  or  practice.  In  the  seven- 
teenth century  we  find  More  taking  the  first  alternative, 
and  Boyle  the  second.  In  the  eighteenth  century  Der- 
ham  and  Nieuwentyt  use  teleology  to  prove  God's 
existence,  as  do  nearly  all  the  writers  of  the  present 
century  except  Stewart,  who  declines  to  do  so,  because 
he  thinks  that  truth  is  intuitive  and  needs  no  proof, 
and  Irons,  who  thinks  that  nobody  but  a  theist  and  a 
Christian  has  any  business  with  teleology  anyhow. 

But  of  those  who  take  the  first  alternative,  and  set 
out  to  prove  God's  existence,  we  have  observed  that 
they  generally  assume  that  truth  after  all,  and  practi- 
cally do  nothing  more  than  to  illustrate  his  attributes. 
Nor  do  those  who  take  the  second  alternative  stick  to 
their  text  much  better.  Boyle  sets  out  to  prove  the 
existence  of  teleology ;  but  much  of  his  argument  is  so 
framed  that  he  seems  to  be  attempting  the  more  ambi- 
tious achievement  of  demonstrating  divine  existence. 
Even  so  late  and  excellent  a  writer  as  Professor  Cooke 
sets  out  with  some  modest  "  illustrations  of  the  attri- 
butes of  God,"  but  ends  with  the  declaration  that  "the 
existence  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature  may  be 
proved  from  the  phenomena  of  the  material  world  with 
as  much  certainty  as  can  any  general  truth  of  science." 

What  is  the  reason  of  all  this  vacillation  and  uncer- 
tainty about  the  true  use  of  teleology  ?  What  is  the 
true  use  of  it  ?     Does  God's  existence  need  proving  so 


RESULTS  OF  THE  HISTORICAL  REVIEW.  307 

much  as  teleology  itself  needs  it?  Harassed  by  its 
enemies  and  abused  by  its  advocates,  foes  and  fightings 
without,  and  fallacies  and  frailties  within,  is  not  that 
doctrine  in  extremis,  and  more  in  need  of  God  than  he 
of  it?  Will  not  the  ambitious  programme  of  demon- 
strating God's  existence  by  means  of  teleology  have  to 
be  laid  aside  for  a  little,  till  we  ascertain  whether  there 
is  any  such  thing  in  existence  as  teleology  ?  The  an- 
swers to  these  questions  I  reserve  until  after  I  have 
finished  the  critique  of  teleology  in  a  subsequent 
chapter. 


308  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

DARWINISM   AND  DESIGN. 

Darwinism  is  a  theory  of  evolution,  and  yet  the 
two  are  not  identical.  I  propose  to  discuss  the  bearing 
of  each  upon  physico-theology  in  separate  chapters,  not 
only  because  they  are  not  precisely  identical, — evolu- 
tion may  be  a  general  truth  of  nature  independent  of 
natural  selection,  which  is  the  characteristic  thing  in 
Darwinism,  —  but  also  because  there  are  certain,  so  to 
speak,  personal  issues  respecting  Darwinism  which  jus- 
tify a  separate  treatment.  In  these  chapters  on  Dar- 
winism and  evolution,  while  I  have  dropped  the  form 
of  a  historical  review  under  which  I  have  delineated 
the  productions  of  the  earlier  authors,  I  shall  still 
preserve  the  spirit  of  the  historian  or  reviewer,  rather 
than  that  of  the  essayist.  I  shall  state  what  others 
have  said  about  the  effect  of  Darwinism  and  evolution 
upon  design-arguments,  rather  than  to  elaborate  my 
own  views,  though  I  shall  make  no  effort  to  conceal 
them. 

I  shall,  in  the  first  place,  mention  some  opinions  upon 
the  anti-Darwinian  side,  to  the  effect  that  Darwinism 
is  fatal  to  natural  theology,  and  indeed  to  every  good 
thing.  Such  opinions  might  be  multiplied  indefinitely 
were  there  any  need  of  it. 

"  Essa}^s  on  Religion  and  Literature,"  edited  by 
Henry  Edward,  Archbishop  of  Westminster,  London, 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  309 

1874,  contains  an  essay  entitled  "  Darwinism  brought 
to  Book,"  by  the  Rev.  F.  H.  Laing,  D.D.  This  is  as 
fierce  and  intemperate  a  diatribe  as  was  ever  penned. 
Considering  the  high  auspices  under  which  it  appeared, 
it  had  almost  the  semblance  of  an  official  anathema. 
But  now,  in  less  than  ten  years  from  its  publication,  I 
have  seen  this  same  Charles  Darwin  laid  to  rest,  with 
all  the  honors  and  sacred  rites  of  the  church,  in  this 
very  Abbey  whose  archbishop  lent  his  name  to  such  an 
assault  upon  him  while  living. 

Eight  years,  however,  is  a  long  time  in  this  busy  age. 
Let  us  see  what  a  very  recent  writer  has  to  say.  "  The 
Creed  of  Science,"  by  William  Graham,  1881,  contains 
this :  — 

' '  But  now  it  appears  that  Darwin  has  at  last  enabled  the 
extreme  materialist  to  attempt  and  carry  the  design-argument, 
the  last  and  hitherto  impregnable  fortress,  behind  which 
natural  theology  had  intrenched  herself  "  (319). 

Then,  after  an  illustration  of  this  statement,  showing 
the  effect  of  the  Darwinian  explanation  of  the  process 
by  which  the  eye  has  been  evolved,  he  says,  — 

"  This  is  the  whole  story.  And  here  the  design-argument 
as  formerly  understood  loses  its  point  and  force,  apparent 
design  being  explained  by,  and  resolved  into,  a  natural  pro- 
cess and  the  fact  of  inheritance.  What  we  mistook  for  a 
preconception  of  an  infinite  Mind,  realized  by  an  Almighty 
and  skilful  hand,  is  a  most  excellent  result  that  chance  has 
spared,  and  that  natural  selection  has  brought  to  the  front  " 
(322). 

The  most  elaborate  attempt  to  prove  that  Darwinism 
and  design  are  mutually  destructive  was  made  by  Dr. 
Hodge  of  Princeton  : *  — 

1  What  is  Darwinism  ?  New  York,  1874. 


310  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

"It  appears  that  Darwinism  includes  three  distinct  ele- 
ments. First,  evolution,  or  the  assumption  that  all  organic 
forms,  vegetable  aud  animal,  have  been  evolved  or  developed 
from  one  or  a  few  primordial  living  germs  ;  second,  that  this 
evolution  has  been  effected  by  natural  selection,  or  the  survi- 
val of  the  fittest ;  and  third,  and  by  far  the  most  important 
and  only  distinctive  element  of  his  theory,  that  this  natural 
selection  is  without  design,  being  conducted  by  unintelligent 
physical  causes  "  (48). 

"It  is,  however,  neither  evolution  nor  natural  selection 
which  gives  Darwinism  its  peculiar  character  and  importance. 
It  is  that  Darwin  rejects  all  teleology,  or  the  doctrine  of  final 
causes  "  (52). 

We  and  all  the  world  have  been  much  in  the  dark 
about  Darwinism,  it  seems.  We  honestly  thought  the 
important  and  distinctive  thing  in  it  was  evolution  by 
natural  selection.  In  our  great  simplicity  we  imagined 
that  he  was  to  take  a  high  rank  among  the  great  think- 
ers and  discoverers  on  account  of  his  work  in  biology. 
But  that,  says  Hodge,  was  a  very  trifling  incident  of 
his  career.  The  great  thing  to  remember  about  him, 
"the  only  distinctive  thing,"  is  that  he  rejects  all  tele- 
ology ! 

But  does  he  reject  all  teleology  ?  How  does  Hodge 
make  it  out  that  this  thing,  which  he  regards  as  the 
only  distinctive  thing  about  Darwin,  really  attaches  to 
him  at  all  ?     Let  us  see  :  — 

"  The  sources  of  evidence  on  this  point  are,  1st,  Mr.  Dar- 
win's own  writings.  2d,  The  expositions  of  his  theory, 
given  by  its  advocates.  3d,  The  character  of  the  objections 
urged  by  its  opponents  "  (52). 

Queer  sources  of  proof  truly,  especially  the  third. 
Dr.  Hodge  is  going  to  prove  what  Darwin  believes  by 
citing  what  Darwin's  enemies  say  he  believes!     The 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  311 

first  source  is  the  only  legitimate  one ;  and  it  is  worthy 
of  note  that  he  occupies  only  eleven  pages  with  "  Dar- 
win's own  testimony,"  including  also  Hodge's  comments 
on  it,  thirty-two  pages  with  the  "Testimony  of  the 
Advocates  of  the  Theory,"  and  eighty-two  pages  with 
the  "  Testimony  of  the  Opponents  of  Darwinism."  Well 
may  he  say  at  the  end,  "  We  have  thus  arrived  at  the 
answer  to  our  question,  What  is  Darwinism?  It  is 
atheism"  (177).  In  order  to  get  Darwin  just  where 
he  wanted  him,  so  that  he  could  hit  him  fair  and  hard, 
he  summoned  the  whole  host  of  his  enemies  and  a 
goodly  array  of  his  over-zealous  and  too  radical  friends, 
by  whose  combined  aid  he  at  last  got  him  fairly  planted 
before  his  loaded  howitzer  yclept  atheist-exterminator, 
and  then  blazed  away ! 

But  to  the  one  legitimate  source  of  proof.  Let  us 
examine  his  quotations  from  Darwin  seriatim.  I  give 
the  pages  from  the  sixth  London  edition  of  the  "  Origin 
of  Species :  "  — 

"  Nothing  can  be  more  hopeless  than  to  attempt  to  explain 
this  similarity  of  pattern  in  members  of  the  same  class  by 
utility  or  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  "  (382). 

"  Similarity  of  pattern  in  members  of  the  same  class  " 
is  simply  a  typical  form,  or  an  example  of  morphology  ; 
and  morphology  is  a  distinct  thing  from  teleology.  No 
scientist  and  no  well-informed  design-advocate  has  any 
desire  to  explain  the  facts  of  morphology  "by  utility 
or  the  doctrine  of  final  causes."  They  would  never 
dream  of  such  a  thing,  and  yet  they  may  be  thorough- 
going teleologists.  This  quotation  lacks  two  things  of 
showing  that  Darwinism  is  death  to  design.  In  the 
first  place,  it  would  not  follow  that  Darwin  rejected 
teleology  because  he  could  not  use  it  to  explain  every 


312  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

tiling  in  heaven  and  earth;  and,  in  the  second  place, 
teleology  is  not  the  only  design-argument.  Hodge 
seemed  to  think  it  was ;  and  this  fact  forms  a  curious 
comment  upon  the  state  of  physico-theology  when  the 
issue  of  Darwinism  was  sprung  upon  it.  If  eutaxi- 
ology  had  been  properly  developed  and  brought  to  the 
front,  Darwinism  and  design  would  have  been  good 
friends  from  the  start. 

Hodge's  second  quotation  from  the  "  Origin  of  Spe- 
cies "  is  the  following  :  — 

"It  is  interesting  to  contemplate  a  tangled  bank,  clothed 
with  many  plants  of  many  kinds,  with  birds  singing  on  the 
bushes,  with  various  insects  flitting  about,  and  with  worms 
crawling  through  the  damp  earth,  and  to  reflect  that  these 
elaborately  constructed  forms,  so  different  from  each  other, 
and  dependent  on  each  other  in  so  complex  a  manner,  have 
all  been  produced  by  laws  acting  around  us.  These  laws, 
taken  in  the  largest  sense,  being  growth,  inheritance,  which 
is  almost  implied  by  reproduction  [this  clause  about  "  inherit- 
ance "  was  omitted  by  Hodge],  variability  from  the  indirect 
and  direct  action  of  the  conditions  of  life,  and  from  use  and 
disuse ;  a  ratio  of  increase  so  high  as  to  lead  to  a  struggle 
for  life,  and  as  a  consequence  to  natural  selection,  entailing 
divergence  of  character  and  extinction  of  less  improved 
forms.  Thus,  from  the  war  of  nature,  from  famine  and 
death,  the  most  exalted  object  which  we  are  capable  of  con- 
ceiving, the  production  of  the  higher  animals  follows.  There 
is  a  grandeur  in  this  view  of  life  with  its  several  powers, 
having  been  originally  breathed  by  the  Creator  into  a  few 
forms,  or  into  one  ;  and  that  whilst  this  planet  has  gone 
cycling  on,  according  to  the  fixed  law  of  gravity,  from  so 
simple  a  beginning,  endless  forms  most  beautiful  and  most 
wonderful  have  been,  and  are  being,  evolved  "  (429). 

Dr.  Hodge  comments  copiously  on  most  of  the  quo- 
tations from  Darwin,  but  offers  not  a  word  on  this  pas- 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  313 

sage ;  so  that  we  are  left  wholly  to  conjecture  how  he 
made  out  a  denial  of  teleology  from  it.  Most  likely  it 
was  from  the  words,  "that  these  forms  have  all  been 
produced  by  the  laws  acting  around  us."  That  is  sim- 
ply a  denial-  of  special  creation.  It  is  probable  that 
Hodge  did  not  distinguish  in  his  own  thought  between 
the  denial  of  special  creation  and  the  denial  of  tele- 
ology. If  he  did,  he  was  in  advance  of  the  majority  of 
theologians.  To  such  a  mind  this  quotation  would  be 
conclusive  evidence  that  Darwin  rejected  teleology .^ 

But  Darwin  simply  inscribed  on  his  last  page  what 
his  whole  book  was  intended  to  prove  ;  viz.,  that  ani- 
mals and  plants  are  not  special  creations.  And  we  can 
even  see  a  sort  of  teleology  in  this  very  passage.  "  The 
most  exalted  object  we  are  capable  of  conceiving,  the 
production  of  the  higher  animals,"  seems  to  lie  in  his 
thought  as  an  end  accomplished  by  means  of  natural 
selection.  And  he  justly  conceives  that  "  there  is  a 
grandeur  in  this  view  "  of  a  purpose  so  long  cherished 
by  the  Creator,  and  so  patiently  wrought  out  while 
"  this  planet  has  gone  cycling  on  according  to  the  fixed 
law  of  gravity."  All  that  seems  to  be  entirely  proper; 
indeed,  not  only  harmless,  but  devout,  and  worthy  to 
stand  as  the  closing  sentence  of  a  grand  book  written 
by  a  man  who  was  at  once  a  great  scientist  and  a  good 
Christian. 

The  teleological  import  of  this  quotation  is  confirmed 
by  some  sentences  in  the  preceding  paragraph. 

"  To  my  mind  it  accords  better  with  what  we  know  of  the 
laws  impressed  on  matter  by  the  Creator,  that  the  production 
and  extinction  of  the  past  and  present  inhabitants  of  the 
world  should  have  been  due  to  secondary  causes,  like  those 
determining  the  birth  and  death  of  the  individual.  When 
I  view  all  beings  not  as  special  creations,  but  as  the  lineal 


314  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

descendants  of  some  few  beings  which  lived  long  before  the 
first  bed  of  the  silurian  system  was  deposited,  they  seem  to 
me  to  become  ennobled.  .  .  .  And,  as  natural  selection  works 
solely  by  and  for  the  good  of  each  being,  all  corporeal  and 
mental  endowments  will  tend  to  progress  towards  perfec- 
tion." 

In  his  opinion  natural  laws  were  "  impressed  on  mat- 
ter by  the  Creator ;  "  and  one  of  them,  natural  selection, 
is  the  means,  by  reason  of  its  working  "  solely  by  and 
for  the  good  of  each  being,"  of  accomplishing  this  most 
excellent,  most  exalted  end,  that  "  all  corporeal  and 
mental  endowments  will  tend  to  progress  towards  per- 
fection." 

Hodge's  third  quotation  is  the  following :  — 

''Did  He  ordain  that  the  crop  and  tail  feathers  of  the 
pigeon  should  vary  in  order  that  the  fancier  might  make  his 
grotesque  pouter  and  fantail  breeds?  Did  He  cause  the 
frame  and  mental  qualities  of  the  dog  to  vary  in  order  that 
a  breed  might  be  formed  of  indomitable  ferocity,  with  jaws 
fitted  to  pin  down  the  bull  for  man's  brutal  sport?  But  if  we 
give  up  the  principle  in  one  case,  —  if  we  do  not  admit  that 
the  variations  of  the  primeval  dog  were  intentionally  guided 
in  order  that  the  greyhound,  for  instance,  that  perfect  im- 
age of  symmetry  and  vigor,  might  be  formed,  —  no  shadow 
of  reason  can  be  assigned  for  the  belief  that  variations, 
alike  in  nature  and  the  result  of  the  same  general  laws,  which 
have  been  the  groundwork  through  natural  selection  of  the 
formation  of  the  most  perfectly  adapted  animals  in  the  world, 
man  included,  were  intentionally  and  specially  guided.  How- 
ever much  we  may  wish  it,  we  can  hardly  follow  Professor 
Asa  Gray  in  his  belief  '  that  variation  has  been  led  along 
certain  beneficial  lines,'  like  a  stream  '  along  definite  and 
useful  lines  of  irrigation.  '  "  * 

1  Variation  of  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domestication,  ii.  431. 
Hodge  omitted  to  tell  his  readers  where  this  passage  was  to  he  found. 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  315 

At  first  view  this  passage  seems  much  more  to  the 
point,  that  Darwin  rejected  teleology,  than  either  of 
the  previous  quotations.  He  implies  a  negation  by  the 
form  of  his  questions  ;  and  in  such  cases  the  interroga- 
tive form,  if  it  carries  a  negative  force  at  all,  amounts 
to  an  emphatic  negation.  So  we  may  say  that  Darwin 
strongly  denies  that  variations  have  been  "intention- 
ally and  specially  guided."  There  is  one  plain  land- 
mark for  us  in  our  attempt  to  find  out  what  Darwin 
really  thought  about  teleological  purposes  in  nature  ; 
and  this,  be  it  known,  is  our  main  purpose.  It  matters 
less  whether  Hodge  truly  represented  or  misrepresented 
his  views,  than  what  his  opinions  really  were.  And 
this  one  landmark  which  we  have  reached  in  our  inves- 
tigation does  seem  to  point  to  the  conclusion  that  he 
rejected  teleology. 

It  often  happens,  however,  that  an  author's  true 
meaning  shines  in  new  light  when  we  examine  the  con- 
text of  any  quotation.  This  will  be  seen  to  be  true  in 
the  present  instance  ;  but,  before  resorting  to  that  means 
of  reaching  the  truth  about  Darwin's  opinions,  let  us 
observe  closely  the  precise  thing  which  he  emphatically 
denies  in  the  passage  just  as  Hodge  gave  it.  He  denies 
that  variations  have  been  intentionally  guided.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  progress  accomplished  by  the  selec- 
tion of  beneficial  variations  has  been  intentionally  and 
specially  guided,  notwithstanding  the  variations  were 
purely  accidental  with  respect  to  the  results  actually 
realized,  though  not  accidental  in  any  other  sense.  If 
this  is  what  Darwin  meant,  there  is  no  denial  of  tele- 
ology in  the  passage  :  progress  has  been  guided  "  along 
certain  beneficial  lines,"  though  variation  has  not,  but 
on  the  contrary  has  been  pushing  out  this  way  and  that 
indiscriminately,  without  any  reference    to   useful  re- 


316  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

suits.  The  whole  tenor  of  his  theory  of  natural  selec- 
tion makes  it  inherently  probable  that  this  is  precisely 
what  he  meant ;  and  this  probability  is  distinctly  and 
emphatically  confirmed  by  the  context  of  Hodge's 
third  quotation.  I  shall  quote  extensively  from  this 
context,  but  I  bespeak  a  careful  perusal  of  the  whole. 
The  passage  combines  a  spirit  of  reverence  with  a  pro- 
found philosophy  worthy  of  Bishop  Butler,  —  not  un- 
like the  "  Analogy  "  indeed,  in  that  it  discloses  a  diffi- 
culty in  natural  religion  precisely  parallel  to  one  in- 
revealed  religion.  It  ought  to  put  to  the  blush  any 
one  who  asserts  that  Darwinism  is  atheism. 

"  The  long-continued  accumulation  of  beneficial  variations 
will  infallibly  lead  to  structures  as  diversified,  as  beautifully 
adapted  to  various  purposes,  and  as  excellently  co-ordinated, 
as  we  see  in  the  animals  and  plants  all  around  us.  Hence  I 
have  spoken  of  selection  as  the  paramount  power,  whether 
applied  by  man  to  the  formation  of  domestic  breeds,  or  by 
nature  to  the  production  of  species.  I  may  recur  to  the 
metaphor  given  in  a  former  chapter:  if  an  architect  were  to 
rear  a  noble  and  commodious  edifice,  without  the  use  of  cut 
stone,  by  selecting  from  the  fragments  at  the  base  of  a  preci- 
pice wedge-formed  stones  for  his  arches,  elongated  stones 
for  his  lintels,  and  flat  stones  for  his  roof,  we  should  admire 
his  skill,  and  regard  him  as  the  paramount  power.  Now,  the 
fragments  of  stone,  though  indispensable  to  the  architect, 
bear  to  the  edifice  built  by  him  the  same  relation  which  the 
fluctuating  variations  of  each  organic  being  bear  to  the 
varied  and  admirable  structures  ultimately  acquired  by  its 
modified   descendants. 

"  Some  authors  have  declared  that  natural  selection  ex- 
plains nothing,  unless  the  precise  cause  of  each  slight  in- 
dividual difference  be  made  clear.  Now,  if  it  were  explained 
to  a  savage  utterly  ignorant  of  the  art  of  building,  how  the 
edifice  has  been  raised  stone  upon  stone,  and  why  wedge- 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  317 

formed  fragments  were  used  for  the  arches,  flat  stones  for 
the  roof,  etc.  ;  and,  if  the  use  of  each  part  and  of  the  whole 
building  were  pointed  out,  it  would  be  unreasonable  if  he 
declared  that  nothing  had  been  made  clear  to  him  because 
the  cause  of  the  precise  shape  of  each  fragment  could  not 
be  given.  But  this  is  a  nearly  parallel  case  with  the  objec- 
tion that  selection  explains  nothing  because  we  know  not 
the  cause  of  each  individual  difference  in  the  structure  of 
each  being. 

' '  The  shape  of  the  fragments  of  stone  at  the  base  of  our 
precipice  may  be  called  accidental :  but  this  is  not  strictly 
correct ;  for  the  shape  of  each  depends  on  a  long  sequence 
of  events,  all  obeying  natural  laws, — on  the  nature  of  the 
rock,  on  the  lines  of  deposition  or  cleavage,  on  the  form  of 
the  mountain  which  depends  on  its  upheaval  and  subsequent 
denudation,  and  lastly  on  the  storm  or  earthquake  which 
threw  down  the  fragments.  But,  in  regard  to  the  use  to 
which  the  fragments  may  be  put,  their  shape  may  be  strictly 
said  to  be  accidental.  And  here  we  are  led  to  face  a  great 
difficulty,  in  alluding  to  which  I  am  aware  that  I  am  travel- 
ling bej^ond  my  proper  province.  An  omniscient  Creator 
must  have  foreseen  every  consequence  which  results  from 
the  laws  imposed  by  Him.  But  can  it  be  reasonably  main- 
tained that  the  Creator  intentionally  ordered,  if  we  use  the 
words  in  any  ordinary  sense,  that  certain  fragments  of  rock 
should  assume  certain  shapes  so  that  the  builder  might  erect 
his  edifice?  If  the  various  laws  which  have  determined 
the  shape  of  each  fragment  were  not  predetermined  for  the 
builder's  sake,  can  it  with  any  greater  probability  be  main- 
tained that  He  specially  ordained,  for  the  sake  of  the  breeder, 
each  of  the  innumerable  variations  in  our  domestic  animals 
and  plants  ;  many  of  these  variations  being  of  no  service  to 
man,  and  not  beneficial,  far  more  often  injurious,  to  the 
creatures  themselves?  Did  He  ordain  that  the  crop  and  tail 
feathers  of  the  pigeon  should  vary  in  order  that  the  fancier 
might  make  his  grotesque  pouter  and  fantail  breeds?     Did 


318  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

He  cause  the  frame  and  mental  qualities  of  the  dog  to  vary 
in  order  that  a  breed  might  be  formed  of  indomitable  feroci- 
ty, with  jaws  fitted  to  pin  down  the  bull  for  man's  brutal 
sport?  But  if  we  give  up  the  principle  in  one  case,  — if  we 
do  not  admit  that  the  variations  of  the  primeval  dog  were 
intentionally  guided  in  order  that  the  grey  hound,  for  in- 
stance, that  perfect  image  of  symmetry  and  vigor,  might 
be  formed, — no  shadow  of  reason  can  be  assigned  for  the 
belief  that  variations,  alike  in  nature  and  the  result  of  the 
same  general  laws,  which  have  been  the  groundwork  through 
natural  selection  of  the  formation  of  the  most  perfectly 
adapted  animals  in  the  world,  man  included,  were  intention- 
ally and  specially  guided.  However  much  we  may  wish  it, 
we  can  hardly  follow  Professor  Asa  Gray  in  his  belief  '  that 
variation  has  been  led  along  certain  beneficial  lines,'  like  a 
stream  '  along  definite  and  useful  lines  of  irrigation.'  If  we 
assume  that  each  particular  variation  was  from  the  beginning 
of  all  time  pre-ordained,  the  plasticity  of  organization  which 
leads  to  many  injurious  deviations  of  structure,  as  well  as 
that  redundant  power  of  reproduction  which  inevitably  leads 
to  a  struggle  for  existence,  and,  as  a  consequence,  to  the 
natural  selection  or  survival  of  the  fittest,  must  appear  to  us 
superfluous  laws  of  nature.  On  the  other  hand,  an  om- 
nipotent and  omniscient  Creator  ordains  every  thing  and 
foresees  every  thing.  Thus  we  are  brought  face  to  face 
with  a  difficulty  as  insoluble  as  is  that  of  free  will  and  pre- 
destination." 

I  am  dealing,  first  of  all,  with  personal  issues  in  this 
chapter;  and  here  is  one  between  Darwin  and  Gray 
which  demands  an  explanation.  This  issue  is  not,  how- 
ever, precisely  what  Hodge  represented  it  to  be ;  viz., 
that  between  the  denial  of  teleology  by  Darwin  and  its 
acceptance  by  Gray.  The  utmost  that  can  be  made  of 
it  is,  that  Gray  says  variations  have  been  guided  in  useful 
lines,  while  Darwin  says  that  jwogress  has  been  guided  in 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  319 

useful  lines  by  the  constant  selection  of  beneficial  varia- 
tions, these  variations  being  "  strictly  accidental "  in  re- 
lation to  the  use  made  of  them,  but  not  at  all  accidental 
in  another  sense.  Here  is  a  difference  truly  ;  but,  in 
my  opinion,  it  arose  from  an  infelicity  of  expression  in 
those  articles  which  Gray  published  in  "  The  Atlantic 
Monthly  "  magazine  at  an  early  stage  of  the  Darwinian 
controversy.  In  his  "  Darwinians "  Gray  compares 
natural  selection  to  the  rudder  which  guides  the  ship, 
while  variation  is  the  wind  that  "  bloweth  where  it 
listeth."  This  indicates  that  he  came  round  to  Dar- 
win's view  "of  selection  as  the  paramount  power, 
whether  applied  by  man  to  the  formation  of  domestic 
breeds,  or  by  nature  to  the  production  of  species. " 

It  is  proper  to  note  the  fact,  that,  although  Gray  seems 
to  have  receded  from  his  earlier  view,  there  are  some 
evolutionists  who  still  diverge  widely  from  Darwin's 
doctrine  of  the  paramount  power  of  selection,  and  give 
more  weight  to  inherent  tendencies  of  organic  structure 
than  he  did.  But  this  is  a  question  of  detail,  which  may 
be  settled  either  this  way  or  that  without  the  slightest 
damage  or  disparagement  to  teleology  or  theism. 

In  the  second  place,  here  is  a  personal  issue  between 
Darwin  and  Hodge.  "  My  notion,"  says  Darwin,  "  of  the 
process  of  natural  selection  and  variation  is  illustrated 
by  the  architect  choosing  his  materials  from  a  heap  of 
natural  fragments,  instead  of  cutting  each  stone  for  its 
place."  How  could  the  most  ardent  teleologist  frame  a 
better  illustration  for  his  purpose  ?  "  Ah,"  says  Hodge, 
"Darwin  doesn't  say  God  selects,  but  nature  selects. 
Selection  is  a  natural  force."  "  Very  true,"  says  Dar- 
win, "  it  is  one  of  the  '  laws  impressed  on  matter  by  the 
Creator.'  "  "  But,"  says  Hodge,  "  do  you  think  God 
intended  that  law  to  work  as  you  say  it  does  ?  "     "  Cer- 


320  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

tainly,"  answers  Darwin,  " '  an  omnipotent  and  om- 
niscient Creator  ordains  every  thing  and  foresees  every 
thing.'  'An  omniscient  Creator  must  have  foreseen 
ever}^  consequence  of  the  laws  imposed  by  him.' " 
"Well,"  says  Hodge,  "in  view  of  such  declarations 
I  can't  very  well  say  that  you  are  an  atheist,  however 
much  I  would  like  to  do  so  ;  but  I  do  say  that  Darwin- 
ism is  atheism."  1  That  is  very  much  as  if  one  should 
tell  a  man,  "  I  will  not  call  you  a  liar,  sir ;  that  is  not 
a  polite  expression,  and  I  never  use  it :  but  I  do  say 
that  your  statement  is  a  damnable  falsehood." 

In  respect  to  this  "insoluble  difficulty"  in  natural 
theology,  which  Darwin  thinks  is  on  a  par  with  that  of 
divine  sovereignty  and  human  freedom  in  dogmatic 
theology,  the  gist  of  it  is  the  antithesis  of  particular 
providence  and  universal  law.  Dr.  McCosh  and  the 
Duke  of  Argyll  have  attempted  to  throw  some  light 
upon  this  problem,  but  I  suppose  neither  of  them  would 
claim  that  they  have  really  solved  it.  It  does  unques- 
tionably present  grave  difficulties,  —  so  grave  that  the 
practical  man  will  be  apt  to  take  the  same  course  with 
it  that  Darwin  did  ;  that  is,  to  consider  it  insoluble,  and 
give  himself  no  further  concern  about  it.  To  his  mind 
there  were  two  such  insoluble  problems,  but  his  faith 
did  not  stagger  under  either.  He  believed  the  will  was 
free,  though  he  could  not  reconcile  that  with  divine 
sovereignty ;  he  believed  in  special  providences,  in  an 
"omnipotent  and  omniscient  Creator  foreseeing  and 
ordaining  every  thing,"  though  he  could  not  reconcile 
that  with  his  deep  conviction  of  the  universal  reign  of 
natural  laws. 

1  "  We  have  thus  arrived  at  the  answer  to  our  question,  What  is  Dar- 
winism ?  It  is  atheism.  This  does  not  mean,  as  before  said,  that  Mr. 
Darwin  himself  and  all  who  adopt  his  views  are  atheists;  but  it  means 
that  his  theory  is  atheistic."  —  WJiat  is  Darwinism?  p.  177. 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  821 

If  we  were  disposed  to  press  his  architectural  illus- 
tration to  the  full  extent  of  its  possible  application,  a 
very  strong  case  might  be  made  out  for  his  belief  in 
teleology.  The  parallelism  between  it  and  the  pro- 
cess of  selection  which  he  intended  it  to  illustrate,  can 
onfv  be  carried  out  by  the  supposition  of  an  intelligent 
Author  of  nature  guiding  all  the  processes  concerned 
in  the  production  of  species.  Some  expressions  em- 
ployed by  him  in  the  chapter  where  he  first  brought  in 
this  illustration  throw  additional  light  upon  this  view 
of  it :  — 

"If  our  architect  succeeded  in  rearing  a  noble  edifice, 
using  the  rough,  wedge-shaped  fragments  for  the  arches,  the 
longer  stones  for  the  lintels,  and  so  forth,  we  should  admire 
his  skill  even  in  a  higher  degree  than  if  he  had  used  stones 
shaped  for  the  purpose.  So  it  is  with  selection,  whether  ap- 
plied by  man  or  by  nature  ;  for  though  variability  is  indis- 
pensably necessary,  yet  when  we  look  at  some  highly  complex 
and  excellently  adapted  organism,  variability  sinks  to  a  quite 
subordinate  position  in  importance  in  comparison  with  selec- 
tion, in  the  same  manner  as  the  shape  of  each  fragment  used 
by  our  supposed  architect  is  unimportant  in  comparison  with 
his  skill."  J 

Hodge's  fourth  quotation  is  as  follows  :  — 

"  Nothing,  at  first  sight,  can  appear  more  difficult  to  believe 
than  that  the  more  complex  organs  and  instincts  have  been 
perfected,  not  by  means  superior  to,  though  analogous  with, 
human  reason,  but  by  the  accumulation  of  innumerable  slight 
variations,  each  good  for  the  individual  possessor.  Never- 
theless, this  difficulty,  though  appearing  to  our  imagination 
insuperably  great,  cannot  be  considered  real  if  we  admit  the 
following  propositions  :  namely,  that  all  parts'  of  the  organiza- 
tion and  instincts  offer  at  least  individual  differences  ;  that 

1  Var.  of  An.  and  Plants  under  Dom.,  ii.  249. 


6ZZ  CRITIQUE   OF   DESIGN  ARGUMENTS. 

there  is  a  struggle  for  existence  leading  to  the  preservation 
of  profitable  deviations  of  structure  or  instinct ;  and,  lastly, 
that  gradations  in  the  state  of  perfection  of  each  organ  may 
have  existed,  each  good  of  its  kind  "  (404). 

This  passage  will  have  to  go  for  what  it  is  worth, 
without  any  explanation  so  far  as  I  am  concerned.  It 
seems  to  bear  the  interpretation  which  Hodge  would 
put  upon  it  ;  but  it  is  the  only  one  which  sustains  his 
view,  and  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  general  tone  of 
Darwin's  writings.  It  is  strikingly  discordant  with  his 
architectural  illustration,  which  exalts  the  skill  requisite 
for  the  process  of  natural  selection,  to  say  that  the 
means  by  which  "the  more  complex  organs  and  in- 
stincts have  been  perfected "  are  not  "  superior  to, 
though  analogous  with,  human  reason."  There  is  a 
slight  obscurity  in  the  grammatical  construction  which 
makes  it  hazardous  either  to  affirm  or  deny  very  posi- 
tively just  what  Darwin  meant  in  this  instance. 

Hodge's  fifth  and  last  quotation  is  the  Darwinian 
explanation  of  the  development  of  the  eye :  — 

"To  suppose  that  the  eye,  with  all  its  inimitable  con- 
trivances for  adjusting  the  focus  to  different  distances,  for 
admitting  different  amounts  of  light,  and  for  the  correc- 
tion of  spherical  and  chromatic  aberration,  could  have  been 
formed  by  natural  selection,  seems,  I  freely  confess,  absurd 
in  the  highest  degree  "  (143). 

"  It  is  scarcely  possible  to  avoid  comparing  the  eye  with  a 
telescope.  We  know  that  this  instrument  has  been  perfected 
by  the  long-continued  efforts  of  the  highest  human  intellects, 
and  we  naturally  infer  that  the  eye  has  been  formed  by  a 
somewhat  analogous  process.  But  may  not  this  inference  be 
presumptuous  ?  Have  we  any  right  to  assume  that  the  Creator 
works  by  intellectual  powers  like  those  of  man  ?  If  we  must 
compare  the  eye  to  an  optical  instrument,  we  ought,  in  imagi- 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  323 

nation,  to  take  a  thick  layer  of  transparent  tissue,  with  spaces 
filled  with  fluid,  and  with  a  nerve  sensitive  to  light  beneath, 
and  then  suppose  every  part  of  this  layer  to  be  continually 
changing  slowly  in  density,  so  as  to  separate  into  layers  of 
different  densities  and  thicknesses,  placed  at  different  dis- 
tances from  each  other,  and  with  the  surfaces  of  each  layer 
slowly  changing  in  form.  Further,  we  must  suppose  that  there 
is  a  power,  represented  by  natural  selection  or  the  survival  of 
the  fittest,  always  intently  watching  each  slight  alteration  in 
the  transparent  layers,  and  carefully  preserving  each  which, 
under  varied  circumstances,  in  any  way  or  in  any  degree  tends 
to  produce  a  distincter  image.  We  must  suppose  each  new 
state  of  the  instrument  to  be  multiplied  by  the  million,  each 
to  be  preserved  until  a  better  one  is  produced,  and  then  the 
.old  ones  to  be  all  destroyed.  In  living  bodies  variation  will 
cause  the  slight  alterations,  generation  will  multiply  them 
almost  infinitely,  and  natural  selection  will  pick  out  with 
unerring  skill  each  improvement."      (147.) 

"  Let  this  process,"  says  Hodge,  "  go  on  for  millions 
of  years,"  and  we  shall  at  last  have  a  perfect  eye.  The 
last  sentence  of  the  paragraph,  which  Hodge  slurs  over 
instead  of  quoting,  contains  an  expression  which  seems 
to  throw  the  whole  process  into  the  province  of  intelli- 
gent creative  action,  though  it  is  creation  by  law.  The 
doctor  was  not  only  quite  skilful  in  selecting  the  point 
to  begin  quoting,  but  he  was  always  careful  to  stop  just 
in  the  nick  of  time.  Here  is  the  sentence  which  he 
omitted :  "  Let  this  process  go  on  for  millions  of  years, 
and,  during  each  year,  on  millions  of  individuals  of 
many  kinds,  and  may  we  not  believe  that  a  living  opti- 
cal instrument  might  thus  be  formed  as  superior  to  one 
of  glass  as  the  works  of  the  Creator  are  to  those  of 
man  ?  "  Darwin  thought  the  eye  was  a  work  of  the  Cre- 
ator if  natural  selection  was  the  means  of  its  production. 


324  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

The  whole  paragraph  is  simply  a  protest  against  that 
mechanical  view  of  natural  processes  which  makes 
them  akin  to  the  methods  of  an  instrument-maker, 
picking  up  his  brass  here  and  his  glass  there,  shaping 
the  one  into  tubes  and  the  other  into  lenses,  polishing, 
fitting,  adjusting  focus,  mounting,  and  finishing  up. 
No,  says  Darwin,  that  is  not  the  way  God  works.  It  is 
by  a  far  slower  and  less  mechanical  process,  —  a  process 
as  different  from  that  of  the  optician  as  the  "living 
optical  instrument"  is  more  perfect  than  the  one  of 
glass.  It  has  been  denied  that  the  eye  is  more  perfect 
than  a  telescope,  —  nay,  the  denial  of  excellence  goes 
much  farther  than  that.1  In  the  point  of  mere  nicety 
and  precision  of  mechanical  adjustments,  this  is  all, 
true ;  but  I  have  not  heard  of  any  telescope  or  micro- 
scope which  could  see.  That  is  a  considerable  difference 
between  the  eye  and  the  finest  optical  instrument  of  hu- 
man construction,  —  a  difference  which  rebukes  equally 
these  croakers  about  the  imperfections  of  the  eye  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  mechanical  school  of  teleologists 
on  the  other.  What  pertinence  is  there  in  the  compari- 
son of  the  eye  to  an  optical  instrument,  when  there  is 
this  fundamental  contrast,  that  the  one  is  a  living  thing, 
which,  in  conjunction  with  the  nervous  system,  has  the 
power  of  vision,  while  the  other  is  a  piece  of  dead 
mechanism?  The  parallelism  upon  which  the  teleo- 
logical  inference  rests  fails  at  the  vital  point ;  and  this 
weakness  becomes  the  more  striking  and  fatal  when  we 
consider  that  the  dead  machinery  has  been  put  together 
piece  by  piece,  while  the  living  organ  has  reached  its 

i  "It  shall  suffice  us  to  say  here,  that  any  optician  who  should 
manufacture  an  instrument  as  grossly  imperfect  as  the  human  eye, 
would  be  hooted  from  the  trade  as  an  ignoramus  and  a  bungler."  — 
Article  on  "  Design  in  Nature,"  Westminster  Review,  July,  1875.  See 
also  Helmholtz's  "  Popular  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects." 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  325 

present  form  and  proportions  by  growth  and  develop- 
ment. 

But,  if  the  mechanical  parallelism  were  exact  and 
complete,  the  conclusion  would  assimilate  God  to  a  mere 
craftsman,  and  a  poor  one  at  that,  since  in  the  matter  of 
mere  mechanism  the  eye  is  inferior  to  some  optical 
instruments.  Darwin  was  wiser  than  the  teleologists  of 
the  school  of  Paley  in  declining  to  look  upon  the  works 
of  God  in  that  way.  But  Dr.  Hodge  belonged  to  the 
very  school  which  was  thus  condemned.  Read  his  dis- 
cussion of  the  teleological  argument  in  the  first  volume 
of  his  "  Systematic  Theology,"  and  you  will  see  that  he 
begins  with  Paley's  truism,  "  Design  implies  a  designer," 
pursues  the  argument  in  the  stereotyped  fashion  of  the 
Bridgewater  Treatises,  and  closes  it  up  with  this  over- 
whelming syllogism  from  Philo  :  "  No  work  of  art  is 
self-made.  The  world  is  the  most  perfect  work  of  art. 
Therefore  the  world  was  made  by  a  good  and  most  per- 
fect author."  To  this  astonishing  syllogism  he  appends 
the  still  more  astonishing  remark,  "  All  the  Christian 
fathers  and  subsequent  theologians  have  reasoned  in 
the  same  way."     Sad  if  true. 

Such  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  "Darwin's  own 
testimony"  on  the  point  of  his  denial  of  design  in 
nature.  An  acute  and  experienced  critic  scans  the 
whole  field  of  his  productions,  and  culls  out  the  pas- 
sages best  adapted  to  show  that  he  rejected  teleology, 
with  the  result  shown  above.  When  all  his  quotations 
are  candidly  examined  together  with  the  context,  the 
impression  produced  by  them  is  not  precisely  what 
we  should  expect  if  it  is  really  true  that  "  Darwinism 
is  atheism." 

We  have  heard  three  witnesses  for  the  prosecution,  — 
that  is,  for   Darwin's   conviction   upon  the  charge  of 


326  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

hostility  to  teleology :  let  us  summon  an  equal  number 
for  the  defence.  The  first  is  Professor  Kolliker  of 
WUrtzburg.  In  his  "  Essay  upon  the  Darwinian  The- 
ory," he  concludes  that  "  Darwin  is,  in  the  fullest  sense 
of  the  word,  a  teleologist."  The  second  is  Professor 
T.  H.  Huxley.  This  may  be  a  surprise ;  and  the  truth 
is,  this  man  was  first  summoned  for  the  prosecution : 
but  the  lawyer  on  that  side  found  that  his  testimony 
was  not  precisely  what  it  had  been  reported  to  be,  not 
just  what  it  appeared  to  be  at  the  first  glance.  In 
short,  he  found  that  he  had  caught  a  Tartar,  and  that 
the  best  thing  he  could  do  was  to  drop  him  quietly 
before  it  came  to  the  test  of  a  cross-examination  in 
open  court.  So  the  advocate  for  the  defence  issued  a 
subpoena  for  him,  and  quite  unexpectedly  Huxley  turns 
up  as  witness  for  teleology.  But  the  court,  or  the 
reader,  in  order  that  we  may  drop  this  legal  by-play, 
will  please  to  observe  that  it  is  not  the  teleology  of 
Paley,  or  teleology  in  the  ordinary  sense,  but  some 
form  of  that  doctrine  which  is  consistent  with  evolu- 
tion, which  Huxley  has  in  mind  when  he  appears  for 
the  defence  of  Darwin  against  the  charge  of  hostility 
to  teleology. 

Referring  to  the  opinion  of  Professor  Kolliker  quoted 
above,  Huxley  says,  — 

"It  is  singular  how  one  and  the  same  book  will  impress 
different  minds.  That  which  struck  the  present  writer  most 
forcibly  on  his  first  perusal  of  the  '  Origin  of  Species '  was 
the  conviction  that  teleology,  as  commonly  understood,  had 
received  its  death-blow  at  Mr.  Darwin's  hands.1 

Such  expressions  certainly  convey  an  impression  of 
hostility  to   teleology;   but  bear  in   mind   that   he   is 

1  Lay  Sermons,  301. 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  327 

speaking  of  teleology   as    commonly   understood,  which 
would  be  that  of  Paley  and  the  Bridgewater  Treatises. 

"If  we  apprehend  the  spirit  of  the  'Origin  of  Species' 
rightly,  then  nothing  can  be  more  entirely  and  absolutely 
opposed  to  teleology,  as  it  is  commonly  understood,  than 
the  Darwinian  theory.  So  far  from  being  '  a  teleologist  in 
the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,'  we  should  deny  that  he  is  a 
teleologist  in  the  ordinary  sense  at  all ;  and  we  should  say, 
that,  apart  from  his  merits  as  a  naturalist,  he  has  rendered  a 
most  remarkable  service  to  philosophical  thought  by  enabling 
the  student  of  nature  to  recognize,  to  the  fullest  extent, 
those  adaptations  to  purpose  which  are  so  striking  in  the 
organic  world,  and  which  teleology  has  done  good  service  in 
keeping  before  our  minds,  without  being  false  to  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  a  scientific  conception  of  the  universe. 
The  apparently  diverging  teachings  of  the  teleologist  and  of 
the  morphologist  are  reconciled  by  the  Darwinian  hypothe- 
sis." 

Here  we  begin  to  get  a  glimpse  of  that  "  wider  tele- 
ology "  of  which  Huxley  speaks  in  another  place. 
"  Adaptations  to  a  purpose  "  is  a  thorough^  teleologi- 
cal  phrase  ;  and  it  appears  that  Darwin  has,  in  Huxley's 
opinion,  not  only  thrown  new  light  upon  these  adapta- 
tions, but  has  done  the  further  service  to  teleology  of 
reconciling  it  with  morphology.  The  famous  contro- 
versy between  Cuvier  and  GeofTroy  Saint-Hilaire  would 
never  have  occurred  if  the  comprehensive  principles  of 
the  "  Origin  of  Species  "  had  been  understood  in  1830. 

In  a  later  volume  1  Huxley  protests  against  the  inter- 
pretation which  Haeckel  puts  upon  Darwinism  :  — 

' '  In  more  than  one  place  Professor  Haeckel  enlarges  upon 
the  service  which  the  '  Origin  of  Species '  has  done  in  favoring 

1  Critiques  and  Addresses  :  London,  1873,  p.  305. 


328  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

what  he  calls  the  '  causal  or  mechanical '  view  of  living  na- 
ture as  opposed  to  the  '  teleological  or  vitalistic  '  view.  And 
no  doubt  it  is  quite  true,  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  the 
most  formidable  opponent  of  all  the  commoner  and  coarser 
forms  of  teleology.  But  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  ser- 
vice to  the  philosophy  of  biology  rendered  by  Mr.  Darwin  is 
the  reconciliation  of  teleology  and  morphology,  and  the  ex- 
planation of  the  facts  of  both,  which  his  views  offer," 

Dr.  Hodge  thought  the  "  only  distinctive  thing " 
about  Darwin  was  his  hostility  to  teleology ;  Professor 
Huxley  thinks  "  the  most  remarkable  service  "  he  has 
rendered  is  in  favor  of  teleology.  We  can  set  off  these 
contrasted  pieces  of  evidence  against  each  other,  which 
may  serve  to  give  an  impartial  and  judicial  balance  to 
our  minds,  while  we  listen  to  the  testimony  of  Professor 
Asa  Gray. 

In  his  "Darwiniana"  (p.  357)  he  says  that  Darwin 
has  "  brought  back  teleology  to  natural  history.  In  Dar- 
winism usefulness  and  purpose  come  to  the  front  again 
as  working  principles  of  the  first  order.  Upon  them, 
indeed,  the  whole  system  rests."  Gray  thinks  that  the 
burdens  which  have  become  too  heavy  for  the  teleolo- 
gist  are  due  to  the  special-creation  hypothesis  ;  but,  "  in 
the  far-reaching  teleology  which  may  take  the  place  of 
the  former  narrow  conceptions,  organs,  and  even  facul- 
ties, useless  to  the  individual,  find  their  explanation 
and  reason  of  being  "  (357).  "  Finally,  Darwinian  tele- 
ology has  the  special  advantage  of  accounting  for  the 
imperfections  and  failures  as  well  as  for  successes.  It 
not  only  accounts  for  them,  but  turns  them  to  prac- 
tical account.  Without  the  competing  multitude,  no 
struggle  for  life,"  no  selection  and  survival  of  the  fittest, 
no  continuous  adaptation  to  changed  environment,  and 
no  progressive  improvement. 


DARWINISM  AND  DESIGN.  329 

"So  the  most  puzzling  things  of  all  to  the  old-school  tele- 
ologists  are  the  principia  of  the  Darwinian.  In  this  system 
the  forms  and  species,  in  all  their  variety,  are  not  mere  ends 
in  themselves  ;  but  the  whole  is  a  series  of  means  and  ends, 
in  the  contemplation  of  which  we  may  obtain  higher  and 
more  comprehensive,  and  perhaps  worthier,  as  well  as  more 
consistent,  views  of  design  in  nature  than  heretofore  "  (378) . 

Such  radical  differences  of  opinion  between  intelli- 
gent men  and  competent  judges  of  the  nature  and  tend- 
ency of  a  given  theory  could  not  exist  without  some 
fundamental  divergence  in  the  point  of  view  from  which 
each  of  them  has  taken  the  bearings  of  Darwinism. 
And  it  is  easy  to  see  what  this  fundamental  divergence 
was  in  the  present  instance.  When  Dr.  Hodge  says 
that  Darwin  rejected  all  teleology,  his  notion  of  what 
teleology  is  differs  toto  coelo  from  the  notion  of  tele- 
ology entertained  by  Dr.  Gray :  still  more  does  it  differ 
from  the  "  wider  teleology  "  of  Professor  Huxley.  So 
that,  strictly  speaking,  these  witnesses  all  agree  in  their 
testimony.  Gray  and  Huxley  would  accord  perfectly 
with  Hodge  in  the  opinion  that  Darwin  rejected  that 
form  of  teleology  which  Hodge  regarded  as  the  only 
possible  form  of  it.  But  these  evolutionists  maintain 
that  there  is  a  wider  and  better  and  more  far-reaching 
teleology,  which,  so  far  from  being  the  object  of  Dar- 
win's hostility,  was  in  a  sense  created  by  him. 

How  far  Darwin  would  accept  such  interpretations 
as  Gray  and  Huxley  put  upon  his  work  is  not  easy  to 
determine.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  he  would  go 
farther  than  Huxley  on  the  teleological  road,  but  not 
so  far  as  Gray.  Huxley's  "wider  teleology,"  which 
denies  any  intelligent  purpose  in  the  structure  of  the 
eye,  does  not  harmonize  well  with  Darwin's  notion  of 
an  omnipotent  and  omniscient  Creator  foreseeing  and 


330  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ordaining  every  consequence  of  the  laws  impressed 
upon  matter  by  him.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  some 
of  Darwin's  expressions,  such  as  that  about  "  the  more 
complex  organs  and  instincts  having  been  perfected, 
not  by  means  superior  to,  though  analogous  with,  human 
reason ; "  and  "  Have  we  any  right  to  assume  that  the 
Creator  works  by  intellectual  powers  like  those  of 
man?"  —  these  expressions  are  not  entirely  consonant 
with  the  "far-reaching  teleology"  of  Gray.  Such  ex- 
pressions, however,  may  mean  much  or  little,  as  you 
choose  to  interpret  them.  The  last  one  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  a  negation  of  intelligent  creative  action, 
but  only  that  creative  intelligence  is  very  different  from 
human  intelligence ;  and  the  other  is  so  framed  that 
whoever  shall  assert  that  it  means  this  will  be  met  by 
a  plausible  claim  that  it  means  that  or  the  other. 

The  personal  issue  respecting  Darwinism  and  tele- 
ology is,  after  all,  of  little  consequence  compared  with 
the  broader  issue  between  evolution  and  teleology,  to 
which  the  next  chapter  will  be  devoted. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSIC O-THEOLOGY.  331 


CHAPTER  XV. 

EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGV. 

The  relations  of  the  theory  of  evolution  to  physico- 
theology  are  not  only  broader  and  more  important  than 
that  of  Darwinism  to  design,  they  are  also  more  diffi- 
cult to  deal  with.  In  fact,  the  question  now  before  us 
is  a  different  one  in  almost  every  aspect  of  it.  In  one 
sense  it  is  easier  instead  of  more  difficult:  there  is 
ample  room  for  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  Dar- 
win's own  view  of  the  effect  of  his  theory  really  was, 
while  there  is  no  longer  any  room  for  doubt  upon  the 
general  question  whether  the  acceptance  of  evolution 
is  destructive  to  all  design-arguments.  Theologians  are 
practically  a  unit  in  the  feeling  that  a  belief  in  evolu- 
tion leaves  theism  intact.  All  the  opinions  cited  in  the 
last  chapter  to  the  effect  that  there  is  an  irrepressible 
conflict  between  Darwinism  and  design  might,  it  is 
true,  be  construed  as  expressing  the  same  hostility 
between  evolution  and  design ;  but  those  opinions  do 
not  reflect  the  prevailing  hue  of  theological  sentiment. 
On  the  contrary,  the  theory  of  evolution  has  now  fairly 
reached  the  third  stage  in  its  relations  to  religion. 

Each  radical  change  in  scientific  conceptions  of  nature 
is  apt  to  be  viewed .  at  first  as  hostile  to  Christianity : 
then,  if  it  commands  the  approval  of  scientists  in  gen- 
eral, there  comes  a  time  when  theologians  represent  it 
as  a  matter  of  indifference,  whether  it  be  true  or  false, 


332  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

so  far  it  effects  their  creed ;  but  finally,  when  it  comes 
to  be  largely  accepted  by  the  world,  they  manage  to 
turn  it  in  some  way  to  the  advantage  of  religion,  and 
become  its  zealous  advocates.  Such  has  been  the  case 
with  astronomy  and  geology,  and  the  history  is  being 
repeated  in  respect  to  evolution.  Already  it  is  freely 
resorted  to  for  illustrative  parallels  to  the  truths  of 
revealed  religion  ;  and  the  number  of  such  illustrations 
is  inexhaustible.  Bishop  Butler  would  find  many  an 
"  analogy  "  now  which  he  was  not  able  to  draw  from 
nature  by  the  light  of  that  science  which  existed  in  his 
day. 

Only  two  of  these  stages  of  theological  opinion  are 
legitimate.  The  first  stage,  which  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  hostility  between  science  and  religion,  is  a  wan- 
ton waste  of  time,  temper,  and  energy,  which  not  only 
might  be  better  employed,  but  could  not  well  be  em- 
ployed more  disastrously.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
attitude  of  neutrality  will  hereafter  be  at  once  assumed 
toward  all  new  theories  of  a  strictly  scientific  character. 
It  may  be  a  question  whether  some  note  of  caution 
ought  not  to  be  sounded  respecting  the  third  stage  of 
theological  opinion.  It  is  all  well  enough  to  draw  upon 
the  facts  of  any  science,  or  even  the  principles  of  any 
theory,  for  popular  illustrations ;  but  the  most  enlight- 
ened friends  of  revealed  religion  will  hereafter  be  slow 
to  link  their  system  with  any  scientific  theory  in  such 
a  way  that  it  shall  be  disparaged  in  any  degree  by  the 
overthrow  of  the  latter.  The  great  example  which 
ought  to  stand  as  a  sufficient  warning  for  all  time  in 
this  matter,  is  that  of  the  ecclesiastical  sanction  given 
to  the  Ptolemaic  as  opposed  to  the  Copernican  as- 
tronomy. 

We  have,  in  this  third  stage  of  theological  opinion 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  333 

when  carried  to  an  undue  extent,  an  interesting  exam- 
ple of  the  meeting  of  extremes.  The  first  stage  is  one 
of  hostility ;  the  third  is  one  of  overstrained  and  exces- 
sive friendship :  but  they  play  into  each  other  because 
the  attachment  of  the  cause  of  Christianity  to  a  given 
theory  makes  it  hostile  to  a  new  and  rival  theory. 

When  I  say  that  the  sentiments  entertained  towards 
the  theory  of  evolution  have  passed  into  this  third 
stage,  I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  asserting  that 
it  has  gone  so  far  as  to  identify  Christianity  with  evolu- 
tion, or  even  that  the  friendly  feeling  is  entirely  unani- 
mous. I  might  present  this  discussion  in  the  same  form 
as  that  of  Darwinism  and  design  ;  that  is,  I  might 
give  a  list  of  theologians  who  maintain  that  there  is  an 
irrepressible  conflict  between  evolution  and  physico- 
theology,  and  a  list  of  those  who  think  there  is  no  such 
conflict.  But  such  a  course  would  be  devoid  of  inter- 
est or  practical  value,  for  the  reason  that  this  question 
is  already  practically  settled  in  favor  of  the  latter  view. 

The  real  problem,  then,  in  respect  to  the  reconciliation 
of  evolution  and  physico-theology  is  not  whether  it  can 
be  done  at  all,  but  how  it  is  to  be  done.  Must  physico- 
theology  undergo  any  modifications?  and,  if  so,  what 
shall  they  be  ?  Those  are  the  real  issues  now  on  trial. 
The  question  what  evolution  is,  or  which  one  of  its 
several  forms  is  meant,  when  we  say  that  it  may  be  ac- 
cepted without  prejudice  to  Christianity,  may  also  have 
to  be  raised.  So  that  it  is  clear  that  we  have  now,  as 
stated  in  the  beginning,  broader,  more  important,  and 
more  difficult  relations  to  deal  with  in  this  chapter  than 
in  the  last. 

As  regards  the  form  of  evolution  to  be  dealt  with, 
most  of  those  who  have  maintained  that  it  might  freely 
be  accepted  or  rejected  simply  upon  its  evidence  and 


334  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

its  merits,  like  any  other  hypothesis,  have  generally  had 
in  view  its  most  comprehensive  form,  or  that  which  re- 
gards the  whole  of  nature  as  one  unbroken  series  of 
causes  and  effects  dominated  throughout  its  whole  ex- 
tent and  its  whole  history  by  natural  laws.  This  is  the 
wiser  course.  There  is  no  gain  in  dealing  with  it  piece- 
meal, reconciling  and  adjusting  physico-theology  to 
some  partial  phase  of  it,  only  to  be  compelled  to  repeat 
the  process  over  and  over  for  the  remaining  phases. 
The  true  method  is  to  place  physcio-theology  upon  a 
basis  independent  of  any  of  its  possible  phases,  taking 
it  in  the  most  sweeping  and  comprehensive  form. 

Can  this  be  done  ?  Let  us  divide  the  question :  can 
it,  in  the  first  place,  be  done  with  respect  to  eutaxiolo- 
gy  ?  There  can  be  no  possibility  of  a  negative  response 
to  this  question.  The  facts  of  order  in  the  cosmos  are 
not  changed,  nor  do  they  speak  a  whit  less  emphatically 
of  an  intelligent  author  of  nature,  by  reason  of  the  ac- 
ceptance of  evolution.  The  direct  effect  of  evolution 
is  to  extend  the  reign  of  law,  or  rather  to  broaden  our 
conceptions  respecting  its  universality ;  and,  since  the 
reign  of  law  is  but  another  name  for  the  order  of  nature, 
the  obvious  effect  of  evolution  is  to  strengthen  eutaxi- 
ology.1     Eutaxiology  needs  no  modification  ;  but,  in  the 

1  This  objection  has  lately  been  started  by  what  may  be  called  the 
"  extreme  left"  of  the  evolutionists  ;  namely,  that  since  human  intelli- 
gence itself  is  a  product  of  nature,  what  it  beholds  in  the  order  of  the 
cosmos,  and  supposes  to  be  a  divine  intelligence,  is  merely  its  own  re- 
flection from  the  orderly  conditions  which  have  evolved  it.  (See  A 
Candid  Examination  of  Theism,  by  Physicus,  p.  58).  The  objection  has 
greater  plausibility  than  force.  If  it  be  true  that  the  order  of  nature 
has  evoked  human  intelligence,  then,  supposing  that  this  order  was  not 
the  product  of  a  prior  intelligence,  it  may  be  that  the  mind  would  catch 
its  own  reflection  from  it,  as  asserted;  but,  upon  the  other  hand,  if 
there  was  a  prior  intelligence,  the  mind  would  without  any  doubt  infer 
its  existence  from  the  cosmos.  Since  the  inference  would  certainly  be 
made  in  the  latter  case,  and  not  certainly  in  the  former,  and  since  this 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  335 

modifications  which  physico-theology  must  undergo,  the 
recognition  of  eutaxioloyy  is  the  most  important  of  all. 
More  than  a  century  ago  the  profound  genius  .of  Kant 
proposed  an  improved  method  of  physico-theology  in 
which  the  recognition  of  the  principle  of  order  is  the 
most  striking  feature.  If  his  suggestions  had  been  com- 
prehended and  followed,  that  science  would  have  been 
placed  on  a  foundation  independent  of  evolution  long 
before  evolution  was  thought  of.  The  avoidance  of  a 
conflict  with  that  theory  would  have  been  one  advan- 
tage of  this  course,  but  not  the  only  one.  Or,  to  put 
the  same  statement  in  another  form,  the  hostile  issue 
which  was  joined  between  the  advocates  of  design  in 
nature  and  the  advocates  of  evolution,  was  not,  in  and 
by  itself,  the  only  mischief  which  resulted  from  the  ill- 
conditioned  state  of  development  of  physico-theology. 
The  hostility  was  unpleasant  enough ;  but  it  was  still 
more  unpleasant  to  reflect,  that  once  more  there  was 
need  of  patching  and  mending  a  theological  system 
in  response  to  a  new  phase  of  scientific  speculation, 
—  a  thing  which  ought  never  to  happen  in  any  case, 
and  was  clearly  needless  in  this  case  because  the  true 


inference  is  made  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  would  seem  more  reasonable  to 
refer  it  to  the  certainty  than  to  the  doubt ;  that  is,  to  suppose  that 
there  was  a  prior  intelligence.  Again,  if  the  order  of  nature  is  at  all  a 
ground  for  inferring  the  existence  of  intelligence,  it  would  seem  that 
a  fortiori  it  must  be  a  valid  ground  if  this  orderly  cosmos  has  added  to 
all  other  perfections  this  unique  and  crowning  one,  that  it  has  evolved 
the  human  intelligence. 

The  general  argument  of  Physicus  against  eutaxiology  is  a  colossal 
fallacy.  He  makes  order  spring  from  ' '  the  persistence  of  force  and  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter."  In  order  to  do  this  he  imparts  such  pro- 
digious and  mysterious  energy  to  this  "  ubiquitous  and  illimitable  x," 
this  tremendous  unknown  which  he  calls  persistence  of  force,  that  he 
makes  a  deity  of  it.  Thus  alone  is  he  able  to  account  for  the  facta 
which  constitute  the  data  of  theism.  He  sets  up  a  god  to  make  us  believe 
there  is  no  God. 


CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

line  of  design-arguments  had  been  pointed  out  long 
before. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  recent  writers  on  natural 
theology  have,  almost  unconsciously  as  it  seems,  been 
led  to  advance  the  principle  of  order  to  the  front 
rank  in  adjusting  their  system  to  evolution.  I  say  al- 
most unconsciously,  because  none  of  them  recognize 
eutaxiology  except  as  some  broader  and  higher  sort  of 
teleology,  or  possibly  some  inferior  and  subordinate 
phase  of  teleology.  Thus  Professor  Cooke,  whose  book 
was  written  in  the  early  days  of  the  agitation  over 
Darwinism,  and  who  tells  us  in  his  preface  that  he  was 
influenced  by  the  supposed  damaging  effect  of  the  new 
theory  in  biology  to  seek  for  design-arguments  in 
chemistry,  dwells  much  upon  his  proof  from  "general 
plan,"  which  is  clearly  eutaxiological,  though  he  re- 
gards it  as  quite  inferior  and  subordinate  to  teleology. 

Professor  Joseph  Le  Conte 2  also  employs  eutaxiology 
to  a  large  extent,  and  with  a  higher  appreciation  of  it 
than  Professor  Cooke  exhibited. 

"Let  us  sketch  the  history  of  thought  on  this  subject: 
first  the  animal  body  was  studied  with  reference  to  its  won- 
derful mechanism,  its  admirable  contrivances  for  use.  This 
is  the  domain  of  the  old  natural  theology.  Then  came,  by 
the  study  of  naturalists,  the  recognition  of  the  strange  fact, 
that  in  the  animal  body  there  are  often  rudimentary  and 
therefore  useless  parts"  (p.  53). 

"Finally,  by  further  patient  study  of  nature,  came  the 
recognition  of  another  law  besides  use,  —  a  law  of  order 
underlying  and,  conditioning  the  law  of  use.  Organisms  are, 
indeed,  contrived  for  use,  but  according  to  a  pre-ordained 
plan  of  structure,  which  must  not  be  violated.  This  is  the 
domain  of  the  new  natural  theology  "  (54). 

1  Religion  and  Science:  London,  1874. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSIC O-THEOLOGY.  337 

Professor  Baden  Powell  was  fully  committed  to  the 
order-argument,  and  consequently  welcomed  evolution, 
even  before  the  publication  of  the  "  Origin  of  Species." 
Dr.  McCosh  also  understood  the  difference  between 
eutaxiology  and  teleology,  but  it  is  singular  that  he  did 
not  make  greater  use  of  the  former  in  adjusting  and 
defining  the  relations  of  evolution  to  physico-theology. 
He  hardly  alludes  to  it  in  his  later  works.  In  his 
"Christianity  and  Positivism  "  (1871), he  says,  "I  stand 
by  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  order  and  adaptation 
in  the  universe."  This  is  a  recognition  of  eutaxiology 
and  teleology  both,  but  his  definition  of  design  is 
wholly  teleological.  "  The  argument  from  design  is,  that 
there  are  evidences  everywhere,  in  heaven  and  earth,  in 
plant  and  animal,  of  natural  agents  being  so  fitted  to 
each  other,  and  so  combining  to  produce  a  beneficent 
end,  as  to  show  that  intention  must  have  been  em- 
ployed in  co-ordinating  and  arranging  them."  The  same 
predominance  of  teleology  appears  in  "The  Develop- 
ment Hypothesis "  (1876)  :  "  We  argue  final  cause, 
i.e.,  design,  from  the  collocation  of  efficient  causes  to 
promote  an  evident  end,  —  say  the  ear  to  hear,  and  the 
eye  to  see." 

There  may  be  wide  differences  of  opinion  respecting 
the  validity  of  the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  order  of 
nature ;  but  there  can  be  but  one  opinion  on  the  point 
of  its  perfect  harmony  with  evolution,  or  its  complete 
independence  of  evolution,  so  that  it  may  stand  or  fall 
on  its  own  merits  whether  evolution  be  a  true  or  a  false 
theory.  One  of  the  design-arguments  at  least  is  secure 
from  any  dangers  arising  from  that  direction. 

How  is  it  with  teleology  ?  This  case  is  not  so  clear, 
and  the  unanimity  respecting  it  is  by  no  means  perfect. 
But  I  think  a  large  majority  of  the  ablest  theologians 


838  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

would  take  the  view,  that  the  establishment  of  evolu- 
tion would  not  destroy  teleology  :  certainly  that  senti- 
ment would  be  unanimous  among  Christian  scientists. 
But  in  respect  to  the  further  questions  whether  tele- 
ology must  receive  any  modifications,  and  what  shall  be 
the  nature  of  these,  there  is  considerable  difference  of 
opinion. 

Professor  Le  Conte  seems  to  think  that  evolution 
makes  no  difference  at  all.  He  opens  his  argument  by 
producing  Paley's  watch,  not  being  aware,  probably, 
that  it  was  already  second-handed,  and  applies  the 
illustration  thus :  — 

"Now,  such  a  watch  is  the  solar  system,  with  its  sun, 
planets,  and  moons,  —  infinitely  more  beautiful,  more  com- 
plex, more  delicately  adjusted,  than  an}'  human  work,  —  wheel 
within  wheel,  each  influencing  the  other,  and  all  controlled 
by  the  central  sun,  and  marking  time  with  the  utmost  exact- 
ness upon  the  dial-plate  of  heaven.  Now,  observe :  it  mat- 
ters not  when  this  was  made,  or  how  it  was  made,  or  where 
the  materials  came  from  out  of  which  it  was  made.  But 
here  is  something  not  material,  but  intellectual,  which  I  per- 
ceive ;  viz.,  the  intelligent  arrangement  for  a  purpose,  the 
contrivance." 

He  devotes  the  whole  of  Lecture  II.  to  a  comparison 
of  the  eye  with  a  camera  obscura.  So  that  we  may 
fairly  say  of  his  plan  for  reconciling  teleology  and  evo- 
lution, that  it  amounts  to  this  :  repeat  Paley's  argu- 
ments, or  similar  ones,  and  append  to  them  the  state- 
ment that  evolution  makes  no  difference. 

The  plan  of  George  St.  Clair  is  somewhat  different, 
though  he  also  adheres  to  the  predilection  for  machinery 
as  the  best  species  of  illustration  ;  but  he  throws  back 
the  contrivance  to  the  causes,  instead  of  taking  his  in- 
ference directly  from  what  he  sees  in  the  effects. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  339 

' '  Whatever  appearance  of  design  exists  in  living  struc- 
tures would  have  its  corresponding  appearance  in  the  causes 
if  the  causes  could  all  be  seen  ;  and  whatever  reason  there  is 
for  using  the  term  '  machinery '  of  the  one,  exists  also  for 
using  it  of  the  other. ' ' * 

He  supposes  that  it  is  not  only  possible  to  reconcile 
teleology  with  evolution,  but  that  it  is  really  enriched 
by  the  process. 

"The  design-argument  remains  unshaken,  and  the  wis- 
dom and  beneficence  of  God  receive  new  illustration. " 

The  Rev.  George  Henslow  coincides  very  nearly  with 
Le  Conte  in  supposing  that  teleology  stands  just  where 
it  did  before  evolution  was  heard  of. 

"  The  design  seen  in  a  structure  is  in  fact  part  of  and  in- 
separable from  it,  pointing  at  once  to  the  existence  of  mind, 
and  is  quite  irrespective  of  the  process  by  which  that  struc- 
ture was  brought  into  existence."  2 

Henslow  outdoes  all  the  rest  in  his  estimate  of  the 
gain  to  teleology  and  religion  by  the  establishment  of 
the  theory  of  evolution.  He  fairly  reaches  the  extreme 
of  linking  the  fortunes  of  all  religion  to  those  of  evo- 
lution, so  that  they  must  stand  or  fall  together.  We 
have  seen  in  a  previous  chapter  how  he  makes  the  ulti- 
mate purpose  of  the  world  as  a  whole  to  be  the  sur- 
rounding of  man  with  inideal  conditions,  —  that  is,  con- 
ditions which  are  not  ideally  perfect,  —  so  that  there  may 
be  a  moral  probation  in  this  life,  fitting  man  thus  to 
enter  upon  the  ideal  heavenly  life. 

"We  do  not  forget  that  God  could  not  only  have  made 
man  at  once  fitted  for  heaven,  but  have  placed  him  there ;  so 

1  Darwinism  and  Design,  by  George  St.  Clair:  London,  1873,  p.  126. 

2  The  Theory  of  Evolution  of  Living  Things:  London,  1873,  p.  x. 


340  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

that  the  wisdom  of  development  and  the  wisdom  of  proba- 
tion are  alike  synonymous  with  the  will  of  God.  They  are 
the  necessary  correlatives  of  that  system  of  progress  which 
has  a  universal  application  in  every  class  of  phenomena  that 
admits  of  improvement  or  differentiation  of  any  kind.  In- 
deed, we  may  go  a  step  farther,  and  say,  that,  were  this  not 
the  case,  heavenly  conditions  could  have  no  difference  from 
earthly  ones  ;  or  rather,  as  they  might  of  course  be  different, 
that,  under  the  present  limitations  of  our  existence,  we  can- 
not conceive  of  any  method  by  which  heavenly  conditions 
should  be  made  contingent  upon  earthly  ones.  So  that  the 
whole  scheme  which  God  has  framed  for  man's  existence,  from 
the  first  that  was  created  to  all  eternity,  collapses  if  the  great 
law  of  evolution  be  suppressed  "  (214). 

In  contrast  to  these  opinions,  which  represent  tele- 
ology as  unchanged  in  every  way  by  the  acceptance  of 
evolution,  except  that  it  is  enriched  with  new  illustra- 
tions, let  us  note  the  opinion  of  Professor  Huxley, 
whom  we  have  already  discovered  to  be  a  teleologist 
after  a  fashion,  but  a  fashion  strikingly  different  from 
that  affected  by  Paley  and  his  school :  — 

"The  teleology  which  supposes  that  the  eye,  such  as  we 
see  it  in  man  or  one  of  the  higher  vertebrata,  was  made  with 
the  precise  structure  which  it  exhibits  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  the  animal  which  possesses  it  to  see,  has  undoubt- 
edly received  its  death-blow.  Nevertheless,  it  is  necessary 
to  remember  that  there  is  a  wider  teleology,  which  is  not 
touched  by  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  but  is  actually  based 
upon  the  fundamental  proposition  of  evolution.  That  prop- 
osition is,  that  the  whole  world,  living  and  not  living,  is  the 
result  of  the  mutual  interaction,  according  to  definite  laws, 
of  the  forces  possessed  by  the  molecules  of  which  the  primi- 
tive nebulosity  of  the  universe  was  composed.  If  this  be 
true,  it  is  no  less  certain  that  the  existing  world  lay  poten- 
tially in  the  cosmic  vapor ;  and  that  a  sufficient  intelligence 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  341 

could,  from  a  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  the  molecules 
of  that  vapor,  have  predicted,  say,  the  state  of  the  fauna  of 
Britain  in  1869,  with  as  much  certainty  as  one  can  say  what 
will  happen  to  the  vapor  of  the  breath  on  a  cold  winter's 
day."  2 

He  then  brings  in  the  simile  of  the  clock  inhabited  by 
a  scientific  "  death-watch,"  who  sees  nothing  but  pure 
mechanism,  and  denies  that  there  is  any  purpose  what- 
ever in  the  structure  of  the  clock ;  and  a  philosophical 
"  death-watch,"  who  is  sure  there  is  a  purpose,  but,  in- 
fluenced by  his  own  function  of  monotonous  ticking, 
concludes  that  the  clock  also  was  made  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  ticking. 

' '  The  teleological  and  the  mechanical  views  of  nature  are 
not  necessarily  mutually  exclusive.  On  the  contrary,  the 
more  purely  a  mechanist  the  speculator  is,  the  more  firmly 
does  he  assume  a  primordial  molecular  arrangement,  of  which 
all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are  the  consequences  ;  and 
the  more  completely  is  he  thereby  at  the  mercy  of  the  tele- 
ologist,  who  can  always  defy  him  to  disprove  that  this  primor- 
dial molecular  arrangement  was  not  intended  to  evolve  the 
phenomena  of  the  universe.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  tele- 
ologist  assert  that  this,  that,  or  the  other  result  of  the  work- 
ing of  any  part  of  the  mechanism  of  the  universe  is  its  pur- 
pose and  final  cause,  the  mechanist  can  always  inquire  how 
he  knows  that  it  is  more  than  an  unessential  incident,  the 
mere  ticking  of  the  clock,  which  he  mistakes  for  its  function. 
And  there  seems  to  be  no  reply  to  this  inquiry,  any  more 
than  to  the  further  not  irrational  question,  Why  trouble 
one's  self  about  matters  which  are  out  of  reach  when  the 
working  of  the  mechanism  itself,  which  is  of  infinite  practi- 
cal importance,  affords  scope  for  all  our  energies?  " 

1  Critiques  and  Addresses,  305. 


342  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

This  whimsical  simile  of  the  clock  and  the  beetles 
cuts  both  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  it  rebukes  Haeckel 
and  all  advocates  of  his  theory,  that  the  universe  is  a 
purely  mechanical  product  of  molecular  forces  inherent 
in  matter,  likening  them  to  that  beetle  who  saw  in  the 
clock  "  nothing  but  matter  and  force  and  pure  mechan- 
ism from  beginning  to  end."  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
intended  to  be  a  rebuke  to  the  advocates  of  the  "  com- 
moner and  coarser  forms  of  teleology,"  as  being  out  of 
their  reckoning  in  what  they  assigned  to  be  the  final 
cause  of  this  or  that  structure,  as  much  as  the  beetle 
who  thought  the  clock  was  made  only  to  tick.  There 
is  also  a  fling  at  anthropomorphism  in  representing  the 
beetle  as  concluding  that  the  function  of  the  clock  was 
the  same  as  his  own.  But  would  any  sensible  beetle 
ever  take  the  first  step  towards  that  conclusion  ?  would 
he  ever  imagine  that  his  own  function  was  only  to  make 
a  ticking  noise,  when  that  was  of  no  manner  of  use  to 
himself,  —  as  purely  incidental  to  his  operations  as  the 
ticking  of  the  clock  to  its  real  function  ?  Again,  is  it 
conceivable  that  seeing  is  "  an  unessential  incident "  in 
the  structure  of  the  eye  ? 

The  simile  is  indeed  two-edged,  but  it  cuts  deepest 
and  keenest  into  the  materialist.  He  is  more  hopelessly 
out  of  his  reckoning  who  denies  any  purpose  whatever, 
than  he  who  merely  assigns  the  wrong  purpose.  More- 
over, the  probabilities  are  strongly  in  favor  of  the  hy- 
pothesis, that  the  teleologist  is  not  only  right  in  assert- 
ing some  purpose,  but  that  he  has  hit  a  real  purpose, 
not  an  unessential  incident,  when  he  asserts  that  eyes 
were  made  or  evolved  "  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the 
animal  which  possesses  them  to  see."  So  that  the 
rebuke  intended  for  him  falls  harmless,  while  that 
launched  at  the  materialist  strikes  home  with  full  force. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  843 

It  is  pleasant  to  know  that  Huxley  believes  in  a  tele- 
ology of  some  sort.  There  is  a  purpose  in  the  clock, 
though  the  philosophical  beetle  missed  it :  so  there  is  a 
purpose  in  the  universe,  though  the  old  teleologists,  in 
Huxley's  opinion,  may  have  missed  their  aim  in  assign- 
ing this  or  that  purpose ;  and  no  one  can  ever  tell  cer- 
tainly whether  they  did  or  not.  He  seems  to  think 
that  it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  inquire  into  these  purposes, 
since  the  discovery  of  them  is  as  much  beyond  human 
faculties  as  the  understanding  of  a  clock  is  beyond 
beetle  faculties. 

Here  is  a  certain  residual  teleology  which  evolution 
has  left  in  its  career  of  conquest ;  but  it  will  seem  to 
most  theists  to  be  the  mere  ghost  of  teleology  as  they 
conceived  it.  If  one  ventures  to  assert  that  eyes  were 
intended  for  vision,  he  falls  at  once  into  the  condemna- 
tion of  advocating  one  of  the  "  commoner  and  coarser 
forms  of  teleology."  Sensible  and  practical  men  are 
supposed  to  abjure  all  search  for  ends  and  purposes  in 
nature,  and  confine  their  energies  to  the  comprehension 
of  "  the  working  of  the  mechanism  itself."  And,  if  any 
one  still  has  a  lurking  ambition  to  be  a  teleologist, 
Huxley  kindly  marks  out  for  him  the  only  possible 
ground  for  his  feet,  the  precise  spot  where  he  must 
plant  himself,  and  the  exact  limits  of  what  he  can  do 
when  he  has  taken  up  his  position  there  with  the  deter- 
mination to  do  or  die  in  that  "  last  ditch."  The  pro- 
fessor blandly  invites  him  to  take  his  stand  upon  "  the 
primitive  nebulosity,"  and  there  boldly  "  defy "  the 
mechanical  theorist  "  to  disprove  that  this  primor- 
dial molecular  arrangement  was  not  intended  to  evolve 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe."  It  does  not  appear 
that  the  valiant  teleologist  thus  suspended  in  the  cold 
ab}'Sses  of  the  cosmic  gas  is  to  be  allowed  to  prove  any 


o44  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

thing :  his  sole  function  is  to  defy  somebody  to  disprove 
something.  If  he  makes  any  positive  assertions,  as 
"  that  this,  that,  or  the  other  result  of  the  working  of 
any  part  of  the  mechanism  of  the  universe  is  its  pur- 
pose and  final  cause,  the  mechanist  can  always  inquire 
how  he  knows  that  it  is  more  than  an  unessential  inci- 
dent,—  the  mere  ticking  of  the  clock." 

This  "  wider  teleology "  of  Huxley's  is  one  of  the 
results  of  attempting  to  reconcile  teleology  and  evolu- 
tion. Essentially  it  consists  in  emasculating  teleology, 
so  that  there  is  nothing  characteristic,  nothing  positive, 
nothing  that  smacks  of  vigor  or  virility,  left  of  it.  The 
contrast  between  this  kind  of  reconciliation  and  that 
of  Le  Conte  —  "  It  matters  not  when  this  was  made,  or 
how  it  was  made,  etc."  —  is  sufficiently  striking. 

Between  these  two  extremes  there  are  those  whose 
plan  of  reconciliation  admits,  upon  the  one  hand,  that 
some  modification  of  the  old  teleology  is  needed ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  does  not  emasculate  it,  does  not 
assign  to  it  the  negative  and  barren  function  of  defying 
somebody  to  disprove  something.  McCosh,  Gray,  and 
Gibson  may  be  reckoned  as  advocates  of  this  view. 
Some  sentences  from  the  last-mentioned  writer  will 
serve  to  show  his  point  of  view :  — 

"A  conviction  is  growing  up  in  the  cultivated  mind,  that 
all  phenomena  are  the  fruit  of  general  laiv,  and  not  of  spe- 
cial appointment.  It  is  in  deference  to  this  that  I  would 
frame  my  modification.  No  doctrine,  it  appears  to  me,  is  so 
clearly  taught  by  modern  science  as  this,  that  God  works  by 
general  laws.  His  appointments  are  at  least  prima  facie 
general,  not  special,  though  it  may  be  that  every  special  case 
has  been  considered  in  making  them.  I  do  not  mean  here 
to  prejudge  the  question,  whether  such  exceptions  to  such 
law  have  ever  taken  place,  say  in  original  creation  or  subse- 


EVOLUTION  AND  PHYSICO-THEOLOGY.  345 

quent  miracle.  But  I  wish  to  detach  the  argument  from 
design  altogether  from  these  difficult  questions.  Looking 
upon  nature  in  the  light  of  modern  science  in  quest  of  evi- 
dence for  an  originating  mind,  what  we  see  is  the  co-opera- 
tion of  a  number  of  general  laws ;  and  the  question  for 
our  consideration  is,  Does  this  co-operation  indicate  an  in- 
telligent and  moral  author?  .  .  .  We  are  not  to  argue  from 
isolated  facts.  We  cannot,  like  Paley,  infer  the  divine  be- 
nevolence from  the  gambols  of  shrimps.  We  must  take 
account,  at  least,  of  all  that  we  know,  and  endeavor  to  grasp 
the  character  of  the  universe  as  a  whole.  On  the  one  hand, 
we  are  not  to  expect  discernible  traces  of  design  everywhere, 
nor  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  are  we  to  disregard  such  traces  if 
they  appear  too  often  to  be  accounted  chances  ;  i.e.,  effects 
for  which  we  cannot  venture  to  assign  a  cause."  1 

Gibson  uses  "  design  "  in  the  old,  loose,  and  ambigu- 
ous way,  so  that  we  can  hardly  apply  this  especially  to 
teleology ;  but  it  may  be  regarded  as  including  tele- 
ology, since  that  is  one  of  the  design-arguments.  Gib- 
son thinks  we  ought  to  take  a  broad  view  of  nature, 
and  infer  a  divine  purpose  from  wide-ranging  agencies 
converging  to  some  definite  result.  Similar  to  this  is 
the  "  far-reaching  teleology  "  of  Professor  Gray. 

"  In  this  system  the  forms  and  species,  in  all  their  variety, 
are  not  mere  ends  in  themselves  ;  but  the  whole  is  a  series  of 
means  and  ends,  in  the  contemplation  of  which  we  may 
obtain  higher  and  more  comprehensive,  and  perhaps  wor- 
thier, as  well  as  more  consistent,  views  of  design  in  nature 
than  heretofore." 

Considering  the  broad  and  profound  changes  which 
the  acceptance  of  evolution  must  make  in  our  views 
of  the  cosmos,  it  would  seem  reasonable  to  expect  con- 

1  Religion  and  Science,  by  the  Rev.  Stanley  T.  Gibson,  p.  30. 


346  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

siderable  modifications  of  the  old  teleology  in  order  to 
harmonize  it  with  evolution.  Its  mechanical  elements, 
its  hostility  to  natural  law,  and  its  bias  in  favOr  of 
arbitrary  interferences,  must  all  be  eliminated.  But, 
important  as  these  changes  may  seem,  we  shall  presently 
see  that  even  more  radical  modifications  are  required 
in  order  to  harmonize  teleology  with  sound  logic  than 
those. which  are  needed  to  bring  it  into  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  doctrine  of  evolution. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  347 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY. 

The  fundamental  proposition  of  this  argument  is, 
that  order  is  a  mark  of  intelligence.  This  may  be  taken 
as  the  major  premise  of  a  syllogism,  of  which  the  minor 
premise  is  that  order  exists  in  the  universe,  and  the 
conclusion  is  that  intelligence  exists  in  the  universe. 
It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention,  that  as  the  order 
from  which  intelligence  is  inferred  exists  independently 
of  human  or  animal  agency,  so  the  intelligence  whose 
existence  is  concluded  is  independent  of  human  or  ani- 
mal intelligence.  That  might  be  taken  as  a  matter  of 
course ;  and  yet  the  mention  of  it  is  not  out  of  place, 
because  the  mere  assertion  that  intelligence  exists  in 
the  universe  is  capable  of  misconstruction.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  simple  mention  of  it  is  sufficient  with- 
out incorporating  the  limiting  clause,  "  other  than  hu- 
man or  animal  intelligence,"  in  the  conclusion  itself, 
thus  making  it  awkward  and  unwieldy. 

The  syllogism  is  the  weakest  form  in  which  to  cast 
an  argument.  If  conviction  is  the  object  in  view,  the 
safest  plan  is  to  mass  your  forces  in  solid  column,  —  to 
roll  up  both  premises  and  the  conclusion  in  a  single 
proposition,  which  may  then  be  wielded  with  good 
effect.  But,  if  the  object  is  to  test  the  validity  of  an 
argument,  there  is  no  better  plan  than  to  spread  it  out 
into  distinct  premises  and  conclusion.     For  this  reason 


348  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

I  shall  employ  a  different  method  in  this  chapter  from 
that  which  would  be  most  effective  if  my  aim  were  to 
construct  eutaxiologjr,  and  to  act  as  an  advocate  for  it. 

The  first  point  to  be  determined  is,  whether  there  is 
any  illicit  process  or  fallacy  in  the  reasoning.  Grant- 
ing the  truth  of  the  premises,  does  the  conclusion 
necessarily  and  legitimately  follow  ? 

What  is  meant  by  saying  that  order  is  a  mark  of  in- 
telligence ?  Simply  that  it  is  invariably  conjoined  with 
it.  If  this  be  granted,  and  if  it  be  conceded  also  that 
order  exists  in  the  universe  aside  from  that  produced 
by  men  and  animals,  then  it  follows  necessarily  and 
legitimately  that  some  intelligence  other  than  animal 
or  human  exists  in  the  universe.  The  reasoning  is  sim- 
ple and  straightforward ;  so  that  any  fallacy  must  be 
easily  detected  if  it  were  really  there,  and  it  does  not 
appear  that  there  is  any. 

The  whole  matter  turns,  therefore,  upon  the  truth  of 
the  premises.  Of  these,  the  minor  premise,  that  there 
is  in  order  in  the  universe,  will  hardly  be  disputed. 
The  possibility  of  any  science  whatever  lies  in  the  fact 
that  there  is  an  established  order  in  nature.  But  is  it 
true  that  the  presence  of  order  is  an  invariable  mark 
of  mind  ?  The  fate  of  this  argument  from  the  order 
of  nature  is  all  bound  up  in  the  answer  to  that  ques- 
tion. 

It  is  desirable,  in  the  first  place,  to  clear  this  funda- 
mental proposition  of  some  possible  misunderstandings. 
When  we  see  clearly  what  it  does  not  assert,  we  shall  be 
better  prepared  to  judge  of  the  truth  of  what  it  does 
assert.  It  does  not,  for  instance,  assert  that  intelli- 
gence never  produces  any  thing  but  orderly  results. 
That  may  be  true ;  but  the  converse  of  it,  that  every 
orderly  result  is  a  product  of  intelligence,  is  the  funda- 


THE   CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  349 

mental  proposition  of  eutaxiology.  This  is  vital  to  the 
argument,  but  that  may  be  either  true  or  false  without 
affecting  it. 

Secondly,  it  is  not  asserted  that  order  is  conjoined 
with  intelligence  in  the  relation  of  an  effect  to  its  cause. 
It  may  be  true  —  nay,  it  is  true,  without  any  doubt —  that 
they  are  conjoined  in  this  relation  ;  but  that  is  not  in- 
cluded in  the  assertion,  nor  is  it  essential  that  it  should 
be.  The  in  variableness  of  the  conjunction  is  the  vital 
point  in  determining  the  validity  of  the  inference  of 
intelligence  from  order.  It  is  wholly  indifferent  in 
what  relation  order  may  stand  to  intelligence,  provided 
only  that  we  know  to  a  certainty  that  intelligence  al- 
ways exists  wherever  order  appears.  The  argument 
will  be  just  the  same,  however,  if  we  do  assert  the  re- 
lation of  cause  and  effect,  as  if  we  do  not  assert  it.  In 
either  case  it  is  the  invar iableness  of  the  relation,  and 
not  the  nature  of  the  relation,  which  gives  validity  to 
the  specific  inference  of  intelligence.  If  the  relation  is 
invariable,  the  inference  is  sound ;  if  not  invariable,  the 
inference  is  faulty,  and  this  without  any  regard  to  any 
other  circumstance  or  quality  of  the  relation,  except 
that  it  is  invariable. 

As  I  have  remarked  in  reviewing  Kant's  physico-the- 
ology,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  principle  of  cause 
and  effect  is  involved  in  every  possible  kind  of  reason- 
ing. Every  case  in  court,  civil  or  criminal,  has  to  do 
with  causes  and  effects,  with  active  powers  and  agencies 
producing  definite  results,  but  not  in  any  such  sense  as 
that  the  validity  of  the  decision  rests  upon  the  law  of 
causation.  So  it  is  not  denied  that  eutaxiology  has  to 
deal  with  causes  and  effects ;  that  order  is,  in  fact,  an 
effect  of  mind.  But  it  is  not  admitted  that  the  princi- 
ple of  cause  and  effect,  the   truth  of  the  proposition, 


350  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

every  event  has  a  cause,  or  the  question  whether  that 
proposition  embodies  the  results  of  induction  or  ex- 
presses an  intuition,  —  it  is  not  admitted  that  any  of 
these  have  any  thing  whatever  to  do  with  the  soundness 
of  the  eutaxiological  inference. 

While  it  is  true  that  the  principle  of  causation  does 
in  a  certain  sense  underlie  all  reasoning,  it  is  never  of 
any  consequence  as  affecting  the  logical  process  or  the 
validity  of  the  inference,  except  in  the  single  instance 
of  the  causal  argument  for  the  existence  of  God.  The 
reasons  for  this  are,  that  the  judgment  —  every  event  has 
a  cause  —  is  so  fundamental,  that  the  disputants  on  the 
negative  side  never  think  of  calling  it  in  question ;  and 
the  positive  inference  from  it  is  so  general,  that  it  has 
no  value  to  the  affirmative  party,  except  when  the  ori- 
gin of  the  whole  material  universe  is  under  considera- 
tion. In  any  ordinary  piece  of  reasoning  it  would 
betoken  either  levity  or  insanity  to  claim  that  a  given 
phenomenon  —  a  blood-stain  for  example  —  had  no  cause, 
or  came  by  chance.  If  the  defendant  in  a  trial  for  mur- 
der should  be  so  reckless  as  to  enter  that  plea,  an  ap- 
peal to  the  law  of  causation  might  be  useful  to  the 
prosecution,  but  useful  only  in  response  to  the  affir- 
mation of  chance  or  causelessness.  When  that  was  cut 
off,  the  utility  of  this  appeal  would  be  at  an  end.  The 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  causation  is  simply 
that  a  certain  appearance,  such  as  a  dark  spot  upon  a 
knife  or  a  floor  or  a  garment,  had  some  cause.  But 
that  is  far  too  general  to  be  of  any  avail  in  convicting 
the  prisoner  of  murder.  What  the  prosecution  desire 
is  the  specific  conclusion  that  human  blood  was  the 
cause  of  these  stains.  The  general  conclusion  that 
they  had  some  cause  is  worthless  to  the  one  party,  and 
the  claim  that  they  had  no  cause  at  all  is  too  idle  to  be 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  351 

entertained  by  the  other  party  :  hence  the  law  of  causa- 
tion does  not  enter  into  the  argument  at  all. 

It  may  be  maintained,  however,  that,  if  simple  causa- 
tion is  not  the  determining  principle  in  such  cases,  the 
principle  of  sufficient  cause  is  involved,  and  that  this 
is  competent  to  lead  to  a  specific  conclusion.  No  other 
cause  than  human  blood  is  adequate  to  account  for  the 
spots  in  question.  That  may  be  true,  but  still  the  ar- 
gument is  not  causal.  It  proceeds  upon  the  principle  of 
identification  by  means  of  marks  instead  of  the  princi- 
ple of  causation.  Microscopic  examination  of  the  spots 
reveals  minute  disks,  or  corpuscles :  that  shows  that 
blood  caused  the  marks.  The  disks  have  a  definite 
form  and  size :  that  shows  that  it  was  human  blood. 
Such  is  the  course  of  the  reasoning  which  might  be 
sufficient  to  convince  a  jury  of  intelligent  men  in  a 
matter  of  life  and  death.  Now,  the  validity  of  it  de- 
pends wholly  upon  the  invariableness  of  the  relation 
between  certain  appearances  and  a  certain  substance. 
The  character  of  the  relation  as  being  causal  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  conclusion.  Simple  causation  leads 
us  to  the  general  conclusion  of  some  cause  :  the  princi- 
ple of  sufficient  cause  acids  one  element  to  this  general 
conclusion,  —  namely,  that  of  some  adequate  cause  ;  but 
to  make  it  specific  we  have  to  resort  to  another  princi- 
ple, that  of  invariable  sequences  without  regard  to  effi- 
cient cause.  And  this  last  principle  is  not  only  the 
final  resort,  but  it  is  really  the  moving  principle  and 
the  life  of  the  argument  from  the  beginning.  The  law 
of  causation  not  only  fails  us  before  we  reach  the  goal, 
but  it  is  of  no  use  at  airv  point.  The  invariableness  of 
the  relation  between  a  given  substance  and  a  given 
phenomenon  is  all  that  is  required,  even  against  the  af- 
firmation   of    chance.     But,  granting  that  the  law  of 


852  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

causation  might  be  appealed  to  against  chance,  that  is 
at  best  the  utmost  extent  of  its  utility  in  ordinary  rea- 
soning. 

In  arguments  concerning  the  origin  of  the  whole 
material  universe  the  case  is  somewhat  different.  Even 
the  general  conclusion,  that  the  universe  had  some 
cause,  is  not  without  some  value  ;  and  the  added  ele- 
ment, that  this  cause  must  have  been  adequate  to  pro- 
duce such  an  effect,  is  still  more  to  the  purpose,  though 
it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  this  adequate  cause 
was  no  other  than  God.  But  in  eutaxiology  the  con- 
clusion that  the  order  of  nature  had  some  adequate  cause 
is  of  no  greater  value  than  a  similar  general  conclusion 
in  a  legal  case.  The  specific  conclusion  of  intelligent 
agency  can  be  reached  only  by  the  logical  process  of 
identification  by  means  of  marks  upon  the  principle  of 
invariable  sequences.  If  order  is  a  mark  of  intelli- 
gence, that  is  enough.  It  is  what  we  shall  have  to  come 
back  to  sooner  or  later,  even  if  we  start  with  causation. 

Kant,  Hume,  Reid,  Stewart,  and  McCosh,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  a  host  of  lesser  lights,  are  all  agreed  that  the 
arguments  of  physico-theology  all  rest  upon  the  princi- 
ple of  causation.  If  the  matter  were  to  be  settled  by 
authority,  that  list  of  names  would  be  enough  to  end 
all  controversy.  But,  since  an  appeal  to  reason  is  rec- 
ognized as  legitimate,  I  cannot  but  believe  that  their 
verdict  will  be  set  aside.  It  is  more  than  a  mere  mat- 
ter of  opinion  as  to  the  classification  of  arguments.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  Kant  held,  that  the  conclu- 
sions of  physico-theology  were  invalid  because  they 
rested  upon  the  causal  argument,  while  that  in  turn 
rested  upon  the  ontological  argument.  If  it  be  true 
that  eutaxiology  is  independent  of  the  causal  argument, 
Kant's  reason  for  condemning  it  will  disappear. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  353 

Thirdly,  it  is  not  asserted  that  the  fundamental  prop- 
osition of  eutaxiology,  if  established,  amounts  to  a 
demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  eutaxio- 
logical  conclusion  is  simply,  that  intelligence  exists  in 
the  universe,  and  that  conclusion  is  to  be  strictly  con- 
strued. The  old  design-advocates  were  far  too  eager 
and  ambitious.  They  thought  to  finish  up  the  business 
at  one  grand  stroke.  They  supposed  they  had  demon- 
strated the  existence  of  God  when  they  had  only  taken 
the  first  step  in  that  demonstration.  They  left  pro- 
digious gaps  in  their  reasoning,  over  which  they  them- 
selves glided  with  such  ease  and  unconsciousness  that 
they  thought  it  unreasonable  if  all  the  world  did  not  do 
the  same.  But  the  day  is  past  when  intelligent  men 
can  expect  to  reach  such  a  tremendous  conclusion  at 
one  jump.  It  is  probably  true  that  a  rigid  demonstra- 
tion of  God's  existence  can  never  be  attained ;  but,  if 
it  is  ever  approximated,  it  must  be  by  taking  one  step 
at  a  time,  instead  of  attempting  to  leap  over  the  whole 
space  at  one  tremendous  effort. 

If  it  be  granted  that  this  problem  must  be  solved 
in  detail  rather  than  in  the  lump,  then  it  is  obvious 
that  the  first  step  towards  its  solution  must  be  in  the 
direction  indicated  by  the  fundamental  proposition  of 
eutaxiology.  The  intelligence  pervading  the  universe 
must  be  the  first  plank  of  that  bridge  by  which  alone 
we  may  ever  hope  to  span  the  mighty  abyss  which  lies 
between  us  and  a  demonstration  that  there  is  a  God. 
Hence,  while  eutaxiology  does  not  assume  that  great 
task  alone,  it  does  aim  to  make  a  direct  contribution  to 
it  so  far  as  it  goes.  And,  aside  from  any  use  or  value 
of  its  conclusion  as  contributing  to  that  proof,  this  con- 
clusion has  great  interest  and  value  in  itself.  Order, 
in  some  aspect,  either  as  an  internal  guiding  principle 


354  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

or  as  an  external  manifestation  of  symmetry  or  beauty, 
is  present  in  every  atom  of  matter,  in  every  nook  and 
cranny  of  creation,  —  as  well  in  the  most  minute  as  in 
the  grandest  phenomena  of  the  universe.  Now,  if  it  be 
true  that  this  order  is  a  mark  of  intelligence,  then  mind 
permeates  matter  through  and  through.  So  it  is  no 
small  or  insignificant  thing  that  eutaxiology  aims  to 
accomplish,  though  it  does  not,  single-handed,  aim  at 
the  stupendous  achievement  which  was  so  lightly  and 
rashly  attempted  by  the  earlier  writers  on  natural  the- 
ology. 

Passing  now  from  what  the  eutaxiologist  does  not 
assert  or  attempt,  what  of  the  truth  of  his  fundamental 
proposition  in  its  naked  and  unperverted  simplicity? 
Is  it  certain  that  order  is  a  mark  of  intelligence  ? 

Unfortunately  we  have  no  absolute  test  of  truth, 
either  in  men  or  in  principles.  In  primitive  times  it 
was  supposed  that  there  might  be  a  demonstration  of 
personal  truthfulness  or  innocence  by  the  wager  of  bat- 
tle, or  the  trial  of  fire  or  water,  or  the  blood  of  a 
victim ;  and  some  modern  metaphysicians  have  con- 
ceived that  certain  arbitrary  tests  might  be  applied  to 
propositions  in  order  to  ascertain  their  validity.  Her- 
bert Spencer,  for  instance,  has  the  test  of  "unthinka- 
bleness."  Certain  propositions  are  mercilessly  slain  out 
of  hand  by  him  because  they  are  "unthinkable."  It 
would  be  extremely  convenient  if  we  had  some  univer- 
sal and  infallible  touchstone  of  truth,  —  convenient  at 
least  for  honest  people.  All  rogues  and  some  philoso- 
phers would  cry,  "  Good  Lord,  deliver  us  !  " 

In  the  absence  of  any  such  single  and  absolute  test, 
all  we  can  do  is  to  turn  a  proposition  from  side  to  side, 
and  inside  out  if  we  can,  —  to  view  it  from  different 
points,  to  observe  its  possible  range  and  applications, 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  355 

and  to  determine  its  logical  classification.  In  respect 
to  the  last  point,  the  proposition  in  question  is,  without 
doubt,  an  induction.  We  are  momently  cod  scions  of 
orderly  results  flowing  from  our  own  intelligence  ;  and 
^ye  have  a  wide  experience  of  similar  results  issuing 
from  the  action  of  other  intelligences.  Hence,  when- 
ever we  meet  with  any  such  results  without  any  previ- 
ous knowledge  of  their  origin,  we  at  once  ascribe  them 
to  the  agency  of  intelligence. 

Suppose  we  find  smooth  stones  or  shells  on  the  beach, 
arranged  at  regular  intervals  in  a  straight  line,  or  in 
three  straight  lines  to  form  a  triangle :  we  should  say 
that  an  intelligent  being  had  done  this.  Would  we 
not,  however,  particularize  instead  of  generalizing, — 
that  is,  would  not  our  conclusion  be,  a  human  being, 
instead  of  some  intelligent  being,  has  done  this  ?  Very 
likely  we  should ;  and  it  is  further  admitted  that  the 
particular  conclusion  —  Man  has  done  this —  is  of  no  use 
in  eutaxiology.  But  the  mind-marks  stamped  upon 
any  geometrical  figure  are  deeper  and  more  ineffaceable 
than  the  merely  human  marks.  If  we  found  such  fig- 
ures in  places  inaccessible  to  men,  we  should  have  no 
doubt  of  intelligence  having  been  concerned  in  their 
production.  If  we  saw  them  upon  the  moon  or  upon 
any  of  the  planets,  we  should  at  once  conclude  that 
they  were  inhabited  by  intelligent  beings.  Our  conclu- 
sion would  not  refer  to  human  agency,  but  simply  to 
intelligence  in  general. 

This  is  a  fair  illustration  of  the  logic  of  eutaxiology. 
We  see  intelligence  producing  orderly  results ;  and  we 
project  the  inference  thence  derived  over  those  cases 
of  orderly  phenomena  of  which  we  do  not  know  the 
cause.  The  logical  method  is  that  of  induction.  The 
relation  of  order  to  intelligence  is  invariable  so  far  as 


356  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

our  observation  has  extended ;  and  we  should  certainly 
have  no  hesitation  in  applying  the  principle  to  cases 
such  as  that  of  symmetrical  forms  upon  other  planets, 
where  we  could  never  verify  the  inference  by  observa- 
tion. The  question  now  arises  whether  it  is  legitimate 
to  apply  it  to  the  order  of  nature.  Here  is  the  vital 
point  in  this  argument. 

Let  us  return  to  the  case  of  shells  or  stones  laid  in 
a  straight  line  upon  the  beach.  If  the  stones  were  of 
nearly  equal  size,  pretty  accurately  adjusted  at  equal 
distances,  and  the  line  approximately  straight,  we  should 
make  the  inference  of  intelligence  confidently.  But 
suppose  these  three  elements  begin  to  vary.  The  sizes 
and  intervals  are  less  exact,  and  the  line  becomes  wavy. 
We  should  begin  to  doubt ;  and  at  some  point  in  this 
series  of  variations,  not  very  far  either  towards  entire 
irregularity,  we  should  conclude  it  was  the  work  of  the 
waves. 

Wave-action  is  an  example  of  the  operation  of  natu- 
ral forces,  and  we  set  it  in  antithesis  to  the  action  of 
an  intelligent  agent.  If  the  line  is  such  that  the  waves 
might  have  made  it,  we  no  longer  think  of  intelligence 
as  being  concerned  in  it.  Is  not  this  fatal  to  eutaxi- 
ology?  Before  we  make  that  inference,  let  us  note 
that  it  was  only  as  the  appearance  of  order  wavered, 
became  faint,  and  finally  disappeared,  that  the  notion 
of  intelligent  agency  receded,  became  doubtful,  and 
finally  vanished.  It  was  because  we  lost  sight  of  order 
that  we  lost  sight  of  intelligence,  not  because  natural 
forces  came  into  view.  Still,  it  is  a  suspicious  circum- 
stance, that,  as  the  appearance  of  order  recedes,  and  as 
the  notion  of  intelligent  agency  goes  glimmering  at  the 
same  time,  the  mind  falls  back  upon  the  action  of  some 
natural  force  as  the  inevitable  alternative.     If  it  was 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  357 

not  some  intelligent  being  that  did  this,  it  was  some 
natural  force  that  did  it.  That  is  our  conclusion :  and 
we  rest  in  such  a  conclusion  with  a  degree  of  content- 
ment which  bodes  no  good  to  the  higher  .conclusions 
which  must  be  sought  out  in  order  to  verify  the  eutaxio- 
logical  inference. 

Is  it,  however,  a  sufficient  philosophy  of  nature  to 
rest  the  inquiry  when  we  have  resolved  any  given  phe- 
nomenon into  an  effect  of  intelligence  or  an  effect  of 
some  natural  force?  Sufficient  undoubtedly  for  the 
child  or  the  savage  or  the  rustic ;  but  does  it  satisfy  a 
trained  mind  ?  Is  it  not  at  least  conceivable,  "  thinka- 
ble "  as  Herbert  Spencer  might  say,  that  some  intelli- 
gence lies  back  of  natural  forces?  Else  why  should 
they  produce  orderly  results  ?  They  do  produce  such 
results  without  any  doubt.  And  it  may  be  a  mistake, 
a  relic  possibly  of  some  superstition  or  prejudice,  to  set 
the  order  of  nature  in  anthithesis  to  intellectual  order. 

Let  us  look  into  this  very  case  of  the  action  of  the 
waves.  It  was  because  we  lost  sight  of  order  that  the 
notion  of  intelligence  vanished.  If  we  can  bring  order 
again  into  view,  will  the  notion  of  intelligence  also  re- 
appear, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  natural  forces  are 
the  immediate  agents  by  which  that  order  is  produced  ? 
The  waves  pile  up  sands,  pebbles,  bowlders,  driftwood, 
kelp,  — whatever  comes  to  hand,  —  in  heaps  of  irregular 
outline  and  extremely  heterogeneous  composition.  The 
thought  of  any  sort  of  order  in  such  action  would 
never  occur  to  a  child  or  a  rustic.  But  ask  the  geolo- 
gist whether  there  is  any  law  of  wave-action,  and  he 
will  point  out  to  you  that  there  is  an  assortment  of  the 
materials  carried  by  the  water.  To  him  the  beach  is 
not  a  jumbled  mass  of  detritus  heaped  up  pell-mell  on 
the  shore :  it  is  a  stratified  deposit.     Not  only  is  there 


358  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

a  definite  order  observed  in  the  superficial  distribution 
of  the  materials,  the  coarser  parts  being  thrown  well 
up  on  the  shore,  the  particles  becoming  finer  as  you 
proceed  towards  the  line  of  low  water,  and  still  finer 
out  under  the  sea ;  but  there  is  also  a  definite  order 
among  the  elements  of  each  thin  lamina  in  the  finer 
portions  of  the  formation. 

Take  up  a  piece  of  an  ancient  off-shore  deposit  which 
in  the  course  of  long  ages  has  hardened  into  stone. 
Each  surface  of  fracture  is  covered  with  shining  plates 
of  mica,  which  are  absent,  or  at  least  less  abundant,  be- 
tween the  lines  of  sedimentation.  Each  swell  of  the 
tide  brings  its  burden  of  detritus.  The  rounded  and 
angular  particles  settle  at  once,  and  form  the  body  of 
one  lamina ;  but  the  mica  scales,  and  any  other  light  and 
flaky  matters,  settle  last  of  all,  lie  flat  upon  the  body  of 
the  lamina  already  formed,  and  mark  the  line  of  weak- 
ness and  fracture  between  that  and  the  next  lamina. 

Thus  we  begin  to  see  that  wave-action  is  orderly ;  but 
do  we  see  that  it  is  in  any  sense  intelligent?  Certainly 
not.  No  one  would  assert  that  the  action  itself  was  in- 
telligent ;  but  that  is  not  the  question  at  issue.  It 
might  be  that  some  intelligent  agency  was  concerned 
in  determining  the  orderly  character  of  wave-action, 
though  no  one  would  think  of  placing  that  intelli- 
gence in  the  waves  themselves.  In  order  to  determine 
whether  there  is  any  reasonable  ground  for  inferring 
that  intelligence  is  in  any  way  concerned  in  their  ac- 
tion, let  us  pursue  the  investigation  of  natural  laws  a 
little  farther.  We  have  reached  one  law  of  wave- 
action  of  considerable  interest  to  the  geologist ;  namely, 
that  there  is  an  assortment  of  the  materials  deposited 
by  water.  But  this  law  is  by  no  means  an  ultimate 
fact.      The   assortment    depends   partly  upon    specific 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  359 

gravity,  and  that  depends  upon  chemical  composition. 
It  depends  also  in  part  upon  the  form  rather  than  the 
weight  of  the  particles,  and  this  form  depends  upon 
the  laws  of  crystallization.  So  that  this  simple  fact  of 
assortment  by  wave-action  brings  to  view  a  long  series 
of  orderly  processes,  the  omission  of  any  one  of  which 
would  vitiate  or  defeat  the  result. 

The  orderly  distribution  of  materials  is,  however, 
but  a  single  phase  of  the  order  which  the  mind  is  able 
to  discover  in  wave-action.  That  one  phase  does  by  it- 
self indeed  take  hold  of  the  deepest  and  most  intricate 
harmonies  of  nature.  The  facts  of  crystallization  and 
chemical  composition  are  full  enough  of  suggestiveness. 
But,  while  the  mind  is  thus  borne  inwards  to  the  min- 
ute manifestations  of  order  in  matter,  there  is  another 
phase  of  wave-action  which  bears  us  outward  to  the 
contemplation  of  harmony  upon  a  broader  scale.  The 
tides  are  lunar  and  solar  pulses,  which  link  the  earth  to 
the  rest  of  the  cosmos,  and  compel  us  to  extend  our 
view  of  the  orderly  elements  involved  in  the  beating 
of  the  waves  upon  the  lonely  shore.  As  we  listen  to 
their  low  monotone,  if  we  could  comprehend  all  that 
it  signifies,  it  would  grow  deeper,  fuller,  richer  in 
meaning,  till  it  rose  to  a  full  chorus  of  celestial  har- 
mony. 

Every  example  of  the  orderly  action  of  natural  forces 
should  be  viewed  in  connection  with  the  whole  system 
of  nature.  The  eutaxiologist  does  not  rest  his  case 
upon  any  single  manifestation  of  order,  nor  even  upon 
any  group  or  series  of  such  manifestations.  He  de- 
mands that  we  shall  take  as  broad  a  view  of  the  cos- 
mos as  the  human  mind  is  competent  to,  and  then 
inquire  whether  there  is  any  intelligent  meaning  in  it 
as  a  whole.     This  demand  is  not  unreasonable ;  but,  if 


860  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

we  comply  with  it,  we  shall  feel  the  force  of  his  asser- 
tion that  the  order  of  nature  implies  intelligence. 

This  concrete  proposition — "The  order  of  nature 
implies  intelligence "  —  is  in  fact  stronger  than  the 
abstract  proposition,  "Order  implies  intelligence;"  and 
this  illustrates  the  weakness  of  the  syllogism.  It  is 
really  easier  to  defend  the  conclusion  than  the  major 
premise.  When  we  say  that  order  is  a  mark  of  intelli- 
gence, we  seem  to  assert  that  each  solitary  instance  of 
order  is  conclusive.  Now,  there  are  many  examples 
of  order  which  are  very  striking,  —  far  more  suggestive 
of  intelligence  than  the  assortment  of  detritus  by  the 
waves.  That  is  one  of  the  weakest  examples  which 
could  be  chosen.  The  facts  of  morphology,  or  the  doc- 
trine of  typical  forms,  are  perhaps  the  strongest.  But 
no  single  class  of  orderly  phenomena  is  so  strong  and 
full  of  matter  for  eutaxiology  as  the  connected  view 
of  the  whole  series  of  orderly  phenomena  in  space  and 
time,  so  far  as  the  mind  is  able  to  grasp  it. 

This  brings  to  view  a  singular  fact  in  the  comparison 
of  eutaxiology  and  teleology.  The  popular  strength  of 
the  latter  argument  is  largely  a  delusion,  because  it  is 
based  upon  misconceptions.  But  eutaxiology  is  so  far 
from  being  strongest  with  the  masses,  that  its  best  points 
can  only  be  apprehended  by  minds  trained  and  habit- 
uated to  broad  and  profound  views  of  nature.  Thus 
the  doctrine  of  an  archetypal  skeleton  is  a  highly  re- 
fined and  metaphysical  conception ;  but  even  that  is 
less  difficult  than  those  comprehensive  views  of  the 
plan  of  creation  which  may  be  obtained  by  taking  the 
whole  connected  series  of  cosmical  phenomena.  Eu- 
taxiology properly  belongs  to  a  period  in  which  the  sci- 
ences of  matter  have  been  largely  developed  ;  because  it 
is  by  means  of  them  alone  that  we  are  able  to  connect 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  361 

any  concrete  example  of  order  with  its  related  phenom- 
ena, and  to  form  an  adequate  picture  of  the  whole.  In 
his  "  Order  of  Nature,"  Professor  Baden  Powell  has 
given  a  very  interesting  account  of  the  progressive  en- 
largement of  the  philosophy  of  matter,  and  of  the 
truer  views  and  more  profound  comprehension  of  the 
principle  of  order  resulting  from  the  advance  of  physi- 
cal science.  While  it  is  true,  as  stated  by  Dr.  McCosh, 
that  the  ancients  attended  to  the  principles  of  order  as- 
well  as  to  the  facts  of  adaptation,  no  science  of  eutaxi- 
ology  was  possible  to  them  in  any  such  sense  as  it  is 
possible  now  that  more  exact  principles  and  wider  gen- 
eralizations have  been  reached  in  the  interpretation  of 
nature.  The  scientific  spirit  which  delights  to  trace  all 
phenomena  to  some  principle  of  order  which  may  be 
formulated  as  the  law  of  such  phenomena,  is  the  best 
soil  for  eutaxiology. 

Is  there  any  spirit  of  opposition  to  this  scientific 
spirit?  any  repugnance  to  the  reduction  of  particular 
classes  of  phenomena,  or  of  phenomena  in  general, 
under  the  reign  of  law  ?  Unquestionably  there  is ;  and 
this  has  been  so  often  manifested  in  one  quarter,  that  it 
is  not  unjust  to  call  it  the  theological  spirit.  So  far  as 
there  is  any  antagonism  between  eutaxiology  and  tele- 
ology, the  former  is  the  scientific  and  the  latter  the 
theological  argument.  And  there  is  a  real  antagonism 
between  eutaxiology  and  the  old  teleology,  because  this 
was  based  upon  the  notion  of  arbitrary  interferences. 
But  as  there  is  no  antagonism  between  a  true  and  sober 
scientific  spirit  and  a  broad  and  an  enlightened  theolog- 
ical spirit,  so  there  is  none  between  eutaxiology  and 
that  modified  teleology  which  is  not  set  in  contrast 
with  natural  law. 

We  noted  it  as  a  suspicious  circumstance,  that  the 


862  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

action  of  natural  forces  is  the  alternative  to  which  the 
mind  resorts  in  contrast  to  the  action  of  intelligence. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  antithesis  is  between  human 
agency  and  physical  force ;  but  there  is  an  underlying 
tendency  to  carry  it  out  to  the  extent  of  contrasting 
physical  force  with  any  sort  of  intelligence,  and  calling 
it  "  blind  "  or  "  brute  "  force.  The  old  teleology  was 
decidedly  of  this  character.  The  conception  of  creation 
by  law,  or  divine  energy  operating  in  an  orderly  manner 
through  and  by  means  of  natural  forces,  was  persistently 
shut  out.  "  Blind  "  force  was  set  over  against  imme- 
diate divine  agency,  as  if  there  were  no  common  ground 
between  them.  This  repugnance  to  natural  law  is  as 
unscriptural  as  it  is  unscientific.  But  it  has  taken  deep 
root,  and  is  the  source  of  the  tendency  to  contrast  the 
orderly  effects  of  physical  force  with  those  of  intelli- 
gence, and  to  rest  in  the  shallow  philosophy  of  account- 
ing for  any  orderly  phenomenon  by  referring  it  to  some 
natural  process,  as  if  that  were  the  end  of  it. 

Bat  the  order  of  nature  cannot  be  so  easily  disposed 
of.  When  we  refer  it  to  natural  laws,  we  give  no  ex- 
planation or  philosophy  of  it  whatever,  but  merely  re- 
state the  problem.  These  laws  are  themselves  mere 
formulas  of  order ;  and,  so  far  from  explaining  any  thing, 
the}^  need  explanation  as  much  as  any  other  form  of 
order ;  and  the  most  reasonable  explanation  of  them  is 
that  they  were  so  settled  and  ordained  by  mind.  Hence 
it  appears,  that  the  suspicious  tendency  to  contrast  the 
order  of  nature  with  intellectual  order  is  no  real  ground 
of  objection  to  eutaxiology,  because  that  tendency  is  a 
relic  of  ancient  prejudice.  It  requires  mental  keenness 
and  mental  breadth,  both  combined,  to  enter  fully  into 
the  spirit  of  eutaxiolog}r.  The  penetrating  insight  is 
requisite  to  catch  the  finer  notes   of  harmony  in  the 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  363 

midst  of  apparent  fortuities.  Largeness  of  spirit  is 
requisite  to  escape  entanglement  in  complex  and  multi- 
farious results,  to  rise  to  the  contemplation  of  general 
laws,  and  to  overcome  all  narrow,  antiquated  prejudices. 

The  order  of  nature  implies  intelligence,  no  matter 
whether  it  be  regarded  as  flowing  necessarily  from  the 
properties  of  matter,  or  arbitrarily  from  the  collocations 
of  matter.  Chalmers  introduced  the  doctrine  of  arbi- 
trary collocations  as  contrasted  with  natural  laws.  As 
an  example  of  what  he  meant  by  collocations,  take  the 
case  of  the  compensation  of  irregularities  in  the  solar 
system.  This  is  effected  by  the  force  of  gravitation  in 
conjunction  with  certain  conditions  of  planetary  move- 
ment; namely,  the  smallness  of  the  inclinations  and 
eccentricities  of  the  orbits,  the  motions  all  in  the  same 
direction,  the  comparatively  vast  mass  of  the  sun,  and 
the  fact  that  the  periods  of  revolution  are  incommen- 
surable. Gravitation  is  regarded  as  flowing  necessarily 
from  the  properties  of  matter ;  but  these  five  conditions 
are  apparently  arbitrary, — that  is,  they  might  any  of 
them  have  been  different  so  far  as  any  natural  law  or 
property  of  matter  with  which  we  are  acquainted  is 
concerned.  Without  these  arbitrary  conditions  gravi- 
tation would  destroy,  instead  of  preserving  the  solar 
system.  Hence,  argues  Chalmers,  the  evidence  of  intel- 
ligence lies  in  the  arbitrary  collocations. 

But  Professor  Powell  very  pertinently  inquires  wheth- 
er the  established  order  of  the  solar  system  would  be 
any  less  a  mark  of  intelligence  if  these  collocations 
should  be  explained  by  some  natural  law  at  present 
unknown;  and  another  query  would  be,  whether  all 
results  flowing  from  the  law  of  gravitation  directly  are 
to  be  rejected  from  the  list  of  marks  of  intelligence. 

Chalmers  brought  in  his  doctrine  for  the  purpose  of 


3G4  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

avoiding  the  interminable  wrangle  about  the  eternity  of 
matter.  I  am  entirely  in  sympathy  with  him  upon  that 
point ;  and  I  have  already  expressed  the  opinion,  that 
there  is  something  in  these  collocations,  provided 
that  the  doctrine  concerning  them  is  rescued  from  that 
attitude  of  hostility  to  natural  law  in  which  its  author 
left  it.  If  there  are  dispositions  of  matter  essential 
to  the  orderly  sequences  which  we  behold,  and  which 
cannot  be  resolved  into  any  law,  but  must  stand  as 
ultimate  facts  or  as  arbitrary  adjustments,  the  inference 
of  intelligent  agency  in  such  adjustments  is  inevitable. 
But  it  is  not  any  more  certain  because  such  adjustments 
have  not  yet  been  explained.  If  they  were  resolved 
into  the  action  of  natural  forces,  the  determinate  direc- 
tion of  those  forces  so  combined  with  gravitation  as  to 
insure  stability  in  the  heavens  would  be  as  conclusive 
of  intelligence  as  the  arbitrary  adjustments. 

Even  if  we  grant  that  the  whole  orderly  and  beautiful 
cosmos  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  properties  of  matter 
without  any  arbitrary  adjustments  or  collocations,  the 
conjunction  of  intelligence  with  that  order  is  none  the 
less  certain.  It  may  appear  fatal  to  eutaxiology  to 
admit  that  order  flows  necessarily  from  the  properties 
of  matter,  unless  we  have  proved  that  matter  is  not 
eternal, — the  very  point  which  Chalmers  wanted  to 
dodge.  But  the  turn  which  Kant  gives  to  the  argu- 
ment at  this  point  is  of  especial  interest.  He  does  not 
shrink  at  all  from  the  admission  of  necessity.  On  the 
contrary,  he  says,  that,  if  matter  is  so  constituted  that  it 
must  produce  an  orderly  and  beautiful  world,  then  an 
intelligent  being  must  have  created  matter,  and  endowed 
it  with  such  properties.  The  point  is  well  taken  :  eu- 
taxiology thus  raises  a  strong  presumption  at  least 
against   the   eternity  of   matter,  and   lends  a  hand  to 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  365 

assist  in  the  task  usually  assigned  to  the  causal  argu- 
ment. It  is,  however,  still  distinct  from  that  argument ; 
because  it  accounts  for  the  origin  of  the  cosmos,  not 
simply  as  a  something  which  exists  and  must  therefore 
have  a  cause,  but  as  an  orderly  system  which  implies 
an  intelligent  author  of  its  order,  and  thence  of  its 
matter,  provided  that  its  order  is  a  necessary  result  of 
the  existence  and  properties  of  its  matter. 

If  it  can  be  demonstrated  that  matter  is  eternal,  then 
the  only  proof  we  can  have  of  a  Supreme  Intelligence 
must  be  from  the  dispositions  of  matter.  The  same  is 
true  if  we  dodge  the  issue  of  the  eternity  or  non-eternity 
of  matter  as  Chalmers  did.  In  that  case  his  arbitrary 
collocations  are  our  only  resource ;  and,  as  fast  as  they 
are  resolved  under  laws  in  consequence  of  new  discov- 
eries, our  argument  crumbles  away.  A  host  of  what  he 
thought  were  good  collocations  have  been  resolved  by 
the  theory  of  natural  selection.  Some  are  still  left,  and 
may  never  be  touched :  still,  one  feels  insecure  upon 
the  ground  of  arbitrary  collocations  which  may  turn 
out  not  to  be  arbitrary  after  all. 

But  the  eternity  of  matter  is  not  demonstrated,  and 
we  are  not  shut  up  to  arbitrary  collocations  as  the  only 
source  of  evidence.  Let  the  atheist  maintain  if  he  will, 
that  the  order  of  nature  flows  necessarily  from  inherent 
properties  of  matter.  The  logical  outcome  of  such  a 
claim  is  the  intelligent  authorship  of  the  matter  itself, 
with  its  properties  and  orderly  sequences. 

The  notion  of  necessity  may  be  extended  still  more 
without  disturbing  the  eutaxiological  inference.  Sup- 
pose it  be  affirmed,  as  was  actually  done  by  Spinoza, 
that  divine  action  itself  is  necessary  instead  of  volun- 
tary:  it  must  still  be  intelligent.  Bishop  Butler  has 
shown,  in  his  "Analogy,"  that/a^e  is,  like  chance,  mean- 


366  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ingless  and  impotent  in  itself.  Admitting  the  utmost 
claim  that  can  be  made  for  necessity,  it  cannot  account 
for  any  positive  result,  but  only  amounts  to  a  condition 
affecting  the  action  of  real  agents.  As  a  condition  it 
may  be  conceived  as  applying  to  human  or  divine  ac- 
tion ;  but  such  action  would  still  be  intelligent,  though 
not  free.  Granting  the  position  of  Spinoza,  Spencer, 
and  other  fatalists,  the  necessity  I  am  under  to  do  this 
or  that  is  simply  a  condition,  —  simply  that  I  must  do 
thus,  and  not  otherwise ;  but  it  by  no  means  dispenses 
with  my  intelligence  in  dispensing  with  my  freedom. 
It  is  conceivable  that  I  must  compose  and  write  this 
page,  but  that  does  not  enable  me  to  do  it  without  the 
exercise  of  intelligence. 

In  like  manner,  if  we  conceive  that  necessity  attaches 
to  divine  action,  such  action  must  still  be  intelligent. 
Fate  is  as  much  a  bugbear  as  chance.  Neither  can  in 
itself  account  for  any  thing.  If  it  be  true,  that  a  fata 
necessity  rules  both  us  and  God,  that  simply  means 
that  our  and  his  intelligent  actions  cannot  be  other  than 
they  are ;  if  chance  rules,  that  simply  means  that  some 
real  agent  acts  fortuitously.  The  fortuitous  action  of 
real  agents  is  conceivable ;  though  chance  is  not  a  real 
agent,  but  a  mere  name  for  such  action.  In  like  man- 
ner, it  is  conceivable  that  certain  real  agents  must  act 
thus,  and  not  otherwise ;  though  fate  is  no  more  a  real 
agent  than  chance,  but  is  simply  a  name  for  the  neces- 
sary action  of  real  agents.  Eutaxiology  has  nothing  to 
fear  either  from  fate  or  chance.  So  far  as  the  latter  is 
concerned,  the  order  of  nature  gives  it  a  most  emphatic 
denial.  Eutaxiology  is  the  very  weapon  to  slay  chance. 
Necessity  is  equally  harmless  to  this  argument ;  because 
it  may  be  admitted  that  order  is  a  necessary  result  of 
the  properties  of  matter,  and  even  that   the    creation 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  EUTAXIOLOGY.  367 

of  matter  was  a  necessary  divine  action,  without  in  the 
least  disparaging  the  inference  that  order  implies  in- 
telligence. 

An  argument  which  is  so  indifferent  to  the  funda- 
mental  doctrines  of  the  fatalists  is  likely  to  be  suspected 
of  favoring  fatalism,  and  there  would  be  some  degree  of 
plausibility  in  such  a  charge.  If  order  were  the  only 
phenomenon  in  nature,  the  universal,  eternal,  unbend- 
ing rule  of  law  would  strongly  suggest  the  notion  of 
fatality.  But  there  are  other  phenomena  in  nature, 
and  these  furnish  better  ground  upon  which  to  contend 
with  the  fatalists.  Eutaxiology  is  not  the  argument  to 
use  against  them ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  it  should 
be  given  over  bodily  into  their  hands  because  it  cannot 
be  used  to  decapitate  them. 

Under  the  admission  of  necessity  as  affecting  divine 
action,  the  eutaxiological  inference  would  of  course  be 
limited  strictly  to  intelligence  without  volition.  It  is 
quite  unnecessary  to  make  that  admission.  I  have 
referred  to  it  simply  to  show  that  the  most  extreme 
fatalism  does  not  destroy  this  argument,  provided  that 
its  conclusion  be  limited  strictly  to  intelligence.  It  is 
no  doubt  wiser  in  any  case,  whether  necessity  be  admit- 
ted or  denied,  to  keep  this  argument  within  that  limit ; 
that  is,  to  use  it  only  to  prove  intelligence.  Any  other 
of  the  divine  attributes  may  be  better  established  by 
some  other  line  of  reasoning.  The  admission  of  neces- 
sity, either  as  regards  the  actual  order  of  the  cosmos  or 
the  original  creation  of  matter,  is  by  no  means  essential 
to  this  argument;  neither  is  the  denial  of  necessity 
essential  to  it.  Hence,  if  volition  or  intention  in  nature 
can  be  shown  upon  other  grounds,  eutaxiology  is  not 
disparaged  thereby,  since  it  is  indifferent  either  to  the 
affirmation  or  denial  of  necessity. 


368  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

The  critique  of  eutaxiology  shows  that  it  is  a  legiti- 
mate line  of  argument.  The  logic  is  sound :  granting 
the  truth  of  the  premises,  the  conclusion  necessarily 
follows.  The  degree  of  probability  that  its  conclusion 
is  true,  is  as  high  as  can  be  expected  in  a  field  where 
rigid  demonstration  is  impossible.  But  that  conclusion 
falls  far  short  of  a  proof  of  God's  existence.  The  ut- 
most that  can  be  claimed  from  this  argument  alone  is, 
that  intelligence  exists  in  the  universe.  A  personal 
Supreme  Being  is  not  proved ;  volition  is  not  proved ; 
benevolence  is  not  proved ;  even  intelligence  is  not 
proved  to  be  infinite.  But  the  proof  of  intelligence 
pervading  all  nature  is  no  mean  result  in  itself,  and 
may  pave  the  way  to  further  results  in  the  direction  of 
a  reasonable  proof  that  there  is  a  God. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  369 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THE   CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY. 

Fitness  in  the  means  used  to  accomplish  an  end 
implies  intelligence.  This  may  be  regarded  as  the 
major  premise  of  the  syllogism  in  the  old  teleology. 
Any  common  example  of  an  end  accomplished  by  suita- 
ble means,  as  vision  by  means  of  the  eye,  would  form 
the  minor  premise  ;  and  the  conclusion  would  be,  that 
this  example  implies  intelligence.  In  this  form  there 
is  as  gross  and  patent  a  petitio  principii  as  in  the  propo- 
sition, "Design  implies  a  designer."  The  selection  of 
an  end,  the  choice  of  means,  and  the  use  or  application 
of  them  to  attain  the  end  in  view,  are  all  highly  intelli- 
gent actions.  We  necessarily  assume  intelligence  the 
moment  we  speak  of  means  and  ends.  We  cannot  give 
utterance  to  the  thought  contained  in  the  subject  of 
our  major  premise  without  assuming  the  existence  of 
that  very  attribute  whose  existence  we  wish  to  prove. 
Hence,  as  in  the  fomer  case,  this  major  premise  is  an 
identical  proposition.  It  amounts  to  saying  that  intel- 
ligent actions  imply  intelligence,  or  that  intelligence  is 
intelligent. 

Let  us,  then,  avoid  this  begging  of  the  question,  by 
framing  our  major  premise  somehow  like  this:  Complex 
structures,  well  fitted  in  every  part  to  produce  a  definite 
result,  are  the  work  of  intelligence ;  or,  The  convergence 
of  many  agencies  or  forces  to  produce  a  definite  result 


370  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

implies  intelligence.  Here  we  avoid  the  words  end  and 
means,  and  all  expressions  which  tend  to  make  the  prop- 
osition identical  in  its  subject  and  predicate.  But  it  is 
questionable  whether  the  proposition  in  this  form  is  true. 
A  cancer  is  a  complex  structure  well  fitted  in  every 
part  to  produce  the  definite  result  of  pain  and  death, 
and  in  it  many  forces  converge  to  this  definite  result : 
must  we,  then,  conclude  that  this  exact  result  was  in- 
tended? The  same  might  be  said  of  a  swamp  breeding 
malaria :  it  is  perfectly  fitted  for  this  work.  And  a 
thousand  injurious  things  might  be  mentioned,  each 
perfectly  adapted  to  its  deadly  work :  were  they  each 
and  all  intended  to  do  this  work? 

More  than  a  century  ago  Maupertuis  claimed  that 
fitness  of  adaptation  was  not  sufficient :  the  result  must 
be  a  rational  one,  in  order  to  induce  the  belief  that  it 
was  selected  as  an  end  by  a  reasonable  being.  He 
framed  this  criticism  with  a  view  to  the  condemnation 
of  those  who  had  brought  forward  trivial  examples,  such 
as  the  folds  in  the  hide  of  the  rhinoceros.  But  his 
criticism  had  a  deeper  meaning  than  he  perceived.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  end  must  be  a  rational  one. 
Teleologists  have  generally  applied  the  test  of  utility. 
It  was  implied  in  their  reasonings,  that  their  inference 
rested  upon  the  adaptation  of  suitable  means  to  accom- 
plish a  useful  end.  This  would  of  course  exclude  any 
of  the  examples  of  injurious  structures  from  the  list  of 
acceptable  design-illustrations.  But  reasonableness  in 
the  end  is  a  higher  test  than  utility.  It  includes  utility, 
and  goes  beyond  it.  Some  higher  motive  than  utility 
might  influence  a  rational  being  in  the  choice  of  an  end, 
but  no  intelligent  being  would  seek  the  accomplishment 
of  an  irrational  purpose.  Either  the  test  of  utility  or 
that  of  reasonableness  is,  however,  sufficient  to  show 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  371 

that  fitness  in  the  adaptation  is  not  alone  conclusive  of 
intention.  Many  fortuitous  assemblages  of  matter  have 
all  the  fitness  of  adaptation  which  could  be  desired; 
but  the  resulting  function  not  being  a  rational  one,  — 
that  is,  not  such  a  result  as  we  can  conceive  that  an 
intelligent  being  would  set  before  himself  as  an  end  to 
be  attained,  —  we  very  properly  decline  to  draw  the 
inference  that  this  result  was  intentional. 

But,  if  the  end  must  be  a  rational  one,  we  cannot  help 
begging  the  question.  The  major  premise  must  be  so 
framed  that  its  subject  designates,  not  merely  a  definite 
result,  but  a  rational  result,  or  else  it  is  not  true  that 
the  adaptation  is  intentional.  We  must  not  say,  Com- 
plex structures  well  fitted  to  produce  a  definite  result 
imply  intelligence,  but,  Complex  structures  well  fitted 
to  produce  a  definite  rational  result  imply  intelligence, 
which  is  a  bald  truism.  What  is  the  trouble  ?  Why  is 
it  that  teleology  cannot  be  freed  from  a  fallacy  in  the 
statement  of  it  ?  It  is  simply  because  teleologists  have 
mistaken  the  true  use  and  scope  of  this  argument.  They 
have  employed  it  to  prove  the  existence  of  God ;  and 
they  have  assumed  —  correctly,  too,  so  far  as  this  single 
point  is  concerned  —  that  this  proof  must  begin  with  a 
demonstration  of  intelligence  in  the  universe.  But  the 
mere  existence  of  intelligence  cannot  be  proved  by  means  of 
teleology.  It  cannot  even  be  attempted  without  begging 
the  question :  the  very  first  step  is  inevitably  a  fallacy. 

This  is  obvious  enough  the  moment  we  reflect  upon 
the  nature  of  the  thing  attempted.  Teleology  always 
has  reference  to  an  end  selected  and  accomplished  by 
suitable  means.  The  essence  of  the  attempt  is  therefore 
to  prove  the  existence  of  intelligence  by  means  of  the 
definite  direction  given  to  intelligence.  But  its  existence 
must  be  assumed  in  order  to  ascertain  its  direction. 


372  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Let  us  apply  these  statements  to  the  classical  watch- 
illustration.  We  are  to  prove  an  intelligent  watch- 
maker from  the  fitness  of  the  watch  to  mark  the  hours. 
The  primary  inference  is  simply  intelligence.  Other 
attributes  of  the  watchmaker  may  be  made  out  subse- 
quently, but  intelligence  is  the  first  conclusion  aimed 
at.  We  first  fix  our  attention  upon  the  end  contem- 
plated, the  marking-off  of  duration  into  definite  and 
equal  portions.  That,  in  its  very  conception,  not  only 
implies  intelligence,  but  the  power  of  abstraction  in  a 
high  degree.  Any  being  who  could  contemplate  such 
an  end  as  that  must  be  intelligent,  no  matter  whether 
the  means  he  employs  are  suitable  or  not.  Regarding 
the  means  actually  employed,  we  may  observe  that 
they  are  as  suitable  as  the  end  is  rational.  But  is 
that  the  real  ground  of  the  conclusion  that  an  intelligent 
being  made  the  watch  ?  B}^  no  means.  The  marks  of 
mind  are  inscribed  on  every  wheel  and  pin  and  lever, 
without  any  regard  to  what  they  are  good  for  as  parts 
of  the  watch,  and  without  any  regard  to  what  the  watch 
is  good  for  as  a  whole.  Intelligence  bathes  and  perme- 
ates the  whole  structure  like  a  subtile  atmosphere.  It 
is  obvious  from  the  very  start ;  and  to  be  obliged  to  go 
through  the  long  and  circuitous  process  of  scrutinizing 
the  end  to  see  whether  it  is  a  rational  one,  determining 
the  fitness  of  the  means  employed,  and  thence  inferring 
intelligence,  —  going  over  a  long  and  intricate  road  to 
reach  at  the  end  the  very  thing  you  started  with,  —  that 
is  a  "  most  lame  and  impotent  conclusion."  Not  only 
does  it  seem  an  utter  waste  of  strength,  but  it  is  neces- 
sarily illogical.  The  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of 
mind  teleogically  involves  a  fallacy  which  can  no  more 
be  escaped  than  the  law  of  gravitation. 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  most  radical  vice  of  the  old 


THE   CRITIQUE   OF  TELEOLOGY.  373 

teleology  lies  in  the  argument  itself,  and  not  in  the  word 
"design."  I  have  spoken  of  the  abuse  of  that  word  in 
one  sense ;  that  is,  the  loose  and  ambiguous  use  of  it. 
We  may  now  see  that  it  has  been  abused  in  another 
sense.  It  has  been  held  responsible  for  fallacies  which 
are  inherent  in  teleology  whenever  that  argument  is 
employed  as  a  primary  proof  of  the  existence  of  God. 
The  application  of  it  in  nature  yields  similar  results  to 
those  which  are  shown  in  the  illustration  of  the  watch. 
Suppose  we  are  to  prove  an  intelligent  author  of  nature 
from  the  fitness  of  the  eye  for  vision.  The  result  is 
rational,  the  means  suitable :  therefore  the  result  was 
intentional,  and  hence  the  eye  was  formed  by  an  intelli- 
gent being.  Such  is  the  circuitous  road  we  must  travel 
in  order  to  prove  ideologically  that  the  eye  was  formed 
by  an  intelligent  being.  We  must  first  infer  intention, 
and  thence  infer  intelligence  ;  but  the  latter  is  more  ob- 
vious than  the  former.  As  every  wheel,  pin,  and  lever 
in  the  watch  bears  the  marks  of  mind,  so  every  rod, 
cone,  and  humor  of  the  eye  is  written  all  over  with  the 
same  marks.  But  the  queer  thing  about  it  is,  that  the 
very  copiousness  of  the  tokens  of  intelligence  prevents 
us  from  a  logical  inference  of  intelligence.  It  constantly 
results  in  reducing  our  syllogism  to  the  form  A  is  A, 
B  is  A  :  therefore  B  is  A.  The  eye,  as  well  as  the  watch, 
is  brimful  of  the  marks  of  mind ;  and  yet  teleology  is 
incompetent  to  infer  intelligence  from  either  without 
a  fallacy. 

This  paradox  is  not  merely  a  curious  one.  It  is  more 
instructive  than  curious  if  carefully  studied:  it  shows 
plainly  that  teleology  has  been  turned  wrong  end  fore- 
most. Its  true  use  is  not  to  prove  the  existence  of  mind 
from  its  direction,  but,  vice  versa,  to  prove  the  intentional 
exercise  of  an  intelligence  whose  existence  has  been  pre- 


374  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

viously  established.  Eutaxiology  is  the  proper  argument 
to  employ  for  proving  the  existence  of  mind  ;  and,  from 
that  as  a  starting-point  for  teleology,  it  may  be  possible 
to  prove  something  higher  and  farther  on  towards  a 
demonstration  of  God's  existence.  The  radical  vice  in 
the  treatment  of  teleology  hitherto  has  been  to  use  it 
as  a  primary  and  independent  argument.  It  can  never 
take  the  first  step  towards  a  demonstration  of  God's  ex- 
istence without  a  fallacy.  The  end  cannot  be  ascer- 
tained without  assuming  intelligence  :  hence  we  can 
never  logically  infer  mere  intelligence  from  the  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  an  end. 

Before  passing  to  consider  the  true  use  of  teleology, 
let  us  note  that  our  examination  -has  already  disclosed 
the  grounds  and  reasons  of  some  curious  facts  brought 
out  by  the  historical  review.  We  found  that  the  old 
teleologists  were  never  disturbed  by  the  discovery  that 
a  wrong  function  had  been  assigned  to  a  particular 
organ.  The  mistaken  adaptation  was  to  them  an  evi- 
dence of  wisdom,  but  the  new  adaptation  was  equally 
an  evidence  of  widsom.  The  reason  of  this  compla- 
cency under  a  change  of  base  was,  that  their  inference 
did  not  really  depend  upon  the  function  at  all,  though 
they  thought  it  did.  An  eye  would  imply  intelligence 
in  its  structure  if  it  had  no  function  whatever. 

A  writer  in  "The  Westminster  Review"  for  July, 
1875,  on  "  Design  in  Nature,"  notes  this  as  one  of  the 
fallacies  of  teleology.  He  cites  the  case  of  the  lungs, 
which  have  been  at  different  periods  supposed  to  per- 
form two  or  three  distinct  offices;  and  under  each 
mistaken  view  of  the  case  the  teleologist  was  ready 
with  his  inference  of  divine  wisdom  from  the  nice 
adaptation  of  the  organ  to  its  supposed  function.  If  a 
given  adaptation  was  an  evidence  of  wisdom,  any  other 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  375 

adaptation  ought  to  be  taken  as  an  evidence  of  folly, 
says  this  reviewer.  It  is  a  poor  rule  that  will  not  work 
both  ways.  But  all  the  erroneous  adaptations,  as  well 
as  the  true  one  of  respiration,  have  been  employed  as 
good  teleological  material. 

There  is  certainly  ground  for  suspecting  a  fallacy  in 
this  facile  inference  of  divine  wisdom  from  every  possible 
turn  things  may  happen  to  take  ;  but  the  fallacy  is 
not  precisely  of  the  nature  claimed  by  this  writer.  It 
consisted  in  a  wrong  method,  rather  than  a  wrong  con- 
clusion. The  inference  of  intelligence  in  each  case  was 
perfectly  sound.  But  the  evidence  of  intelligence  lay 
in  the  orderly  disposition  of  the  tissues,  without  any 
reference  to  the  function  to  be  performed  by  the  organ. 
If  one  should  make  a  journey  to  Mars,  and  find  people 
there  who  made  watches  for  toys,  just  for  the  fun  of 
"seeing  the  hands  go  round,"  he  would  not  give  up  the 
belief  that  intelligence  was  concerned  in  their  manu- 
facture, simply  because  they  were  not  intended  to  serve 
any  useful  purpose.  The  evidence  of  intelligence  does 
not  depend  upon  the  adaptation  to  an  end,  and  remains 
intact  under  a  mistaken  view  of  what  the  end  is,  or 
even  upon  the  supposition  that  no  purpose  at  all  was 
contemplated.  So  that  the  old  teleologists  were  right 
in  their  conclusion.  Their  only  mistake  was  in  placing 
the  inference  upon  false  grounds,  —  making  it  teleologi- 
cal instead  of  eutaxiological. 

Another  remarkable  fact  brought  out  in  the  historical 
review  finds  its  explanation  at  this  point.  We  found 
considerable  differences  both  in  the  theory  and  practice 
of  teleologists  respecting  the  proper  use  of  their  argu- 
ment, and  a  great  deal  of  vacillation  and  vibration  from 
one  view  to  another  in  the  case  of  individual  authors. 
Shall  we  use  teleology  to   prove   God's  existence,  or 


376  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

assume  his  existence  in  order  to  establish  teleology? 
That  has  been  the  standing  problem,  never  yet  fairly 
resolved,  lying  obscurely  in  the  consciousness  of  all 
the  old  teleologists,  and  sometimes  carrying  them  over 
to  one  view,  sometimes  to  the  other.  Cicero  used  tele- 
ology, only  to  prove  that  the  gods  "  care  for  man  in  par- 
ticular," thus  making  it  an  argument  for  a  special  provi- 
dence. Boyle  argued  for  teleology  on  the  assumption 
of  God's  existence,  as  did  Ray  also ;  but  both  these 
writers,  and  more  notably  the  latter,  turn  about  and 
argue  for  the  existence  of  God  from  teleology,  uncon- 
scious of  the  vicious  circle  in  which  they  are  moving. 
Dugald  Stewart  uses  teleology,  not  as  an  argument  at 
all,  but  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  divine  attri- 
butes. He  held  that  the  divine  existence  was  intuitively 
perceived,  and  of  course  it  would  be  folly  to  attempt  to 
prove  an  intuition.  Professor  Cooke  seems  to  have  the 
same  notion  of  the  true  function  of  design-arguments 
as  illustrations  of  the  attributes  of  God,  though  it  does 
not  appear  that  he  had  the  same  ground  for  it.  He 
speaks  of  the  possibility  of  demonstrating  God's  exist- 
ence as  clearly  as  any  of  the  higher  principles  of  science 
can  be  proved,  which  implies  that  he  does  not  agree 
with  Stewart  that  this  fundamental  truth  is  intuitive. 

The  authors  I  have  mentioned  appear  to  have  settled 
opinions  about  the  true  use  of  teleology,  though  they 
are  not  all  consistent  with  themselves  in  the  practical 
treatment  of  their  theme.  Another  class  of  writers  seem 
to  be  in  doubt  which  is  the  correct  view  of  the  case,  and 
consequently  vibrate  from  one  side  to  the  other.  Now 
they  are  arguing  for  the  existence  of  teleolog}^  upon 
grounds  which  involve  the  assumption  that  there  is  a 
God,  and  presently  they  are  demonstrating  God's  exist- 
ence by  means  of  teleology.     I  conceive  that  the  ex- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  377 

planation  of  this  vacillating  course  upon  the  part  of 
individuals,  and  of  the  striking  differences  of  opinion 
entertained  by  different  writers  as  well,  lies  in  the 
peculiar  and  paradoxical  character  of  teleology  as  ex- 
hibited in  this  critique.  It  looks  like  a  very  promising 
line  of  demonstration,  and  yet  it  cannot  be  used  as  a 
primary  and  independent  argument  for  the  existence  of 
God.  Some  suspicion  of  this  difficulty  seems  to  have 
mingled  with  a  consciousness  of  real  strength  and  sound- 
ness of  the  argument  in  the  minds  of  its  advocates,  and 
to  have  produced  these  differences  and  vacillations. 

But  the  third  and  largest  class  of  the  old  teleolo<nsts 
had  no  suspicion  that  any  thing  was  wrong.  They 
plunge  headlong  into  a  teleological  demonstration  of 
God's  existence ;  and,  so  far  from  suspecting  that  they 
are  attempting  the  impossible,  they  think  that  their  task 
is  an  easy  one.  Invariably,  and  without  a  solitary 
exception,  we  find  them  begging  the  question.  Such  a 
long  list  of  fallacious  attempts  seems  to  argue  a  lament- 
able weakness,  at  least,  if  not  a  total  atrophy  of  the 
logical  faculty.  But  its  true  explanation  lies  in  the 
remarkably  deceptive  character  of  teleology.  It  looks 
so  strong  and  easy  to  handle,  while  in  fact  —  regarding 
it,  as  they  did,  as  a  primary  and  direct  proof  of  divine 
intelligence  —  it  is  really  so  weak  and  impossible  to 
manage.  There  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  confusion  of 
function  and  purpose,  which  forms  the  flimsy  basis  of  its 
popular  strength ;  and  then  there  is  the  baffling  para- 
dox, that  in  an  argument  which,  so  to  speak,  floats  in  an 
atmosphere  of  intelligence,  we  cannot  reach  intelligence 
as  a  conclusion  without  a  logical  faux  pas.  The  weak- 
ness exhibited  by  so  many  false  attempts,  extending 
over  so  many  centuries,  is  certainly  remarkable,  but  it 
had  a  remarkable  cause."    The  fault  was,  not  that  tele- 


378  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

ologists  were  guilty  of  a  fallacy  in  the  progress  of  their 
reasoning,  for  that  was  strictly  unavoidable  from  the 
nature  of  the  argument  and  the  use  to  which  it  was 
applied ;  but  the  evidence  of  a  weakness  of  logical 
insight  is,  that  they  suffered  themselves  first  to  be 
entrapped  by  the  delusive  popular  strength  of  tele- 
ology, and  then  to  be  bound  hand  and  foot  in  the  coils 
of  that  remarkable  paradox  mentioned  above. 

Is  there  any  such  thing  as  teleology  ?  and,  if  so,  what 
use  can  be  made  of  it?  According  to  what  has  been 
already  advanced,  it  is  futile  and  fallacious  to  undertake 
to  prove  the  existence  of  mind  from  its  direction  to  a 
certain  end.  That  is  inverting  the  natural  order  of 
things.  We  must  perceive  its  existence  before  we  can 
even  raise  the  question  of  its  direction,  much  more 
before  we  can  determine  that  direction.  But  can  we 
determine  the  latter  in  any  case  ?  If  so,  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  teleology,  and  we  shall  probably  find  some  good 
and  rational  use  for  it  if  it  really  exists.  There  is  no 
doubt  but  that  we  can  often  reach  a  conclusion  which 
is  practically  satisfactory  in  respect  to  the  direction  of 
human  intelligence.  Right  or  wrong,  we  are  constantly 
making  inferences  of  this  kind.  When  we  see  efforts 
intelligently  guided  to  a  rational  issue,  —  to  the  attain- 
ment of  a  definite  object,  —  we  have  no  hesitation  in 
concluding  that  this  object  is  an  end,  and  that  these 
efforts  were  intentionally  guided  to  its  accomplishment. 
We  may  make  wrong  inferences,  for  men's  intentions 
and  motives  are  the  most  hidden  and  recondite  of 
mental  phenomena.  Hence  appears  once  more  the  folly 
of  using  teleology  to  prove  intelligence.  You  select  the 
most  secret  and  difficult  thing  as  the  means  of  proving 
one  of  the  plainest.  You  will  not  accept  any  tokens  of 
the  existence  of  mind  till  you  ifave  determined  precisely 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  879 

what  it  is  aiming  at.  If  we  are  quite  liable  to  mistake 
human  intentions,  how  much  less  probable  is  it  that 
we  can  fathom  divine  purposes !  and  how  extremely- 
hazardous  to  rest  the  proof  of  God's  existence  primarily 
upon  our  judgment  that  he  intended  this  or  that  result 
of  the  action  of  natural  forces ! 

Can  we  in  any  case  decipher  creative  intentions  ? 
There  is  plainly  a  teleology  of  human  motives.  It  is 
this  which  the  courts  employ  in  determining  the  vital 
question  of  previous  intention  in  the  commission  of 
crime ;  and,  with  all  the  difficulties  which  beset  the  de- 
termination of  motives,  our  judgments  respecting  them 
are  quite  reliable  in  ordinary  affairs.  But  teleology, 
as  it  is  commonly  understood,  does  not  refer  to  the  de- 
ciphering of  human,  but  of  divine,  intentions.  Unless 
it  is  possible  to  discover  the  latter,  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  teleology  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense.  Now, 
some  of  the  results  wrought  out  in  nature  bear  such 
strong  marks  of  purpose,  that  I,  for  one,  have  not  the 
least  doubt  that  they  have  been  intentionally  wrought 
out.  I  am  free  to  say,  without  any  fear  of  Huxley  be- 
fore my  eyes,  that  I  suppose  eyes  were  made  "  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  the  animal  which  possesses  them  to 
see."  This,  however,  is  not  the  place  to  defend  this 
belief,  nor  shall  I  make  any  set  defence  of  it  anywhere 
in  this  volume.  My  task  at  present  is  not  to  stand  as 
the  champion  of  teleology,  but  to  determine  its  true 
use  and  its  logical  status.  I  have  declared  my  belief 
that  certain  creative  purposes  may  be  deciphered,  simply 
by  way  of  answering  the  question,  Is  there  any  such 
thing  as  teleology  ? 

Granting  an  affirmative  answer  to  this  question,  in 
order  that  we  may  proceed  to  the  next  one,  the  true  use 
of  teleology  is  not  hard  to  discover.     By  the  light   of 


380  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  principles  established  in  this  chapter  and  the  last,  it 
is  obvious  that  teleology  must  be  used  as  a  supplement 
to  eutaxiology.  The  latter  argument  establishes  the 
existence  of  intelligence  in  the  universe,  thus  laying  the 
first  plank  of  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  God. 
It  is  possible  that  teleology,  standing  upon  that  as  a 
foundation,  may  be  able  to  show  that  this  intelligence 
has  been  directed  to  particular  and  definite  results,  thus 
proving  volition.  If  intellect  and  will  can  be  shown  to 
exist  supreme  over  nature,  the  proof  of  a  personal 
Supreme  Being  is  not  indeed  complete,  but  some  real 
advance  towards  it  will  have  been  made. 

The  moment  we  change  the  aim  of  teleology  from 
the  proof  of  intelligence  to  the  proof  of  intention,  it  is 
relieved  of  the  radical  difficulty  which  beset  its  initial 
steps  in  the  old  form.  The  difference  is  precisely  that 
between  grasping  a  weapon  by  the  blade,  and  grasping 
it  by  the  handle.  Starting  as  we  now  do  with  intelli- 
gence as  an  established  fact  in  nature,  and  wishing  to 
reach  the  conclusion  that  this  intelligence  has  been  pur- 
posely directed  to  a  particular  result,  we  are  no  longer 
obliged  to  exclude  all  terms  implying  intelligence  from 
the  subject  of  our  major  premise.  The  predicate  has 
been  changed  so  as  to  read  volition  instead  of  intelli- 
gence ;  and  we  shall  not  have  an  identical  proposition, 
although  terms  implying  intelligence  may  be  inserted 
in  our  subject.  Circumstances,  forces,  or  agencies  con- 
verging to  a  definite  rational  result  imply  volition  ;  that 
is,  imply  that  this  result  is  intended,  is  an  end.  Such 
would  be  the  character  of  the  major  premise  in  the  new 
teleology. 

The  opinion  of  Dugald  Stewart,  that  teleology  should 
be  used  simply  to  illustrate  the  divine  attributes  was 
occasioned  by  his  notion  of  the  intuitive  perception  of 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  381 

the  divine  existence  ;  but  it  is  worthy  of  further  notice  in 
this  discussion  of  the  true  use  of  teleology,  entirely  aside 
from  the  peculiar  view  which  first  inspired  it.  There 
is  one  point  of  view  which  tends  to  throw  teleology  just 
where  he  placed  it,  or  where  Cicero  placed  it ;  that  is,  to 
make  it  simply  the  means  of  illustrating  the  attributes 
or  the  providence  of  God,  at  all  events  to  exclude  it 
from  any  share  in  the  demonstration  of  divine  existence. 
To  many  persons  it  may  appear  inexpedient  —  possibly 
they  may  even  view  it  as  fallacious  in  logic  and  un- 
sound in  psychology  —  to  separate  the  proof  of  intel- 
ligence from  that  of  volition.  We  are  so  accustomed 
to  the  co-existence  of  intellect  and  will  in  person- 
ality, that  we  with  difficulty  conceive  of  their  separate 
existence,  or  of  the  existence  of  either  apart  from  a 
person.  So  that,  if  eutaxiology  is  competent  to  prove 
intelligence  in  the  universe,  it  may  seem  that  volition  is 
included  in  this  demonstration,  and  that  nothing  is  left 
for  teleology  but  some  such  function  as  that  indicated 
by  Stewart  or  Cicero. 

There  is  a  degree  of  plausibility  in  this  view,  and  yet 
it  is  not  sound  on  the  whole.  It  would  be  a  rash  claim 
to  maintain  that  the  proof  of  intelligence  includes  that 
of  volition,  because  the  two  must  be  associated  in  per- 
sonality. We  might  as  well  put  in  the  further  claim, 
that  the  affections  are  also  demonstrated  in  the  demon- 
stration of  intelligence,  because  they  constitute  the  third 
element  of  personality.  On  the  other  hand,  there  may 
be  a  suspicion  of  unsoundness  in  the  eutaxiological  in- 
ference, because  it  is  content  to  assert  simply  the  exist- 
ence of  intelligence  without  volition,  because  these  are 
always  associated  in  our  experience.  This  suspicion 
would  be  without  just  grounds,  as  we  must  readily 
admit  when  we  consider  that  the  separate  existence  and 


882  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

the  separate  proof  of  intellect  and  will  are  two  entirely 
distinct  things.  The  entaxiologist  by  no  means  asserts 
their  separate  existence  by  making  the  demonstration  of 
intelligence  a  distinct  argument.  Volition  may  neces- 
sarily accompany  every  movement  of  intellect,  and  yet 
it  may  be  necessary  to  establish  each  faculty  by  a  dif- 
ferent and  independent  line  of  evidence.  In  this  event 
teleology  is  unquestionably  the  proper  form  of  demon- 
stration to  establish  volition  ;  and,  even  if  this  may  be 
proved  in  some  other  way,  still  teleology  will  furnish  the 
best  and  strongest  demonstration  of  it. 

It  is  possible  to  prove  volition  by  means  of  eutaxi- 
ology, —  not,  however,  by  claiming  that  it  is  included  in 
the  demonstration  of  intelligence.  The  course  of  the 
argument  would  be  somewhat  like  this  :  We  infer  intel- 
ligence from  the  indications  that  matter  has  been  ad- 
justed in  cornformity  to  a,  plan;  as,  for  instance,  the 
bodies  of  animals  exhibit  a  morphological  type.  But 
this  type  is  a  mere  idea,  and  powerless  in  itself  to  shape 
any  thing :  hence  volition  must  have  been  exercised  in 
causing  matter  to  assume  the  forms  prefigured  in  the 
intellctual  conception  of  the  t}rpe. 

This  argument  seems  clear  and  sound  enough,  but  it 
is  not  really  strong  against  the  attack  of  the  fatalists. 
They  would  assert  that  a  fatal  necessity  impelled  natu- 
ral forces  to  produce  the  given  results,  and  even  that 
the  Creator  was  not  free  to  do  otherwise  than  he  has 
done.  I  have  already  shown  that  this  attack  is  power- 
less against  the  inference  of  intelligence :  but  it  is 
fatal,  unless  fairly  met  and  answered,  to  the  inference  of 
volition ;  and  it  is  not  clear  how  a  good  answer  can  be 
framed  upon  the  grounds  and  principles  of  eutaxiology. 
Teleology  looks  more  promising  at  this  point.  Its  prin- 
ciples of  flexibility  and  specialty,  and  its  facts  of  adap- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  383 

tation,  may  be  wielded  against  the  fatalists  with  better 
effect  than  those  elements  of  stern,  unbending,  univer- 
sal law  which  characterize  eutaxiology.  So  that,  upon 
the  whole,  I  cannot  agree  with  those  who  would  exclude 
teleology  from  any  place  in  the  demonstration  of  God's 
existence. 

The  proposition  which  constitutes  the  major  premise 
of  teleology  is  an  induction.  Experience  of  our  own 
methods  of  procedure,  and  observation  of  the  actions 
and  avowed  purposes  of  other  intelligent  beings,  lead 
us  to  connect  actions  and  motives.  We  frame  for  our- 
selves some  general  principle  like  this :  Certain  lines  of 
action  all  tending  to  a  specific  result  imply  a  purpose ; 
and  we  use  this  in  unravelling  concealed  intentions. 
This  is  all  perfectly  legitimate  as  applied  to  human  con- 
duct. The  method  is  sound.  If  inaccurate  results  are 
occasionally  exhibited,  it  is  because  of  insufficient  data, 
or  a  mistaken  use  of  what  might  be  competent  to  lead 
to  a  just  conclusion  if  rightly  applied.  The  vital  ques- 
tion is,  whether  we  may  safely  apply  this  method  to  simi- 
lar indications  of  a  purpose  in  nature.  That  there  are 
such  indications  is  the  substance  of  our  minor  premise, 
and  this  will  hardly  be  disputed.  Long  trains  of  agen- 
cies have  converged  to  such  a  definite  and  rational  re- 
sult as  the  production  of  a  given  species,  —  the  horse,  for 
example,  —  or  the  production  of  a  complex  and  useful 
organ,  as  the  eye.  The  flexibility  of  nature  is  no  less 
striking  than  its  uniformity.  The  general  plans  of  the 
cosmos  are  not  more  conspicuous  than  its  special  adap- 
tations;  so  that  the  inference  of  volition  —  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  definite  and  rational  results  which  are 
from  time  to  time  wrought  out  in  nature  are  intentional 
results  —  seems  not  unreasonable.  At  all  events,  it  is 
not  illogical,  and  that  is  the  point  mainly  insisted  upon 


834  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

here.  I  wish  to  show  that  teleology  may  he  so  con- 
structed and  applied  that  all  its  logical  processes  shall 
he  sound  and  legitimate.  The  truth  of  its  premises, 
and  consequently  of  its  conclusion,  is  another  matter. 

This  argument  does  not,  any  more  than  eutaxiology, 
depend  upon  the  law  of  causation.  Volition  is  indeed 
causally  related  to  the  direction  imparted  to  natural 
forces,  from  which  we  infer  the  existence  of  volition. 
But  the  validity  of  the  inference  is  not  determined  by 
the  principle  that  every  event  has  a  cause.  That  law 
can  never  lead  to  any  thing  more  than  a  general  conclu- 
sion, while  the  teleological  inference  is  specific.  From 
the  law  of  causation  we  know  that  the  convergence  of 
forces  to  a  definite  and  rational  result  has  some  cause; 
but  that  is  all  we  can  possibly  do  by  means  of  that 
principle.  By  induction,  however,  we  connect  such 
appearances  with  the  exertion  of  will-power,  and  thus 
reach  a  specific  inference  of  volition,  to  which  the  law 
of  causation  is  wholly  incompetent  to  conduct  us.  It 
is  clear  and  certain,  that  both  of  the  design-arguments 
are  independent  of  the  argument  for  a  First  Cause, 
notwithstanding  the  high  authority  of  those  who  have 
maintained  the  opposite  opinion. 

The  new  teleology  harmonizes  entirely  with  the  theo- 
ry of  evolution.  At  the  same  time  the  modifications 
which  distinguish  it  from  the  old  doctrine  have  been 
framed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  sound  logic  rather 
than  the  requirements  of  evolution.  It  aspires  to  be 
independent  of  any  particular  theory  of  nature.  The 
co-operation  of  natural  forces  to  produce  rational  re- 
sults is  a  fact,  no  matter  whether  evolution  be  true  or 
false.  Undoubtedly  a  broader  view  of  such  conver- 
ging lines  of  action  may  be  obtained  from  the  stand- 
point of  evolution.     Long  trains  of  orderly  sequences 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  885 

may  be  observed,  not  only  pointing  to  some  one  end 
worthy  to  be  chosen  and  intended  by  a  rational  being, 
but  accomplishing  multiplied  ends  all  along  the  course 
of  progressive  development.  So  that  I  entirely  concur 
with  those  who  hold  that  teleology  is  stronger  upon  the 
ground  of  evolution  than  upon  the  ground  of  special 
creation  ;  but  it  may  be  placed  upon  a  safe  foundation, 
which  is  independent  of  either  hypothesis. 

Some  general  considerations  respecting  both  of  the 
design-arguments  and  their  relation  to  other  arguments 
for  the  existence  of  God,  may  be  appropriately  intro- 
duced at  this  point. 

We  have  seen,  that  an  impression  prevailed  among  the 
old  teleologists  that  it  was  an  easy  thing  to  make  a  book 
on  natural  theology.  Derham  excused  the  tendency 
to  repetition,  upon  the  ground  that  in  this  line  of  writ- 
ing "  the  observations  were  obvious."  It  is  true,  that, 
without  any  dangerous  mental  strain,  a  deal  of  plausible 
and  shallow  discussion  may  be  produced  under  the  cap- 
tion of  "design."  But  both  eutaxiology  and  teleology 
are  in  fact  somewhat  difficult.  Any  just  or  profound 
view  of  them  discloses  a  wide,  deep,  and  somewhat 
misty  sea.  A  very  delightful  voyage  may  be  made 
about  the  outskirts  of  this  sea,  keeping  always  within 
hailing  distance  of  the  shore  in  anticipation  of  rough 
weather.  That  is  the  way  to  make  a  popular  book  on 
such  a  subject.  But,  while  it  is  not  necessary  to  keep 
always  to  the  deep  water,  no  argument  can  be  highly 
esteemed  which  has  not  shown  itself  to  be  sea-worthy. 

While  both  of  the  design-arguments  are  to  an  unex- 
pected degree  difficult,  there  is  yet  a  considerable  dif- 
ference in  the  character  of  the  difficulties  which  beset 
each  argument.  Broadly  speaking,  we  may  say  that  the 
dangers  of  eutaxiology  are  metaphysical ;  of  teleology, 


386  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

logical.  The  order-argument  presents  no  such  fallacy- 
traps  as  teleology ;  but  it  does  conduct  us  into  a  realm 
where  fate  and  necessity  are  words  of  ominous  import. 
But,  fortunately,  each  argument  stands  ready  to  re- 
enforce  the  weak  points  of  the  other.  Eutaxiology,  by 
its  conclusion  of  the  existence  of  a  supreme  intelligence, 
rescues  teleology  from  its  most  dangerous  fallacy ;  and 
the  fatalistic  aspects  of  eutaxiology  are  best  answered 
by  the  facts  of  teleology.  Here  we  see  the  importance 
of  holding  both  of  these  arguments,  as  it  were,  in  the 
same  leash.  Not  only  is  each  an  aid  and  a  corrective 
to  the  other,  but  each  is  competent  to  make  a  distinct 
and  specific  contribution  to  the  general  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  Supreme  Being. 

But  when  we  speak  of  proving  the  existence  of 
a  being,  meaning  thereby  a  person,  we  are  travelling  far 
beyond  the  primary  conclusions  which  may  be  legiti- 
mately reached  by  means  of  eutaxiology  and  teleology. 
Granting  that  the  former  is  competent  to  prove  an 
all-pervading  intelligence  in  the  cosmos,  and  that  the 
latter  is  able  to  show  the  domination  of  a  supreme  will, 
the  demonstration  of  a  personal  God  is  yet  incomplete. 
The  unity  of  the  cosmos  disclosed  by  modern  science, 
the  uniformity  and  universality  of  law,  and  the  persist- 
ence of  force,  furnish  a  good  foundation  for  the  proof 
of  unity  in  the  mind  and  will  which  dominate  nature. 
But  respecting  the  possibility  of  proving  from  nature 
the  benevolence  of  the  Deity,  and  thus  completing  the 
list  of  attributes  of  personality,  there  are  wide  differ- 
ences of  opinion.  The  majority  of  the  authors  whose 
works  I  have  reviewed  are  of  the  opinion  that  it  can  be 
done,  and  many  of  them  have  made  the  attempt.  But 
Professor  Cooke  and  Mr.  Irons  are  positive  that  it 
cannot  be  done,  while  Mr.  Henslow's  method  of  doing 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  387 

it  is  a  considerable  remove  from  optimism.  He  thinks 
the  evils  of  this  life  are  themselves  an  evidence  of 
divine  benevolence,  because  they  are  a  part  of  the  gen- 
eral scheme  of  surrounding  man  with  "  inideal  circum- 
stances "  in  order  to  make  his  probation  complete.  The 
very  badness  of  the  world  convinces  him  that  God  is 
good.  There  is  a  good  deal. to  be  said  for  this  view, 
but  it  would  hardly  come  under  the  head  of  natural 
theology. 

Some  materials  undoubtedly  exist  in  the  universe  out 
of  which  to  manufacture  the  blackest  sort  of  pessimism, 
and  other  materials  exist  for  the  construction  of  the 
most  extreme  and  brilliant-hue d  optimism. 

This  may  account  for  the  radical  divergence  of  opin- 
ions on  this  point.  Not  only  do  authors  differ  in  their 
conclusions,  but  individuals  in  daily  life  differ  from  each 
other,  and  from  themselves  at  different  times.  The  fact 
is,  that  one's  view  of  this  life  is  influenced  by  the  state 
of  his  digestion,  his  bank-account,  and  other  trifles  of 
that  sort,  far  more  than  is  consistent  with '  sound  phi- 
losophy. Business  reverses  and  dyspepsia  are  more 
fruitful  of  pessimistic  views  than  all  the  speculations  of 
Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann  ;  on  the  other  hand,  a 
sound  condition  of  the  digestive  apparatus  and  a  hand- 
some balance  in  bank  enable  us  to  see  a  deal  of  benevo- 
lence in  the  present  system  of  things.  The  average 
sentiment  of  mankind  is  probably  a  compromise  between 
the  two  extremes,  but  not  an  even  compromise.  It  is 
optimism  toned  down,  —  a  mild,  rose-colored  variety  of 
optimism  ;  and  this  comfortable  average  is  very  likely 
to  be  somewhere  near  the  truth. 

I  infer  this,  not  only  because  it  is  the  average  senti- 
ment of  humanity,  but  because  the  same  conclusion 
may,  I  think,  fairly  be  extracted  from  nature.     But  the 


888  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

proper  way  to  reach  it  is  not  by  attempting  to  sum  up 
the  evils  and  the  beneficences  of  this  sublunary  exist- 
ence, and  then  striking  a  balance,  but  by  a  generalized 
view  of  the  system  as  a  whole.  In  trying  to  read  the 
riddle  of  nature  in  this  way,  and  to  determine  whether 
its  meaning  is  sinister  or  beneficent,  I  maintain  that  the 
theor}^  of  evolution  is  of  great  assistance.  Not  only 
does  it  lead  us  to  observe  the  operation  of  general  laws 
instead  of  isolated  cases,  and  afford  the  opportunity  of 
viewing  the  cosmos  more  at  large  as  a  compact  unit 
with  a  general  expression  of  benevolence  :  it  has  the 
farther  advantage  of  weaving  in  the  evils  themselves  as 
a  part  of  the  scheme  of  progress,  —  a  necessary  incident 
of  the  struggle  for  existence. 

But,  supposing  that  we  can  establish  all  of  the  ele- 
ments of  personality  on  natural  grounds,  another  prob- 
lem is  to  prove  that  these  attributes  are  infinite.  Nature 
does  not  furnish  the  data  for  this  demonstration.  The 
power  possessed  by  that  Being  who  is  supreme  over 
nature  must  be  adequate  to  produce  all  the  effects 
which  we  behold ;  but,  since  all  these  effects  and  the 
whole  material  universe  are  finite,  we  cannot  thence 
infer  infinite  power,  or  infinite  attributes  of  any  kind. 
Neither  of  the  three  cosmological  arguments  —  the 
eutaxiological,  the  teleological,  or  the  causal  —  can 
establish  the  infiniteness  of  any  divine  attribute. 

Is  it  not  possible  that  some  other  theistic  argument 
may  fill  this  gap  ?  It  has  been  too  much  the  fashion  for 
the  theologian  to  select  a  particular  argument,  stake  his 
all  upon  it,  and  lose  no  opportunity  of  disparaging  and 
sneering  at  the  other  arguments.  Descartes'  partiality 
to  the  ontological  proof,  and  contempt  of  teleology,  is 
a  case  in  point,  and  by  no  means  the  only  one.  His  pet 
argument  has  in  turn  been  more  scouted  of  late  than  any 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGY.  389 

other.  But  perhaps  these  same  despised  a  priori  con- 
ceptions of  a  Being  infinite  in  all  perfections  may  be 
just  the  thing  to  supplement  the  conclusions  of  the 
three  cosmological  arguments.  It  is  no  doubt  absurd  to 
argue  the  existence  of  a  perfect  being,  simply  because 
we  have  the  conception  of  such  a  being;  but  it  is  possi- 
ble that  this  conception  may  enable  us  to  round  out  to 
infinity  the  attributes  of  a  being  whose  existence  has 
been  otherwise  established. 

May  not  all  of  the  theistic  arguments  be  combined 
into  one,  as  suggested  by  the  Rev.  R.  A.  Thompson  ? 
They  have  hitherto  been  handled  too  much  like  partisan 
troops,  each  making  his  own  fight  without  regard  to  the 
rest.  The  massing  of  them  into  a  solid  phalanx  would 
be  more  effective.  Possibly  it  cannot  be  done,  but  it  is 
worth  attempting.  No  line  of  work  more  inviting,  or 
more  hopeful  of  fertile  results,  could,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
offer  itself  to  the  theologian  than  this  of  investigating 
what  definite  thing  each  argument  is  competent  to  do, 
in  what  form  it  is  most  effective,  and  especially  how 
they  may  all  be  marshalled  and  combined  into  a  single 
connected  and  logical  demonstration.  In  the  mean 
time  let  us  rejoice  that  the  practical  human  reason  is 
already  amply  persuaded  that  there  is  a  God.  Mankind 
has  not  been  obliged  to  wait  for  a  logical  demonstration 
of  that  fact.  Faith  has  walked  securely  where  Reason 
stumbled  :  the  child  and  the  peasant  have  believed  and 
worshipped  while  the  philosopher  groped  in  doubt  and 
mystery. 


390  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES. 

Several  very  recent  works  on  natural  theology  have 
appeared,  all  of  which  contain  more  or  less  matter  for 
criticism,  provided  the  conclusions  of  this  work  are  of 
any  value.  I  had  intended  to  review  all  of  them,  and 
point  out  minutely  their  merits  and  demerits  as  they 
appear  to  me  in  the  light  of  those  principles  to  which 
my  investigation  of  the  subject  has  led ;  but  upon  ma- 
ture reflection  I  have  determined  not  to  undertake  this 
task.  The  number  of  these  books  all  told,  great  and 
small,  including  those  which  touch  upon  design-argu- 
ments as  incidental  to  their  main  theme,  is  consid- 
erable ;  and  I  know  not.  how  much  it  may  be  increased 
by  new  publications  before  the  appearance  of  my  own. 
It  seems  a  well-nigh  hopeless  attempt,  therefore,  to 
make  my  review  exhaustive.  Besides,  there  is  consid- 
erable similarity  in  the  style  of  treatment  adopted  by 
all  these  late  writers,  so  that  a  good  deal  of  repetition 
would  be  involved  in  a  detailed  examination  of  each 
of  them.  Hence  I  have  concluded  to  select  one  of  the 
most  important  of  them,  and  to  present  it  as  a  sample 
both  of  the  excellences  and  defects  of  natural  theology 
as  it  stands  to-day.  "  Final  Causes,"  by  Paul  Janet, 
translated    from   the    French   by   William   Affleck,1  is 

1  An  American  edition  has  recently  been  published  by  Charles  Scrib- 
ner's  Sons. 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  391 

facile  princeps  among  these  recent  works.  It  is  almost 
the  only  one  which  is  exclusively  devoted  to  design- 
arguments  :  the  rest  treat  of  theistic  arguments  in  gen- 
eral, or  insert  their  discussion  of  teleology  into  the  body 
of  a  treatise  mainly  devoted  to  some  other  topic.  This 
alone  would  justify  my  selection  of  Janet  as  the  type  of 
existing  teleologists.  It  would  be  impossible  to  leave 
him  out,  if  later  teleology  is  to  have  any  notice  at  all; 
and  a  careful  review  of  his  work  will,  on  the  other  hand, 
cover  all  the  necessary  points. 

Janet's  preliminary  chapter  is  entitled  "  The  Prob- 
lem ; "  and  his  summary  of  it  is,  that  "  the  final  cause 
cannot  be  laid  down  a  priori  as  a  necessary  condition 
of  thought :  it  must  be  sought  and  established  by  analy- 
sis and  discussion.  That  will  be  the  object  of  this  work. 
This  inquiry  divides  itself  into  two  problems,  —  1st,  Is 
finality  a  law  of  nature  ?  2d,  What  is  the  cause  of  that 
law  ?  These  two  questions  are  quite  distinct,  and  much 
obscurity  arises  from  having  confounded  them.  We 
will  treat  them  separately  in  two  different  books." 

It  will  be  observed  that  he  uses  "finality  "  instead  of 
teleology ;  but,  as  appears  in  the  sequel,  he  gives  it  a 
much  wider  and  looser  sense. 

In  chapter  first  he  reaches,  by  his  method  of  "  analysis 
and  discussion,"  "  the  principle  of  teleological  concord- 
ance, or  principle  of  final  causes."     It  is  stated  thus :  — 

"  When  a  certain  coincidence  of  phenomena  is  determined, 
not  only  by  its  relation  to  the  past,  but  also  by  its  relation  to 
the  future,  we  will  not  have  clone  justice  to  the  principle  of 
causality,  if,  in  supposing  a  cause  for  this  coincidence,  we 
neglect  to  explain,  besides,  its  precise  relation  to  the  future 
phenomenon.  In  other  words,  the  agreement  of  several 
phenomena,  bound  together  with  a  future  determinate  phe- 
nomenon, supposes  a  cause  in  which  that  future  phenomenon 


392  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

is  ideally  represented  ;  and  the  probability  of  this  presump- 
tion increases  with  the  complexity  of  the  concordant  phe- 
nomena, and  the  number  of  the  relations  which  unite  them 
to  the  final  phenomenon." 

Nearly  half  of  "  The  Facts  "  in  chapter  second  con- 
sists of  a  fresh  discussion  of  that  classical  example,  the 
eye ;  and  the  other  half,  of  an  enumeration  of  remark- 
able cases  of  instinct. 

Chapter  third,  on  "  The  Industry  of  Man,  and  the  In- 
dustry of  Nature,"  is  a  very  important  one  :  — 

u  By  a  course  of  analogical  inductions  we  have  tried  to 
prove  :  1st,  That  our  fellow-men  act  for  an  end  ;  2d,  That 
the  animals,  when  they  obey  intelligence  and  feeling,  act  for 
an  end  ;  3d,  That  instinctive  actions  are  directed  towards  an 
end ;  4th,  That  the  functions  themselves,  so  analogous  to 
the  instincts,  are  equally  directed  towards  an  end." 

Such  is  the  outline  of  his  demonstration  that  "  finality 
is  a  law  of  nature." 

Chapter  fourth,  "  Organ  and  Function,"  is  a  careful 
and  extremely  valuable  resume  of  the  latest  physiologi- 
cal researches :  — 

' '  To  sum  up  :  There  is  no  contradiction  between  our  prin- 
ciples and  the  most  recent  scientific  conceptions." 

In  his  fifth  chapter,  "  The  Contrary  Facts,"  M.  Janet 
frames  clever  explanations  of  a  large  number  of  facts 
which  have  been  supposed  to  be  hostile  to  teleology. 

In  the  next  chapter,  on  "  Mechanism  and  Finality," 
he  refutes  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature  by  an  admir- 
able use  of  the  method  of  reductio  ad  absurdum  :  — 

"  To  sum  up :  It  follows  from  the  preceding  discussion, 
that  the  mechanical  hypothesis  fully  carried  out  leads,  —  1st, 
To  the  violation  of  all  the  laws  of  analogical  reasoning,  by 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  393 

forcing  us  even  to  call  in  question  the  existence  of  intelli- 
gence in  other  men ;  2d,  To  a  violation  of  all  the  laws  of 
science,  by  forcing  us  to  acknowledge  an  absolute  hiatus 
between  all  the  phenomena  of  nature  and  the  intelligence  of 
man ;  3d,  To  a  contradiction,  because  it  is  forcibly  arrested 
in  the  presence  of  a  last  case,  the  human  intelligence." 

He  then  proceeds  to  show  that  the  Ideological  hy- 
pothesis is  the  only  adequate  one  at  those  points  where 
the  mechanical  hypothesis  breaks  down,  and  that  it 
even  covers  the  ground  of  the  physical  and  inorganic, 
where  mechanism  is  strongest.  Thus  he  advances  the 
argument  a  stage  beyond  the  point  reached  in  chapter 
third ;  that  is,  having  shown  in  that  chapter  that  there 
is  a  law  of  finality  running  through  the  realm  of  life, 
he  now  extends  that  law  over  dead  matter. 

The  last  three  chapters  of  Book  I.  are  devoted  to 
"  Evolution  in  General,"  and  to  the  several  forms  of  it 
advocated  by  Lamarck,  Darwin,  and  Spencer :  — 

"  Transformism,  then,  under  whatever  form  it  is  presented, 
shakes  none  of  the  reasons  we  have  given  above  in  favor  of 
natural  finality ;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  not  irreconcilable 
with  it,  and,  on  the  other,  it  is  inexplicable  without  it." 

Book  II.  is  a  prolonged  tussle  with  German  metaphys- 
ics and  mysticism.  He  wrestles  manfully  with  Kant, 
with  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann,  with  Fortlage,  and 
last,  but  not  least,  with  Hegel.  Some  of  these  he  differs 
from  toto  coelo,  and  challenges  to  mortal  combat ;  in 
others  he  finds  much  to  commend,  as  well  as  somewhat 
to  criticise.  In  the  latter  category  Kant  naturally  takes 
the  highest  place.  Janet  seems  to  have  drawn  more 
from  him  than  from  any  other  author  on  natural  theol- 
ogy, unless  it  be  Leibnitz,  whom  he  always  quotes  with 
approval. 


394  CRITIQUE   OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

In  the  last  chapter  he  concludes,  that  "  The  Supreme 
End  of  Nature  "  is  morality.  "  Morality  is,  therefore, 
at  once  the  accomplishment  and  the  ultimate  proof  of 
the  law  of  finality." 

Such  is  the  outline  of  this  somewhat  famous  book,  — 
M.  Janet's  "  great  work  on  4  Final  Causes.'  '  Given 
a  perspicuous  and  admirable  style,  thorough  literary 
training,  and  free  access  to  the  best  materials,  and  the 
reader  can  imagine  how  such  an  outline  has  been  filled 
up.  It  is  unquestionably  done  with  great  ability,  so  far 
as  the  matter  of  the  argument  is  concerned. 

With  such  an  acknowledgment  it  would  be  a  grace- 
ful and  fitting  thing  to  bring  this  notice  to  a  close.  It 
would  certainly  be  far  more  grateful  and  agreeable  to 
my  own  feelings  to  do  so,  for  I  have  read  this  author 
with  much  pleasure  and  profit.  But  it  would  furnish 
just  ground  for  a  suspicion  of  timidity  not  to  apply  to 
a  living  author  the  same  rigid  canons  of  criticism 
which  I  have  used  unsparingly  in  estimating  the  works 
of  the  illustrious  departed.  I  am  constrained  to  say, 
therefore,  that,  while  the  matter  of  the  argument  is 
handled  with  signal  ability,  the  logical  form  of  it  is 
lamentably  at  fault.  Inasmuch  as  I  believe  that  this 
is  chiefly  the  result  of  a  faulty  nomenclature,  I  will 
discuss  this  matter  first. 

Janet  retains  the  phrase  "  final  cause,"  and  even  glo- 
ries in  it,  since  he  makes  it  the  title  of  his  book.  At 
the  same  time  he  makes  a  notable  change  in  the  mean- 
ing of  it.  Whewell,  and  the  old  teleologists  generally, 
struggled  to  ■maintain  a  broad  distinction  between  final 
and  efficient  causes,  although  they  did  not  all,  or  any 
of  them  always,  succeed  in  this  laudable  effort. 
.  "The  idea  of  final  cause,  of  end,  purpose,  design,  inten- 
tion, is  altogether  different  from  the  idea  of  cause  as  efficient 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  395 

cause.  But,  if  the  idea  be  clearly  entertained  and  steadily 
applied,  the  word  is  a  question  of  subordinate  importance. 
The  term  final  cause  has  long  been  familiarly  used,  and 
appears  not  likely  to  lead  to  confusion."1 

Once  admit  the  term  final  cause,  however,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  struggle  to  keep  it  clear  of  entanglements 
with  efficient  causes  will  be  a  losing  game  from  the 
start,  and  will  become  more  and  more  hopeless  with  the 
lapse  of  time.  In  confirmation  of  this  it  is  interesting 
to  note  that  Janet,  and  with  him  the  whole  group  of 
recent  design-advocates,  has  surrendered  bodily  and  un- 
conditionally to  efficient  cause.  When  they  say  cause 
they  mean  invariably  efficient  cause ;  for  the  final  cause 
has  been,  in  their  understanding  and  employment  of  it, 
merged  into  the  efficient,  and  become  a  species  of  it. 
Thus  Janet  says  (489),  — 

"  No  one  denies  that  the  final  cause  may  be  reduced  to  the 
efficient  cause,  if  in  the  efficient  cause  itself  the  final  cause 
be  introduced  ;  namely,  the  desire  and  idea,  —  in  other  words, 
the  anticipation  of  the  effect.  And  it  matters  little  whether 
the  cause,  thus  analyzed  into  its  elements,  is  called  final  or 
efficient." 

To  justify  such  notions  the  nomenclature  ought  to 
be  enlarged.  Causes  are  all  efficient ;  but  in  the  genus 
efficient  cause  there  are  two  species,  which  may  be 
distinguished  as  efficient  efficient  causes  and  final  ef- 
ficient causes.  However,  the  difference  between  these 
twTo  species  does  not  amount  to  much  anyhow,  so  that, 
in  any  given  case  "  it  matters  little  whether  the  cause 
is  called  "  final  efficient  or  efficient  efficient ! 

Now,  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  things  must  be 
true:    either    there    is  more    difference    than    that  in- 

i  Whewell:  Phi.  of  Ind.  Sci.,  Book  ix.  ch.  vi.  p.  628. 


CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

<licated  above  between  the  notion  of  efficient  cause 
and  the  notion  intended  to  be  conveyed  by  the  phrase 
final  cause,  or  else  all  teleology  is  in  vain,  all  the  books 
and  all  the  preaching  on  natural  theology  have  been  in 
vain,  and  the  world  is  destined  to  flounder  along  in 
dense  ignorance  of  its  Author  so  far  as  any  help  from 
final  causes  is  concerned.  For  if  they  are  only  a  species 
of  efficient  causes,  and  so  faintly  distinguished  from 
"  efficient  causes  properly  so  called "  (one  of  Janet's 
expressions  which  implies  some  degree  of  impropriety 
in  his  own  nomenclature)  as  to  render  it  a  matter 
of  indifference  whether  a  given  cause  is  called  final  or 
efficient,  then  all  the  learned  treatises  about  them  are 
a  pure  and  prodigious  waste  of  ink  and  paper.  They 
have  too  much  "  finality  "  in  them  to  be  good  for  any 
thing  in  a  theory  of  efficient  causation,  and  too  little 
distinctiveness  to  be  good  for  any  thing  by  themselves. 
It  is  the  first  of  these  alternative  propositions  that  is 
the  true  one.  The  difference  between  the  two  notions 
in  question  is  not  a  shadowy  difference  between  species 
or  varieties  of  the  same  genus :  it  is  radical  and  generic, 
so  much  so  that  it  is  wholly  inadmissible  to  call  them 
by  the  same  name,  or  to  include  them  in  the  same 
genus.  The  end  is  not  a  cause  at  all:  it  is  a  motive. 
Men  act  in  view  of  ends  as  motives,  but  the  efficient 
cause  lies  in  the  determinations  of  the  will.  The  char- 
acteristic element  of  a  cause  is  its  power  to  produce  the 
phenomenon  which  is  its  proper  effect.  Ends  have  no 
such  power.  The  will  may  choose  them  or  set  them 
aside,  unless  you  deny  freedom  to  the  will;  for  that 
you  virtually  do  if  you  attribute  to  ends  the  power  of 
producing  phenomena.  If  the  motive  is  all-powerful 
and  cannot  be  resisted,  then  the  will  is  powerless,  and 
a  blank  fatalism  alone  remains  to  us. 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  397 

It  is  true,  nevertheless,  —  and  this  is  what  gives  the 
semblance  of  a  cause  to  ends,  and  makes  it  dangerous 
to  juggle  with  them  under  the  name  of  causes,  —  that  an 
end  having  once  been  perceived  and  chosen,  the  an- 
ticipation of  it,  or  its  representation  in  the  thought  of 
the  agent,  thenceforth  exerts  a  regulative  force  upon  the 
whole  train  of  agencies  set  in  motion  for  its  realization. 
It  has  the  power  of  determining  the  means  to  be  these, 
and  not  those.  But  at  every  point  in  the  train  of  agen- 
cies the  end  is  merely  a  motive,  and  lacks  the  power  of 
producing  the  means,  because  at  every  step  a  new  de- 
termination of  the  will  may  intervene  to  stop  the  whole 
process.  For  example,  if  health  be  the  end  in  view,  the 
mental  conception  of  that  end  has  the  power  of  deter- 
mining the  means  to  be  the  exercise  of  walking  in  the 
open  air,  rather  than  sitting  in  a  damp  cellar ;  but  this 
motive  of  gaining  health  has  not  the  power  to  produce 
a  single  step.  All  that  depends  upon  the  will,  provided 
the  will  is  free. 

Another  characteristic  of  ends  which  gives  them  the 
semblance  of  causes  is,  that  they  are  conditional  notions. 
The  conception  of  them  is  a  customary  condition  to  the 
action  of  the  will  as  an  efficient  cause.  Then,  since 
the  cause  includes  all  the  conditions,  it  is  strictly  true 
that  the  end,  as  a  mental  conception,  is  included  in  the 
efficient  cause.  But,  instead  of  this  circumstance  being 
any  justification  for  the  phrase  final  cause,  it  constitutes 
a  new  reason  for  rejecting  it.  The  very  close  relation  of 
the  end,  as  a  motive  and  as  a  condition,  to  the  efficient 
cause,  is  the  precise  reason  why  it  breeds  endless  con- 
fusion to  call  them  both  causes.  Janet  is  right  in 
saying  that  the  former  is  included  in  the  latter,  and 
may  in  a  sense  be  resolved  into  it.  But  what  follows  ? 
Why,  that,  without  making  any  account  of  the  physical 


CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

causes,  there  are  two  mental  efficient  causes  of  every 
phenomenon !  There  can  be  no  less  in  any  case  of  act- 
ing for  an  end,  provided  you  call  the  latter  a  cause  at 
all.  For  the  true  efficient  cause,  the  volition,  is  never 
absent;  and,  if  the  end  is  also  a  cause,  it  is  in  reality 
another  efficient  cause,  giving  us  two  mental  efficient 
causes  in  each  case.  How  much  simpler  and  safer  to 
call  the  end  just  an  end,  and  so  make  an  end  at  once  of 
it,  and  of  the  dreary  mass  of  confusion  engendered  by 
that  fag-end  of  scholasticism,  the  phrase  final  cause  ! 

Such  is  the  true  analysis  of  the  nature  of  ends  in 
human  action.  But  all  teleologists  agree,  that  human 
acting  for  ends  presents  the  best  approximate  model  of 
divine  acting  for  ends ;  and  none  of  them  is  more  em- 
phatic upon  this  point  than  M.  Janet.  No  more,  then, 
in  creative  than  in  human  thought  can  the  conception 
of  an  end  be  the  cause  of  its  realization.  If  God  is  a 
free  agent,  then  he  acts  in  view  of  ends  as  motives; 
but  these  are  not  the  cause  of  his  action.  He  can  choose 
or  refuse  to  produce  a  given  result.  One  difference 
there  may  be :  we  cannot  conceive  that  he,  like  man, 
should  once  choose  an  end,  and  then  abandon  it.  But 
this  does  not  change  the  essential  character  of  divine 
ends  in  any  such  sense  as  to  convert  them  into  efficient 
causes.  The  original  determination  of  the  divine  will, 
and  the  steady  persistence  of  that  determination  founded 
upon  its  wisdom,  unlike  the  vacillating  purposes  of  men, 
is  the  efficient  cause  of  the  whole  train  of  physical 
agencies  employed  to  produce  the  end. 

This  is  true,  no  matter  what  theory  we  adopt  respect- 
ing the  relation  of  God's  will  to  physical  forces.  If 
these  are  the  direct  expression  of  that  will,  as  some 
suppose,  then  it  is  emphatically  true  ;  if  they  have  some 
virtue  in  themselves  aside  from  immediate  volitions  of 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  399 

the  Deity,  then  it  is  still  true,  for  they  are  subject  to 
his  will. 

But,  lest  this  should  seem  to  be  a  mere  dispute  about 
words,  let  us  see  if  any  specially  injurious  consequences 
have  resulted  from  Janet's  retention  of  a  scholastic 
phrase.  Referring  to  the  first  page  of  his  preliminary 
chapter,  the  first  consequence  we  notice  is  the  infelici- 
tous paradox,  that  health  is  both  "  the  cause  and  the 
effect  of  walking,"  —  a  slight  infelicity,  indeed,  but  an 
infelicity  nevertheless.  Such  expressions  give  color  and 
substance  to  the  criticism  of  Spinoza,  that  teleologists 
"  regard  as  cause  what  is  effect."  Thus  far  our  author 
is  leaning  upon  Aristotle,  and  has  no  chance  to  develop 
any  latent  confusion  of  ideas  which  is  the  inevitable 
product  of  a  misapplication  of  terms.  But  turn  over 
to  his  second  page,  where  he  essays  to  construct  an  ex- 
ample of  his  own,  and  you  perceive  that  even  so  early 
in  his  first  chapter  he  is  caught  in  the  toils  of  a  faulty 
nomenclature :  — 

"  A  man  kills  another.  In  a  sense  the  death  of  the  latter 
had  as  a  cause  the  action  of  killing,  — that  is  to  say,  the  action 
of  plunging  a  poniard  into  a  living  body,  a  mechanical  cause, 
without  which  there  would  have  been  no  death  ;  but  recipro- 
cally this  action  of  killing  had  as  a  determining  cause  the 
will  to  kill,  and  the  death  of  the  victim,  foreseen  and  willed 
beforehand  by  the  criminal,  was  the  determining  cause  of  the 
crime.  Thus  a  final  cause  is  a  fact  which  may  be  in  some  sort 
considered  as  the  cause  of  its  own  cause.  [Most  astonishing 
jugglery  of  words  !  Either  there  is  something  very  profound 
in  it,  or  else  it  is  what  it  appears  to  be  on  its  face,  —  mere 
nonsense.]  But,  as  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  be  a  cause  before 
it  exists,  the  true  cause  is  not  the  fact  itself,  but  its  idea." 

Setting  aside,  as  comparatively  trivial  in  importance, 
the  improbability  that  death  in  itself  should  be  the  mo- 


400  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

tive  of  any  killing,  or  that  any  one  should  commit 
murder  merely  for  the  pleasure  of  it,  and  not  with  some 
such  end  in  view  as  robbery,  or  the  gratification  of  hate, 
or  the  defence  of  his  own  life,  let  us  subject  to  analysis 
the  several  points  of  this  example.  1st,  Death  is  caused 
by  stabbing;  2d,  Stabbing  is  caused  by  "the  will  to 
kill ;  "  3d,  Stabbing  is  caused,  and  consequently  death  is 
caused,  "by  the  death  of  the  victim,"  not  as  a  realized 
fact,  but  as  a  preconceived  idea.  Thus  the  death  of  the 
victim  is  caused  by  the  death  of  the  victim,  or  the  final 
cause  (death)  is  the  cause  of  its  own  cause  (stabbing). 
The  first  difficulty  about  this  is,  that  stabbing  appears 
to  have  tivo  causes,  and  both  of  them  final ;  for  it  is  ap- 
parent, that,  in  leading  up  to  his  brilliant  paradox,  "  A 
cause  is  the  cause  of  its  own  cause,"  M.  Janet  regarded 
stabbing  as  the  efficient,  and  "  the  will  to  kill "  as  the 
final  cause.  Then  subsequently  he  brings  in  the  ideal 
death  of  the  victim  as  the  final  cause.  And,  since  it  is 
quite  inadmissible  to  suppose  that  our  accomplished 
membre  de  V Institute  would  reduce  to  one  and  the  same 
thing  the  will  of  the  criminal  and  his  idea  of  the  death 
of  the  victim,  it  follows  that  we  have  two  final  causes  of 
the  stabbing. 

The  second  and  most  radical  difficulty  is  to  compre- 
hend how  an  idea  can  be  a  cause  in  the  sense  of  having 
power  to  produce  the  effect  of  stabbing  and  death.  It 
is  easy  to  see  how  it  might  be  a  motive  in  view  of  which 
the  murderous  purpose  was  formed.  But  the  will  was 
free  to  reject  this  motive. 

However,  suppose  we  grant  that  the  idea  of  death 
was  the  cause  of  the  killing.  It  was  really  an  efficient 
cause  according  to  M.  Janet ;  although  he  amuses  him- 
self by  calling  it  a  final  cause  for  a  while,  until,  closely 
pressed  in  the  last  analysis,  he  at  length  concedes  that 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  401 

it  is  at  bottom  efficient.  The  will  to  kill  is  also  an 
efficient  cause  without  any  question.  It  is  such  in  the 
true  analysis  of  this  example ;  and  it  is  such  in  reality, 
even  according  to  M.  Janet,  though  he  plainly  considers 
it  as  final  efficient  rather  than  efficient  efficient.  So  that 
the  third  difficulty  about  this  example  is,  that  the  death 
of  the  poor  victim  has,  including  the  stabbing,  undoubt- 
edly a  very  efficient  sort  of  an  efficient  efficient,  —  no  less 
than  three  efficient  causes  instead  of  two  final  causes. 

There  seems  to  be  quite  an  advantage  in  point  of  sim- 
plicity, as  well  as  of  truth,  in  saying  that  stabbing  was 
the  proximate  cause  of  death,  and  the  will  to  kill  the 
ultimate  cause  of  it.  Other  elements  of  the  case  were 
not  causes  at  all.  The  end  in  view,  whether  it  was 
death  for  its  own  sake,  or  some  ulterior  purpose,  was 
the  motive  of  the  killing,  but  not  the  cause  of  it  in  any 
proper  sense  of  the  word  "  cause." 

It  may  possibly  be  doubted  whether  Janet  regarded 
the  will  to  kill  as  a  final  cause.  Even  if  he  did  not,  this 
will  not  rid  his  example  of  confusion.  But  that  he  did 
so  regard  it  appears  probable  from  the  manner  in  which 
he  contrasts  it  with  the  "  mechanical"  cause  ;  viz.,  "  the 
action  of  plunging  a  poniard  into  a  living  body."  This 
probability  rises  into  moral  certainty  when  we  observe 
how  constantly  he  sets  up  the  antithesis  of  the  final  cause 
and  mechanical  or  physical  causes.1  Nor  is  he  singu- 
lar in  maintaining  this  antithesis.  We  have  observed  a 
tendency  among  the  old  teleologists,  notably  Cud  worth, 
to  make  all  mental  causality  final,  and  to  set  this  in  sharp 
contrast  with  "secondary,"  "physical,"  "mechanical," 
and  "  blind  "  efficient  causes.  This  tendency  is  one  of 
several  sorts  of  confusion  arising  from  the  doctrine  of 

i  See  pp.  xvii.,  52, 128;  also  the  title  of  ch.  vi.,  Book  I.,  Mechanism 
and  Finality. 


402  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

final  causes.  It  is  surprising  to  see  it  perpetuated  in 
the  recent  writings  of  able  and  generally  clear-headed 
men.  Thus  Professor  Noah  Porter,  D.D.,  says,  "The 
relations  under  which  this  axiom  (i.e.,  the  necessary  rela- 
tion of  means  and  ends)  requires  that  objects  should  be 
connected,  is  higher  than  that  by  which  they  are  united 
under  the  category  of  efficient  or  blind  causative  force."  x 
The  Rev.  G.  F.  Wright  says,  "  The  doctrine  of  second 
causes  involves  difficulties  analogous  to  those  in  the  doc- 
trine of  final  causes ; "  2  and  in  another  place  he  speaks 
of  "secondary  or  efficient  causation,"  as  if  secondary 
and  efficient  were  equivalent  terms,  —  as  if  God  were 
not  the  Great  Efficient.  So  Porter's  expressions  imply 
that  efficient  causative  force  is  the  same  as  "  blind  " 
causative  force.  Nor  are  these  solitary  examples :  the 
works  of  recent  teleologists  are  full  of  such  expressions. 
This  may  possibly  be  explained  by  their  disposition  to 
magnify  their  office  as  teleologists,  and  to  disparage  effi- 
cient causes ;  but  it  is  much  more  likely  to  be  the  conse- 
quence of  a  bad  nomenclature.  When  you  call  the  end 
a  final  cause,  and  invoke  it  as  a  higher  and  diviner  expla- 
nation of  things  than  mere  mechanism,  you  are  pretty 
sure  to  glide  unconsciously  into  a  vague  and  shadowy 
mental  tendency  to  contrast  the  two  things  broadly,  and 
to  draw  in,  under  the  category  of  final,  all  mental  and 
divine  causation.  That  it  was  some  vague  tendency, 
rather  than  conscious  and  deliberate  choice,  which  led 
these  writers  to  use  such  expressions,  appears  from  the 
fact  that  they  would  be  among  the  foremost  to  admit 

1  Human  Intellect,  §  609,  p.  595.  Porter  resolves  the  final  into  the 
efficient  cause  in  these  terms  :  "  The  end.  .  .  .  may  he  conceived  of 
as  an  efficient  force  carried  hack  from  the  end  to  the  beginning  of  the 
series  of  causes  and  effects,  which  drives  them  to  their  issue  by  a  con- 
stant energy  "  (§  615). 

2  Studies  in  Science  and  Religion,  186. 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  403 

that  the  human  will  is  free,  and  therefore  is  a  veritable 
efficient  cause  ;  and  also  that  God,  as  the  First  Cause, 
is  an  efficient  cause. 

Since  I  have  alluded  to  the  opinions  and  language  of 
other  recent  writers,  in  order  to  illustrate  some  points 
of  Janet's  book,  I  will  conclude  this  digression  by  an 
example  from  a  famous  logician,  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill,  which 
exhibits  very  much  the  same  confusion  as  the  criminal 
case  of  M.  Janet :  — 

"  Sight,  being  a  fact  not  precedent  but  subsequent  to  the 
putting  together  of  the  organic  structure  of  the  eye,  can  only 
be  connected  with  the  production  of  that  structure  in  the 
character  of  a  final,  not  an  efficient  cause  ;  that  is,  it  is  not 
sight  itself,  but  an  antecedent  idea  of  it,  that  must  be  the 
efficient  cause.  But  this  at  once  marks  the  origin  as  pro- 
ceeding from  an  intelligent  will."  1 

Here  we  have  "  sight "  for  the  final  cause,  and  "  the 
antecedent  idea  of  it  "  for  the  efficient  cause  ;  but  what 
then  is  the  "  intelligent  will "  ?  Is  it  another  final 
cause,  or  another  efficient  cause,  or  no  cause  at  all? 
There  seems  to  be  an  awkward  plurality  of  causes  in 
all  these  cases,  wherever  either  the  end  or  the  ante- 
cedent idea  of  it  is  reckoned  as  a  cause.  Some  need  of 
Occam's  razor  {Entia  non  multiplicanda  sunt,  etc.)  to 
shear  away  the  superfluous  causes.  I  would  say  the 
intelligent  will  is  the  efficient  cause,  sight  is  the  end, 
and  the  antecedent  idea  of  it  is  the  motive  in  view  of 
which  the  will  acts. 

A  further  evidence  of  confusion  of  ideas  is,  that,  when 
M.  Janet  is  arguing  against  the  doctrine  that  finality 
may  be  laid  down  d  priori  as  a  necessary  condition  of 
thought,  he  maintains  a  very  broad  distinction  between 

1  Three  Essays  on  Religion,  171. 


404  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

it  and  causality ;  but  in  answering  Spinoza's  criticism  he 
approximates  them  so  closely  as  to  declare  that  "  it 
matters  little  whether  the  cause  thus  analyzed  into  it? 
elements  is  called  final  or  efficient." 

Again,  on  p.  419,  he  says,  "  The  word  '  end '  may  signi 
fy  two  things,  —  either  the  motive  of  the  creative  act,  01 
the  terminus  of  that  act."  But  in  the  note  on  p.  440,  "  ] 
know  not  whether  it  is  admissible  to  confound  the  final 
cause  with  the  motive."  Now,  the  end  and  the  final 
cause  are  one  and  the  same  thing  in  the  unanimous 
opinion  and  usage  of  all  teleologists,  not  excepting  Janet, 
as  appears  both  from  the  sentence  following  the  one  last 
quoted,  and  from  the  second  sentence  of  his  first  chapter. 
In  one  place,  therefore,  he  is  positive  that  the  end  is  a 
motive,  but  later  he  is  in  doubt  about  it.  It  would 
appear,  that  the  true  nature  of  the  end  constrained  him 
in  the  heat  of  discussion  to  say  that  it  is  a  motive  instead 
of  a  cause ;  but,  upon  reflection,  some  obscure  percep- 
tion that  this  was  inconsistent  with  the  scholastic  no- 
menclature dawned  upon  him,  and  he  expresses  a  doubt 
whether  the  end  may  be  called  a  motive.  Probably  the 
same  feeling  led  him  to  relegate  to  a  note  one  of  Lesage's 
best  definitions  :  "  The  final  cause  is  the  motive  that 
determines  an  intelligent  being  to  will  an  end." 

Upon  the  whole,  it  appears  that  Janet  has  been  too 
compliant  in  the  acceptance  of  a  teleological  nomencla- 
ture already  formed.  He  would  have  prospered  better  if 
he  had  relied  more  upon  his  own  penetration  and  power 
of  keen  discriminations,  of  which  he  gives  abundant  evi- 
dence in  most  of  his  work.  So  much  for  the  latest  sad 
example  of  the  consequences  of  propagating  a  piece  of 
scholastic  word-jnggling  in  modern  scholarship. 

A  sort  of  succedaneum  to  the  phrase  "  final  cause  " 
is  the  term  "  finality,"  which  Janet  habitually  employs 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  405 

instead  of  teleology.  But  he  makes  it  wider  than  the 
latter,  inasmuch  as  he  recognizes  a  "  finality  of  plan ,"  as 
well  as  of  adaptation  ;  and  this  is  the  only  recognition  he 
gives  to  eutaxiology.  He  resolves  the  whole  of  physico- 
theology  into  teleology  by  making  order  an  end  in  itself. 
This  confusion  of  two  distinct  arguments,  together  with 
his  loose  employment  of  the  word  "finality,"  makes  his 
Book  II.  peculiarly  disappointing.  One  feels,  that,  in- 
stead of  a  close  logical  relation  to  Book  I.,  we  have  here 
a  free  and  diffuse  dissertation  upon  the  general  question 
of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  in  which  the  writer 
seems  content  to  overthrow  certain  errors  of  the  German 
school,  without  much  direct  or  positive  argument  of  his 
own. 

But  the  greatest  blemish  of  this  book,  otherwise  so 
excellent,  is  to  be  found  in  the  logical  form  into  which 
Janet  has  cast  his  teleology  :  "  This  proof,  as  is  known, 
has  been  reduced  to  a  syllogism,  whose  major  is,  that  all 
order,  or,  strictly  speaking,  all  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends,  supposes  an  intelligence  ;  and  whose  minor  is,  that 
nature  presents  order,  and  an  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends"  (p.  290).  The  conclusion  would  be,  that  nature 
supposes  an  intelligence. 

Leaving  out  the  word  order,  because  that  belongs  to 
a  line  of  argument  wholly  distinct  (namely,  to  eutaxi- 
ology), and  because,  "  strictly  speaking,"  it  is  adaptation 
alone  that  Janet  relies  upon,  we  have  the  syllogism,  — 
Adaptation  of  means  to  ends  supposes  an  intelligence ; 
nature  presents  an  adaptation  of  means  to  ends :  there- 
fore nature  supposes  an  intelligence. 

I  have  shown  above  (Chap.  XVII.)  that  teleology  can- 
not be  employed  as  a  primary  and  direct  argument  for 
the  existence  of  intelligence  ;  and  this  attempt  of  Janet's 
forms  a  fine  commentary  upon  my  Critique  of  Teleology. 


406  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

Every  teleologist  who  makes  the  attempt  encounters 
this  dilemma  :  Either  his  major  premise  is  an  identical 
proposition,  or,  if  he  frames  it  so  as  to  avoid  that  diffi- 
culty, it  is  no  longer  true.  The  old  teleologists  were 
quite  oblivious  to  this  fallacy-trap  ;  and  so  we  might 
suppose  the  author  now  under  review  to  be,  if  we  re- 
garded his  syllogism  alone.  Its  major  premise  is  clearly 
an  identical  proposition.  But  he  states  this  syllogism  in 
a  casual,  indifferent  manner,  not  as  his  own  chosen  form 
of  the  argument ;  so  that  we  must  look  to  the  body  of 
his  work,  rather  than  to  this  syllogism,  for  the  real  logic 
of  his  argument.  We  then  perceive  that  he  has  strug- 
gled manfully  to  impart  a  valid  logical  form  to  teleology ; 
and,  if  he  has  failed,  it  is  only  because  failure  is  strictly 
unavoidable  whenever  intelligence  is  made  the  direct 
teleological  conclusion. 

Before  proceeding  to  examine  the  course  of  his  argu- 
ment in  detail,  let  us  look  once  more  at  this  syllogism. 
While  it  is  true  that  his  logic  of  teleology  is  not  to  be 
judged  by  it  alone,  still  his  statement  of  the  syllogism 
with  evident  approval  stands  as  a  fact  which  must  enter 
into  our  estimation  of  the  logical  validity  of  his  work. 
That  the  major  premise,  "Adaptation  of  means  to  ends 
supposes  an  intelligence,"  is  identical  in  its  subject  and 
predicate,  is  plain  enough  according  to  the  uniform 
sense  given  to  the  word  end  by  all  the  English  teleolo- 
gists, and  by  myself  throughout  this  work ;  namely, 
that  an  end  is  a  result  foreseen,  chosen  and  accomplished 
by  an  intelligent  agent.  Such  being  the  definition  of 
"end,"  it  is  mere  tautology  to  say  that  "the  adaptation 
of  means  to  ends  supposes  an  intelligence."  But  the 
usage  of  English  teleologists  must  not  be  appealed  to 
against  M.  Janet,  unless  he  himself  sanctions  and  adopts 
that  usage.      But   it   appears  that  he  does.      He  says 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  407 

(p.  440),  "  Lesage  defines  the  end  nearly  as  we  have 
ourselves  done  at  the  beginning  of  this  work,  — '  The 
effect  of  an  intelligent  cause,  considered  in  so  far  as  it 
has  known  and  willed  it,  is  called  the  end  of  that 
cause.' ,!  Intelligence  being  thus  included  in  the  end 
by  definition,  once  more  we  remark  that  it  is  pure 
tautology  and  a  bald  truism  to  say  that  "  the  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  ends  supposes  an  intelligence."  Even 
if  Janet  did  not  thus  define  and  use  the  word  "end," 
he  might  fairly  be  held  and  judged  by  the  uniform  usage 
of  teleologists,  unless  he  distinctly  renounced  it. 

But  is  there  any  such  uniform  usage?  Do  we  not 
hear  from  the  German  thinkers  a  great  deal  about  "  un- 
conscious finality,"  instead  of  a  foreseeing,  consciously 
intelligent  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  ?  Many  have, 
without  question,  maintained  that  nature  reaches  her 
ends  by  a  blind,  groping  tendency,  rather  than  intelli- 
gent choice.  It  cannot  be  maintained  that  the  usage 
has  been  uniform  in  respect  to  the  including  of  intelli- 
gence in  the  definition  of  the  end.  This  makes  it  clear, 
that  to  judge  Janet  simply  from  his  s}dlogistic  state- 
ment of  the  argument  would  be  unjust  and  superficial. 
We  are  thrown  back,  therefore,  upon  the  body  of  his 
work  for  a  detailed  examination  of  his  logical  processes. 

Our  author  is  not  quite  so  shallow  as  to  make  finality 
include  intelligence  by  definition,  and  thus  assume  at 
the  start  what  he  has  written  the  whole  of  Book  II.  to 
prove.  The  petitio  principii  would  be  too  gross  and 
palpable.  That  definition  may  be  regarded  as  merely 
the  statement  of  his  "  problem,"  indicating  what  is  to 
be  proved  instead  of  assuming  it.  Although  he  does 
describe  the  end  in  his  "Preliminary  Chapter"  as  a 
"foreseen  effect"  or  an  "idea,"  still  he  is  very  careful 
to  exclude  from  Book  I.  any  consideration  of  the  cause 


408  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

of  finality.  His  cautions  are  manifold  and  constant. 
He  is  laboring  simply  to  prove  the  existence  of  the 
principle  of  finality  without  any  reference  to  an  intel- 
ligent cause  of  it,  or  any  cause  of  it  whatever. 

As  an  evidence  of  his  logical  scrupulousness,  study 
the  following  qotations  :  — 

"  We  do  not  set  out  from  the  idea  of  an  end  to  conclude 
from  it  that  the  combinations  which  conduct  to  it  are  means  ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  those  combinations  only  appear  intelli- 
gible to  us  when  viewed  as  means,  and  this  is  why  the  effect 
becomes  an  end.  We  set  out,  in  short,  from  infixed  point, 
which  is  given  us  in  experience  as  an  effect ;  but,  this  effect 
only  being  possible  by  an  incalculable  mass  of  coincidences, 
it  is  this  agreement  between  so  many  coincidences  and  a  cer- 
tain effect  which  constitutes  precisely  the  proof  of  finality. 
...  It  is  evident  we  do  not  start  at  all  from  the  hypothe- 
sis that  sight  is  an  end  ;  for  that  is  what  we  wish  to  demon- 
strate. No  more  do  we  set  out  from  the  adaptation  of  the 
means  to  the  end  ;  for,  if  there  is  no  end,  there  is  no  adapta- 
tion, and  there  would  be  here  again  a  vicious  circle.  We  set 
out  from  an  effect  as  an  effect.  Then,  remarking  that  such 
an  effect  has  only  been  possible  if  millions  of  causes  have 
agreed  to  produce  it,  we  see  in  this  agreement  the  criterion 
which  transforms  the  effect  into  an  end,  and  the  cause  into 
means.  .  .  .  Now,  how  would  so  many  diverse  causes  hap- 
pen to  converge  to  the  self-same  point  if  there  were  not  some 
cause  which  directed  them  towards  that  point  ?  "  x 

Here  we  see  how  careful  he  is  not  to  take  any  thing 
for  granted  ;  and  we  see  also  what  is  his  criterion  of 
finality.  It  is  the  coincidence  of  causes  in  a  given  effect ; 
it  is  their  agreement  to  produce  this  effect ;  it  is  their 
mutual  convergence  to  the.  self-same  point.  Further 
light  is  thrown  upon  this  criterion  of  finality  in  the  prin- 

i  Pp.  40,  41,  and  42. 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  409 

ciple  of  teleological  concordance  quoted  at  the  beginning 
of  this  review  (p.  891).  In  all  this  we  see  that  he  is 
careful  to  exclude  intelligence  as  a  necessary  element 
of  his  definition  of  the  end,  or  of  his  criterion  of  finality. 

It  is  all-important  for  us  to  know  precisely  what  he 
means  by  "  finality,"  when  he  concludes,  as  the  result  of 
the  "  analogical  inductions  "  of  Book  I.,  that  finality  is  a 
law  of  nature.  In  order  to  attain  this  knowledge  of  his 
meaning  we  certainly  cannot  do  better  than  to  apply 
the  criterion  which  he  himself  furnishes.  Accordingly 
we  conclude  that  the  end  is  a  "determinate  phenomenon  " 
bound  together  with  several  antecedent  phenomena 
which  have  conspired  together  to  produce  it  by  a  mani- 
fest "coincidence,"  "agreement,"  and  "convergence." 

Now,  if  this  is  the  true  definition  of  "finality"  as  that 
word  is  used  in  Book  I.,  we  may  insert  it  into  the  major 
premise  of  the  syllogism  at  the  beginning  of  Book  II. 
Instead  of  saying,  "  The  adaptation  of  means  to  ends 
supposes  an  intelligence,"  —  a  form  of  statement  con- 
demned by  Janet  himself,1  although  he  uses  it  here, 
—  we  shall  say,  "  The  agreement  of  several  phenomena, 
bound  together  with  a  future  determinate  phenomenon," 
"  supposes  an  intelligence  ;  "  or  the  coincidence,  agree- 
ment, or  convergence  of  many  causes  to  one  definite 
and  the  self-same  point  supposes  an  intelligence.  But 
we  have  already  examined  this  species  of  teleological 
major  premise  in  the  beginning  of  our  Critique  of  Tele- 
ology. We  there  found,  that,  while  it  had  dodged  one 
horn  of  the  dilemma  since  it  was  no  longer  an  identical 
proposition,  it  was  firmly  transfixed  upon  the  other 
since  it  was  no  longer  true.  A  garbage-heap  breeding 
stench  presents  an  unexceptionable  example  of  coinci- 
dence, agreement,  and  convergence  of  phenomena  bound 
1  See  above  the  passage  quoted  from  p.  41  of  his  first  chapter. 


410  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

together  with  a  future  determinate  phenomenon.  Who 
knows  how  many  "  Biddies  "  and  "  Chinese  cheap  Johns  " 
have  been  concerned  in  this  accumulation  of  kitchen- 
offal  and  what  not  ?  Who  knows  what  peculations  of 
city  officials  have  absorbed  the  funds,  and  left  the  streets 
unswept?  Causes  enough  there  are  in  all  conscience: 
they  have  perfectly  "agreed"  too,  and  the  "effect" 
upon  the  nostrils  is  a  very  "  determinate  "  one.  Still, 
this  example  of  "  the  agreement  of  several  phenomena, 
bound  together  with  a  future  determinate  phenomenon," 
does  not  somehow  exactly  "suppose  an  intelligence," 
but  rather  the  want  of  it.  The  simple  truth  is,  that 
Janet  has  made  his  finality  so  broad  that  it  is  nothing 
but  causality.  It  includes  all  sorts  of  effects  without 
any  relation  to  intelligence  whatever.  With  such  a 
range  of  meaning  as  that  for  his  key-word,  it  ought  not 
to  have  taken  nearly  three  hundred  pages  for  him  to 
prove  that  "  finality  is  a  law  of  nature." 

It  seems,  indeed,  that  he  has  himself  discovered  this 
weak  point.  In  the  preface  to  his  second  edition  he 
inserts  some  notable  amendments  into  his  criterion  of 
finality:  "Now  what  is  the  distinctive  character  of 
these  facts  in  which  we  recognize  the  necessity  of  an  en- 
tirely new  order  of  things,  namely,  of  the  final  cause  ? 
That  character  is  adaptation  to  the  future."  So  far  he  is 
merely  reciting  his  old  criterion.  But  he  immediately, 
in  effect,  admits  that  this  criterion  applies  to  "all 
causality  without  exception,"  and  hence  will  not  answer 
at  all  as  the  criterion  of  finality. 

"That  is  the  difficulty:  here  is  the  solution.  Without 
doubt,  given  a  certain  number  of  causes  that  act  together, 
they  must  produce  a  certain  effect ;  and  it  is  no  way  aston- 
ishing that  they  be  appropriate  to  that  effect.  But  that 
effect,  so  far  as  it  is  only  a  result,  can  only  be  an  effect  what- 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  411 

soever,  having  no  relation  to  the  interest  of  the  being  that  is 
the  subject  of  it,  supposing  that  there  are  beings  that  have 
an  interest  in  such  phenomena,  rather  than  in  others  ;  but 
that  is  the  property  of  living  beings.  Suppose  now  that  such 
an  interest  exists,  it  is  then  evident  that  we  no  longer  have 
to  do  with  whatsoever  effects,  but  with  determined  effects, 
having  a  precise  relation  to  the  conservation  of  the  being. 
The  unlimited  field  of  undetermined  effects  is  restrained. 
An  infinitude  of  effects  are  found  to  be  set  aside  as  indiffer- 
ent or  contrary  to  the  conservation  of  the  being.  Those  only 
must  be  produced  that  are  in  harmony  with  life ;  but  these 
phenomena  are  still  in  the  future,  when  the  organization  is 
formed.  That  organization,  in  place  of  being  called  to  pro- 
duce whatsoever  effects,  is  circumscribed  in  its  work  by  the 
necessity  to  produce  such  a  given  effect,  and  not  another. 
This  is  what  we  call  adaptation  to  the  future.  [He  would 
have  us  believe  that  he  is  only  explaining  his  old  criterion  of 
finality,  whereas,  in  fact,  he  has  made  an  entirely  new  one.] 
For  that  there  must  be  an  arrangement  of  causes,  not  merely 
a  confused  and  any  rencounter,  but  a  precise  and  limited  ren- 
counter. It  is  this  precision,  limitation,  and  circumscription 
in  the  arrangement  of  causes  that  is  not  explained,  and  that 
consequently,  in  the  mechanist  hypothesis,  is  without  cause."  \ 

Well  did  Maupertuis  say  that  the  end  must  be  a 
rational  one !  Janet  is  forced  at  length  to  frame  his  cri- 
terion of  finality  in  such  terms  as  to  assume  intelligence 
after  all !  He  must  do  it :  otherwise  he  cannot  distin- 
guish finality  from  causality.  The  end  has  now  become 
a  determined  effect,  instead  of  a  "whatsoever"  (?)  effect. 
The  causes  are  arranged  with  'precision  I  The  organiza- 
tion is  so  circumscribed  as  "  to  produce  such  a  given 
effect,  and  not  another."  Only  that  effect  must  be  pro- 
duced which  is  in  harmony  with  life,  and  for  the  "  inter- 
est of  the   being  that   is  the  subject  of   it."      Truly, 

1  P.  xviii. 


412  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN- ARGUMENTS. 

nothing  but  intelligence  can  attend  to  all  these  points* 
and  secure  their  realization. 

Let  us  then  insert  this  new  criterion  of  finality  into 
the  teleological  major  premise.  The  precise,  limited, 
and  circumscribed  rencounter  of  causes  so  ARRANGED  as 
to  produce  a  determined  effect  for  the  interest  and 
CONSERVATION  of  some  living  being,  supposes  an  intelli- 
gence. Of  course  it  does.  No  one  would  be  likely  to 
deny  the  truth  of  the  proposition  in  this  form.  It  is  so 
true  that  it  is  a  truism,  an  identical  proposition  once 
more.  Intelligence  has  been  assumed  as  the  test  of 
what  an  end  is  ;  and  indeed  it  is  impossible  to  define  the 
end,  or  to  distinguish  it  from  a  simple  effect,  without 
assuming  intelligence  in  the  statement  of  the  criterion. 
In  short,  our  author  has  now  impaled  himself  upon  the 
first  horn  of  the  teleological  dilemma,  instead  of  the 
second. 

This  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  truth  of  the  military 
maxim,  that  it  is  dangerous  to  change  front  under  fire ; 
and  a  further  disadvantage  of  this  change  is,  that  much 
of  Book  I.  would  have  to  be  rewritten  to  make  it  con- 
form to  the  new  criterion  of  finality.  M.  Janet  would 
find  the  task  of  proving  that  finality  is  a  law  of  nature 
much  more  onerous  than  he  has,  if  it  is  understood  that 
this  finality  is  not  merely  an  "  adaptation  to  the  future," 
but  a  principle  or  force  which  arranges  causes  in  pre- 
cise, limited,  and  circumscribed  lines,  for  the  production 
of  determined  effects  in  harmony  with  the  organization, 
and  for  the  interest  and  conservation  of  living1  beings. 

Janet's  work,  including  his  last  preface,  serves  most 
admirably  to  illustrate  the  inherent  difficulties  of  the 
old  teleology,  which  has  the  existence  of  intelligence  for 
its  direct  conclusion.  He  has  labored  more  diligently 
to  overcome  these  difficulties,  and  with  a  keener  insig'it 


JANET  ON  FINAL  CAUSES.  413 

of  their  true  nature,  than  any  of  the  old  writers.  In 
the  first  place,  we  see  him  guarding  his  first  book  so 
sedulously  against  the  assumption  of  intelligence,  that 
he  runs  his  finality  into  mere  causality.  He  seems  to 
have  perceived  the  first  horn  of  the  teleological  dilemma  ; 
and,  in  steering  clear  of  that,  he  ran  plump  against  the 
second.  Such  a  finality  as  his  old  criterion  described 
did  not  "suppose  intelligence."  His  major  premise  was 
no  longer  true  ;  and  he  himself  plainly  felt  that  some- 
thing was  wrong :  so  he  proceeded  to  frame  his  new 
criterion  of  finality.  This  does  undoubtedly  distinguish 
it  from  causality.  Truth  is  restored  to  his  major  prem- 
ise. But,  in  thus  wriggling  away  from  the  second  horn 
of  the  teleological  dilemma,  he  falls  once  more  square 
upon  the  first.  He  has  assumed  an  intelligent  arrange 
ment  of  causes  as  a  criterion  of  the  end.  His  majoi 
premise  has  again  become  an  identical  proposition.  He 
has  only  two  terms,  instead  of  three,  out  of  which  to 
construct  his  syllogism  ;  and,  finally,  he  has  begged  the 
whole  question. 

What  a  pity  that  he  did  not  perceive  how  useless  all 
his  efforts  were,  and  must  be,  so  long  as  he,  in  common 
with  the  whole  company  of  design-advocates,  was  trying 
to  force  teleology  to  a  conclusion  which  it  will  not  bear  ! 
That  is  the  whole  cause  of  the  trouble.  His  last  cri- 
terion of  finality,  —  and  the  only  one  which  serves  to 
discriminate  between  it  and  causality, — in  which  he 
speaks  of  the  precise  arrangement  of  causes  to  produce 
determined  and  rational  effects,  clearly  shows  that  it  is 
impossible,  without  the  assumption  of  intelligence,  to 
determine  the  existence  of  ends :  hence  that  we  cannot 
in  any  case  infer  from  ends  the  existence  of  intelligence. 
That  inference  flows  from  order,  and. belongs  to  eutaxi- 
clogy.     Rut  in  the  legitimate  province  of  teleology  we 


414  CRITIQUE  OF  DESIGN-ARGUMENTS. 

may  infer,  from  the  existence  of  ends,  the  direction  of 
intelligence  ;  we  may  infer  that  it  has  been  concentrated 
in  a  purpose  to  be  accomplished;  we  may  infer  that  a 
divine  volition  has  gone  forth.  This  is  the  true  function 
of  teleology;  this  is  its  proper  conclusion;  this  is  to 
take  it  by  the  handle,  and  not  by  the  blade. 


INDEX. 


Age  of  reptiles,  261,  262,  299. 
Analogy  the  logical  method  of  the 

old  teleology,  64,  223,  226,  288. 
Anaxagoras,  48. 
Anthropological  argument  defined, 

7;  "by  whom   employed,   86,   97, 

197,  239,  272-274. 
Anthropomorphism,  152,  227,  325, 

342. 
Anti-Cartesian   group    of    teleolo- 

gists,  95,  96. 
Aquinas,  Thomas,  76,  77. 
Aristotle,  30,  37. 
Bahbage,  269. 

Bacon,  Francis  (Lord),  44,  91  seq. 
Balbus,  56,  58,  60  seq. 
Bayle,  113. 

Bell,  Sir  Charles,  72,  258. 
Benevolence  of  the  Deity,  171, 172, 

206,  295,  345,  387. 
Boyle,  95,  133-147,  175,  176,  291,  292. 
Bridgewater,  Francis  Henry,  Earl 

of,  243. 
Bridgewater  Treatises,  243-269. 
Brougham,  Henry  (Lord),  9,  270- 

274. 
Brown,  William  Laurence,  277,278. 
Bruno,  90. 
Buckland,  259,  260. 
Burnett,  John,  277. 
Burnett  Prize  Essays,  277-282. 
Butler,  Joseph,  Bishop  of  Durham, 

202. 
Causal  argument,  7,  8,  77,  197,  210 
seq.,  349  seq. 


Chalmers,  244  seq.,  286,  363-365. 

Chamberlayne,  187. 

Chance,  argument  of  the  ancients 
against,  60,  65;  not  a  real  agent, 
365,  366. 

Cicero,  59-69. 

Collocations,  Chalmers's  doctrine 
of,  245,  seq.,  286,  287,  363-365. 

Combination  of  theistic  arguments, 
279,  389. 

Cooke,  Josiah  P.,  292  seq.,  306, 
336. 

Cosmological  argument.  (See  Cau- 
sal argument.) 

Cosmology,  4-7,  202,  284. 

Cotta,  56,  59,  60. 

Coxe,  John  Redman,  69,  72. 

Crombie,  239-242. 

Cudworth,  39,  95,  108-123,  183. 

Carver,  251-253,  285,  327. 

Darwin,  308-330. 

Derham,  174-186,  205,  273,  278. 

Descartes,  92  seq.,  112, 134. 

Deluge,  260,  261. 

Design,  hitherto  synonymous  with 
teleology,  1,  143;  use  and  abuse 
of,  26-30,  373;  ambiguity  of,  26, 
304;  meaning  of,  in  eutaxiology 
and  teleolgy,  27;  fallacies  of ,  29, 
30. 

Design-arguments,  3,  7,  28. 

Dilemma,  teleological,  vi,  406. 
Dickie,  283. 

Epicurus,  57,  59,  117, 120  seq. 
Eternity  of  matter,  246,  364. 

415 


416 


INDEX. 


Eutaxiology  defined,  7;  analysis  of, 
16-25;  used  by  Anaxagoras,  48,  49, 
Cicero,  65,  Sebonde,  86,  More,  97, 
Ray,  157,  Newton,  163,  Derham, 
184,  Wollaston,  197  seq.,  Kant,  216 
seq.,  Stewart,  237,  Crombie,  241, 
Whewell,  248  seq.,  Tullocli,  280, 
McCosb,  283,  Powell,  288,  Cooke, 
292  seq.,  Le  Conte,  336,  Janet,  405; 
independent  of  causal  argument, 
213  seq.,  276,  349  seq.;  popular 
strength  of,  19,  20;  distinct  from 
teleology,  2,  20  seq.,  216  seq.,  249, 
281,  2S2;  critique  of,  347  seq. 

Evolution,  2,  111,  113,  231,  331  seq., 
384,  388. 

Fallacies,  petitio  principli,  30,  55, 
131,  139,  149,  241,242,  306,  369  seq., 
406,  407,  413  ;  circulus  inprobando, 
140,  144,  149,  164,  306,  408;  wrepov 

nporepov,  129. 

Fatalism,  30,  365,  396,  397. 

Finality,  391  seq. 

Final    cause,   30-45,   114   seq.,  232, 

281,  285,  394  seq. 
Fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  59, 

60,  120  seq.- 
Foster,  James,  D.D.,  202. 
Galen,  69-72. 
Ghost-argument,  104-108. 
Geology  and  Genesis,  259. 
Gibson,  344,  345 
Graham,  309. 

Gray,  Dr.  Asa,  314  seq.,  328, 344,  345. 
Grew,  Nehemiah,  M.D.,  5, 164-174. 
Haeckel,  327. 
Hallam,  87. 

Harvey,  16,  69,  145,  252. 
Henslow,  299 'seq.,  339,  386,  387. 
Hickok,  6. 
Hodge,  Charles,  D.D.,  29,  30,  309- 

325. 
Hume,  219-227,  352. 
Huxley,  326  seq.,  340  seq. 
Hylozoism,  5,  58,  66,  96,  109,  173. 
Induction,  91  seq.,  226-228,  241,  270 

seq.,  355,  383. 


Infiniteness    of   divine    attributes, 

380. 
Irons,  William  J.,  274-277. 
Janet,  390  ad  fin. 
Kant,  39,  48,  210-219,  305,  335,  352, 

364,  393. 
Kidd,  John,  M.D.,  247. 
Kirby,  Rev.  William,  260-262,  299. 
Kleiber,  78. 
Kolliker,  326. 
Laing,  309. 
Le  Clerc,  113. 
Le  Conte,  336,  338,  344. 
Lewes,  128-131. 
Lesage,  404,  407. 
Leibnitz,  206,  393. 
Lucretius,  117. 
Mantell,  261,  262,  299. 
Maupertuis,  Moreau  de,  6,  202-207. 
McCosh,  3  seq.,  29,  65,  283-287,  337, 

344,  352. 
Mill,  J.  S.,  403. 
Misplacement  of  the  facts  of  eutaxi 

ology,  22,  143,  265. 
Montaigne,  79,  87  seq. 
Modifications    needed    in    design 

arguments,  333  seq. 
More,  Henry,  D.D.,  95-108, 177,  302 

306. 
Natural  theology  defined,  8;   dis 

tinguished  from  natural  religion 

9;  first  used  by  Sebonde,  78,  note, 

strength    and    weakness    of,  73 

natural  theology  in  Middle  Ages. 

74  seq. ;  value  of,  202,  274,  295. 
Newton,  95,  102-164,  204,  305. 
Nieuwentyt,  187-195. 
Nomenclature    of    teleology,    303, 

304. 
Ontological  argument,  7,  77,  97,  21( 

seq.,  389. 
Owen,  Professor  Richard,  284,  285. 
Paley,  192,  229  seq.,  272. 
Paradox,  teleological,  52,  160,  171, 

374,  375. 
Physico-theology,  8. 
Physicus,  334,  335. 


INDEX. 


417 


Plagiarism,  63,  72,  73,  104,  161,  176- 

178,  192,  193,  230,  272. 
Plastic  nature,  Cudworth's  theory 

of,  96,  109  seq. 
Plato,  58,  96. 
Polytheism    of    the    ancients,    67, 

124. 
Porter,  Noah,  D.D.,  402. 
Powell,  Professor  Baden,  4,  29,  89, 

288-292,  337,  363. 
Prout,  William,  M.D.,  262-265. 
Rational  theology,  7,  75,  291. 
Pay,  95,  148-161,  177,  268. 
Recent  teleology,  390  seq. 
Reid,  227,  278,  352. 
Religion  and  science,  331  seq.,  361. 
Reimarus,  208,  209. 
Roget,    Peter    Mark,    M.  D.,    258, 

259. 
Saint-Hilaire,  Geoffroy,  251,  327. 
Schoolmen,  31,  74,  134. 
Scotus  Erigena,  75. 
Scriptural  theology,  74,  90. 
Sehonde,  78-89. 

Second  causes,  230,  234,  401,  402. 
Signatures  of  plants,  103,  159. 
Socrates,  49-55,  65,  66,  124. 
Spinoza,  125-132,  299. 
St.  Clair,  338. 
Stewart,  Dugald,  78,  87  seq.,  231- 

239,  352. 
Sumner,  Archbishop,  277,  278. 


Subjective  method  of  Descartes, 
92  seq. 

Theology,  analysis  of,  11;  popular 
strength  of,  9-15,  159,  360;  not  an 
indispensable  guide  to  research, 
15, 16, 35, 145, 146, 231  seq.,  251  seq.; 
proper  use  of,  54, 55, 65,  97, 138  seq., 
148,  149, 155,  177,  188,  234,  266,  276, 
306,  381-383,  414;  mechanical  tele- 
ology, 71,  223,  226,  229,  324,  338. 

Thompson,  Rev.  R.  A.,  278-280. 

Transcendental  theology,  7,  208. 

Trivial  examples  of  design,  137, 
160,  205,  206,  229,  302. 

Tulloch,  280-282. 

Utility  to  man  the  end  of  nature, 
62,  63,  102,  126,  131,  134,  135,  184, 
291,  298. 

Variations  not  intended,  314  seq. 

Velleius,  56  seq. 

Vital  principle,  5, 172-174. 

Volcanoes,  178, 179,  302. 

Voltaire,  204,  276. 

Vortices,  Descartes'  theory  of,  93, 
112. 

Watch-illustration,  189  seq.,  230, 
338,  372. 

Whewell,  32  seq.,  248-258,  281,  394. 

Wolff,  5. 

Wollaston,  195-202. 

Wright,  Rev.  G.  F.,  402. 

Zeno,  49. 


The 


Conflict  of  Christianity 

WITH    HEATHENISM. 

By  DR.    GERHARD     UHLHORN. 

TEA  NSLA  TED     B  Y 

PROF.  EGBERT    C.  SMYTH    and    REV.  C.  J.  H.  ROPES. 


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Men  and  Books ; 

OR,    STUDIES    IN    HOMILETICS 

Lectures  Introductory  to  the  "  Theory  of  Preaching." 
By  Professor  AUSTIN  PHELPS,  D.D. 


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